

# Formalization: Distance Hijacking Attacks on Distance Bounding Protocols

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## Contents

<b>1 Some general lemmas needed in the formalization</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2 Agents, Key distributions, and Transceivers</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>3 Message Theory Locale</b>	<b>7</b>
3.1 The Notion of Subterms . . . . .	7
3.1.1 Idempotence and Transitivity . . . . .	7
3.1.2 Unions . . . . .	8
3.2 Required Constructors for Message Theories . . . . .	10
3.3 Message Derivation: Constructors, parts, subterms, and DM .	10
<b>4 Theory of Events for Security Protocols</b>	<b>12</b>
4.1 Function <i>knows</i> . . . . .	13
4.2 Function <i>used</i> . . . . .	14
<b>5 Lexicographic order on lists</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>6 (Finite) multisets</b>	<b>21</b>
6.1 The type of multisets . . . . .	21
6.2 Representing multisets . . . . .	23
6.3 Basic operations . . . . .	23
6.3.1 Union . . . . .	23
6.3.2 Difference . . . . .	24
6.3.3 Equality of multisets . . . . .	25
6.3.4 Pointwise ordering induced by count . . . . .	26
6.3.5 Intersection . . . . .	29
6.3.6 Filter (with comprehension syntax) . . . . .	29
6.3.7 Set of elements . . . . .	30
6.3.8 Size . . . . .	31
6.4 Induction and case splits . . . . .	32

6.4.1	Strong induction and subset induction for multisets . . . . .	34
6.5	Alternative representations . . . . .	36
6.5.1	Lists . . . . .	36
6.5.2	Association lists – including rudimentary code generation . . . . .	42
6.6	The multiset order . . . . .	44
6.6.1	Well-foundedness . . . . .	44
6.6.2	Closure-free presentation . . . . .	47
6.6.3	Partial-order properties . . . . .	48
6.6.4	Monotonicity of multiset union . . . . .	49
6.7	The fold combinator . . . . .	50
6.8	Image . . . . .	53
6.9	Termination proofs with multiset orders . . . . .	54
6.10	Legacy theorem bindings . . . . .	58
<b>7</b>	<b>Tree with Nat labeled nodes and</b>	<b>60</b>
7.1	Linear Order on trees . . . . .	60
<b>8</b>	<b>Message Theory for XOR</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Message Algebra with XOR</b>	<b>62</b>
9.1	Linear Order on Messages via NatTree . . . . .	62
9.2	Normalization Function and its Properties . . . . .	65
9.3	Equivalence Relation $=_E$ on Messages . . . . .	86
9.4	Simplification Rules for normxor . . . . .	87
9.5	Reduced Message represent Equivalence Classes . . . . .	90
9.6	parts, subterms, and quotient type . . . . .	123
9.6.1	rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages . . . . .	126
9.6.2	fsubterms . . . . .	127
9.6.3	rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages . . . . .	128
9.6.4	parts . . . . .	130
9.6.5	simplification rules for parts . . . . .	132
9.6.6	subterms . . . . .	135
9.6.7	simplification rules for subterms . . . . .	136
9.6.8	results about parts and subterms . . . . .	140
9.6.9	fparts/subterm and norm interaction . . . . .	154
9.7	message derivation . . . . .	156
9.7.1	Freeness of all constructors besides Xor . . . . .	157
9.7.2	interaction of DM with subterms/parts . . . . .	161
<b>10</b>	<b>The Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality</b>	<b>199</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>Abstract</b>	<b>199</b>

<b>12 Formal Proof</b>	<b>199</b>
12.1 Vector, Dot and Norm definitions . . . . .	199
12.1.1 Vector . . . . .	199
12.1.2 Dot and Norm . . . . .	200
<b>13 Physical Distance and Communication Distance</b>	<b>204</b>
<b>14 Primes</b>	<b>210</b>
14.1 Set up Transfer . . . . .	211
14.2 Primes . . . . .	211
14.2.1 Make prime naively executable . . . . .	214
14.3 Infinitely many primes . . . . .	217
<b>15 Permutations</b>	<b>217</b>
15.1 Some examples of rule induction on permutations . . . . .	218
15.2 Ways of making new permutations . . . . .	218
15.3 Further results . . . . .	219
15.4 Removing elements . . . . .	219
<b>16 Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic (unique factorization into primes)</b>	<b>222</b>
16.1 Definitions . . . . .	222
16.2 Arithmetic . . . . .	223
16.3 Prime list and product . . . . .	223
16.4 Sorting . . . . .	225
16.5 Permutation . . . . .	225
16.6 Existence . . . . .	226
16.7 Uniqueness . . . . .	227
<b>17 Initial knowledge of Agents (Key distributions)</b>	<b>235</b>
17.1 Asymmetric Keys . . . . .	235
17.1.1 Inverse of keys . . . . .	237
17.2 Locales for Public Key Distribution, Shared Symmetric Keys, and Nonces . . . . .	237
<b>18 Derivation of Messages</b>	<b>241</b>
18.1 Derivation of Nonces . . . . .	241
18.2 Derivation of Signatures . . . . .	242
<b>19 Inductively defined Systems parameterized by Protocols</b>	<b>243</b>
19.1 Protocol independent Facts . . . . .	243
19.1.1 Simplification rules for the used Set and beforeEvent .	245
19.2 Protocols and the parameterized System Definition . . . . .	246

<b>20 Protocol-independent Invariants of the System</b>	<b>248</b>
20.1 Some Simple Lemmas . . . . .	248
20.2 Signature Creation and Key Knowledge by Dishonest Users .	257
<b>21 Systems with constant local-clock Offsets</b>	<b>295</b>
<b>22 Security Analysis of a fixed version of the Brands-Chaum protocol that uses implicit binding to prevent Distance Hijacking attacks. We prove that the resulting protocol is secure in our model Note that we abstract away from the individual bits exchanged in the rapid bit exchange phase, by performing the message exchange in 2 steps instead <math>2^*k</math> steps.</b>	<b>298</b>
22.1 Direct Definition for Brands-Chaum Variant . . . . .	303
22.2 Equality for direct and parameterized Definition . . . . .	305
22.3 Some invariants capturing the Behavior of honest Agents .	307
22.4 Security proof for Honest Provers . . . . .	333
22.5 Security for dishonest Provers . . . . .	339
<b>23 Security Analysis of a fixed version of the Brands-Chaum protocol that uses explicit binding with a hash function to prevent Distance Hijacking Attacks. We prove that the resulting protocol is secure in our model Note that we abstract away from the individual bits exchanged in the rapid bit exchange phase, by performing the message exchange in 2 steps instead <math>2^*k</math> steps.</b>	<b>349</b>
23.1 Direct Definition . . . . .	353
23.2 Equality for direct and parameterized Definition . . . . .	354
23.3 Some invariants capturing the Behavior of honest Agents .	356
23.4 Security proof for Honest Provers . . . . .	371
23.5 Security for dishonest Provers . . . . .	377
<b>24 Security analysis of the signature based Brands-Chaum protocol which results in a proof that there is a trace that violates distance-bounding security.</b>	<b>379</b>
24.1 Direct Definition for Brands-Chaum protocol . . . . .	383
24.2 Equality for direct and parameterized Definition . . . . .	385
<b>25 Security analysis of the "fixed" version of the signature based Brands-Chaum protocol based on explicit binding with XOR. The analysis results in a proof that there is a trace that violates distance-bounding security.</b>	<b>392</b>
25.1 Direct Definition for Brands-Chaum protocols (Explicit + Xor)	397
25.2 Equality for direct and parameterized Definition . . . . .	398

## 1 Some general lemmas needed in the formalization

```
theory Misc imports Main Real begin

lemma Un-snd [simp]: fst‘(UN x. H x) = (UN x. fst‘(H x))
by (auto)

lemma app-union [simp]: f‘(X ∪ Y) = (f‘X ∪ f‘Y)
by (auto)

lemma app-bUnion [simp]:
  f‘(UN x∈H. G x) = (UN x∈H. f‘(G x))
by auto
```

```
lemma [simp] : A ∪ (B ∪ A) = B ∪ A
by blast
```

By default only *o-apply* is built-in. But in the presence of eta-expansion this means that some terms displayed as  $f \circ g$  will be rewritten, and others will not!

```
declare o-def [simp]

lemma fst-set[simp]: fst‘{ev. ev = (a,b,c) ∧ P} = {m. m = a ∧ P}
by auto

lemma subsetD2: [| c ∈ A; A ⊆ B |] ==> c ∈ B
by auto

lemma set-un-eq: [| A = B; C = D |] ==> A ∪ C = B ∪ D
by auto
```

## 2 Agents, Key distributions, and Transceivers

```
types
key = nat
time = real

consts
invKey      :: key=>key — inverse of a symmetric key

specification (invKey)
invKey [simp]: invKey (invKey K) = K
by (rule exI [of - id], auto)

datatype — We allow any number of honest agents and intruders
```

```

agent = Honest nat | Intruder nat

instantiation agent :: linorder
begin

fun
  less-agent :: agent ⇒ agent ⇒ bool
  where
    (Honest a) < (Honest b) = (a < b) |
    (Honest a) < (Intruder b) = True |
    (Intruder b) < (Honest a) = False |
    (Intruder a) < (Intruder b) = (a < b)

definition
  less-eq-agent: (a::agent) ≤ b = ((a = b) ∨ (a < b))

instance proof
  fix x y :: agent show (x < y) = (x ≤ y ∧ ¬ y ≤ x)
    apply (auto simp add: less-eq-agent)
    apply (case-tac x, auto)
    apply (case-tac x)
    apply (case-tac y, auto)+
    done
  next
    fix x :: agent show x ≤ x by (auto simp add: less-eq-agent)
  next
    fix x y z :: agent show [x ≤ y; y ≤ z] ==> x ≤ z
      apply (auto simp add: less-eq-agent)
      apply (case-tac x)
      apply (case-tac y)
      apply (case-tac z)
      apply auto
      apply (case-tac z)
      apply auto
      apply (case-tac y, auto)
      apply (case-tac z, auto)
      done
  next
    fix x y :: agent show [x ≤ y; y ≤ x] ==> x = y
      apply (auto simp add: less-eq-agent)
      apply (case-tac x)
      apply (case-tac y, auto)
      apply (case-tac y, auto)
      done
  next
    fix x y :: agent show x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x
      apply (auto simp add: less-eq-agent)
      apply (case-tac x, case-tac y, auto, case-tac y, auto)
      done

```

```

qed

end

datatype
  transmitter = Tx agent nat

datatype
  receiver = Rx agent nat

lemmas [split] = transmitter.split receiver.split
               transmitter.split-asm receiver.split-asm
end

```

### 3 Message Theory Locale

```
theory MessageTheory imports Misc begin
```

#### 3.1 The Notion of Subterms

```

locale MESSAGE-THEORY-SUBTERM-NOTION =
  fixes f :: 'msg set ⇒ 'msg set
  assumes inj[intro]:  $X \in H \implies X \in f H$ 
  and singleton:  $X \in f H \implies \exists Y \in H. X \in f \{Y\}$ 
  and mono:  $G \subseteq H \implies f G \subseteq f H$ 
  and idem [simp]:  $f (f H) = f H$ 
begin

```

##### 3.1.1 Idempotence and Transitivity

```
lemma empty [simp]:  $f \{\} = \{\}$ 
by (auto dest: singleton)
```

```
lemma emptyE [elim!]:  $X \in f \{\} \implies P$ 
by simp
```

```
lemma increasing:  $H \subseteq f H$ 
by auto
```

```
lemma subset-iff [simp]:  $(f G \subseteq f H) = (G \subseteq f H)$ 
apply (rule iffI)
apply (iprover intro: subset-trans increasing)
apply (frule mono, simp)
done
```

```
lemma trans: [|  $X \in f G$ ;  $G \subseteq f H$  |]  $\implies X \in f H$ 
apply (drule mono)
```

```

apply (subgoal-tac  $f G \subseteq f H$ )
apply (erule rev-subsetD)
by auto

```

### 3.1.2 Unions

```

lemma Un-subset1:  $f(G) \cup f(H) \subseteq f(G \cup H)$ 
by auto

```

```

lemma Un-subset2:  $f(G \cup H) \subseteq f(G) \cup f(H)$ 
apply auto
apply (drule singleton)
apply auto
apply (erule trans)
apply force
apply (erule contrapos-np)
apply (erule trans)
apply force
done

```

```

lemma Un [simp]:  $f(G \cup H) = f(G) \cup f(H)$ 
by (intro equalityI Un-subset1 Un-subset2)

```

```

lemma insert:  $f(\text{insert } X H) = f\{X\} \cup fH$ 
apply (subst insert-is-Un [of - H])
apply (simp only: Un)
done

```

```

lemma insert2:

$$f(\text{insert } X (\text{insert } Y H)) = f\{X\} \cup f\{Y\} \cup fH$$

apply (simp add: Un-assoc)
apply (simp add: insert [symmetric])
done

```

```

lemma UN-subset1:  $(\bigcup_{x \in A} f(H x)) \subseteq f(\bigcup_{x \in A} H x)$ 
by (intro UN-least mono UN-upper)

```

```

lemma UN-subset2:  $f(\bigcup_{x \in A} H x) \subseteq (\bigcup_{x \in A} f(H x))$ 
apply auto
apply (drule singleton)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=a in bexI) prefer 2
apply force
apply (erule trans)
apply force
done

```

```

lemma UN [simp]:  $f(\bigcup_{x \in A} H x) = (\bigcup_{x \in A} f(H x))$ 
by (intro equalityI UN-subset1 UN-subset2)

```

This allows *blast* to simplify occurrences of *parts* ( $G \cup H$ ) in the assumption.

```
lemmas in-parts-UnE = Un [THEN equalityD1, THEN subsetD, THEN UnE]
declare in-parts-UnE [elim!]
```

```
lemma insert-subset: insert X (f H) ⊆ f(insert X H)
by auto
```

Cut

```
lemma cut:
  [| Y ∈ f(insert X G); X ∈ f H |] ==> Y ∈ f(G ∪ H)
apply (erule trans)
by auto
```

```
lemmas insertI = subset-insertI [THEN mono, THEN subsetD]
```

```
lemma cut-eq [simp]: X ∈ f H ==> f(insert X H) = f H
by (force dest!: cut intro: insertI)
```

```
lemmas insert-eq-I = equalityI [OF subsetI insert-subset]
```

```
lemma bUnion [simp]:
  f(∪x∈H. G x) = (∪x∈H. f(G x))
by auto
```

```
lemma set: X ∈ f {m. m = a ∧ P} ==> X ∈ f {m. m = a}
apply auto
apply (erule trans)
apply auto
done
```

```
lemma elem-trans:
  assumes a: X ∈ f {Y} and b: Y ∈ f H
  shows X ∈ f H using a b
proof –
  from a have c: {X} ⊆ f {Y} by auto
  with b have {Y} ⊆ f H by auto
  with c show ?thesis apply – apply (rule trans) by auto
qed
```

```
lemma fst-set: X ∈ f (fst ` {ev. ev = (a,b) ∧ C}) ==> X ∈ f {a}
apply (erule rev-subsetD)
apply auto
done
```

```
lemma mono-elem: [| x ∈ f H; H ⊆ G |] ==> x ∈ f G
apply (drule mono)
by (erule rev-subsetD)
```

end

### 3.2 Required Constructors for Message Theories

```
locale MESSAGE-THEORY-DATA =
  fixes Key :: key ⇒ 'msg
  and Crypt :: key ⇒ 'msg ⇒ 'msg
  and Nonce :: agent ⇒ nat ⇒ 'msg
  and MPair :: 'msg ⇒ 'msg ⇒ 'msg
  and Hash :: 'msg ⇒ 'msg
  and Number :: int ⇒ 'msg
begin

definition
  MACM :: '['msg,'msg] => 'msg           (((Hash[-] /-) [0, 1000]))
  — Message Y paired with a MAC computed with the help of X
where
  Hash[X] Y == MPair (Hash (MPair X Y)) Y

end
```

### 3.3 Message Derivation: Constructors, parts, subterms, and DM

```
locale MESSAGE-THEORY-PARTS = MESSAGE-THEORY-DATA Key +
  parts: MESSAGE-THEORY-SUBTERM-NOTION parts
  for Key :: key ⇒ 'msg and parts :: 'msg set ⇒ 'msg set

locale MESSAGE-THEORY-SUBTERM = MESSAGE-THEORY-PARTS -----
  - Key +
  subterms: MESSAGE-THEORY-SUBTERM-NOTION subterms
  for Key :: key ⇒ 'msg and subterms :: 'msg set ⇒ 'msg set +
  assumes parts-subset-subterms: !!H. parts H ⊆ subterms H
begin

lemmas parts-in-subterms = parts-subset-subterms[THEN subsetD]

end

locale MESSAGE-THEORY-DM = MESSAGE-THEORY-SUBTERM -----
  Key for Key :: key ⇒ 'msg +
  fixes DM :: agent ⇒ 'msg set ⇒ 'msg set
  fixes LowHam :: 'msg set
  fixes distort :: 'msg ⇒ 'msg ⇒ 'msg
  fixes components :: 'msg set ⇒ 'msg set

locale MESSAGE-DERIVATION = MESSAGE-THEORY-DM -----
  for Key :: nat ⇒ 'msg +
  assumes nonce-subterms-DM-nonce:
```

$\text{!! } A.$   
 $\text{Nonce } B \text{ } NB \in \text{subterms } (\text{DM } A \text{ } H) \implies$   
 $A \neq B$   
 $\implies \text{Nonce } B \text{ } NB \in \text{subterms } H$   
**assumes** *nonce-parts-DM-nonce*:  
 $\text{!! } A.$   
 $\text{Nonce } B \text{ } NB \in \text{parts } (\text{DM } A \text{ } H) \implies$   
 $A \neq B$   
 $\implies \text{Nonce } B \text{ } NB \in \text{parts } H$   
**and** *key-parts-DM-key*:  
 $\text{!! } A.$   
 $\text{Key } k \in \text{parts } (\text{DM } A \text{ } H)$   
 $\implies \text{Key } k \in \text{parts } H$   
**and** *sig-subterms-DM-sig-or-key*:  
 $\text{!! } H \text{ } A.$   
 $\text{Crypt } k \text{ } msig \in \text{subterms } (\text{DM } A \text{ } H)$   
 $\implies \text{Crypt } k \text{ } msig \in \text{subterms } H$   
 $\vee \text{Key } k \in \text{parts } H$   
**and** *mac-subterms-DM-mac-or-key*:  
 $\text{Hash } (\text{MPair } (\text{Key } k) \text{ } m) \in \text{subterms } (\text{DM } A \text{ } H)$   
 $\implies \text{Hash } (\text{MPair } (\text{Key } k) \text{ } m) \in \text{subterms } H$   
 $\vee \text{Key } k \in \text{parts } H$   
**and** *distort-LowHam*:  
 $\text{distort } X \text{ } Y \in \text{LowHam} \implies \exists \text{ } d \in \text{LowHam}. \text{ } X = \text{distort } Y \text{ } d$   
**and** *distort-comm*:  
 $\text{distort } X \text{ } Y = \text{distort } Y \text{ } X$   
**and** *key-parts-distortion*:  
 $\llbracket d \in \text{LowHam}; \text{Key } k \in \text{parts } \{\text{distort } m \text{ } d\} \rrbracket$   
 $\implies \text{Key } k \in \text{parts } \{m\}$   
**and** *key-not-LowHam*:  
 $\llbracket d \in \text{LowHam}; \text{Key } k \in \text{subterms } \{\text{distort } m \text{ } d\} \rrbracket$   
 $\implies \text{Key } k \in \text{subterms } \{m\}$   
**and** *nonce-not-LowHam*:  
 $\llbracket d \in \text{LowHam}; \text{Nonce } A \text{ } N \in \text{subterms } \{\text{distort } m \text{ } d\} \rrbracket$   
 $\implies \text{Nonce } A \text{ } N \in \text{subterms } \{m\}$   
**and** *crypt-not-LowHam*:  
 $\llbracket d \in \text{LowHam}; \text{Crypt } E \text{ } F \in \text{subterms } \{\text{distort } m \text{ } d\} \rrbracket$   
 $\implies \text{Crypt } E \text{ } F \in \text{subterms } \{m\}$   
**and** *hash-not-LowHam*:  
 $\llbracket d \in \text{LowHam}; \text{Hash } c \in \text{subterms } \{\text{distort } m \text{ } d\} \rrbracket$   
 $\implies \text{Hash } c \in \text{subterms } \{m\}$

```

and      components-subset-parts:
 $x \in \text{components } S \implies x \in \text{parts } S$ 

and      key-components-parts:
 $\text{Key } k \in \text{parts } S \implies \exists m \in \text{components } S. \text{Key } k \in \text{parts } \{m\}$ 

and      nonce-components-subterm:
 $\text{Nonce } A N \in \text{subterms } S \implies \exists m \in \text{components } S. \text{Nonce } A N \in \text{subterms } \{m\}$ 

and      hash-components-subterm:
 $\text{Hash } c \in \text{subterms } S \implies \exists m \in \text{components } S. \text{Hash } c \in \text{subterms } \{m\}$ 

and      crypt-components-subterm:
 $\text{Crypt } k m \in \text{subterms } S \implies \exists M \in \text{components } S. \text{Crypt } k m \in \text{subterms } \{M\}$ 

```

**end**

## 4 Theory of Events for Security Protocols

**theory** Event imports MessageTheory begin

**datatype**  
 $'msg\ event = Send\ transmitter\ 'msg\ 'msg\ list$   
 $| Recv\ receiver\ 'msg$   
 $| Claim\ agent\ 'msg$

**types**  
 $'msg\ trace = (time * 'msg\ event)\ list$

list.induct with time \* event as elements

**lemma** trace-induct:  
 $\llbracket P [] ; \bigwedge t ev xs. P xs \implies P ((t, ev) \# xs) \rrbracket \implies P xs$   
**by** (rule list.induct, auto)

**locale** INITSTATE = MESSAGE-DERIVATION - - - - - Key for Key  
 $:: nat \Rightarrow 'msg +$

**fixes** initState :: agent  $\Rightarrow 'msg\ set$

**context** MESSAGE-DERIVATION begin

**fun**  
 $knows :: [agent, 'd\ trace] \Rightarrow 'd\ set$   
**where**

```

knows-Nil:
knows A [] = {}
| knows-Cons:
knows A (x#xs) =
(case x of
  (t,Recv (Rx A' i) m) =>
    if A=A' then insert m (knows A xs) else knows A xs
  _ => knows A xs)

```

#### 4.1 Function *knows*

```

lemmas parts-insert-knows-A = parts.insert [of - knows A evs]
lemmas subterms-insert-knows-A = subterms.insert [of - knows A evs]

```

```

lemma knows-A-Send [simp]:
knows A ((t,Send (Tx A i) X L) # evs) = (knows A evs)
by simp

```

```

lemma knows-A-Recv [simp]:
knows A ((t,Recv (Rx A i) X) # evs) = insert X (knows A evs)
by simp

```

```

lemma knows-Recv-Other [simp]:
A ≠ A' ==> knows A ((t,Recv (Rx A' i) X) # evs) = knows A evs
by simp

```

```

lemma knows-subset-knows-Send:
knows A evs ⊆ knows A ((t,Send B X L) # evs)
by (simp add: subset-insertI)

```

```

lemma knows-subset-knows-Claim:
knows A evs ⊆ knows A ((t,Claim B X) # evs)
by force

```

```

lemma knows-subset-knows-Recv:
knows A evs ⊆ knows A ((t, Recv B X) # evs)
by (simp add: subset-insertI)

```

Everybody sees what is sent over the network

```

lemma Recv-imp-knows-A:
assumes A: (t,Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set evs shows X ∈ knows A evs using A
apply (induct evs)
apply (simp-all (no-asm-simp) split add: event.split)
apply (auto split: event.split)
done

```

end

What the Agent knows is either initially known or included in a received message

```

definition (in INITSTATE)
  knowsI :: [agent,'msg trace] ⇒ 'msg set where
    knowsI A tr = (knows A tr ∪ initState A)

lemma (in INITSTATE) knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState:
  assumes knowsx: X ∈ knowsI A evs
  shows (∃ t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set evs) ∨ X ∈ initState A using knowsx
  proof (induct rule: trace-induct)
    case 1
    thus ?case by (auto simp add: knowsI-def)
  next
    case (? t ev xs)
    note prem = ‹X ∈ knowsI A ((t,ev) # xs)› and
      IH = ‹X ∈ knowsI A xs
        ⟹ (exists t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set xs) ∨ X ∈ initState A›
    thus ?case
      proof cases
        assume X ∈ knowsI A xs
        with IH show ?thesis by (auto simp add: knowsI-def)
      next
        assume xn: X ∉ knowsI A xs
        show ?case
          proof (cases ev)
            case (Send TA' X' L)
            with xn have X ∉ knowsI A ((t,ev) # xs) by (auto simp add: knowsI-def)
            thus ?thesis using prem by contradiction
          next
            case Claim
            with prem have X ∈ knowsI A xs by (auto simp add: knowsI-def)
            with xn show ?thesis by contradiction
          next
            case (Recv RA' X')
            with prem and xn have xeq: X = X'
            by (auto split: split-if-asm simp add: knowsI-def)
            with prems xn have ∃ i. RA' = Rx A i
            by (auto split: split-if-asm simp add: knowsI-def)
            with prems xeq show ?thesis by auto
            qed
          qed
        qed
      qed

```

## 4.2 Function used

```
context MESSAGE-DERIVATION begin
```

```

fun
  used :: 'msg trace ⇒ 'msg set
  where
    used-Nil:
```

```

used []      = {}
| used-Cons:
  used ((-,ev) # evs) =
    (case ev of
      Send T X L => subterms {X} ∪ used evs
      | Recv T X => used evs
      | Claim A X => used evs)
    — The case for Recv seems anomalous, but Recv always follows Send in real
    protocols.

lemma Send-imp-used: (t, Send A X L) ∈ set evs ⇒ X ∈ used evs
  apply (induct evs)
  apply (auto split: event.split)
done

lemma used-Send [simp]: used ((t,Send A X L) # evs) = subterms{X} ∪ used
  evs
by simp

lemma used-Claim [simp]: used ((t,Claim A X) # evs) = used evs
by simp

lemma used-Recv [simp]: used ((t,Recv A X) # evs) = used evs
by simp

lemma used-nil-subset: used [] ⊆ used evs
by simp

lemma Send-imp-parts-used:
  assumes a: (t, Send A X L) ∈ set evs and b: Y ∈ subterms {X}
  shows Y ∈ used evs using a b
  proof (induct evs rule: trace-induct)
    case 1 thus ?case by (auto split: event.split)
  next
    case (?ts x xs)
    thus ?case by (auto split: event.split)
  qed

lemma used-Receive-nothing [simp]:
  used ((t, Recv B m) # tr) = used tr
by (auto simp add: used.simps split: event.split)

lemma subterms-set-used:
  assumes (t, Send RA X L) ∈ set tr and Y ∈ subterms {X}
  shows Y ∈ used tr using prems
  proof (induct rule: trace-induct)
    case 1
    hence False by auto
    thus ?case by auto
  qed

```

```

next
  case (? t' ev tr)
    show ?case
    proof cases
      assume (t, Send RA X L) ∈ set tr
      thus ?thesis using prems by (auto split: event.split)
next
  assume (t, Send RA X L) ∉ set tr
  with prems have (t, Send RA X L) = (t',ev) by auto
  thus ?thesis using ⟨Y ∈ subterms {X}⟩ by auto
  qed
qed

end

context INITSTATE begin

definition
  usedI :: 'msg trace ⇒ 'msg set where
  usedI tr = used tr ∪ (UN B. subterms (initState B))

lemma initState-into-used: X ∈ subterms (initState B) ==> X ∈ usedI evs
  apply (auto simp add: usedI-def)
done

lemma usedI-Send [simp]:
  usedI ((t,Send A X L) # evs) = subterms{X} ∪ usedI evs
  apply (simp add: usedI-def used.simps)
  by auto

lemma usedI-Claim [simp]: usedI ((t,Claim A X) # evs) = usedI evs
  by (simp add: usedI-def used.simps)

lemma usedI-Recv [simp]: usedI ((t,Recv A X) # evs) = usedI evs
  by (simp add: usedI-def used.simps)

lemma usedI-nil-subset: usedI [] ⊆ usedI evs
  apply (simp add: usedI-def)
done

lemma knowsI-subset-knowsI-Cons: knowsI A evs ⊆ knowsI A (e # evs)
  by (induct e, auto simp: knowsI-def knowsI.simps split: event.split)

lemma initState-subset-knowsI: initState A ⊆ knowsI A evs
  apply (auto simp add: knowsI-def)
done

end

```

```
lemma (in MESSAGE-DERIVATION) knows-subset-knows-Cons:
```

```
  knows A evs ⊆ knows A (e # evs)
```

```
by (induct e, auto simp: knows.simps split: event.split)
```

```
lemma (in MESSAGE-DERIVATION) Send-imp-used-parts:
```

```
  (Y ∈ subterms {X} ∧ (t, Send A X L) ∈ set evs)
```

```
  ⇒ Y ∈ used evs
```

```
apply (induct evs)
```

```
apply (auto split: event.split)
```

```
done
```

```
lemma (in MESSAGE-DERIVATION) Used-imp-send-parts:
```

```
  Y ∈ used evs ⇒ (∃ X t A L. Y ∈ subterms {X} ∧ (t, Send A X L) ∈ set evs)
```

```
apply (induct evs)
```

```
apply (auto split: event.split)
```

```
apply (case-tac b)
```

```
apply auto
```

```
done
```

```
lemma (in MESSAGE-DERIVATION) used-order-irrev:
```

```
assumes a: set X = set Y
```

```
shows used X = used Y using a
```

```
apply auto
```

```
apply (drule Used-imp-send-parts)
```

```
apply (elim exE)
```

```
apply (rule Send-imp-used-parts)
```

```
apply auto
```

```
apply (drule Used-imp-send-parts)
```

```
apply (elim exE)
```

```
apply (rule Send-imp-used-parts)
```

```
apply auto
```

```
done
```

```
lemma (in MESSAGE-DERIVATION) used-mono:
```

```
assumes a: set X ⊆ set Y and b: x ∈ used X
```

```
shows x ∈ used Y using a b
```

```
apply –
```

```
apply (drule Used-imp-send-parts)
```

```
apply (elim exE)
```

```
apply (rule Send-imp-used-parts)
```

```
apply auto
```

```
done
```

```
lemma (in INITSTATE) usedI-mono:
```

```
assumes a: set X ⊆ set Y and b: x ∈ usedI X
```

```
shows x ∈ usedI Y using a b
```

```
apply (auto simp add: usedI-def)
```

```
apply (rule used-mono)
```

```

apply auto
done

lemma (in MESSAGE-DERIVATION) used-time-irrev:
assumes a:  $\text{snd}^c(\text{set } X) = \text{snd}^c(\text{set } Y)$ 
shows  $\text{used } X = \text{used } Y$  using a apply -
apply auto
apply (drule Used-imp-send-parts)
apply (elim exE)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{Send } A \ Xa \ L \in \text{snd}^c\text{set } Y$ ) prefer 2
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists \ ty. \ (\text{ty}, \ \text{Send } A \ Xa \ L) \in \text{set } Y$ ) prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (rule Send-imp-used-parts)
apply auto
apply (drule Used-imp-send-parts)
apply (elim exE)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{Send } A \ Xa \ L \in \text{snd}^c\text{set } X$ ) prefer 2
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists \ tx. \ (\text{tx}, \ \text{Send } A \ Xa \ L) \in \text{set } X$ ) prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (rule Send-imp-used-parts)
apply auto
done

lemma (in INITSTATE) usedI-time-irrev:
assumes a:  $\text{snd}^c(\text{set } X) = \text{snd}^c(\text{set } Y)$ 
shows  $\text{usedI } X = \text{usedI } Y$  using a
apply (simp add: usedI-def)
apply (rule set-un-eq)
apply (rule used-time-irrev)
apply auto
done

lemma (in MESSAGE-DERIVATION) used-mono-snd:
assumes a:  $\text{snd}^c(\text{set } X) \subseteq \text{snd}^c(\text{set } Y)$  and
b:  $x \in \text{used } X$ 
shows  $x \in \text{used } Y$  using a b
proof -
let ?U = map ( $\lambda (t, ev). (0::real, ev)$ ) X and ?V = map ( $\lambda (t, ev). (0::real, ev)$ ) Y
have ux:  $\text{snd}^c(\text{set } ?U) = \text{snd}^c(\text{set } X)$  apply (auto intro: Set.rev-image-eqI)
done
have vy:  $\text{snd}^c(\text{set } ?V) = \text{snd}^c(\text{set } Y)$  apply (auto intro: Set.rev-image-eqI) done
from a have a:  $(\text{set } ?U) \subseteq (\text{set } ?V)$  using prems apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists \ t. (t, ba) \in \text{set } Y$ ) defer
apply force

```

```

apply (erule exE) apply auto done
from ux <x ∈ used X> have x ∈ used ?U apply -
  apply (simp only: used-time-irrev [where X=X and Y=?U]) done
  with a have x ∈ used ?V apply - apply (rule used-mono [where X=?U and
Y=?V])
    by auto
  with vy [THEN sym] show ?thesis apply -
    apply (simp only: used-time-irrev [where X=Y and Y=?V]) done
qed

lemma (in INITSTATE) usedI-mono-snd:
[| snd`{set X} ⊆ snd`{set Y}; x ∈ usedI X |] ==> x ∈ usedI Y
  apply (auto simp add: usedI-def)
  apply (rule used-mono-snd)
  apply auto
done

end

```

## 5 Lexicographic order on lists

```

theory List-lexord
imports List Main
begin

instantiation list :: (ord) ord
begin

definition
list-less-def: xs < ys ↔ (xs, ys) ∈ lexord {(u, v). u < v}

definition
list-le-def: (xs :: - list) ≤ ys ↔ xs < ys ∨ xs = ys

instance ..

end

instance list :: (order) order
proof
fix xs :: 'a list
show xs ≤ xs by (simp add: list-le-def)
next
fix xs ys zs :: 'a list
assume xs ≤ ys and ys ≤ zs
then show xs ≤ zs by (auto simp add: list-le-def list-less-def)
  (rule lexord-trans, auto intro: transI)
next
fix xs ys :: 'a list

```

```

assume xs ≤ ys and ys ≤ xs
then show xs = ys apply (auto simp add: list-le-def list-less-def)
apply (rule lexord-irreflexive [THEN noteE])
defer
apply (rule lexord-trans) apply (auto intro: transI) done
next
fix xs ys :: 'a list
show xs < ys ↔ xs ≤ ys ∧ ¬ ys ≤ xs
apply (auto simp add: list-less-def list-le-def)
defer
apply (rule lexord-irreflexive [THEN noteE])
apply auto
apply (rule lexord-irreflexive [THEN noteE])
defer
apply (rule lexord-trans) apply (auto intro: transI) done
qed

instance list :: (linorder) linorder
proof
fix xs ys :: 'a list
have (xs, ys) ∈ lexord {(u, v). u < v} ∨ xs = ys ∨ (ys, xs) ∈ lexord {(u, v). u
< v}
by (rule lexord-linear) auto
then show xs ≤ ys ∨ ys ≤ xs
by (auto simp add: list-le-def list-less-def)
qed

instantiation list :: (linorder) distrib-lattice
begin

definition
(inf :: 'a list ⇒ -) = min

definition
(sup :: 'a list ⇒ -) = max

instance
by intro-classes
(auto simp add: inf-list-def sup-list-def min-max.sup-inf-distrib1)

end

lemma not-less-Nil [simp]: ¬ (x < [])
by (unfold list-less-def) simp

lemma Nil-less-Cons [simp]: [] < a # x
by (unfold list-less-def) simp

lemma Cons-less-Cons [simp]: a # x < b # y ↔ a < b ∨ a = b ∧ x < y

```

```

by (unfold list-less-def) simp

lemma le-Nil [simp]:  $x \leq [] \longleftrightarrow x = []$ 
  by (unfold list-le-def, cases x) auto

lemma Nil-le-Cons [simp]:  $[] \leq x$ 
  by (unfold list-le-def, cases x) auto

lemma Cons-le-Cons [simp]:  $a \# x \leq b \# y \longleftrightarrow a < b \vee a = b \wedge x \leq y$ 
  by (unfold list-le-def) auto

instantiation list :: (order) bot
begin

definition
  bot = []

instance proof
qed (simp add: bot-list-def)

end

lemma less-list-code [code]:
   $xs < ([]::'a::\{equal, order\} list) \longleftrightarrow False$ 
   $[] < (xs::'a::\{equal, order\}) \# xs \longleftrightarrow True$ 
   $(xs::'a::\{equal, order\}) \# xs < y \# ys \longleftrightarrow x < y \vee x = y \wedge xs < ys$ 
  by simp-all

lemma less-eq-list-code [code]:
   $x \# xs \leq ([]::'a::\{equal, order\} list) \longleftrightarrow False$ 
   $[] \leq (xs::'a::\{equal, order\} list) \longleftrightarrow True$ 
   $(xs::'a::\{equal, order\}) \# xs \leq y \# ys \longleftrightarrow x < y \vee x = y \wedge xs \leq ys$ 
  by simp-all

end

```

## 6 (Finite) multisets

```

theory Multiset
imports Main
begin

6.1 The type of multisets

typedef 'a multiset = "{f :: 'a => nat. finite {x. f x > 0}}"
morphisms count Abs-multiset
proof
  show "(λx. 0::nat) ∈ ?multiset" by simp

```

**qed**

**lemmas** *multiset-typedef* = *Abs-multiset-inverse count-inverse count*

**abbreviation** *Melem* ::  $'a \Rightarrow 'a \text{ multiset} \Rightarrow \text{bool}$   $((-/ : \# -) [50, 51] 50)$  **where**  
 $a : \# M == 0 < \text{count } M a$

**notation** (*xsymbols*)  
*Melem* (**infix**  $\in \# 50$ )

**lemma** *multiset-eq-iff*:

$M = N \longleftrightarrow (\forall a. \text{count } M a = \text{count } N a)$   
**by** (*simp only*: *count-inject* [*symmetric*] *fun-eq-iff*)

**lemma** *multiset-eqI*:

$(\bigwedge x. \text{count } A x = \text{count } B x) \implies A = B$   
**using** *multiset-eq-iff* **by** *auto*

Preservation of the representing set *multiset*.

**lemma** *const0-in-multiset*:

$(\lambda a. 0) \in \text{multiset}$   
**by** (*simp add*: *multiset-def*)

**lemma** *only1-in-multiset*:

$(\lambda b. \text{if } b = a \text{ then } n \text{ else } 0) \in \text{multiset}$   
**by** (*simp add*: *multiset-def*)

**lemma** *union-preserves-multiset*:

$M \in \text{multiset} \implies N \in \text{multiset} \implies (\lambda a. M a + N a) \in \text{multiset}$   
**by** (*simp add*: *multiset-def*)

**lemma** *diff-preserves-multiset*:

**assumes**  $M \in \text{multiset}$   
**shows**  $(\lambda a. M a - N a) \in \text{multiset}$

**proof** –

**have**  $\{x. N x < M x\} \subseteq \{x. 0 < M x\}$   
**by** *auto*  
**with** *assms show* *?thesis*  
**by** (*auto simp add*: *multiset-def intro*: *finite-subset*)

**qed**

**lemma** *filter-preserves-multiset*:

**assumes**  $M \in \text{multiset}$   
**shows**  $(\lambda x. \text{if } P x \text{ then } M x \text{ else } 0) \in \text{multiset}$

**proof** –

**have**  $\{x. (P x \longrightarrow 0 < M x) \wedge P x\} \subseteq \{x. 0 < M x\}$   
**by** *auto*  
**with** *assms show* *?thesis*  
**by** (*auto simp add*: *multiset-def intro*: *finite-subset*)

```

qed

lemmas in-multiset = const0-in-multiset only1-in-multiset
union-preserves-multiset diff-preserves-multiset filter-preserves-multiset

```

## 6.2 Representing multisets

Multiset enumeration

```

instantiation multiset :: (type) {zero, plus}
begin

definition Mempty-def:
  0 = Abs-multiset (λa. 0)

abbreviation Mempty :: 'a multiset ({}#) where
  Mempty ≡ 0

definition union-def:
  M + N = Abs-multiset (λa. count M a + count N a)

instance ..

end

definition single :: 'a => 'a multiset where
  single a = Abs-multiset (λb. if b = a then 1 else 0)

syntax
  -multiset :: args => 'a multiset  ({#(-)#{})
translations
  {#x, xs#} == {#x#} + {#xs#}
  {#x#} == CONST single x

lemma count-empty [simp]: count {}# a = 0
  by (simp add: Mempty-def in-multiset_multiset-typedef)

lemma count-single [simp]: count {#b#} a = (if b = a then 1 else 0)
  by (simp add: single-def in-multiset_multiset-typedef)


```

## 6.3 Basic operations

### 6.3.1 Union

```

lemma count-union [simp]: count (M + N) a = count M a + count N a
  by (simp add: union-def in-multiset_multiset-typedef)

instance multiset :: (type) cancel-comm-monoid-add proof
qed (simp-all add: multiset-eq-iff)

```

### 6.3.2 Difference

```

instantiation multiset :: (type) minus
begin

definition diff-def:
   $M - N = \text{Abs-multiset } (\lambda a. \text{count } M a - \text{count } N a)$ 

instance ..

end

lemma count-diff [simp]:  $\text{count } (M - N) a = \text{count } M a - \text{count } N a$ 
  by (simp add: diff-def in-multiset_multiset-typedef)

lemma diff-empty [simp]:  $M - \{\#\} = M \wedge \{\#\} - M = \{\#\}$ 
  by(simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma diff-cancel[simp]:  $A - A = \{\#\}$ 
  by (rule multiset-eqI) simp

lemma diff-union-cancelR [simp]:  $M + N - N = (M::'a multiset)$ 
  by(simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma diff-union-cancelL [simp]:  $N + M - N = (M::'a multiset)$ 
  by(simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma insert-DiffM:
   $x \in\# M \implies \{\#x\#} + (M - \{\#x\#}) = M$ 
  by (clarsimp simp: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma insert-DiffM2 [simp]:
   $x \in\# M \implies M - \{\#x\#} + \{\#x\#} = M$ 
  by (clarsimp simp: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma diff-right-commute:
   $(M::'a multiset) - N - Q = M - Q - N$ 
  by (auto simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma diff-add:
   $(M::'a multiset) - (N + Q) = M - N - Q$ 
  by (simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma diff-union-swap:
   $a \neq b \implies M - \{\#a\#} + \{\#b\#} = M + \{\#b\#} - \{\#a\#}$ 
  by (auto simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma diff-union-single-conv:
   $a \in\# J \implies I + J - \{\#a\#} = I + (J - \{\#a\#})$ 
  by (simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

```

### 6.3.3 Equality of multisets

```

lemma single-not-empty [simp]: {#a#} ≠ {#} ∧ {#} ≠ {#a#}
  by (simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma single-eq-single [simp]: {#a#} = {#b#} ↔ a = b
  by (auto simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma union-eq-empty [iff]: M + N = {#} ↔ M = {#} ∧ N = {#}
  by (auto simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma empty-eq-union [iff]: {#} = M + N ↔ M = {#} ∧ N = {#}
  by (auto simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma multi-self-add-other-not-self [simp]: M = M + {#x#} ↔ False
  by (auto simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma diff-single-trivial:
  ¬ x ∈# M ⇒ M - {#x#} = M
  by (auto simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma diff-single-eq-union:
  x ∈# M ⇒ M - {#x#} = N ↔ M = N + {#x#}
  by auto

lemma union-single-eq-diff:
  M + {#x#} = N ⇒ M = N - {#x#}
  by (auto dest: sym)

lemma union-single-eq-member:
  M + {#x#} = N ⇒ x ∈# N
  by auto

lemma union-is-single:
  M + N = {#a#} ↔ M = {#a#} ∧ N = {#} ∨ M = {#} ∧ N = {#a#} (is ?lhs = ?rhs)proof
    assume ?rhs then show ?lhs by auto
  next
    assume ?lhs thus ?rhs
      by (simp add: multiset-eq-iff split;if-splits) (metis add-is-1)
  qed

lemma single-is-union:
  {#a#} = M + N ↔ {#a#} = M ∧ N = {#} ∨ M = {#} ∧ {#a#} = N
  by (auto simp add: eq-commute [of {#a#} M + N] union-is-single)

lemma add-eq-conv-diff:
  M + {#a#} = N + {#b#} ↔ M = N ∧ a = b ∨ M = N - {#a#} +
  {#b#} ∧ N = M - {#b#} + {#a#} (is ?lhs = ?rhs)

```

```

proof
  assume ?rhs then show ?lhs
  by (auto simp add: add-assoc add-commute [of {#b#}])
    (drule sym, simp add: add-assoc [symmetric])
next
  assume ?lhs
  show ?rhs
  proof (cases a = b)
    case True with ?lhs show ?thesis by simp
  next
    case False
    from ?lhs have a ∈# N + {#b#} by (rule union-single-eq-member)
    with False have a ∈# N by auto
    moreover from ?lhs have M = N + {#b#} - {#a#} by (rule union-single-eq-diff)
    moreover note False
    ultimately show ?thesis by (auto simp add: diff-right-commute [of - {#a#}])
      diff-union-swap)
  qed
qed

lemma insert-noteq-member:
  assumes BC: B + {#b#} = C + {#c#}
  and bnotc: b ≠ c
  shows c ∈# B
  proof –
    have c ∈# C + {#c#} by simp
    have nc: ¬ c ∈# {#b#} using bnotc by simp
    then have c ∈# B + {#b#} using BC by simp
    then show c ∈# B using nc by simp
  qed

lemma add-eq-conv-ex:
  (M + {#a#} = N + {#b#}) =
  (M = N ∧ a = b ∨ (∃ K. M = K + {#b#} ∧ N = K + {#a#}))
  by (auto simp add: add-eq-conv-diff)

```

#### 6.3.4 Pointwise ordering induced by count

**instantiation** multiset :: (type) ordered-ab-semigroup-add-imp-le  
**begin**

**definition** less-eq-multiset :: 'a multiset ⇒ 'a multiset ⇒ bool **where**  
 mset-le-def: A ≤ B ↔ (∀ a. count A a ≤ count B a)

**definition** less-multiset :: 'a multiset ⇒ 'a multiset ⇒ bool **where**  
 mset-less-def: (A::'a multiset) < B ↔ A ≤ B ∧ A ≠ B

**instance proof**  
**qed** (auto simp add: mset-le-def mset-less-def multiset-eq-iff intro: order-trans an-

```

tisym)

end

lemma mset-less-eqI:
 $(\bigwedge x. \text{count } A x \leq \text{count } B x) \implies A \leq B$ 
by (simp add: mset-le-def)

lemma mset-le-exists-conv:
 $(A::'a multiset) \leq B \longleftrightarrow (\exists C. B = A + C)$ 
apply (unfold mset-le-def, rule iffI, rule-tac x = B - A in exI)
apply (auto intro: multiset-eq-iff [THEN iffD2])
done

lemma mset-le-mono-add-right-cancel [simp]:
 $(A::'a multiset) + C \leq B + C \longleftrightarrow A \leq B$ 
by (fact add-le-cancel-right)

lemma mset-le-mono-add-left-cancel [simp]:
 $C + (A::'a multiset) \leq C + B \longleftrightarrow A \leq B$ 
by (fact add-le-cancel-left)

lemma mset-le-mono-add:
 $(A::'a multiset) \leq B \implies C \leq D \implies A + C \leq B + D$ 
by (fact add-mono)

lemma mset-le-add-left [simp]:
 $(A::'a multiset) \leq A + B$ 
unfolding mset-le-def by auto

lemma mset-le-add-right [simp]:
 $B \leq (A::'a multiset) + B$ 
unfolding mset-le-def by auto

lemma mset-le-single:
 $a :# B \implies \{\#a#\} \leq B$ 
by (simp add: mset-le-def)

lemma multiset-diff-union-assoc:
 $C \leq B \implies (A::'a multiset) + B - C = A + (B - C)$ 
by (simp add: multiset-eq-iff mset-le-def)

lemma mset-le-multiset-union-diff-commute:
 $B \leq A \implies (A::'a multiset) - B + C = A + C - B$ 
by (simp add: multiset-eq-iff mset-le-def)

lemma diff-le-self [simp]:  $(M::'a multiset) - N \leq M$ 
by (simp add: mset-le-def)

```

```

lemma mset-lessD:  $A < B \implies x \in\# A \implies x \in\# B$ 
apply (clar simp simp: mset-le-def mset-less-def)
apply (erule-tac x=x in allE)
apply auto
done

lemma mset-leD:  $A \leq B \implies x \in\# A \implies x \in\# B$ 
apply (clar simp simp: mset-le-def mset-less-def)
apply (erule-tac x = x in allE)
apply auto
done

lemma mset-less-insertD:  $(A + \{\#\} < B) \implies (x \in\# B \wedge A < B)$ 
apply (rule conjI)
apply (simp add: mset-lessD)
apply (clar simp simp: mset-le-def mset-less-def)
apply safe
apply (erule-tac x = a in allE)
apply (auto split: split-if-asm)
done

lemma mset-le-insertD:  $(A + \{\#\} \leq B) \implies (x \in\# B \wedge A \leq B)$ 
apply (rule conjI)
apply (simp add: mset-leD)
apply (force simp: mset-le-def mset-less-def split: split-if-asm)
done

lemma mset-less-of-empty[simp]:  $A < \{\#\} \longleftrightarrow \text{False}$ 
by (auto simp add: mset-less-def mset-le-def multiset-eq-iff)

lemma multi-psub-of-add-self[simp]:  $A < A + \{\#\}$ 
by (auto simp: mset-le-def mset-less-def)

lemma multi-psub-self[simp]:  $(A::'a multiset) < A = \text{False}$ 
by simp

lemma mset-less-add-bothsides:
 $T + \{\#\} < S + \{\#\} \implies T < S$ 
by (fact add-less-imp-less-right)

lemma mset-less-empty-nonempty:
 $\{\#\} < S \longleftrightarrow S \neq \{\#\}$ 
by (auto simp: mset-le-def mset-less-def)

lemma mset-less-diff-self:
 $c \in\# B \implies B - \{\#\} < B$ 
by (auto simp: mset-le-def mset-less-def multiset-eq-iff)

```

### 6.3.5 Intersection

```

instantiation multiset :: (type) semilattice-inf
begin

definition inf-multiset :: 'a multiset  $\Rightarrow$  'a multiset  $\Rightarrow$  'a multiset where
  multiset-inter-def: inf-multiset A B = A - (A - B)

instance proof -
  have aux:  $\bigwedge m n q :: \text{nat}. m \leq n \implies m \leq q \implies m \leq n - (n - q)$  by arith
  show OFCLASS('a multiset, semilattice-inf-class) proof
    qed (auto simp add: multiset-inter-def mset-le-def aux)
  qed

end

abbreviation multiset-inter :: 'a multiset  $\Rightarrow$  'a multiset  $\Rightarrow$  'a multiset (infixl # $\cap$  70) where
  multiset-inter  $\equiv$  inf

lemma multiset-inter-count [simp]:
  count (A # $\cap$  B) x = min (count A x) (count B x)
  by (simp add: multiset-inter-def multiset-typedef)

lemma multiset-inter-single:  $a \neq b \implies \{\#a\# \# \cap \{\#b\#\} = \{\#\}$ 
  by (rule multiset-eqI) (auto simp add: multiset-inter-count)

lemma multiset-union-diff-commute:
  assumes B # $\cap$  C = {#}
  shows A + B - C = A - C + B
  proof (rule multiset-eqI)
    fix x
    from assms have min (count B x) (count C x) = 0
      by (auto simp add: multiset-inter-count multiset-eq-iff)
    then have count B x = 0  $\vee$  count C x = 0
      by auto
    then show count (A + B - C) x = count (A - C + B) x
      by auto
  qed

```

### 6.3.6 Filter (with comprehension syntax)

Multiset comprehension

```

definition filter :: ('a  $\Rightarrow$  bool)  $\Rightarrow$  'a multiset  $\Rightarrow$  'a multiset where
  filter P M = Abs-multiset ( $\lambda x. \text{if } P x \text{ then } \text{count } M x \text{ else } 0$ )

hide-const (open) filter

lemma count-filter [simp]:

```

```

count (Multiset.filter P M) a = (if P a then count M a else 0)
by (simp add: filter-def in-multiset multiset-typedef)

lemma filter-empty [simp]:
  Multiset.filter P {#} = {#}
  by (rule multiset-eqI) simp

lemma filter-single [simp]:
  Multiset.filter P {#x#} = (if P x then {#x#} else {#})
  by (rule multiset-eqI) simp

lemma filter-union [simp]:
  Multiset.filter P (M + N) = Multiset.filter P M + Multiset.filter P N
  by (rule multiset-eqI) simp

lemma filter-diff [simp]:
  Multiset.filter P (M - N) = Multiset.filter P M - Multiset.filter P N
  by (rule multiset-eqI) simp

lemma filter-inter [simp]:
  Multiset.filter P (M #∩ N) = Multiset.filter P M #∩ Multiset.filter P N
  by (rule multiset-eqI) simp

syntax
  -MCollect :: pttrn ⇒ 'a multiset ⇒ bool ⇒ 'a multiset ((1{# - :# -./ -#}))  

syntax (xsymbol)
  -MCollect :: pttrn ⇒ 'a multiset ⇒ bool ⇒ 'a multiset ((1{# - ∈# -./ -#}))  

translations
  {#x ∈# M. P#} == CONST Multiset.filter (λx. P) M

```

### 6.3.7 Set of elements

```

definition set-of :: 'a multiset => 'a set where
  set-of M = {x. x :# M}

lemma set-of-empty [simp]: set-of {#} = {}
by (simp add: set-of-def)

lemma set-of-single [simp]: set-of {#b#} = {b}
by (simp add: set-of-def)

lemma set-of-union [simp]: set-of (M + N) = set-of M ∪ set-of N
by (auto simp add: set-of-def)

lemma set-of-eq-empty-iff [simp]: (set-of M = {}) = (M = {#})
by (auto simp add: set-of-def multiset-eq-iff)

lemma mem-set-of-iff [simp]: (x ∈ set-of M) = (x :# M)
by (auto simp add: set-of-def)

```

```

lemma set-of-filter [simp]: set-of {# x:#M. P x #} = set-of M ∩ {x. P x}
by (auto simp add: set-of-def)

lemma finite-set-of [iff]: finite (set-of M)
using count [of M] by (simp add: multiset-def set-of-def)

```

### 6.3.8 Size

```

instantiation multiset :: (type) size
begin

```

```

definition size-def:
size M = setsum (count M) (set-of M)

```

```

instance ..

```

```

end

```

```

lemma size-empty [simp]: size {} = 0
by (simp add: size-def)

```

```

lemma size-single [simp]: size {#b#} = 1
by (simp add: size-def)

```

```

lemma setsum-count-Int:
finite A ==> setsum (count N) (A ∩ set-of N) = setsum (count N) A
apply (induct rule: finite-induct)
apply simp
apply (simp add: Int-insert-left set-of-def)
done

```

```

lemma size-union [simp]: size (M + N::'a multiset) = size M + size N
apply (unfold size-def)
apply (subgoal-tac count (M + N) = (λa. count M a + count N a))
prefer 2
apply (rule ext, simp)
apply (simp (no-asm-simp) add: setsum-Un-nat setsum-addf setsum-count-Int)
apply (subst Int-commute)
apply (simp (no-asm-simp) add: setsum-count-Int)
done

```

```

lemma size-eq-0-iff-empty [iff]: (size M = 0) = (M = {})
by (auto simp add: size-def multiset-eq-iff)

```

```

lemma nonempty-has-size: (S ≠ {}) = (0 < size S)
by (metis gr0I gr-implies-not0 size-empty size-eq-0-iff-empty)

```

```

lemma size-eq-Suc-imp-elem: size M = Suc n ==> ∃ a. a :# M

```

```

apply (unfold size-def)
apply (drule setsum-SucD)
apply auto
done

lemma size-eq-Suc-imp-eq-union:
assumes size M = Suc n
shows ∃ a N. M = N + {#a#}
proof -
from assms obtain a where a ∈# M
  by (erule size-eq-Suc-imp-elem [THEN exE])
then have M = M - {#a#} + {#a#} by simp
then show ?thesis by blast
qed

```

## 6.4 Induction and case splits

```

lemma setsim-decr:
finite F ==> (0::nat) < f a ==>
  setsum (f (a := f a - 1)) F = (if a ∈ F then setsum f F - 1 else setsum f F)
apply (induct rule: finite-induct)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac a = a in mk-disjoint-insert, auto)
done

lemma rep-multiset-induct-aux:
assumes 1: P (λa. (0::nat))
and 2: !!f b. f ∈ multiset ==> P f ==> P (f (b := f b + 1))
shows ∀f. f ∈ multiset --> setsum f {x. f x ≠ 0} = n --> P f
apply (unfold multiset-def)
apply (induct-tac n, simp, clarify)
apply (subgoal-tac f = (λa. 0))
apply simp
apply (rule 1)
apply (rule ext, force, clarify)
apply (frule setsum-SucD, clarify)
apply (rename-tac a)
apply (subgoal-tac finite {x. (f (a := f a - 1)) x > 0})
prefer 2
apply (rule finite-subset)
prefer 2
apply assumption
apply simp
apply blast
apply (subgoal-tac f = (f (a := f a - 1))(a := (f (a := f a - 1)) a + 1))
prefer 2
apply (rule ext)
apply (simp (no-asm-simp))
apply (erule ssubst, rule 2 [unfolded multiset-def], blast)

```

```

apply (erule allE, erule impE, erule-tac [2] mp, blast)
apply (simp (no-asm-simp) add: setsum-decr del: fun-upd-apply One-nat-def)
apply (subgoal-tac {x. x ≠ a --> f x ≠ 0} = {x. f x ≠ 0})
prefer 2
apply blast
apply (subgoal-tac {x. x ≠ a ∧ f x ≠ 0} = {x. f x ≠ 0} - {a})
prefer 2
apply blast
apply (simp add: le-imp-diff-is-add setsum-diff1-nat cong: conj-cong)
done

theorem rep-multiset-induct:
f ∈ multiset ==> P (λa. 0) ==>
(!!f b. f ∈ multiset ==> P f ==> P (f (b := f b + 1))) ==> P f
using rep-multiset-induct-aux by blast

theorem multiset-induct [case-names empty add, induct type: multiset]:
assumes empty: P {#}
and add: !!M x. P M ==> P (M + {#x#})
shows P M
proof -
note defns = union-def single-def Mempty-def
note add' = add [unfolded defns, simplified]
have aux: ⋀a::'a. count (Abs-multiset (λb. if b = a then 1 else 0)) =
(λb. if b = a then 1 else 0) by (simp add: Abs-multiset-inverse in-multiset)
show ?thesis
apply (rule count-inverse [THEN subst])
apply (rule count [THEN rep-multiset-induct])
apply (rule empty [unfolded defns])
apply (subgoal-tac f(b := f b + 1) = (λa. f a + (if a=b then 1 else 0)))
prefer 2
apply (simp add: fun-eq-iff)
apply (erule ssubst)
apply (erule Abs-multiset-inverse [THEN subst])
apply (drule add')
apply (simp add: aux)
done
qed

lemma multi-nonempty-split: M ≠ {#} ==> ∃A a. M = A + {#a#}
by (induct M) auto

lemma multiset-cases [cases type, case-names empty add]:
assumes em: M = {#} ==> P
assumes add: ⋀N x. M = N + {#x#} ==> P
shows P
proof (cases M = {#})
assume M = {#} then show ?thesis using em by simp
next

```

```

assume  $M \neq \{\#\}$ 
then obtain  $M' m$  where  $M = M' + \{\#m\#}$ 
  by (blast dest: multi-nonempty-split)
  then show ?thesis using add by simp
qed

lemma multi-member-split:  $x \in \# M \implies \exists A. M = A + \{\#x\#}$ 
apply (cases  $M$ )
  apply simp
apply (rule-tac  $x=M - \{\#x\#}$  in exI, simp)
done

lemma multi-drop-mem-not-eq:  $c \in \# B \implies B - \{\#c\#} \neq B$ 
by (cases  $B = \{\#\}$ ) (auto dest: multi-member-split)

lemma multiset-partition:  $M = \{\# x:\#M. P x \#\} + \{\# x:\#M. \neg P x \#\}$ 
apply (subst multiset-eq-iff)
apply auto
done

lemma mset-less-size:  $(A::'a multiset) < B \implies \text{size } A < \text{size } B$ 
proof (induct  $A$  arbitrary:  $B$ )
  case ( $\text{empty } M$ )
    then have  $M \neq \{\#\}$  by (simp add: mset-less-empty-nonempty)
    then obtain  $M' x$  where  $M = M' + \{\#x\#}$ 
      by (blast dest: multi-nonempty-split)
    then show ?case by simp
next
  case (add  $S x T$ )
    have  $IH: \bigwedge B. S < B \implies \text{size } S < \text{size } B$  by fact
    have  $SxSubT: S + \{\#x\#} < T$  by fact
    then have  $x \in \# T$  and  $S < T$  by (auto dest: mset-less-insertD)
    then obtain  $T'$  where  $T: T = T' + \{\#x\#}$ 
      by (blast dest: multi-member-split)
    then have  $S < T'$  using SxSubT
      by (blast intro: mset-less-add-bothsides)
    then have  $\text{size } S < \text{size } T'$  using IH by simp
    then show ?case using T by simp
qed

```

#### 6.4.1 Strong induction and subset induction for multisets

Well-foundedness of proper subset operator:

proper multiset subset

**definition**

$mset-less-rel :: ('a multiset * 'a multiset) set$  **where**  
 $mset-less-rel = \{(A,B). A < B\}$

```

lemma multiset-add-sub-el-shuffle:
  assumes  $c \in\# B$  and  $b \neq c$ 
  shows  $B - \{\#c\#} + \{\#b\#} = B + \{\#b\#} - \{\#c\#}$ 
proof -
  from  $\langle c \in\# B \rangle$  obtain  $A$  where  $B = A + \{\#c\#}$ 
    by (blast dest: multi-member-split)
  have  $A + \{\#b\#} = A + \{\#b\#} + \{\#c\#} - \{\#c\#}$  by simp
  then have  $A + \{\#b\#} = A + \{\#c\#} + \{\#b\#} - \{\#c\#}$ 
    by (simp add: add-ac)
  then show ?thesis using B by simp
qed

lemma wf-mset-less-rel: wf mset-less-rel
apply (unfold mset-less-rel-def)
apply (rule wf-measure [THEN wf-subset, where f1=size])
apply (clarify simp: measure-def inv-image-def mset-less-size)
done

```

The induction rules:

```

lemma full-multiset-induct [case-names less]:
assumes ih:  $\bigwedge B. \forall (A::'a multiset). A < B \implies P A \implies P B$ 
shows P B
apply (rule wf-mset-less-rel [THEN wf-induct])
apply (rule ih, auto simp: mset-less-rel-def)
done

lemma multi-subset-induct [consumes 2, case-names empty add]:
assumes F  $\leq A$ 
  and empty:  $P \{\#\}$ 
  and insert:  $\bigwedge a F. a \in\# A \implies P F \implies P (F + \{\#a\#})$ 
shows P F
proof -
  from  $\langle F \leq A \rangle$ 
  show ?thesis
  proof (induct F)
    show  $P \{\#\}$  by fact
  next
    fix x F
    assume P:  $F \leq A \implies P F$  and i:  $F + \{\#x\#} \leq A$ 
    show  $P (F + \{\#x\#})$ 
    proof (rule insert)
      from i show  $x \in\# A$  by (auto dest: mset-le-insertD)
      from i have  $F \leq A$  by (auto dest: mset-le-insertD)
        with P show  $P F$  .
    qed
  qed
qed

```

## 6.5 Alternative representations

### 6.5.1 Lists

```

primrec multiset-of :: 'a list  $\Rightarrow$  'a multiset where
  multiset-of [] = {#}
  multiset-of (a # xs) = multiset-of xs + {# a #}

lemma in-multiset-in-set:
   $x \in \# \text{multiset-of } xs \longleftrightarrow x \in \text{set } xs$ 
  by (induct xs) simp-all

lemma count-multiset-of:
  count (multiset-of xs) x = length (filter ( $\lambda y. x = y$ ) xs)
  by (induct xs) simp-all

lemma multiset-of-zero-iff[simp]: (multiset-of x = {#}) = (x = [])
  by (induct x) auto

lemma multiset-of-zero-iff-right[simp]: ({#} = multiset-of x) = (x = [])
  by (induct x) auto

lemma set-of-multiset-of[simp]: set-of (multiset-of x) = set x
  by (induct x) auto

lemma mem-set-multiset-eq:  $x \in \text{set } xs = (x : \# \text{multiset-of } xs)$ 
  by (induct xs) auto

lemma multiset-of-append [simp]:
  multiset-of (xs @ ys) = multiset-of xs + multiset-of ys
  by (induct xs arbitrary: ys) (auto simp: add-ac)

lemma multiset-of-filter:
  multiset-of (filter P xs) = {#x : # multiset-of xs. P x #}
  by (induct xs) simp-all

lemma multiset-of-rev [simp]:
  multiset-of (rev xs) = multiset-of xs
  by (induct xs) simp-all

lemma surj-multiset-of: surj multiset-of
  apply (unfold surj-def)
  apply (rule allI)
  apply (rule-tac M = y in multiset-induct)
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac x = x # xa in exI)
  apply auto
  done

lemma set-count-greater-0: set x = {a. count (multiset-of x) a > 0}

```

```

by (induct x) auto

lemma distinct-count-atmost-1:
  distinct x = (! a. count (multiset-of x) a = (if a ∈ set x then 1 else 0))
apply (induct x, simp, rule iffI, simp-all)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (simp-all add: set-of-multiset-of [THEN sym] del: set-of-multiset-of)
apply (erule-tac x = a in allE, simp, clarify)
apply (erule-tac x = aa in allE, simp)
done

lemma multiset-of-eq-setD:
  multiset-of xs = multiset-of ys ==> set xs = set ys
by (rule) (auto simp add: multiset-eq-iff set-count-greater-0)

lemma set-eq-iff-multiset-of-eq-distinct:
  distinct x ==> distinct y ==>
  (set x = set y) = (multiset-of x = multiset-of y)
by (auto simp: multiset-eq-iff distinct-count-atmost-1)

lemma set-eq-iff-multiset-of-remdups-eq:
  (set x = set y) = (multiset-of (remdups x) = multiset-of (remdups y))
apply (rule iffI)
apply (simp add: set-eq-iff-multiset-of-eq-distinct[THEN iffD1])
apply (drule distinct-remdups [THEN distinct-remdups
  [THEN set-eq-iff-multiset-of-eq-distinct [THEN iffD2]]])
apply simp
done

lemma multiset-of-compl-union [simp]:
  multiset-of [x ← xs. P x] + multiset-of [x ← xs. ¬P x] = multiset-of xs
by (induct xs) (auto simp: add-ac)

lemma count-multiset-of-length-filter:
  count (multiset-of xs) x = length (filter (λy. x = y) xs)
by (induct xs) auto

lemma nth-mem-multiset-of: i < length ls ==> (ls ! i) :# multiset-of ls
apply (induct ls arbitrary: i)
apply simp
apply (case-tac i)
apply auto
done

lemma multiset-of-remove1 [simp]:
  multiset-of (remove1 a xs) = multiset-of xs - {#a#}
by (induct xs) (auto simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma multiset-of-eq-length:

```

```

assumes multiset-of xs = multiset-of ys
shows length xs = length ys
using assms proof (induct xs arbitrary: ys)
  case Nil then show ?case by simp
next
  case (Cons x xs)
    then have x ∈# multiset-of ys by (simp add: union-single-eq-member)
    then have x ∈ set ys by (simp add: in-multiset-in-set)
    from Cons.preds [symmetric] have multiset-of xs = multiset-of (remove1 x ys)
      by simp
    with Cons.hyps have length xs = length (remove1 x ys) .
    with ⟨x ∈ set ys⟩ show ?case
      by (auto simp add: length-remove1 dest: length-pos-if-in-set)
qed

lemma multiset-of-eq-length-filter:
  assumes multiset-of xs = multiset-of ys
  shows length (filter (λx. z = x) xs) = length (filter (λy. z = y) ys)
proof (cases z ∈# multiset-of xs)
  case False
    moreover have ¬ z ∈# multiset-of ys using assms False by simp
    ultimately show ?thesis by (simp add: count-multiset-of-length-filter)
next
  case True
    moreover have z ∈# multiset-of ys using assms True by simp
    show ?thesis using assms proof (induct xs arbitrary: ys)
      case Nil then show ?case by simp
    next
      case (Cons x xs)
        from ⟨multiset-of (x # xs) = multiset-of ys⟩ [symmetric]
          have *: multiset-of xs = multiset-of (remove1 x ys)
          and x ∈ set ys
          by (auto simp add: mem-set-multiset-eq)
        from * have length (filter (λx. z = x) xs) = length (filter (λy. z = y) (remove1 x ys)) by (rule Cons.hyps)
        moreover from ⟨x ∈ set ys⟩ have length (filter (λy. z = y) ys) > 0 by (simp add: filter-empty-conv)
        ultimately show ?case using ⟨x ∈ set ys⟩
          by (simp add: filter-remove1) (auto simp add: length-remove1)
    qed
  qed

context linorder
begin

lemma multiset-of-insort [simp]:
  multiset-of (insort-key k x xs) = {#x#} + multiset-of xs
  by (induct xs) (simp-all add: ac-simps)

```

```

lemma multiset-of-sort [simp]:
  multiset-of (sort-key k xs) = multiset-of xs
  by (induct xs) (simp-all add: ac-simps)

```

This lemma shows which properties suffice to show that a function  $f$  with  $f xs = ys$  behaves like sort.

```

lemma properties-for-sort-key:
  assumes multiset-of ys = multiset-of xs
  and  $\bigwedge k. k \in set ys \implies filter (\lambda x. f k = f x) ys = filter (\lambda x. f k = f x) xs$ 
  and sorted (map f ys)
  shows sort-key f xs = ys
  using assms proof (induct xs arbitrary: ys)
    case Nil then show ?case by simp
  next
    case (Cons x xs)
    from Cons.preds(2) have
       $\forall k \in set ys. filter (\lambda x. f k = f x) (remove1 x ys) = filter (\lambda x. f k = f x) xs$ 
      by (simp add: filter-remove1)
    with Cons.preds have sort-key f xs = remove1 x ys
      by (auto intro!: Cons.hyps simp add: sorted-map-remove1)
    moreover from Cons.preds have x ∈ set ys
      by (auto simp add: mem-set-multiset-eq intro!: ccontr)
    ultimately show ?case using Cons.preds by (simp add: insort-key-remove1)
  qed

```

```

lemma properties-for-sort:
  assumes multiset: multiset-of ys = multiset-of xs
  and sorted ys
  shows sort xs = ys
  proof (rule properties-for-sort-key)
    from multiset show multiset-of ys = multiset-of xs .
    from (sorted ys) show sorted (map (λx. x) ys) by simp
    from multiset have  $\bigwedge k. length (filter (\lambda y. k = y) ys) = length (filter (\lambda x. k = x) xs)$ 
      by (rule multiset-of-eq-length-filter)
    then have  $\bigwedge k. replicate (length (filter (\lambda y. k = y) ys)) k = replicate (length (filter (\lambda x. k = x) xs)) k$ 
      by simp
    then show  $\bigwedge k. k \in set ys \implies filter (\lambda y. k = y) ys = filter (\lambda x. k = x) xs$ 
      by (simp add: replicate-length-filter)
  qed

```

```

lemma sort-key-by-quicksort:
  sort-key f xs = sort-key f [x ← xs. f x < f (xs ! (length xs div 2))]
  @ [x ← xs. f x = f (xs ! (length xs div 2))]
  @ sort-key f [x ← xs. f x > f (xs ! (length xs div 2))] (is sort-key f ?lhs = ?rhs)
  proof (rule properties-for-sort-key)
    show multiset-of ?rhs = multiset-of ?lhs
    by (rule multiset-eqI) (auto simp add: multiset-of-filter)

```

```

next
  show sorted (map f ?rhs)
    by (auto simp add: sorted-append intro: sorted-map-same)
next
  fix l
  assume l ∈ set ?rhs
  let ?pivot = f (xs ! (length xs div 2))
  have *: ∀x. f l = f x ↔ f x = f l by auto
  have [x ← sort-key f xs . f x = f l] = [x ← xs. f x = f l]
  unfolding filter-sort by (rule properties-for-sort-key) (auto intro: sorted-map-same)
  with * have **: [x ← sort-key f xs . f l = f x] = [x ← xs. f l = f x] by simp
  have ∀x P. P (f x) ?pivot ∧ f l = f x ↔ P (f l) ?pivot ∧ f l = f x by auto
  then have ∀P. [x ← sort-key f xs . P (f x) ?pivot ∧ f l = f x] =
    [x ← sort-key f xs. P (f l) ?pivot ∧ f l = f x] by simp
  note *** = this [of op <] this [of op >] this [of op =]
  show [x ← ?rhs. f l = f x] = [x ← ?lhs. f l = f x]
  proof (cases f l ?pivot rule: linorder-cases)
    case less then moreover have f l ≠ ?pivot and ¬ f l > ?pivot by auto
    ultimately show ?thesis
      by (simp add: filter-sort [symmetric] ** ***)
next
  case equal then show ?thesis
    by (simp add: * less-le)
next
  case greater then moreover have f l ≠ ?pivot and ¬ f l < ?pivot by auto
  ultimately show ?thesis
    by (simp add: filter-sort [symmetric] ** ***)
qed
qed

```

```

lemma sort-by-quicksort:
  sort xs = sort [x ← xs. x < xs ! (length xs div 2)]
  @ [x ← xs. x = xs ! (length xs div 2)]
  @ sort [x ← xs. x > xs ! (length xs div 2)] (is sort ?lhs = ?rhs)
  using sort-key-by-quicksort [of λx. x, symmetric] by simp

```

A stable parametrized quicksort

```

definition part :: ('b ⇒ 'a) ⇒ 'a ⇒ 'b list ⇒ 'b list × 'b list × 'b list where
  part f pivot xs = ([x ← xs. f x < pivot], [x ← xs. f x = pivot], [x ← xs. pivot < f x])

```

```

lemma part-code [code]:
  part f pivot [] = ([], [], [])
  part f pivot (x # xs) = (let (lts, eqs, gts) = part f pivot xs; x' = f x in
    if x' < pivot then (x # lts, eqs, gts)
    else if x' > pivot then (lts, eqs, x # gts)
    else (lts, x # eqs, gts))
  by (auto simp add: part-def Let-def split-def)

```

```

lemma sort-key-by-quicksort-code [code]:
  sort-key f xs = (case xs of [] => []
    | [x] => xs
    | [x, y] => (if f x ≤ f y then xs else [y, x])
    | - => (let (lts, eqs, gts) = part f (f (xs ! (length xs div 2))) xs
      in sort-key f lts @ eqs @ sort-key f gts))
proof (cases xs)
  case Nil then show ?thesis by simp
next
  case (Cons - ys) note hyps = Cons show ?thesis proof (cases ys)
    case Nil with hyps show ?thesis by simp
  next
    case (Cons - zs) note hyps = hyps Cons show ?thesis proof (cases zs)
      case Nil with hyps show ?thesis by auto
    next
      case Cons
        from sort-key-by-quicksort [of f xs]
        have sort-key f xs = (let (lts, eqs, gts) = part f (f (xs ! (length xs div 2))) xs
          in sort-key f lts @ eqs @ sort-key f gts)
        by (simp only: split-def Let-def part-def fst-conv snd-conv)
        with hyps Cons show ?thesis by (simp only: list.cases)
      qed
    qed
  qed
end

hide-const (open) part

lemma multiset-of-remdups-le: multiset-of (remdups xs) ≤ multiset-of xs
  by (induct xs) (auto intro: order-trans)

lemma multiset-of-update:
  i < length ls ==> multiset-of (ls[i := v]) = multiset-of ls - {#ls ! i#} + {#v#}
proof (induct ls arbitrary: i)
  case Nil then show ?case by simp
next
  case (Cons x xs)
    show ?case
    proof (cases i)
      case 0 then show ?thesis by simp
    next
      case (Suc i')
        with Cons show ?thesis
          apply simp
          apply (subst add-assoc)
          apply (subst add-commute [of {#v#} {#x#}])
          apply (subst add-assoc [symmetric])
          apply simp
    qed
  qed
qed

```

```

apply (rule mset-le-multiset-union-diff-commute)
apply (simp add: mset-le-single nth-mem-multiset-of)
done
qed
qed

lemma multiset-of-swap:
i < length ls ==> j < length ls ==>
multiset-of (ls[j := ls ! i, i := ls ! j]) = multiset-of ls
by (cases i = j) (simp-all add: multiset-of-update nth-mem-multiset-of)

```

### 6.5.2 Association lists – including rudimentary code generation

```

definition count-of :: ('a × nat) list ⇒ 'a ⇒ nat where
count-of xs x = (case map-of xs x of None ⇒ 0 | Some n ⇒ n)

```

```

lemma count-of-multiset:
count-of xs ∈ multiset
proof –
let ?A = {x::'a. 0 < (case map-of xs x of None ⇒ 0::nat | Some (n::nat) ⇒ n)}
have ?A ⊆ dom (map-of xs)
proof
fix x
assume x ∈ ?A
then have 0 < (case map-of xs x of None ⇒ 0::nat | Some (n::nat) ⇒ n) by simp
then have map-of xs x ≠ None by (cases map-of xs x) auto
then show x ∈ dom (map-of xs) by auto
qed
with finite-dom-map-of [of xs] have finite ?A
by (auto intro: finite-subset)
then show ?thesis
by (simp add: count-of-def fun-eq-iff multiset-def)
qed

```

```

lemma count-simps [simp]:
count-of [] = (λ_. 0)
count-of ((x, n) # xs) = (λy. if x = y then n else count-of xs y)
by (simp-all add: count-of-def fun-eq-iff)

```

```

lemma count-of-empty:
x ∉ fst ` set xs ==> count-of xs x = 0
by (induct xs) (simp-all add: count-of-def)

```

```

lemma count-of-filter:
count-of (filter (P ∘ fst) xs) x = (if P x then count-of xs x else 0)
by (induct xs) auto

```

```

definition Bag :: ('a × nat) list ⇒ 'a multiset where

```

```

Bag xs = Abs-multiset (count-of xs)

code-datatype Bag

lemma count-Bag [simp, code]:
  count (Bag xs) = count-of xs
  by (simp add: Bag-def count-of-multiset Abs-multiset-inverse)

lemma Mempty-Bag [code]:
  {} = Bag []
  by (simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma single-Bag [code]:
  {#x#} = Bag [(x, 1)]
  by (simp add: multiset-eq-iff)

lemma filter-Bag [code]:
  Multiset.filter P (Bag xs) = Bag (filter (P o fst) xs)
  by (rule multiset-eqI) (simp add: count-of-filter)

lemma mset-less-eq-Bag [code]:
  Bag xs ≤ A ↔ (∀(x, n) ∈ set xs. count-of xs x ≤ count A x)
  (is ?lhs ↔ ?rhs)
proof
  assume ?lhs then show ?rhs
  by (auto simp add: mset-le-def count-Bag)
next
  assume ?rhs
  show ?lhs
  proof (rule mset-less-eqI)
    fix x
    from ?rhs have count-of xs x ≤ count A x
    by (cases x ∈ fst ‘set xs) (auto simp add: count-of-empty)
    then show count (Bag xs) x ≤ count A x
    by (simp add: mset-le-def count-Bag)
  qed
qed

instantiation multiset :: (equal) equal
begin

definition
  HOL.equal A B ↔ (A::'a multiset) ≤ B ∧ B ≤ A

instance proof
  qed (simp add: equal-multiset-def eq-iff)

end

```

```

lemma [code nbe]:
  HOL.equal (A :: 'a::equal multiset) A  $\longleftrightarrow$  True
  by (fact equal-refl)

definition (in term-syntax)
  bagify :: ('a::typerep  $\times$  nat) list  $\times$  (unit  $\Rightarrow$  Code-Evaluation.term)
   $\Rightarrow$  'a multiset  $\times$  (unit  $\Rightarrow$  Code-Evaluation.term) where
  [code-unfold]: bagify xs = Code-Evaluation.valtermify Bag {·} xs

notation fcomp (infixl  $\circ >$  60)
notation scomp (infixl  $\circ ->$  60)

instantiation multiset :: (random) random
begin

definition
  Quickcheck.random i = Quickcheck.random i  $\circ ->$  ( $\lambda$ xs. Pair (bagify xs))

instance ..

end

no-notation fcomp (infixl  $\circ >$  60)
no-notation scomp (infixl  $\circ ->$  60)

hide-const (open) bagify

```

## 6.6 The multiset order

### 6.6.1 Well-foundedness

```

definition mult1 :: ('a  $\times$  'a) set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a multiset  $\times$  'a multiset) set where
  mult1 r = {(N, M).  $\exists$  a M0 K. M = M0 + {#a#}  $\wedge$  N = M0 + K  $\wedge$ 
  ( $\forall$  b. b :# K  $\dashrightarrow$  (b, a)  $\in$  r)}
```

  

```

definition mult :: ('a  $\times$  'a) set  $\Rightarrow$  ('a multiset  $\times$  'a multiset) set where
  mult r = (mult1 r)+
```

  

```

lemma not-less-empty [iff]: (M, {#})  $\notin$  mult1 r
  by (simp add: mult1-def)

lemma less-add: (N, M0 + {#a#})  $\in$  mult1 r  $\Longrightarrow$ 
  ( $\exists$  M. (M, M0)  $\in$  mult1 r  $\wedge$  N = M + {#a#})  $\vee$ 
  ( $\exists$  K. ( $\forall$  b. b :# K  $\dashrightarrow$  (b, a)  $\in$  r)  $\wedge$  N = M0 + K)
  (is -  $\Longrightarrow$  ?case1 (mult1 r)  $\vee$  ?case2)
  proof (unfold mult1-def)
    let ?r =  $\lambda$ K a.  $\forall$  b. b :# K  $\dashrightarrow$  (b, a)  $\in$  r
    let ?R =  $\lambda$ N M.  $\exists$  a M0 K. M = M0 + {#a#}  $\wedge$  N = M0 + K  $\wedge$  ?r K a
    let ?case1 = ?case1 {(N, M). ?R N M}
```

```

assume ( $N, M0 + \{\#a\#\}$ )  $\in \{(N, M). ?R N M\}$ 
then have  $\exists a' M0' K.$ 
 $M0 + \{\#a\#\} = M0' + \{\#a'\#\} \wedge N = M0' + K \wedge ?r K a'$  by simp
then show ?case1  $\vee$  ?case2
proof (elim exE conjE)
  fix  $a' M0' K$ 
  assume  $N: N = M0' + K$  and  $r: ?r K a'$ 
  assume  $M0 + \{\#a\#\} = M0' + \{\#a'\#\}$ 
  then have  $M0 = M0' \wedge a = a' \vee$ 
     $(\exists K'. M0 = K' + \{\#a'\#\} \wedge M0' = K' + \{\#a\#\})$ 
    by (simp only: add-eq-conv-ex)
  then show ?thesis
proof (elim disjE conjE exE)
  assume  $M0 = M0' a = a'$ 
  with  $N r$  have  $?r K a \wedge N = M0 + K$  by simp
  then have ?case2 .. then show ?thesis ..
next
  fix  $K'$ 
  assume  $M0' = K' + \{\#a\#\}$ 
  with  $N$  have  $n: N = K' + K + \{\#a\#\}$  by (simp add: add-ac)

  assume  $M0 = K' + \{\#a'\#\}$ 
  with  $r$  have ?R ( $K' + K$ )  $M0$  by blast
  with  $n$  have ?case1 by simp then show ?thesis ..
qed
qed
qed

```

```

lemma all-accessible: wf r ==>  $\forall M. M \in acc (mult1 r)$ 
proof
  let ?R = mult1 r
  let ?W = acc ?R
  {
    fix  $M M0 a$ 
    assume  $M0: M0 \in ?W$ 
    and wf-hyp: !!b.  $(b, a) \in r ==> (\forall M \in ?W. M + \{\#b\#\} \in ?W)$ 
    and acc-hyp:  $\forall M. (M, M0) \in ?R \rightarrow M + \{\#a\#\} \in ?W$ 
    have  $M0 + \{\#a\#\} \in ?W$ 
    proof (rule accI [of  $M0 + \{\#a\#\}$ ])
      fix  $N$ 
      assume ( $N, M0 + \{\#a\#\}$ )  $\in ?R$ 
      then have  $((\exists M. (M, M0) \in ?R \wedge N = M + \{\#a\#\}) \vee$ 
         $(\exists K. (\forall b. b :# K \rightarrow (b, a) \in r) \wedge N = M0 + K))$ 
      by (rule less-add)
      then show  $N \in ?W$ 
    proof (elim exE disjE conjE)
      fix  $M$  assume  $(M, M0) \in ?R$  and  $N: N = M + \{\#a\#\}$ 
      from acc-hyp have  $(M, M0) \in ?R \rightarrow M + \{\#a\#\} \in ?W$  ..
      from this and  $(M, M0) \in ?R$  have  $M + \{\#a\#\} \in ?W$  ..

```

```

then show  $N \in ?W$  by (simp only:  $N$ )
next
  fix  $K$ 
  assume  $N: N = M0 + K$ 
  assume  $\forall b. b :# K \rightarrow (b, a) \in r$ 
  then have  $M0 + K \in ?W$ 
  proof (induct  $K$ )
    case empty
      from  $M0$  show  $M0 + \{\#\} \in ?W$  by simp
    next
      case (add  $K x$ )
        from add.prems have  $(x, a) \in r$  by simp
        with wf-hyp have  $\forall M \in ?W. M + \{\#x\#} \in ?W$  by blast
        moreover from add have  $M0 + K \in ?W$  by simp
        ultimately have  $(M0 + K) + \{\#x\#} \in ?W ..$ 
        then show  $M0 + (K + \{\#x\#}) \in ?W$  by (simp only: add-assoc)
      qed
      then show  $N \in ?W$  by (simp only:  $N$ )
    qed
  qed
} note tedious-reasoning = this

assume wf: wf r
fix  $M$ 
show  $M \in ?W$ 
proof (induct  $M$ )
  show  $\{\#\} \in ?W$ 
  proof (rule accI)
    fix  $b$  assume  $(b, \{\#\}) \in ?R$ 
    with not-less-empty show  $b \in ?W$  by contradiction
  qed

fix  $M a$  assume  $M \in ?W$ 
from wf have  $\forall M \in ?W. M + \{\#a\#} \in ?W$ 
proof induct
  fix  $a$ 
  assume  $r: \exists b. (b, a) \in r \Rightarrow (\forall M \in ?W. M + \{\#b\#} \in ?W)$ 
  show  $\forall M \in ?W. M + \{\#a\#} \in ?W$ 
  proof
    fix  $M$  assume  $M \in ?W$ 
    then show  $M + \{\#a\#} \in ?W$ 
      by (rule acc-induct) (rule tedious-reasoning [OF - r])
  qed
  qed
  from this and  $\langle M \in ?W \rangle$  show  $M + \{\#a\#} \in ?W ..$ 
  qed
qed

theorem wf-mult1: wf r ==> wf (mult1 r)

```

```

by (rule acc-wfI) (rule all-accessible)

theorem wf-mult: wf r ==> wf (mult r)
unfolding mult-def by (rule wf-trancl) (rule wf-mult1)

```

### 6.6.2 Closure-free presentation

One direction.

```

lemma mult-implies-one-step:
trans r ==> (M, N) ∈ mult r ==>
  ∃ I J K. N = I + J ∧ M = I + K ∧ J ≠ {#} ∧
  (∀ k ∈ set-of K. ∃ j ∈ set-of J. (k, j) ∈ r)
apply (unfold mult-def mult1-def set-of-def)
apply (erule converse-trancl-induct, clarify)
apply (rule-tac x = M0 in exI, simp, clarify)
apply (case-tac a :# K)
apply (rule-tac x = I in exI)
apply (simp (no-asm))
apply (rule-tac x = (K - {#a#}) + Ka in exI)
apply (simp (no-asm-simp) add: add-assoc [symmetric])
apply (drule-tac f = λM. M - {#a#} in arg-cong)
apply (simp add: diff-union-single-conv)
apply (simp (no-asm-use) add: trans-def)
apply blast
apply (subgoal-tac a :# I)
apply (rule-tac x = I - {#a#} in exI)
apply (rule-tac x = J + {#a#} in exI)
apply (rule-tac x = K + Ka in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (simp add: multiset-eq-iff split: nat-diff-split)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (drule-tac f = λM. M - {#a#} in arg-cong, simp)
apply (simp add: multiset-eq-iff split: nat-diff-split)
apply (simp (no-asm-use) add: trans-def)
apply blast
apply (subgoal-tac a :# (M0 + {#a#}))
apply simp
apply (simp (no-asm))
done

lemma one-step-implies-mult-aux:
trans r ==>
  ∀ I J K. (size J = n ∧ J ≠ {#}) ∧ (∀ k ∈ set-of K. ∃ j ∈ set-of J. (k, j) ∈ r)) --> (I + K, I + J) ∈ mult r
apply (induct-tac n, auto)
apply (frule size-eq-Suc-imp-eq-union, clarify)
apply (rename-tac J', simp)
apply (erule noteE, auto)
apply (case-tac J' = {#})

```

```

apply (simp add: mult-def)
apply (rule r-into-trancl)
apply (simp add: mult1-def set-of-def, blast)

Now we know  $J' \neq \{\#\}$ .
apply (cut-tac  $M = K$  and  $P = \lambda x. (x, a) \in r$  in multiset-partition)
apply (erule-tac  $P = \forall k \in \text{set-of } K. ?P k$  in rev-mp)
apply (erule ssubst)
apply (simp add: Ball-def, auto)
apply (subgoal-tac
  (( $I + \{\# x : \# K. (x, a) \in r \#\} + \{\# x : \# K. (x, a) \notin r \#\},$ 
     $(I + \{\# x : \# K. (x, a) \in r \#\}) + J' \in \text{mult } r$ )
 prefer 2
 apply force
apply (simp (no-asm-use) add: add-assoc [symmetric] mult-def)
apply (erule trancl-trans)
apply (rule r-into-trancl)
apply (simp add: mult1-def set-of-def)
apply (rule-tac  $x = a$  in exI)
apply (rule-tac  $x = I + J'$  in exI)
apply (simp add: add-ac)
done

lemma one-step-implies-mult:
trans  $r ==> J \neq \{\#\} ==> \forall k \in \text{set-of } K. \exists j \in \text{set-of } J. (k, j) \in r$ 
==>  $(I + K, I + J) \in \text{mult } r$ 
using one-step-implies-mult-aux by blast

```

### 6.6.3 Partial-order properties

```

definition less-multiset :: 'a::order multiset ⇒ 'a multiset ⇒ bool (infix <# 50)
where
 $M' <# M \longleftrightarrow (M', M) \in \text{mult } \{(x', x). x' < x\}$ 

definition le-multiset :: 'a::order multiset ⇒ 'a multiset ⇒ bool (infix <= # 50)
where
 $M' <= # M \longleftrightarrow M' <# M \vee M' = M$ 

notation (xsymbols) less-multiset (infix ⊂# 50)
notation (xsymbols) le-multiset (infix ⊆# 50)

interpretation multiset-order: order le-multiset less-multiset
proof -
have irrefl:  $\bigwedge M :: 'a multiset. \neg M \subset# M$ 
proof
fix  $M :: 'a multiset$ 
assume  $M \subset# M$ 
then have MM:  $(M, M) \in \text{mult } \{(x, y). x < y\}$  by (simp add: less-multiset-def)
have trans:  $\{(x' :: 'a, x). x' < x\}$ 
by (rule transI) simp

```

```

moreover note MM
ultimately have  $\exists I J K. M = I + J \wedge M = I + K$ 
 $\wedge J \neq \{\#\} \wedge (\forall k \in \text{set-of } K. \exists j \in \text{set-of } J. (k, j) \in \{(x, y). x < y\})$ 
by (rule mult-implies-one-step)
then obtain I J K where M = I + J and M = I + K
and J  $\neq \{\#\}$  and  $(\forall k \in \text{set-of } K. \exists j \in \text{set-of } J. (k, j) \in \{(x, y). x < y\})$  by
blast
then have aux1:  $K \neq \{\#\}$  and aux2:  $\forall k \in \text{set-of } K. \exists j \in \text{set-of } K. k < j$  by
auto
have finite (set-of K) by simp
moreover note aux2
ultimately have set-of K = {}
by (induct rule: finite-induct) (auto intro: order-less-trans)
with aux1 show False by simp
qed
have trans:  $\bigwedge K M N :: 'a \text{ multiset}. K \subset\# M \implies M \subset\# N \implies K \subset\# N$ 
unfolding less-multiset-def mult-def by (blast intro: trancl-trans)
show class.order (le-multiset :: 'a multiset  $\Rightarrow$  -) less-multiset proof
qed (auto simp add: le-multiset-def irrefl dest: trans)
qed

lemma mult-less-irrefl [elim!]:
M  $\subset\# (M :: 'a :: \text{order multiset}) \implies R$ 
by (simp add: multiset-order.less-irrefl)

```

#### 6.6.4 Monotonicity of multiset union

```

lemma mult1-union:
(B, D)  $\in \text{mult1 } r \implies (C + B, C + D) \in \text{mult1 } r$ 
apply (unfold mult1-def)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x = a in exI)
apply (rule-tac x = C + M0 in exI)
apply (simp add: add-assoc)
done

lemma union-less-mono2: B  $\subset\# D \implies C + B \subset\# C + (D :: 'a :: \text{order multiset})$ 
apply (unfold less-multiset-def mult-def)
apply (erule trancl-induct)
apply (blast intro: mult1-union)
apply (blast intro: mult1-union trancl-trans)
done

lemma union-less-mono1: B  $\subset\# D \implies B + C \subset\# D + (C :: 'a :: \text{order multiset})$ 
apply (subst add-commute [of B C])
apply (subst add-commute [of D C])
apply (erule union-less-mono2)
done

```

```

lemma union-less-mono:
   $A \subset\# C ==> B \subset\# D ==> A + B \subset\# C + (D::'a::order multiset)$ 
  by (blast intro!: union-less-mono1 union-less-mono2 multiset-order.less-trans)

```

```

interpretation multiset-order: ordered-ab-semigroup-add plus le-multiset less-multiset
proof
qed (auto simp add: le-multiset-def intro: union-less-mono2)

```

## 6.7 The fold combinator

The intended behaviour is  $\text{fold-mset } f z \{\#x_1, \dots, x_n\#} = f x_1 (\dots (f x_n z) \dots)$  if  $f$  is associative-commutative.

The graph of  $\text{fold-mset}$ ,  $z$ : the start element,  $f$ : folding function,  $A$ : the multiset,  $y$ : the result.

**inductive**

```

 $\text{fold-msetG} :: ('a \Rightarrow 'b \Rightarrow 'b) \Rightarrow 'b \Rightarrow 'a \text{ multiset} \Rightarrow 'b \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ 
  for  $f :: 'a \Rightarrow 'b \Rightarrow 'b$ 
  and  $z :: 'b$ 

```

**where**

```

   $\text{emptyI} [\text{intro}]: \text{fold-msetG } f z \{\#\} z$ 
  |  $\text{insertI} [\text{intro}]: \text{fold-msetG } f z A y \implies \text{fold-msetG } f z (A + \{\#x\#}) (f x y)$ 

```

**inductive-cases**  $\text{empty-fold-msetGE}$  [elim!]:  $\text{fold-msetG } f z \{\#\} x$   
**inductive-cases**  $\text{insert-fold-msetGE}$ :  $\text{fold-msetG } f z (A + \{\#\}) y$

**definition**

```

 $\text{fold-mset} :: ('a \Rightarrow 'b \Rightarrow 'b) \Rightarrow 'b \Rightarrow 'a \text{ multiset} \Rightarrow 'b \text{ where}$ 
 $\text{fold-mset } f z A = (\text{THE } x. \text{fold-msetG } f z A x)$ 

```

**lemma** Diff1-fold-msetG:

```

 $\text{fold-msetG } f z (A - \{\#x\#}) y \implies x \in\# A \implies \text{fold-msetG } f z A (f x y)$ 
apply (frule-tac  $x = x$  in  $\text{fold-msetG.insertI}$ )
apply auto
done

```

**lemma** fold-msetG-nonempty:  $\exists x. \text{fold-msetG } f z A x$   
**apply** (induct A)  
**apply** blast  
**apply** clarsimp  
**apply** (drule-tac  $x = x$  in  $\text{fold-msetG.insertI}$ )  
**apply** auto  
**done**

**lemma** fold-mset-empty[simp]:  $\text{fold-mset } f z \{\#\} = z$   
**unfolding** fold-mset-def **by** blast

**context** comp-fun-commute  
**begin**

```

lemma fold-msetG-determ:
  fold-msetG f z A x ==> fold-msetG f z A y ==> y = x
proof (induct arbitrary: x y z rule: full-multiset-induct)
  case (less M x1 x2 Z)
  have IH:  $\forall A. A < M \longrightarrow$ 
     $(\forall x x' x''. fold\text{-}msetG f x'' A x \longrightarrow fold\text{-}msetG f x'' A x'$ 
     $\longrightarrow x' = x)$  by fact
  have Mfoldx1: fold-msetG f Z M x1 and Mfoldx2: fold-msetG f Z M x2 by fact +
  show ?case
  proof (rule fold-msetG.cases [OF Mfoldx1])
    assume M = {#} and x1 = Z
    then show ?case using Mfoldx2 by auto
  next
    fix B b u
    assume M = B + {#b#} and x1 = f b u and Bu: fold-msetG f Z B u
    then have MBb: M = B + {#b#} and x1: x1 = f b u by auto
    show ?case
    proof (rule fold-msetG.cases [OF Mfoldx2])
      assume M = {#} x2 = Z
      then show ?case using Mfoldx1 by auto
  next
    fix C c v
    assume M = C + {#c#} and x2 = f c v and Cv: fold-msetG f Z C v
    then have MCC: M = C + {#c#} and x2: x2 = f c v by auto
    then have CsubM: C < M by simp
    from MBb have BsubM: B < M by simp
    show ?case
    proof cases
      assume b=c
      then moreover have B = C using MBb MCC by auto
      ultimately show ?thesis using Bu Cv x1 x2 CsubM IH by auto
  next
    assume diff: b ≠ c
    let ?D = B - {#c#}
    have cinB: c ∈# B and binC: b ∈# C using MBb MCC diff
      by (auto intro: insert-noteq-member dest: sym)
    have B - {#c#} < B using cinB by (rule mset-less-diff-self)
    then have DsubM: ?D < M using BsubM by (blast intro: order-less-trans)
    from MBb MCC have B + {#b#} = C + {#c#} by blast
    then have [simp]: B + {#b#} - {#c#} = C
      using MBb MCC binC cinB by auto
    have B: B = ?D + {#c#} and C: C = ?D + {#b#}
      using MBb MCC diff binC cinB
      by (auto simp: multiset-add-sub-el-shuffle)
    then obtain d where Dfoldd: fold-msetG f Z ?D d
      using fold-msetG-nonempty by iprover
    then have fold-msetG f Z B (f c d) using cinB
      by (rule Diff1-fold-msetG)

```

```

then have  $f c d = u$  using  $IH\ BsubM\ Bu$  by blast
moreover
have  $fold\text{-}msetG\ f\ Z\ C\ (f\ b\ d)$  using  $binC\ cinB\ diff\ Dfoldd$ 
  by (auto simp: multiset-add-sub-el-shuffle
    dest: fold-msetG.insertI [where  $x=b$ ])
then have  $f b d = v$  using  $IH\ CsubM\ Cv$  by blast
ultimately show ?thesis using  $x_1\ x_2$ 
  by (auto simp: fun-left-comm)
qed
qed
qed
qed

lemma fold-mset-insert-aux:
(fold-msetG f z (A + {#x#}) v) =
(∃ y. fold-msetG f z A y ∧ v = f x y)
apply (rule iffI)
prefer 2
apply blast
apply (rule-tac A=A and f=f in fold-msetG-nonempty [THEN exE, standard])
apply (blast intro: fold-msetG-determ)
done

lemma fold-mset-equality: fold-msetG f z A y ==> fold-mset f z A = y
unfolding fold-mset-def by (blast intro: fold-msetG-determ)

lemma fold-mset-insert:
fold-mset f z (A + {#x#}) = f x (fold-mset f z A)
apply (simp add: fold-mset-def fold-mset-insert-aux)
apply (rule the-equality)
apply (auto cong add: conj-cong
  simp add: fold-mset-def [symmetric] fold-mset-equality fold-msetG-nonempty)
done

lemma fold-mset-commute: f x (fold-mset f z A) = fold-mset f (f x z) A
by (induct A) (auto simp: fold-mset-insert fun-left-comm [of x])

lemma fold-mset-single [simp]: fold-mset f z {#x#} = f x z
using fold-mset-insert [of z {#}] by simp

lemma fold-mset-union [simp]:
fold-mset f z (A+B) = fold-mset f (fold-mset f z A) B
proof (induct A)
  case empty then show ?case by simp
next
  case (add A x)
  have A + {#x#} + B = (A+B) + {#x#} by (simp add: add-ac)
  then have fold-mset f z (A + {#x#} + B) = f x (fold-mset f z (A + B))
    by (simp add: fold-mset-insert)

```

```

also have ... = fold-mset f (fold-mset f z (A + {#x#})) B
  by (simp add: fold-mset-commute[of x,symmetric] add fold-mset-insert)
finally show ?case .
qed

lemma fold-mset-fusion:
  assumes comp-fun-commute g
  shows (∀x y. h (g x y) = f x (h y)) ==> h (fold-mset g w A) = fold-mset f (h
w) A (is PROP ?P)
proof -
  interpret comp-fun-commute g by (fact assms)
  show PROP ?P by (induct A) auto
qed

lemma fold-mset-rec:
  assumes a ∈# A
  shows fold-mset f z A = f a (fold-mset f z (A - {#a#}))
proof -
  from assms obtain A' where A = A' + {#a#}
    by (blast dest: multi-member-split)
  then show ?thesis by simp
qed

end

```

A note on code generation: When defining some function containing a sub-term *fold-mset F*, code generation is not automatic. When interpreting locale *left-commutative* with *F*, the would be code thms for *fold-mset* become thms like *fold-mset F z {#} = z* where *F* is not a pattern but contains defined symbols, i.e. is not a code thm. Hence a separate constant with its own code thms needs to be introduced for *F*. See the image operator below.

## 6.8 Image

```

definition image-mset :: ('a ⇒ 'b) ⇒ 'a multiset ⇒ 'b multiset where
  image-mset f = fold-mset (op + o single o f) {#}

```

```

interpretation image-fun-commute: comp-fun-commute op + o single o f for f
proof qed (simp add: add-ac fun-eq-iff)

```

```

lemma image-mset-empty [simp]: image-mset f {#} = {#}
by (simp add: image-mset-def)

```

```

lemma image-mset-single [simp]: image-mset f {#x#} = {#f x#}
by (simp add: image-mset-def)

```

```

lemma image-mset-insert:
  image-mset f (M + {#a#}) = image-mset f M + {#f a#}
by (simp add: image-mset-def add-ac)

```

```

lemma image-mset-union [simp]:
  image-mset f (M+N) = image-mset f M + image-mset f N
apply (induct N)
apply simp
apply (simp add: add-assoc [symmetric] image-mset-insert)
done

lemma size-image-mset [simp]: size (image-mset f M) = size M
by (induct M) simp-all

lemma image-mset-is-empty-iff [simp]: image-mset f M = {#}  $\longleftrightarrow$  M = {#}
by (cases M) auto

syntax
  -comprehension1-mset :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  'b  $\Rightarrow$  'b multiset  $\Rightarrow$  'a multiset
    (({#/-. - :# -#})))

translations
  {#e. x:#M#} == CONST image-mset (%x. e) M

syntax
  -comprehension2-mset :: 'a  $\Rightarrow$  'b  $\Rightarrow$  'b multiset  $\Rightarrow$  bool  $\Rightarrow$  'a multiset
    (({#/ | - :# -/ -#})))

translations
  {#e | x:#M. P#}  $\Rightarrow$  {#e. x :# {# x:#M. P#}#}

This allows to write not just filters like {# x :# M. x < c#} but also images
like {#x + x. x :# M#} and {#x+x|x:#M. x<c#}, where the latter is
currently displayed as {#x + x. x :# {# x :# M. x < c#}#}.

enriched-type image-mset: image-mset proof -
  fix f g
  show image-mset f  $\circ$  image-mset g = image-mset (f  $\circ$  g)
  proof
    fix A
    show (image-mset f  $\circ$  image-mset g) A = image-mset (f  $\circ$  g) A
      by (induct A) simp-all
  qed
next
  show image-mset id = id
  proof
    fix A
    show image-mset id A = id A
      by (induct A) simp-all
  qed
qed

```

## 6.9 Termination proofs with multiset orders

```
lemma multi-member-skip: x  $\in\#$  XS  $\Longrightarrow$  x  $\in\#$  {# y #} + XS
```

```

and multi-member-this:  $x \in \# \{ \# \ x \ # \} + XS$ 
and multi-member-last:  $x \in \# \{ \# \ x \ # \}$ 
by auto

definition ms-strict = mult pair-less
definition ms-weak = ms-strict  $\cup$  Id

lemma ms-reduction-pair: reduction-pair (ms-strict, ms-weak)
unfolding reduction-pair-def ms-strict-def ms-weak-def pair-less-def
by (auto intro: wf-mult1 wf-trancl simp: mult-def)

lemma smsI:
  (set-of A, set-of B)  $\in$  max-strict  $\implies$  (Z + A, Z + B)  $\in$  ms-strict
  unfolding ms-strict-def
  by (rule one-step-implies-mult) (auto simp add: max-strict-def pair-less-def elim!:max-ext.cases)

lemma wmsI:
  (set-of A, set-of B)  $\in$  max-strict  $\vee$  A = {#}  $\wedge$  B = {#}
   $\implies$  (Z + A, Z + B)  $\in$  ms-weak
  unfolding ms-weak-def ms-strict-def
  by (auto simp add: pair-less-def max-strict-def elim!:max-ext.cases intro: one-step-implies-mult)

inductive pw-leq
where
  pw-leq-empty: pw-leq {#} {#}
  | pw-leq-step:  $\llbracket (x,y) \in pair\text{-}leq; pw\text{-}leq X Y \rrbracket \implies pw\text{-}leq (\{\#x\#} + X) (\{\#y\#} + Y)$ 

lemma pw-leq-lstep:
  (x, y)  $\in$  pair-leq  $\implies$  pw-leq {#x#} {#y#}
  by (drule pw-leq-step) (rule pw-leq-empty, simp)

lemma pw-leq-split:
  assumes pw-leq X Y
  shows  $\exists A B Z. X = A + Z \wedge Y = B + Z \wedge ((set\text{-}of A, set\text{-}of B) \in max\text{-}strict$ 
   $\vee (B = \{\#\} \wedge A = \{\#\}))$ 
  using assms
  proof (induct)
    case pw-leq-empty thus ?case by auto
  next
    case (pw-leq-step x y X Y)
    then obtain A B Z where
      [simp]: X = A + Z Y = B + Z
      and 1[simp]: (set-of A, set-of B)  $\in$  max-strict  $\vee$  (B = {#}  $\wedge$  A = {#})
      by auto
    from pw-leq-step have x = y  $\vee$  (x, y)  $\in$  pair-less
    unfolding pair-leq-def by auto
    thus ?case
    proof

```

```

assume [simp]:  $x = y$ 
have
   $\{\#x\#\} + X = A + (\{\#y\#\} + Z)$ 
   $\wedge \{\#y\#\} + Y = B + (\{\#y\#\} + Z)$ 
   $\wedge ((set-of A, set-of B) \in max-strict \vee (B = \{\#\} \wedge A = \{\#\}))$ 
  by (auto simp: add-ac)
thus ?case by (intro exI)
next
  assume  $A: (x, y) \in pair-less$ 
  let ? $A' = \{\#x\#\} + A$  and ? $B' = \{\#y\#\} + B$ 
  have  $\{\#x\#\} + X = ?A' + Z$ 
     $\{\#y\#\} + Y = ?B' + Z$ 
    by (auto simp add: add-ac)
  moreover have
     $(set-of ?A', set-of ?B') \in max-strict$ 
    using 1 A unfolding max-strict-def
    by (auto elim!: max-ext.cases)
  ultimately show ?thesis by blast
qed
qed

lemma
assumes pwleq: pw-leq  $Z Z'$ 
shows ms-strictI:  $(set-of A, set-of B) \in max-strict \implies (Z + A, Z' + B) \in ms-strict$ 
and ms-weakI1:  $(set-of A, set-of B) \in max-strict \implies (Z + A, Z' + B) \in ms-weak$ 
and ms-weakI2:  $(Z + \{\#\}, Z' + \{\#\}) \in ms-weak$ 
proof -
  from pw-leq-split[OF pwleq]
  obtain  $A' B' Z''$ 
  where [simp]:  $Z = A' + Z''$   $Z' = B' + Z''$ 
  and mx-or-empty:  $(set-of A', set-of B') \in max-strict \vee (A' = \{\#\} \wedge B' = \{\#\})$ 
  by blast
  {
    assume max:  $(set-of A, set-of B) \in max-strict$ 
    from mx-or-empty
    have  $(Z'' + (A + A'), Z'' + (B + B')) \in ms-strict$ 
    proof
      assume max':  $(set-of A', set-of B') \in max-strict$ 
      with max have  $(set-of (A + A'), set-of (B + B')) \in max-strict$ 
        by (auto simp: max-strict-def intro: max-ext-additive)
      thus ?thesis by (rule smsI)
    next
      assume [simp]:  $A' = \{\#\} \wedge B' = \{\#\}$ 
      show ?thesis by (rule smsI) (auto intro: max)
    qed
    thus  $(Z + A, Z' + B) \in ms-strict$  by (simp add: add-ac)
    thus  $(Z + A, Z' + B) \in ms-weak$  by (simp add: ms-weak-def)
  }

```

```

}

from mx-or-empty
have (Z'' + A', Z'' + B') ∈ ms-weak by (rule wmsI)
thus (Z + {#}, Z' + {#}) ∈ ms-weak by (simp add:add-ac)
qed

lemma empty-neutral: {#} + x = x x + {#} = x
and nonempty-plus: {# x #} + rs ≠ {#}
and nonempty-single: {# x #} ≠ {#}
by auto

setup ∙
let
  fun msetT T = Type (@{type-name multiset}, [T]);

  fun mk-mset T [] = Const (@{const-abbrev Mempty}, msetT T)
  | mk-mset T [x] = Const (@{const-name single}, T --> msetT T) $ x
  | mk-mset T (x :: xs) =
    Const (@{const-name plus}, msetT T --> msetT T --> msetT T) $
      mk-mset T [x] $ mk-mset T xs

  fun mset-member-tac m i =
    (if m <= 0 then
      rtac @{thm multi-member-this} i ORELSE rtac @{thm multi-member-last}
    i
    else
      rtac @{thm multi-member-skip} i THEN mset-member-tac (m - 1) i)

  val mset-nonempty-tac =
    rtac @{thm nonempty-plus} ORELSE' rtac @{thm nonempty-single}

  val regroup-munion-conv =
    Function-Lib.regroup-conv @{const-abbrev Mempty} @{const-name plus}
    (map (fn t => t RS eq-reflection) (@{thms add-ac} @ @{thms empty-neutral}))

  fun unfold-pwleq-tac i =
    (rtac @{thm pw-leq-step} i THEN (fn st => unfold-pwleq-tac (i + 1) st))
    ORELSE (rtac @{thm pw-leq-lstep} i)
    ORELSE (rtac @{thm pw-leq-empty} i)

  val set-of-simps = [@{thm set-of-empty}, @{thm set-of-single}, @{thm set-of-union},
    @{thm Un-insert-left}, @{thm Un-empty-left}]
in
  ScnpReconstruct.multiset-setup (ScnpReconstruct.Multiset
  {
    msetT=msetT, mk-mset=mk-mset, mset-regroup-conv=regroup-munion-conv,
    mset-member-tac=mset-member-tac, mset-nonempty-tac=mset-nonempty-tac,
    mset-pwleq-tac=unfold-pwleq-tac, set-of-simps=set-of-simps,
    smsI'= @{thm ms-strictI}, wmsI2''= @{thm ms-weakI2}, wmsI1= @{thm

```

```

ms-weakI1 },
  reduction-pair= @{thm ms-reduction-pair}
})
end
}}

```

## 6.10 Legacy theorem bindings

**lemmas** multi-count-eq = multiset-eq-iff [symmetric]

**lemma** union-commute:  $M + N = N + (M::'a multiset)$   
**by** (fact add-commute)

**lemma** union-assoc:  $(M + N) + K = M + (N + (K::'a multiset))$   
**by** (fact add-assoc)

**lemma** union-lcomm:  $M + (N + K) = N + (M + (K::'a multiset))$   
**by** (fact add-left-commute)

**lemmas** union-ac = union-assoc union-commute union-lcomm

**lemma** union-right-cancel:  $M + K = N + K \longleftrightarrow M = (N::'a multiset)$   
**by** (fact add-right-cancel)

**lemma** union-left-cancel:  $K + M = K + N \longleftrightarrow M = (N::'a multiset)$   
**by** (fact add-left-cancel)

**lemma** multi-union-self-other-eq:  $(A::'a multiset) + X = A + Y \implies X = Y$   
**by** (fact add-imp-eq)

**lemma** mset-less-trans:  $(M::'a multiset) < K \implies K < N \implies M < N$   
**by** (fact order-less-trans)

**lemma** multiset-inter-commute:  $A \# \cap B = B \# \cap A$   
**by** (fact inf.commute)

**lemma** multiset-inter-assoc:  $A \# \cap (B \# \cap C) = A \# \cap B \# \cap C$   
**by** (fact inf.assoc [symmetric])

**lemma** multiset-inter-left-commute:  $A \# \cap (B \# \cap C) = B \# \cap (A \# \cap C)$   
**by** (fact inf.left-commute)

**lemmas** multiset-inter-ac =  
 multiset-inter-commute  
 multiset-inter-assoc  
 multiset-inter-left-commute

**lemma** mult-less-not-refl:  
 $\neg M \subset \# (M::'a::order multiset)$

```

by (fact multiset-order.less-irrefl)

lemma mult-less-trans:
   $K \subset\# M ==> M \subset\# N ==> K \subset\# (N::'a::order multiset)$ 
  by (fact multiset-order.less-trans)

lemma mult-less-not-sym:
   $M \subset\# N ==> \neg N \subset\# (M::'a::order multiset)$ 
  by (fact multiset-order.less-not-sym)

lemma mult-less-asym:
   $M \subset\# N ==> (\neg P ==> N \subset\# (M::'a::order multiset)) ==> P$ 
  by (fact multiset-order.less-asym)

ML <<
fun multiset-postproc - maybe-name all-values (T as Type (-, [elem-T]))
  (Const - \$ t') =
  let
    val (maybe-opt, ps) =
      Nitpick-Model.dest-plain-fun t' ||> op ~~
      ||> map (apsnd (snd o HOLogic.dest-number))
    fun elems-for t =
      case AList.lookup (op =) ps t of
        SOME n => replicate n t
      | NONE => [Const (maybe-name, elem-T --> elem-T) \$ t]
  in
    case maps elems-for (all-values elem-T) @
      (if maybe-opt then [Const (Nitpick-Model.unrep (), elem-T)]
       else []) of
      [] => Const (@{const-name zero-class.zero}, T)
    | ts => foldl1 (fn (t1, t2) =>
        Const (@{const-name plus-class.plus}, T --> T --> T)
        \$ t1 \$ t2)
      (map (curry (op \$) (Const (@{const-name single},
          elem-T --> T))) ts)
  end
  | multiset-postproc - - - - t = t
>>

declaration <<
Nitpick-Model.register-term-postprocessor @{typ 'a multiset}
  multiset-postproc
>>

end

```

## 7 Tree with Nat labeled nodes and

**theory** *NatTree* **imports** *Main* **begin**

**datatype**

```
'leaf tree = Leaf nat 'leaf
          | Node nat ('leaf tree) ('leaf tree)
```

### 7.1 Linear Order on trees

**instantiation** *tree* :: (*linorder*) *linorder*

**begin**

**fun**

```
less-tree :: 'a tree ⇒ 'a tree ⇒ bool
```

**where**

```
(Leaf a x) < (Leaf b y) = (if (a = b) then x < y else a < b) |
(Node a n1 n2) < (Node b m1 m2) = (if (a = b)
                                         then (if (n1 = m1) then n2 < m2 else n1 < m1)
                                         else (a < b)) |
(Leaf - -) < (Node - - -) = True |
(Node - - -) < (Leaf - -) = False
```

**definition** *less-eq-tree*:  $(a::'a \text{ tree}) \leq b = ((a = b) \vee (a < b))$

**lemma** *antisym2*:  $(x :: 'a \text{ tree}) < y \implies \neg y < x$

**apply** (*induct arbitrary*: *y* **rule**: *tree.induct*)

**apply** (*case-tac* *y*, *auto*)

**apply** (*case-tac* *y*, *auto split*: *split-if-asm*)

**done**

**lemma** *antisym*:

**fixes** *x y* :: '*a tree* **shows**  $(x < y) = (x \leq y \wedge \neg y \leq x)$

**proof** –

**have**  $\neg x < x$  **by** (*induct rule*: *tree.induct*, *auto*)

**thus** ?*thesis* **using** *antisym2* **by** (*auto simp add*: *less-eq-tree*)

**qed**

**instance proof**

**fix** *x y* :: '*a tree* **show**  $(x < y) = (x \leq y \wedge \neg y \leq x)$  **using** *antisym* **by** *auto*

**next**

**fix** *x* :: '*a tree* **show**  $x \leq x$  **by** (*auto simp add*: *less-eq-tree*)

**next**

**fix** *x y* :: '*a tree* **show**  $[x \leq y; y \leq x] \implies x = y$

**apply** (*insert antisym* [*of x y*])

**apply** (*unfold less-eq-tree*)

**by** *clarsimp*

**next**

**fix** *x y* :: '*a tree* **show**  $x \leq y \vee y \leq x$

**apply** (*induct arbitrary*: *y* **rule**: *tree.induct*)

```

apply (auto simp add: less-eq-tree)
apply (case-tac y, auto split: split-if-asm)
apply (case-tac y, auto split: split-if-asm)
by force
next
fix x y z :: 'a tree show  $\llbracket x \leq y; y \leq z \rrbracket \implies x \leq z$ 
proof (induct arbitrary: x z rule: tree.induct)
  case (Leaf nat leaf x z)
    thus ?case
  apply (case-tac z, case-tac x) prefer 3
  apply (case-tac x)
  apply (auto simp add: less-eq-tree split: split-if-asm)
done
next
case (Node nat tree1 tree2 x z) thus ?case
proof (cases z)
  case (Leaf n t) thus ?thesis using prems(3-)
by (auto simp add: less-eq-tree split: split-if-asm)
next
  case (Node natz tree1z tree2z) thus ?thesis
  proof (cases x)
    case (Leaf n t) thus ?thesis using prems(3-)
    by (auto simp add: less-eq-tree split: split-if-asm)
  next
    case (Node natx tree1x tree2x) thus ?thesis
    proof (cases)
      assume natx = natz thus ?thesis
      proof -
        have t1:  $\llbracket tree1x \leq tree1; tree1 \leq tree1z \rrbracket \implies tree1x \leq tree1z$  using prems(1)
        .
        have t2:  $\llbracket tree2x \leq tree2; tree2 \leq tree2z \rrbracket \implies tree2x \leq tree2z$  using prems(2)
        .
        show ?thesis using t1 t2 prems(3-)
      apply (auto simp add: less-eq-tree split: split-if-asm)
      by (auto dest: antisym2)
      qed
    next
    assume natx  $\neq$  natz thus ?thesis using prems(3-)
    by (auto simp add: less-eq-tree split: split-if-asm)
  qed
  qed
  qed
qed
end
end

```

## 8 Message Theory for XOR

```
theory MessageTheoryXor
imports MessageTheory Event
  ~~ /src/HOL/Library/List-lexord
  ~~ /src/HOL/Library/Multiset
    NatTree
begin
```

## 9 Message Algebra with XOR

the term algebra for messages with xor

```
datatype
fmsg = AGENT agent      — Agent names
      | NUMBER int       — Ordinary integers
      | REAL real        — Real Numbers, used for times, locations, ..
      | NONCE agent nat   — Unguessable nonces, tagged with agent to prevent collisions
      | KEY key           — Crypto keys
      | HASH fmsg         — Hashing
      | MPAIR fmsg fmsg   — Compound messages
      | CRYPT key fmsg    — Encryption, public- or shared-key
      | XOR fmsg fmsg (infixr ⊕ 65) — Exclusive-or of two messages
      | ZERO
```

### 9.1 Linear Order on Messages via NatTree

```
datatype mleaf = TNat nat | TReal real | TInt int | TAgent agent
```

```
definition nil-tree[simp]: nil = Leaf 0 (TNat 0)
```

```
fun
fmsg2tree :: fmsg ⇒ mleaf tree
where
fmsg2tree (AGENT a) = Leaf 1 (TAgent a) |
fmsg2tree (NUMBER i) = Leaf 2 (TInt i) |
fmsg2tree (REAL r) = Leaf 3 (TReal r) |
fmsg2tree (NONCE a n) = Node 4 (Leaf 41 (TAgent a)) (Node 42 (Leaf 42
(TNat n)) nil) |
fmsg2tree (KEY k) = Leaf 5 (TNat k) |
fmsg2tree (HASH h) = Node 6 (fmsg2tree h) nil |
fmsg2tree (MPAIR a b) = Node 7 (fmsg2tree a) (Node 71 (fmsg2tree b) nil) |
fmsg2tree (CRYPT k m) = Node 8 (Leaf 81 (TNat k)) (Node 81 (fmsg2tree m)
nil) |
fmsg2tree (XOR a b) = Node 9 (fmsg2tree a) (Node 91 (fmsg2tree b) nil) |
fmsg2tree ZERO = Leaf 10 (TNat 0)
```

```

instantiation mleaf :: linorder
begin

fun
  less-mleaf :: mleaf  $\Rightarrow$  mleaf  $\Rightarrow$  bool
where
  ( $TNat\ n$ )  $<$  ( $TNat\ m$ ) = ( $n < m$ ) |
  ( $TNat\ -$ )  $<$  - = True |
  ( $TReal\ r$ )  $<$  ( $TReal\ s$ ) = ( $s < r$ ) |
  ( $TReal\ -$ )  $<$  ( $TNat\ -$ ) = False |
  ( $TReal\ -$ )  $<$  - = True |
  ( $TInt\ i$ )  $<$  ( $TInt\ j$ ) = ( $i < j$ ) |
  ( $TInt\ -$ )  $<$  ( $TNat\ -$ ) = False |
  ( $TInt\ -$ )  $<$  ( $TReal\ -$ ) = False |
  ( $TInt\ -$ )  $<$  - = True |
  ( $TAgent\ a$ )  $<$  ( $TAgent\ b$ ) = ( $a < b$ ) |
  ( $TAgent\ a$ )  $<$  - = False

definition less-eq-mleaf: ( $a::mleaf$ )  $\leq$   $b$  = (( $a = b$ )  $\vee$  ( $a < b$ ))

instance proof
  fix  $x\ y :: mleaf$  show ( $x < y$ ) = ( $x \leq y \wedge \neg y \leq x$ )
    apply (auto simp add: less-eq-mleaf)
    apply (case-tac  $x$ , auto)
    apply (case-tac  $x$ )
    apply (case-tac  $y$ , auto) +
    done
  next
    fix  $x :: mleaf$  show  $x \leq x$  by (auto simp add: less-eq-mleaf)
  next
    fix  $x\ y\ z :: mleaf$  show  $\llbracket x \leq y; y \leq z \rrbracket \implies x \leq z$ 
      apply (auto simp add: less-eq-mleaf)
      apply (case-tac  $x$ )
      apply (case-tac  $y$ )
      apply (case-tac  $z$ , auto)
      apply (case-tac  $y$ , auto)
      apply (case-tac  $y$ , auto)
      apply (case-tac  $y$ , auto)
      apply (case-tac  $z$ , auto)
      apply (case-tac  $z$ , auto)
      apply (case-tac  $y$ , auto)
      apply (case-tac  $z$ , auto)
      done
  next
    fix  $x\ y :: mleaf$  show  $\llbracket x \leq y; y \leq x \rrbracket \implies x = y$ 

```

```

apply (auto simp add: less-eq-mleaf)
apply (case-tac x)
  apply (case-tac y, auto)
  apply (case-tac y, auto)
  apply (case-tac y, auto)
  apply (case-tac y, auto)
done
next
fix x y :: mleaf show x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x
  apply (auto simp add: less-eq-mleaf)
  apply (case-tac x)
    apply (case-tac y, auto) +
done
qed
end

lemma fmsg2tree-inj: inj fmsg2tree
  apply (unfold inj-on-def)
  apply (rule ballI)
  apply (rule-tac fmsg=x in fmsg.induct)
  apply auto
  apply (case-tac y, auto) +
done

lemmas fmsg2tree-inj2 = fmsg2tree-inj[simplified inj-on-def, rule-format, simplified]
instantiation fmsg :: linorder
begin

definition less-fmsg: (a :: fmsg) < b = (fmsg2tree a < fmsg2tree b)

definition less-eq-fmsg: (a :: fmsg) ≤ b = (fmsg2tree a ≤ fmsg2tree b)

instance proof
fix x y :: fmsg show (x < y) = (x ≤ y ∧ ¬ y ≤ x)
  by (auto simp add: less-fmsg less-eq-fmsg)
next
fix x :: fmsg show x ≤ x by (auto simp add: less-eq-fmsg)
next
fix x y z :: fmsg show [x ≤ y; y ≤ z] ⇒ x ≤ z
  by (auto simp add: less-eq-fmsg)
next
fix x y :: fmsg show [x ≤ y; y ≤ x] ⇒ x = y
  apply (auto simp add: less-eq-fmsg)
  apply (auto intro: fmsg2tree-inj2)
done
next

```

```

fix x y :: fmsg show x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x
  apply (auto simp add: less-eq-fmsg)
  done
qed

end

```

## 9.2 Normalization Function and its Properties

**definition**

$XORnz :: fmsg \Rightarrow fmsg \Rightarrow fmsg$  (**infixr** ⊕ 65)

**where**

$XORnz a b = (\text{if } b = \text{ZERO} \text{ then } a \text{ else } a \oplus b)$

**fun**

$normxor :: fmsg \Rightarrow fmsg \Rightarrow fmsg$  (**infixr** ⊗ 65)

**where**

$x \otimes \text{ZERO} = x$  |

$\text{ZERO} \otimes x = x$  |

$(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2) =$

$(\text{if } a1 = b1 \text{ then } a2 \otimes b2$

$\text{else } (\text{if } a1 < b1 \text{ then } a1 \odot (a2 \otimes (b1 \oplus b2))$

$\text{else } (b1 \odot ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2)))$ ) |

$a \otimes (b1 \oplus b2) =$

$(\text{if } a = b1 \text{ then } b2$

$\text{else } (\text{if } a < b1 \text{ then } a \oplus (b1 \oplus b2)$

$\text{else } b1 \odot (a \otimes b2)))$ ) |

$(b1 \oplus b2) \otimes a =$

$(\text{if } a = b1 \text{ then } b2$

$\text{else } (\text{if } a < b1 \text{ then } a \oplus (b1 \oplus b2)$

$\text{else } b1 \odot (b2 \otimes a)))$ ) |

$a \otimes b = (\text{if } a = b \text{ then } \text{ZERO} \text{ else } (\text{if } a < b \text{ then } a \oplus b \text{ else } b \oplus a))$

**fun**

$norm :: fmsg \Rightarrow fmsg$

**where**

$norm (\text{AGENT } a) = \text{AGENT } a$  |

$norm \text{ZERO} = \text{ZERO}$  |

$norm (\text{NUMBER } n) = \text{NUMBER } n$  |

$norm (\text{REAL } r) = \text{REAL } r$  |

$norm (\text{NONCE } a t) = \text{NONCE } a t$  |

$norm (\text{KEY } k) = \text{KEY } k$  |

$norm (\text{HASH } h) = \text{HASH } (\text{norm } h)$  |

$norm (\text{MPAIR } a b) = \text{MPAIR } (\text{norm } a) (\text{norm } b)$  |

$norm (\text{CRYPT } k m) = \text{CRYPT } k (\text{norm } m)$  |

$norm (a \oplus b) = (\text{norm } a) \otimes (\text{norm } b)$

```

lemma normxor-com:  $x \otimes y = y \otimes x$ 
  apply (induct x arbitrary: y)
  apply (rule-tac fmsg=y in fmsg.induct, auto) +
done

definition
  standard :: fmsg  $\Rightarrow$  bool
where
  standard  $x \equiv x \notin \{XOR\ x\ y \mid x\ y.\ True\} \cup \{ZERO\}$ 

lemma standard-xorD[dest]: standard ( $XOR\ a\ b$ )  $\Longrightarrow P$ 
  apply (auto simp add: standard-def)
done

lemma standard-zeroD[dest]: standard ZERO  $\Longrightarrow P$ 
  apply (auto simp add: standard-def)
done

lemma standard-AGENT[simp]: standard (AGENT a) by (auto simp add: standard-def)
lemma standard-NUMBER[simp]: standard (NUMBER a) by (auto simp add: standard-def)
lemma standard-REAL[simp]: standard (REAL a) by (auto simp add: standard-def)
lemma standard-NONCE[simp]: standard (NONCE a b) by (auto simp add: standard-def)
lemma standard-KEY[simp]: standard (KEY a) by (auto simp add: standard-def)
lemma standard-HASH[simp]: standard (HASH h) by (auto simp add: standard-def)
lemma standard-MPAIR[simp]: standard (MPAIR a b) by (auto simp add: standard-def)
lemma standard-CRYPT[simp]: standard (CRYPT k m) by (auto simp add: standard-def)

lemma normxor-case-standard-fst:
  standard a  $\Longrightarrow$ 
   $a \otimes (x \oplus y) =$ 
  (if a = x then y
   else (if a < x then a  $\oplus$  (x  $\oplus$  y)
        else x  $\odot$  (a  $\otimes$  y)))
  apply (case-tac a, auto)
done

lemma normxor-case-standard-snd:
  standard a  $\Longrightarrow$ 
   $(x \oplus y) \otimes a =$ 
  (if a = x then y
   else (if a < x then
         a  $\oplus$  (x  $\oplus$  y)
         else x  $\odot$  (y  $\otimes$  a)))
  apply (case-tac a, auto)
done

```

```

lemma normxor-case-standard-both:
   $\llbracket \text{standard } a; \text{standard } b \rrbracket \implies a \otimes b = (\text{if } a = b \text{ then } \text{ZERO} \text{ else } (\text{if } a < b \text{ then } a \oplus b \text{ else } b \oplus a))$ 
apply (case-tac a)
apply (case-tac b)
apply (force,force,force,force,force,force,force,force,force)
apply (case-tac b)
done

```

```

lemma normxor-case-zero-fst[simp]: normxor ZERO x = x
apply (case-tac x)
apply auto
done

```

```

lemma normxor-case-zero-snd[simp]: normxor x ZERO = x
apply (case-tac x)
apply auto
done

```

**lemmas** normxor-standard = normxor-case-standard-fst normxor-case-standard-snd  
 normxor-case-standard-both

**definition**  
 $\text{first} :: \text{fmsg} \Rightarrow \text{fmsg}$   
**where**  
 $\text{first } x = (\text{if } \text{standard } x \text{ then } x \text{ else } \text{case } x \text{ of } \text{XOR } a \ b \Rightarrow a \mid - \Rightarrow x)$

```

lemma first-xor-fst-standard[simp]: standard a  $\implies$  first (XOR a b) = a
apply (auto simp add: first-def)
done

```

```

lemma first-standard[simp]: standard  $x \Rightarrow \text{first } x = x$  by (auto simp add: first-def)
lemma first-ZERO[simp]: first ZERO = ZERO by (auto simp add: first-def)
lemma first-HASH[simp]: first (HASH  $x$ ) = HASH  $x$  by (auto simp add: first-def)
lemma first-AGENT[simp]: first (AGENT  $x$ ) = AGENT  $x$  by (auto simp add: first-def)
lemma first-NUMBER[simp]: first (NUMBER  $x$ ) = NUMBER  $x$  by (auto simp add: first-def)
lemma first-REAL[simp]: first (REAL  $x$ ) = REAL  $x$  by (auto simp add: first-def)
lemma first-NONCE[simp]: first (NONCE  $x y$ ) = NONCE  $x y$  by (auto simp add: first-def)
lemma first-CRYPT[simp]: first (CRYPT  $x y$ ) = CRYPT  $x y$  by (auto simp add: first-def)
lemma first-MPAIR[simp]: first (MPAIR  $x y$ ) = MPAIR  $x y$  by (auto simp add: first-def)
lemma first-KEY[simp]: first (KEY  $x$ ) = KEY  $x$  by (auto simp add: first-def)

```

**inductive**

```

normed :: fmsg => bool
where
| Agent[intro]: normed (AGENT  $a$ )
| Number[intro]: normed (NUMBER  $n$ )
| Real[intro]: normed (REAL  $r$ )
| Nonce[intro]: normed (NONCE  $a t$ )
| Key[intro]: normed (KEY  $k$ )
| Zero[intro]: normed ZERO
| Hash[intro]: normed  $h \Rightarrow$  normed (HASH  $h$ )
| MPair[intro]: [ normed  $a$ ; normed  $b$  ]  $\Rightarrow$  normed (MPAIR  $a b$ )
| Crypt[intro]: normed  $m \Rightarrow$  normed (CRYPT  $k m$ )
| Xor: [ normed  $a$ ; standard  $a$ ; normed  $b$ ;  $a < \text{first } b$ ;  $b \neq \text{ZERO}$  ]
     $\Rightarrow$  normed (XOR  $a b$ )

```

Inversion rules for normed

```

lemma normed-XOR-ZERO-fst[intro]:  $\neg (\text{normed } (\text{XOR } \text{ZERO } a))$ 
proof -

```

```

{
  fix  $x$  :: fmsg
  have normed  $x \Rightarrow \forall a. x \neq \text{XOR } \text{ZERO } a$ 
    apply (induct  $x$  rule: normed.induct)
    apply auto
    done
}
thus ?thesis by auto

```

qed

```

lemma normed-XOR-ZERO-snd[intro]:  $\neg (\text{normed } (\text{XOR } a \text{ ZERO}))$ 
proof -

```

```

{
  fix  $x$  :: fmsg

```

```

have normed x ==>  $\forall a. x \neq \text{XOR } a \text{ ZERO}$ 
  apply (induct x rule: normed.induct)
  apply auto
  done
}
thus ?thesis by auto
qed

lemma normed-XOR-XOR-fst[intro]:  $\neg (\text{normed } (\text{XOR } (\text{XOR } a b) c))$ 
proof -
{
  fix x :: fmsg
  have normed x ==>  $\forall a b c. x \neq \text{XOR } (\text{XOR } a b) c$ 
    apply (induct x rule: normed.induct)
    apply auto
    done
}
thus ?thesis by auto
qed

lemma normed-XOR-same:  $\neg \text{normed } (\text{XOR } x x)$ 
proof -
{
  fix x :: fmsg
  have normed x ==>  $\forall a. x \neq \text{XOR } a a$ 
    apply (induct x rule: normed.induct)
    apply (auto simp add: first-def)
    done
}
thus ?thesis by auto
qed

lemma normed-XOR-sameD[dest]:  $\text{normed } (\text{XOR } x x) \Rightarrow P$ 
by (insert normed-XOR-same, auto)

lemma normed-XOR-XOR-fstD[dest]:  $\text{normed } (\text{XOR } (\text{XOR } a b) c) \Rightarrow P$ 
by (insert normed-XOR-XOR-fst, auto)

lemma normed-XOR-ZERO-fstD[dest]:  $\text{normed } (\text{XOR } \text{ZERO } x) \Rightarrow P$ 
by (insert normed-XOR-ZERO-fst, auto)

lemma normed-XOR-ZERO-sndD[dest]:  $\text{normed } (\text{XOR } x \text{ ZERO}) \Rightarrow P$ 
by (insert normed-XOR-ZERO-snd, auto)

lemma order-fmsg-total:  $x \neq y \Rightarrow \neg ((x::fmsg) < y) \Rightarrow y < x$ 
by auto

inductive-cases normed-XOR-nested:  $\text{normed } (\text{XOR } a (\text{XOR } b c))$ 
inductive-cases normed-XOR:  $\text{normed } (\text{XOR } a b)$ 

```

```

inductive-cases normed-HASH: normed (HASH a)
inductive-cases normed-MPAIR: normed (MPAIR a b)
inductive-cases normed-CRYPT: normed (CRYPT k m)

lemma normed-xor-snd: normed (XOR a b)  $\implies$  normed b
  apply (erule normed-XOR)
  apply auto
  done

lemma normed-xor-fst: normed (XOR a b)  $\implies$  normed a
  apply (erule normed-XOR)
  apply auto
  done

lemma normed-xor-smaller-standard:  $\llbracket \text{normed } (\text{XOR } a b); \text{ standard } b \rrbracket \implies a < b$ 
  apply (erule normed-XOR)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def)
  done

lemma normed-xor-smaller-nested:  $\llbracket \text{normed } (\text{XOR } a (\text{XOR } b c)) \rrbracket \implies a < b$ 
  apply (erule normed-XOR-nested)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def split: split-if-asm)
  done

lemma normed-xor-fst-standard: normed (XOR x1 x2)  $\implies$  standard x1
  apply (erule normed-XOR)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def split: split-if-asm)
  done

lemma normed-xor-snd-nozero: normed (XOR x1 x2)  $\implies$  x2  $\neq$  ZERO
  apply (erule normed-XOR)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def split: split-if-asm)
  done

lemma normed-xor-not-nested-diff:
   $\llbracket x < y; \text{standard } x; \text{standard } y; \text{normed } x; \text{normed } y \rrbracket \implies \text{normed } (\text{XOR } x y)$ 
  apply (rule normed.Xor)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def split: split-if-asm)
  done

lemma normed-XOR-XOR-smaller-trans:
   $\llbracket \text{normed } (\text{XOR } a (\text{XOR } b c)); \text{standard } c \rrbracket \implies a < c$ 
  apply (erule normed-XOR-nested)
  apply auto
  apply (erule normed-XOR)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def split: split-if-asm)
  done

```

```

lemma standard-xor-nested-normxor:
  assumes normeda: normed a
  and standarda: standard a
  and normedb: normed b
  and standardb: standard b
  and normedxor: normed (b1 ⊕ b2)
  and normedaxor: normed (a ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2))
  and bless: b < b1
  shows normed (a ⊗ (b ⊕ (b1 ⊕ b2))) using prems
proof -
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume a = b
    thus ?thesis using prems
      apply (case-tac a)
      by auto
  next
    assume neq: a ≠ b
    show ?thesis proof cases
      assume a < b
      thus ?thesis using prems
        apply (case-tac a)
        apply (auto intro!: normed.Xor split: split-if-asm simp add: first-def)
      done
    next
      assume ¬ a < b
      hence xle: b < a using neq by auto
      thus ?thesis using prems
        apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def split: split-if-asm)
        apply (case-tac standard b2) prefer 3
        apply (case-tac standard b2) prefer 5
        apply (case-tac standard b2) prefer 7
        apply (case-tac standard b2)
        apply (auto intro!: normed.Xor intro: order-fmsg-total
          split: split-if-asm
          simp add: first-def
          dest: normed-xor-smaller-standard
          normed-xor-smaller-nested normed-xor-fst-standard)
        apply (case-tac b2, auto)
        apply (drule normed-xor-smaller-nested)
        apply force
      done
    qed
  qed
qed

lemma standard-xor-normxor:
  assumes normeda: normed a
  and standarda: standard a

```

```

and    normedx:  normed x
and    normedy:  normed y
and    standardx: standard x
and    standardy: standard y
and    normedxor: normed (a ⊕ y)
and    normedaxor: normed (a ⊗ x)
and    aless:    x < y
shows normed (a ⊗ (x ⊕ y)) using prems
apply (case-tac a, auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
apply (auto intro!: normed.Xor split: split-if-asm simp add: first-def)
done

lemma xor-normxor:
assumes normeda:  normed a
and    standarda: standard a
and    normedx:  normed (x ⊕ y)
and    normedxor: normed (a ⊕ y)
and    normedaxor: normed (a ⊗ x)
and    aless:    x < first y
and    ynotzero: y ≠ ZERO
shows normed (a ⊗ (x ⊕ y)) using prems
apply -
apply (frule normed-xor-fst)
apply (frule normed-xor-snd)
apply (frule normed-xor-fst-standard)
apply (case-tac standard y)
apply (rule standard-xor-normxor)
apply force apply force apply force
apply force apply force apply force
apply force apply force
apply (force simp add: first-def)
apply (case-tac y)
apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply (simp only: ext)
apply (rule standard-xor-nested-normxor)
by (auto simp add: first-def)

lemma normxor-normed-com: normed (a ⊗ b) ==> normed (b ⊗ a)
by (auto simp add: normxor-com)

lemma standard-standard-normxor:
assumes normed a
and normed b
and standard a
and standard b
shows normed (a ⊗ b) using prems
apply (case-tac a)
apply (auto intro!: normed.Xor order-fmsg-total simp add: first-def normxor-standard)

```

```

split: split-if-asm)
done

lemma normed-xor-smaller[intro]: [ normed (XOR a b) ]  $\implies$  a < first b
  apply (erule normed-XOR)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def)
done

lemma normxor-assoc:
  assumes st: standard a
  and   le-b: a < first b
  and   le-c: a < first c
  and   bnz: b  $\neq$  ZERO
  and   cnz: c  $\neq$  ZERO
  shows (a  $\oplus$  b)  $\otimes$  c = b  $\otimes$  (a  $\oplus$  c) using prems
proof cases
  assume b  $\otimes$  c = ZERO
  have (a  $\oplus$  b)  $\otimes$  c = a using prems
    apply (case-tac standard c)
    apply (auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def split: split-if-asm)
    apply (case-tac c, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (case-tac c, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    done
  also have a = b  $\otimes$  (a  $\oplus$  c) using prems
    apply (case-tac standard b)
    apply (auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def split: split-if-asm)
    apply (case-tac b, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (case-tac b, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    done
  finally show ?thesis by auto
next
  assume b  $\otimes$  c  $\neq$  ZERO
  have (a  $\oplus$  b)  $\otimes$  c = a  $\oplus$  (b  $\otimes$  c) using prems
    apply (case-tac standard c)
    apply (auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def split: split-if-asm)
    apply (case-tac c, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (case-tac c, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    done
  also have ... = b  $\otimes$  (a  $\oplus$  c) using prems
    apply (case-tac standard b)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def first-def split: split-if-asm)
    apply (case-tac b, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (case-tac c, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (case-tac b, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    done
  finally show (a  $\oplus$  b)  $\otimes$  c = b  $\otimes$  (a  $\oplus$  c) by auto
qed

lemma normxor-first:

```

```

assumes normed x
and normed y
and normxor x y ≠ ZERO
shows first (x ⊗ y) ≥ min (first x) (first y) using prems
proof (induct x arbitrary: y)
  case (Agent a)
  thus ?case using prems
    apply (induct y)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    done
next
  case (Hash h)
  show ?case using prems(4,6–)
    apply (induct y)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (auto dest: normed-xor-smaller normed-xor-fst-standard)
    done
next
  case (MPair a b)
  show ?case using prems(4,6,8–)
    apply (induct y)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (auto dest: normed-xor-smaller normed-xor-fst-standard)
    done
next
  case (Real r)
  thus ?case
    apply (induct y)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    done
next
  case (Crypt m k)
  show ?case using prems(4,6–)
    apply (induct y)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (auto dest: normed-xor-smaller normed-xor-fst-standard)
    done
next
  case (Number n)
  thus ?case
    apply (induct y)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    done
next
  case (Nonce a n)
  thus ?case
    apply (induct y)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    done

```

```

next
  case (Key k)
  thus ?case
    apply (induct y)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    done
next
  case Zero
  thus ?case
    apply (induct y)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    done
next
  case(Xor a1 a2)
  show ?case using prems(4,6,7,9--)
    apply (induct y)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def) defer
    apply (force dest: normed-xor-smaller normed-xor-fst-standard) defer
    apply (force dest: normed-xor-smaller normed-xor-fst-standard)
    apply (case-tac standard y2)
      apply (auto split: split-if-asm simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
      apply (case-tac y2)
      apply (auto split: split-if-asm simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def) prefer
2
      apply (drule normed-xor-snd)
      apply force
      apply (erule normed-XOR)
      apply auto
      apply (frule normed-xor-snd)
      apply simp
      apply (drule prems(8)) back back back
      apply force
      apply (auto simp add: min-def split: split-if-asm)
      apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
      apply force
      done
qed

lemma normed-normxor:
  assumes na: normed a
  and nb: normed b
  shows normed (a  $\otimes$  b)
  using na nb
proof (induct a arbitrary: b rule: normed.induct)
  case (Agent a)
  show ?case using <normed b>
  proof (induct b)
    case (Agent x) show ?case by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Number x) show ?case by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)

```

```

next case (Real x) show ?case by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Key k) show ?case by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Nonce x y) show ?case by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case Zero show ?case by auto
next case (Hash h)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (MPair x y)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Crypt k m)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next
  case (Xor x y) show ?case using prems apply – by (rule xor-normxor, auto
intro: normed.Xor)
  qed
next
  case (Xor a b c)
  have normab: normed (XOR a b) using prems apply – apply (rule normed.Xor)
by auto
  have normed (normxor c (XOR a b)) using <normed cproof (induct c)
    case (Agent x)
    show ?case using prems(1–3) prems(5–6) prems(8–) normab apply –
      apply (rule xor-normxor)
    by (auto intro: prems(7)[of AGENT x, THEN normxor-normed-com] normed.Xor
      simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
next case (Number x)
  show ?case using prems(1–3) prems(5–6) prems(8–) normab apply –
    apply (rule xor-normxor)
    by (auto intro: prems(7)[of NUMBER x, THEN normxor-normed-com]
normed.Xor
      simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
next case (Real x)
  show ?case using prems(1–3) prems(5–6) prems(8–) normab apply –
    apply (rule xor-normxor)
  by (auto intro: prems(7)[of REAL x, THEN normxor-normed-com] normed.Xor
    simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
next case (Key k)
  show ?case using prems(1–3) prems(5–6) prems(8–) normab apply –
    apply (rule xor-normxor)
  by (auto intro: prems(7)[of KEY k, THEN normxor-normed-com] normed.Xor
    simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
next case Zero show ?case using prems
  apply simp
  apply (rule normed.Xor)
  by auto
next case (Nonce x y)
  show ?case using prems(1–3) prems(5–6) prems(8–) normab apply –
    apply (rule xor-normxor)
  by (auto intro: prems(7)[of NONCE x y, THEN normxor-normed-com])

```

```

normed.Xor
  simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
next case (Hash h)
  show ?case using prems(1-3) prems(5-6) prems(8-) normab apply -
    apply (rule xor-normxor)
  by (auto intro: prems(7)[of HASH h, THEN normxor-normed-com] normed.Xor
      simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
next case (MPair x y)
  show ?case using prems(1-3) prems(5-6) prems(8-) normab apply -
    apply (rule xor-normxor)
  by (auto intro: prems(7)[of MPART x y, THEN normxor-normed-com])
normed.Xor
  simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
next case (Crypt k m)
  show ?case using prems(1-3) prems(5-6) prems(8-) normab apply -
    apply (rule xor-normxor)
  by (auto intro: prems(7)[of CRYPT m k, THEN normxor-normed-com])
normed.Xor
  simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
next
  case (Xor x y)
  have normedxxy: normed (x ⊕ y)
    using ⟨x < first y⟩ ⟨standard x⟩ ⟨normed x⟩ ⟨normed y⟩ ⟨y ≠ ZERO⟩
    by (auto intro: normed.Xor normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  show ?case proof cases
    assume a = x
    thus ?case using ⟨y ≠ ZERO⟩ ⟨normed y⟩ ⟨normed b⟩
  apply (auto intro: normed.Xor)
  by (erule prems(7)[THEN normxor-normed-com])
next
  assume neq: a ≠ x
  show ?case proof cases
assume le: a < x
show ?case proof cases
  assume nxzero: b ⊗ (x ⊕ y) = ZERO
  hence (a ⊕ b) ⊗ (x ⊕ y) = a using le
    by (auto split: split-if-asm simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  thus ?case using ⟨normed a⟩ by (auto simp only: normxor-com)
next
  assume nxnotzero: b ⊗ (x ⊕ y) ≠ ZERO
  hence eq1: (a ⊕ b) ⊗ (x ⊕ y) = a ⊕ (b ⊗ (x ⊕ y))
    using prems by (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  have normedxor: normed (b ⊗ (x ⊕ y)) using normedxxy
    by (rule prems(7))
  have less-a: a < first (b ⊗ (x ⊕ y))
  proof cases
    assume b = x
    thus ?thesis using prems(1-3) prems(5-6) prems(8-)
  apply (case-tac standard b)

```

```

by (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
next
  assume neq:  $b \neq x$ 
  thus ?thesis
proof cases
  assume b < x
  show ?thesis using prems(1–3) prems(5–6) prems(8–)
    apply (case-tac standard b)
    apply (force simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (case-tac b)
    apply force apply force apply force
    apply force apply force apply force
    apply force apply force prefer 2
    apply force
    apply simp
    apply (frule normed-xor-fst-standard)
    apply (drule normed-xor-smaller)
    apply (auto split: split-if-asm simp add: normxor-assoc normxor-standard
XORnz-def)
    apply (frule normed-xor-snd)
    apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
    apply (drule-tac x=msg2 and y=y in normxor-first)
  apply (auto simp add: min-def normxor-standard XORnz-def split: split-if-asm)
  done
next
  assume  $\neg (b < x)$ 
  hence  $x < b$  using neq by auto
  show ?thesis using prems(1–3) prems(5–6) prems(8–)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (case-tac standard b)
    apply (force simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (case-tac b)
    apply force apply force
    apply force apply force
    apply force apply force
    apply force apply force
    apply (auto split: split-if-asm dest: normed-xor-fst-standard
      simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (frule normed-xor-fst-standard)
    apply simp
    apply (frule normed-xor-fst-standard)
    apply (frule normed-xor-snd)
    apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
    apply (drule-tac x=msg2 and y=y in normxor-first)
  apply (auto simp add: min-def normxor-standard XORnz-def split: split-if-asm)
  done
qed
qed
hence normed (a  $\oplus$  (b  $\otimes$  (x  $\oplus$  y)))

```

```

using <normed a> <standard a> normedx y nxnotzero less-a
apply (case-tac standard (b ⊗ (x ⊕ y)))
  apply (rule normed.Xor) prefer 6
  apply (case-tac b ⊗ (x ⊕ y), auto intro: prems)
  apply (rule normed.Xor)
  apply auto
  apply (drule-tac b=x ⊕ y in prems(7))
  apply force
done
thus ?case apply (auto simp only: eq1 normxor-com) done
qed
next
assume ¬ (a < x)
hence le: x < a using neq by auto
show ?case proof cases
  assume nxzero: (a ⊕ b) ⊗ y = ZERO
  hence (a ⊕ b) ⊗ (x ⊕ y) = x using le
    by (auto split: split-if-asm simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  thus ?case using <normed x> by (auto simp only: normxor-com)
next
assume nxnotzero: (a ⊕ b) ⊗ y ≠ ZERO
hence eq1: (a ⊕ b) ⊗ (x ⊕ y) = x ⊕ ((a ⊕ b) ⊗ y)
  using prems by (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
have normedxor: normed ((a ⊕ b) ⊗ y)
  using normedx y prems(1-3) prems(5-6) prems(8-)
  apply -
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (case-tac standard y)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (rule normed.Xor)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (rule prems(7))
  apply auto prefer 2
  apply (case-tac y)
  by (auto split: split-if-asm simp add: normxor-com normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  hence normed (x ⊕ ((a ⊕ b) ⊗ y))
    using <normed x> <standard x> normedx y nxnotzero prems(1-3) prems(5-6)
    prems(8-) apply -
    apply (rule normed.Xor)
    apply (auto split: split-if-asm simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (frule normed-xor-fst-standard)
    apply (frule normed-xor-snd) back
    apply (frule normed-xor-smaller) back
    apply (drule-tac x=XOR a b and y=y in normxor-first)
    apply auto
    apply (auto simp add: min-def split: split-if-asm)
done
thus ?case apply (auto simp only: eq1 normxor-com) done
qed

```

```

qed
qed
qed
thus ?case apply - by (erule normxor-normed-com)
next
  case (Number int)
  show ?case using <normed b>
  proof (induct b)
    case (Agent x) show ?case by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Number x) show ?case by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Real x) show ?case by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Key k) show ?case by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Nonce x y) show ?case by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case Zero show ?case by auto
  next case (Hash h)
    show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (MPair x y)
    show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Crypt k m)
    show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next
    case (Xor x y) show ?case using prems apply - by (rule xor-normxor, auto
intro: normed.Xor)
    qed
  next
    case (Hash m)
    show ?case using <normed b>
    proof (induct b)
      case (Agent x)
      show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (Number x)
      show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (Real x)
      show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (Key k)
      show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (Nonce x y)
      show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case Zero show ?case using prems by auto
    next case (Hash h)
      show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (MPair x y)
      show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (Crypt k m)
      show ?case using prems apply - by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next
      case (Xor x y) show ?case using prems apply - by (rule xor-normxor, auto
intro: normed.Xor)
      qed

```

```

next
  case (MPair x y)
    show ?case using <normed b>
    proof (induct b)
      case (Agent x)
        show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Number x)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Real x)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Key k)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Nonce x y)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case Zero show ?case using prems by auto
next case (Hash h)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (MPair x y)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Crypt k m)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next
    case (Xor x y) show ?case using prems apply – by (rule xor-normxor, auto
intro: normed.Xor)
    qed
next
  case (Crypt k m)
    show ?case using <normed b>
    proof (induct b)
      case (Agent x)
        show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Number x)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Real x)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Key k)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Nonce x y)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case Zero show ?case using prems by auto
next case (Hash h)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (MPair x y)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Crypt k m)
  show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next
    case (Xor x y) show ?case using prems apply – by (rule xor-normxor, auto
intro: normed.Xor)

```

```

qed
next
  case (Real r)
  show ?case using <normed b>
  proof (induct b)
    case (Agent x)
    show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Number x)
    show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Real x)
    show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Key k)
    show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Nonce x y)
    show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case Zero show ?case using prems by auto
  next case (Hash h)
    show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (MPair x y)
    show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next case (Crypt k m)
    show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
  next
    case (Xor x y) show ?case using prems apply – by (rule xor-normxor, auto)
    intro: normed.Xor)
    qed
  next
    case (Nonce a t)
    show ?case using <normed b>
    proof (induct b)
      case (Agent x)
      show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (Number x)
      show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (Real x)
      show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (Key k)
      show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (Nonce x y)
      show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case Zero show ?case using prems by auto
    next case (Hash h)
      show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (MPair x y)
      show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next case (Crypt k m)
      show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
    next
      case (Xor x y) show ?case using prems apply – by (rule xor-normxor, auto)

```

```

intro: normed.Xor)
qed
next
case (Key k)
show ?case using <normed b>
proof (induct b)
case (Agent x)
show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Number x)
show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Real x)
show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Key k)
show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Nonce x y)
show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case Zero show ?case using prems by auto
next case (Hash h)
show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (MPair x y)
show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next case (Crypt k m)
show ?case using prems apply – by (rule standard-standard-normxor, auto)
next
case (Xor x y) show ?case using prems apply –
by (rule xor-normxor, auto intro: normed.Xor)
qed
next
case Zero
show ?case using <normed b>
proof (induct b)
case (Agent x)
show ?case using prems apply – by auto
next case (Number x) show ?case using prems apply – by auto
next case (Real x) show ?case using prems apply – by auto
next case (Key k) show ?case using prems apply – by auto
next case (Nonce x y) show ?case using prems apply – by auto
next case Zero show ?case using prems by auto
next case (Hash h) show ?case using prems apply – by auto
next case (MPair x y) show ?case using prems apply – by auto
next case (Crypt k m) show ?case using prems apply – by auto
next case (Xor x y) show ?case using prems apply –
apply auto
apply (case-tac y)
apply (auto intro!: normed.Xor)
done
qed
qed

```

```

lemma normed-norm: normed (norm x)
proof (induct x)
  case (NUMBER i)
    show ?case by auto
  next
  case (AGENT a)
    show ?case by auto
  next
  case ZERO
    show ?case by auto
  next
  case (REAL r)
    show ?case by auto
  next
  case (NONCE a n)
    show ?case by auto
  next
  case (KEY k)
    show ?case by auto
  next
  case (HASH h)
    show ?case using prems by auto
  next
  case (MPAIR a b)
    show ?case using prems by auto
  next
  case (CRYPT k m)
    show ?case using prems by auto
  next
  case (XOR a b)
    show ?case using prems
    apply (auto intro: normed-normxor)
    done
qed

lemma normxor-normed-id:
  assumes nx: normed (XOR a b)
  shows a ⊗ b = a ⊕ b using prems
proof -
  have norma: normed a using nx by (rule normed-xor-fst)
  have normb: normed b using nx by (rule normed-xor-snd)
  show ?thesis using norma normb nx
  proof (induct a arbitrary: b)
    case (Agent a)
    thus ?case apply -
      apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
      apply (case-tac standard b, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
      apply (case-tac b, auto)
  qed

```

```

done
next
case (Real x)
thus ?case apply -
  apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
apply (case-tac standard b, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (case-tac b, auto)
  done
next
case (Number i)
thus ?case apply -
  apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
apply (case-tac standard b, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (case-tac b, auto)
  done
next
case (Key k)
thus ?case apply -
  apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
apply (case-tac standard b, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (case-tac b, auto)
  done
next
case (Nonce a m)
thus ?case apply -
  apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
apply (case-tac standard b, auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (case-tac b, auto)
  done
next
case (Hash h)
show ?case using prems(2) prems(4–5) apply -
  apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
  apply (case-tac standard b)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (case-tac b)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  done
next
case (MPair a b c)
show ?case using prems(2) prems(4) prems(6–7) apply -
  apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
  apply (case-tac standard c)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (case-tac c)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  done
next
case (Crypt m k c)

```

```

show ?case using prems(2) prems(4-5) apply -
  apply (frule normed-xor-smaller)
  apply (case-tac standard c)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (case-tac c)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

next
  case Zero
  show ?case using prems by auto
next
  case (Xor a b c)
  thus ?case by auto
qed
qed

lemma norm-normed-id:
  assumes nx: normed x
  shows norm x = x
  using nx
  apply (induct x)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
  apply (rule normxor-normed-id)
  apply (rule normed.Xor)
  apply auto
done

```

### 9.3 Equivalence Relation $=_E$ on Messages

inductive

*xor-eq* :: *fmsg*  $\Rightarrow$  *fmsg*  $\Rightarrow$  bool ( $- \approx -$  [60,60])

where

*Xor-assoc[intro]*:  $(XOR\ X\ (XOR\ Y\ Z)) \approx (XOR\ (XOR\ X\ Y)\ Z)$  |

*Xor-com[intro]*:  $XOR\ X\ Y \approx XOR\ Y\ X$  |

*Xor-Zero[intro]*:  $XOR\ X\ ZERO \approx X$  |

*Xor-cancel[intro]*:  $X \approx Y \implies (XOR\ X\ Y \approx ZERO)$  |

*MPair-cong*:  $\llbracket X \approx A ; Y \approx B \rrbracket \implies MPAIR\ X\ Y \approx MPAIR\ A\ B$  |

*Hash-cong*:  $X \approx Y \implies HASH\ X \approx HASH\ Y$  |

*Crypt-cong*:  $M \approx N \implies CRYPT\ K\ M \approx CRYPT\ K\ N$  |

*Xor-cong*:  $\llbracket X \approx A ; Y \approx B \rrbracket \implies (XOR\ X\ Y \approx XOR\ A\ B)$  |

*refl[intro]*:  $X \approx X$  |

*symm*:  $X \approx Y \implies Y \approx X$  |

*trans*:  $\llbracket X \approx Y ; Y \approx Z \rrbracket \implies X \approx Z$

lemmas *Xor-assoc-trans* = *xor-eq.Xor-assoc* [THEN *xor-eq.trans*]

lemmas *Xor-assoc-trans2* = *xor-eq.Xor-assoc* [THEN *symm*, THEN *xor-eq.trans*]

lemmas *Xor-com-trans* = *xor-eq.Xor-com* [THEN *xor-eq.trans*]

```
lemmas Xor-cong-trans = xor-eq.Xor-cong [THEN xor-eq.trans]
```

## 9.4 Simplification Rules for normxor

```
lemma normxor-cancel[simp]:  $x \otimes x = \text{ZERO}$ 
```

```
  apply (induct x)
```

```
  apply auto
```

```
done
```

```
lemma normxor-simp1[simp]:
```

```
   $\llbracket \text{normed } a; \text{normed } b; \text{standard } a; a < \text{first } b; b \neq \text{ZERO} \rrbracket$ 
```

```
   $\implies a \otimes b = \text{XOR } a b$ 
```

```
  apply (induct b, auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
```

```
  apply (frule normed-xor-snd)
```

```
  apply (frule normed-xor-fst-standard)
```

```
  apply simp
```

```
  apply (frule normed-xor-snd)
```

```
  apply (frule normed-xor-fst-standard)
```

```
  apply simp
```

```
done
```

```
lemma case-zero[simp]:  $f \neq \text{ZERO} \implies (\text{case } f \text{ of } \text{ZERO} \Rightarrow f\text{zero} \mid - \Rightarrow f\text{nonzero})$ 
```

```
= fnonzero
```

```
  apply (case-tac f, auto)
```

```
done
```

```
lemma Xor-zero-fst[intro]:  $\text{ZERO} \oplus x \approx x$ 
```

```
  apply (rule Xor-com-trans, auto)
```

```
done
```

```
lemma normxor-simp2[simp]:
```

```
   $\llbracket \text{normed } a; \text{normed } b; \text{standard } a; a < \text{first } b; b \neq \text{ZERO} \rrbracket$ 
```

```
   $\implies b \otimes a = a \oplus b$ 
```

```
by (simp add: normxor-com)
```

```
lemma normxor-XORnz[simp]:
```

```
   $\llbracket \text{standard } a; a < \text{first } b \rrbracket \implies a \otimes b = a \odot b$ 
```

```
  apply (case-tac standard b)
```

```
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
```

```
  apply (force simp add: XORnz-def)
```

```
  apply (case-tac b)
```

```
  apply force+ defer
```

```
  apply (force simp add: XORnz-def)
```

```
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def first-def)
```

```
done
```

```
lemma normxor-XORnz2[simp]:
```

```
   $\llbracket \text{standard } a; \text{standard } c; c < a \rrbracket \implies (a \odot b) \otimes c = c \odot (a \odot b)$ 
```

```
  apply (case-tac standard b)
```

```

apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp3[simp]:

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket c1 < \text{first } b2; b2 \otimes c2 = \text{ZERO}; \text{standard } c1; b2 \neq \text{ZERO} \rrbracket \\ & \implies b2 \otimes c1 \oplus c2 = c1 \end{aligned}$$

apply (case-tac standard b2)
apply (force simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
apply (case-tac b2, auto)
apply (auto simp add: first-def simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp4[simp]:

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket a < \text{first } c \vee c = \text{ZERO}; \text{standard } a; b \neq \text{ZERO} \rrbracket \\ & \implies c \otimes (a \oplus b) = a \odot (c \otimes b) \end{aligned}$$

apply (case-tac standard c)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
apply (case-tac c)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def first-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp5[simp]:

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket \text{standard } a \rrbracket \implies \\ & (a \oplus b) \otimes (a \odot c) = b \otimes c \end{aligned}$$

apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp6[simp]:

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket b < \text{first } a \vee a = \text{ZERO}; \text{standard } b \rrbracket \\ & \implies a \otimes b = b \odot a \end{aligned}$$

apply (case-tac standard a)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
apply (case-tac a)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def first-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp7[simp]:

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket \text{standard } a; \text{standard } c; c < a \rrbracket \implies \\ & (a \oplus b) \otimes (c \odot d) = c \odot ((a \oplus b) \otimes d) \end{aligned}$$

apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp8[simp]:

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket \text{standard } a; a < \text{first } c \vee c = \text{ZERO} \rrbracket \\ & \implies c \otimes (a \odot b) = a \odot (c \otimes b) \end{aligned}$$

apply (case-tac standard c)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
apply (case-tac c)

```

```

apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def first-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp9[simp]:
  [ standard a; standard c; a < c ] ==>
  (a ⊕ b) ⊗ (c ⊙ d) = a ⊙ (b ⊗ (c ⊙ d))
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp10[simp]:
  [ standard a; standard c; c < a ] ==>
  (c ⊙ d) ⊗ (a ⊕ b) = c ⊙ (d ⊗ (a ⊕ b))
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp11[simp]:
  [ standard a ] ==>
  (a ⊕ b) ⊗ (a ⊕ c) = b ⊗ c
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp12[simp]:
  [ standard a; standard c; a < c ] ==>
  (a ⊕ b) ⊗ (c ⊙ d) = a ⊙ (b ⊗ (c ⊙ d))
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp13[simp]:
  [ standard a ] ==> (a ⊙ b) ⊗ a = b
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp14[simp]:
  [ standard a; standard c; c < a ] ==> (a ⊙ b) ⊗ c = c ⊙ (a ⊙ b)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma XORnz-left: b = c ==> a ⊙ b = a ⊙ c
apply (auto simp add: XORnz-def)
done

lemma XORnz-nonzero[simp]: a ⊙ (b ⊕ c) = a ⊕ (b ⊕ c)
apply (auto simp add: XORnz-def)
done

lemma XORnz-nonzero2[simp]: b ≠ ZERO ==> a ⊙ (b ⊙ c) = a ⊕ (b ⊙ c)
apply (auto simp add: XORnz-def)
done

```

```

lemma XORnz-nonzero3[simp]:  $b \neq \text{ZERO} \implies a \odot b = a \oplus b$ 
  apply (auto simp add: XORnz-def)
done

lemma XORnz-zero[simp,intro]:
   $a \neq \text{ZERO} \implies a \odot c \neq \text{ZERO}$ 
  apply (auto simp add: XORnz-def)
done

```

## 9.5 Reduced Message represent Equivalence Classes

new induction principle

```

lemma normed-induct2 [consumes 1, case-names Zero Standard Xor]:
   $\llbracket \text{normed } x; P \text{ ZERO};$ 
     $\text{!! } x. \llbracket \text{normed } x; \text{standard } x \rrbracket \implies P (x);$ 
     $\text{!! } a b. \llbracket \text{normed } a; P a; \text{standard } a; \text{normed } b; P b; a < \text{first } b; b \neq \text{ZERO} \rrbracket \implies$ 
     $P (\text{XOR } a b) \rrbracket$ 
     $\implies P x$ 
proof (induct x rule: normed.induct)
  case (Agent d)
    show ?case using prems by (auto intro: prems(2))
  next
    case (Real d)
    show ?case using prems by (auto intro: prems(2))
  next
    case (Number d)
    show ?case using prems by (auto intro: prems(2))
  next
    case (Key d)
    show ?case using prems by (auto intro: prems(2))
  next
    case (Nonce n k)
    show ?case using prems by (auto intro: prems(2))
  next
    case (Hash h)
    show ?case using prems by (auto intro: prems(4))
  next
    case (Crypt m k)
    show ?case using prems by (auto intro: prems(4))
  next
    case (MPair a b)
    show ?case using prems by (auto intro: prems(6))
  next
    case (Xor a b)
    show ?case using prems by auto
qed

```

**lemma** normed-XOR2:

```

[normed (a ⊕ b);
  [normed a; standard a; normed b; a < first b; b ≠ ZERO; normed (a ⊕ b)]
  ==> P]
  ==> P
apply auto
apply (erule normed-XOR)
apply auto
done

lemma normxor-simp8-standard[simp]:
  [ standard a; standard c; a < c ]
  ==> c ⊗ (a ⊕ b) = a ⊕ (c ⊗ b)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp5-com[simp]:
  [ standard a ] ==>
  (a ⊕ c) ⊗ (a ⊕ b) = c ⊗ b
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def normxor-com)
done

lemma normxor-simp13-com[simp]:
  [ standard a ] ==> a ⊗ (a ⊕ b) = b
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp14-com[simp]:
  [ standard a; standard c; c < a ] ==> c ⊗ (a ⊕ b) = c ⊕ (a ⊕ b)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-simp12-com[simp]:
  [ standard a; standard c; a < c ] ==>
  (c ⊕ d) ⊗ (a ⊕ b) = a ⊕ ((c ⊕ d) ⊗ b)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done

lemma normxor-assoc2-s-s-x:
  assumes normed a and standard a
  and normed b and standard b
  and normed (c1 ⊕ c2)
  and (a ⊗ b) ⊗ c1 = a ⊗ (b ⊗ c1)
  and (a ⊗ b) ⊗ c2 = a ⊗ (b ⊗ c2)
  shows (a ⊗ b) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) = a ⊗ (b ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2))
proof cases
  assume a = b
  hence R: (a ⊗ b) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) = c1 ⊕ c2 using prems by auto
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume b=c1

```

```

thus ?thesis using prems
  by (auto simp add: normxor-normed-id normxor-standard)
next
  assume b≠c1
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume b<c1
    hence a ⊗ (b ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)) = a ⊗ (b ⊕ (c1 ⊕ c2)) using prems
    by (auto simp add: normxor-normed-id normxor-standard)
    also have ... = c1 ⊕ c2 using prems
    by (auto simp add: normxor-normed-id normxor-standard)
    finally show ?thesis using R by auto
next
  assume ¬ b<c1
  hence a ⊗ (b ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)) = b ⊗ (c1 ⊕ (b ⊗ c2)) using prems
  by (auto simp add: normxor-normed-id normxor-standard)
  also have ... = c1 ⊕ c2 using prems apply -
  apply (erule normed-XOR2)
  by simp
  also have ... = c1 ⊕ c2 using prems apply -
  apply (erule normed-XOR2) by auto
  finally show ?thesis using R by auto
qed
qed
next
  assume anb: a ≠ b
  thus ?thesis
    proof cases
      assume a < b
      show ?thesis proof cases
        assume b=c1
        thus ?thesis using prems apply -
        by (erule normed-XOR2, auto simp add: normxor-standard split: split-if-asm)
      next
        assume b≠c1
        show ?thesis proof cases
      assume b < c1
      thus ?thesis using prems apply -
      by (erule normed-XOR2, auto simp add: normxor-standard split: split-if-asm)
      next
      assume ¬ b < c1
      hence le: c1 < b using prems by auto
      show ?thesis proof cases
        assume a=c1
        thus ?thesis using prems le apply -
        by (auto simp add: normxor-standard split: split-if-asm)
      next
      assume a≠c1
      show ?thesis proof cases
        assume a < c1

```

```

thus ?thesis using prems le apply -
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard split: split-if-asm)
  apply (erule normed-XOR2, auto simp add: normxor-com)
  done
next
  assume  $\neg a < c1$ 
  hence  $c1 < a$  using prems by auto
  thus ?thesis using prems le apply -
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard split: split-if-asm)
    apply (erule normed-XOR2, auto simp add: normxor-com)
    done
qed
qed
qed
qed
next
  assume  $\neg (a < b)$ 
  hence  $b < a$  using anb by auto
  thus ?thesis using prems
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
    apply (erule normed-XOR2, auto simp add: normxor-standard)
    apply (erule normed-XOR2, auto simp add: normxor-standard)
    apply (erule normed-XOR2, auto simp add: normxor-standard)
    done
qed
qed

lemma normxor-assoc2-x-s-s:
  assumes normed a and standard a
  and normed b and standard b
  and normed ( $c1 \oplus c2$ )
  and  $(c1 \otimes b) \otimes a = c1 \otimes (b \otimes a)$ 
  and  $(c2 \otimes b) \otimes a = c2 \otimes (b \otimes a)$ 
  shows  $((c1 \oplus c2) \otimes b) \otimes a = (c1 \oplus c2) \otimes (b \otimes a)$ 
proof -
  have  $((c1 \oplus c2) \otimes b) \otimes a = a \otimes ((c1 \oplus c2) \otimes b)$  by (auto simp add: normxor-com)
  also have ... =  $a \otimes (b \otimes (c1 \oplus c2))$  by (auto simp add: normxor-com)
  also have ... =  $(a \otimes b) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)$  using prems apply -
    apply (rule normxor-assoc2-s-s-x[THEN sym])
    apply force apply force apply force apply force apply force
    by (auto simp only: normxor-com)
  also have ... =  $(c1 \oplus c2) \otimes (b \otimes a)$  by (auto simp add: normxor-com)
  finally show  $((c1 \oplus c2) \otimes b) \otimes a = (c1 \oplus c2) \otimes (b \otimes a)$  by auto
qed

lemma normxor-assoc2-s-s-x:
  assumes normed a and standard a
  and normed ( $b1 \oplus b2$ )

```

```

and      normed c and standard c
and      ( $a \otimes b1$ )  $\otimes c = a \otimes (b1 \otimes c)$ 
and      ( $a \otimes b2$ )  $\otimes c = a \otimes (b2 \otimes c)$ 
shows   ( $a \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)$ )  $\otimes c = a \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c)$ 
proof cases
assume  $a = b1$ 
have A: ( $a \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)$ )  $\otimes c = b2 \otimes c$  using prems by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
thus ?thesis
proof cases
assume  $b1=c$ 
thus ?thesis using prems A apply -
by (auto simp add: normxor-normed-id normxor-standard normxor-com split: split-if-asm)
next
assume  $b1 \neq c$ 
show ?thesis using prems
apply (case-tac  $b1 < c$ )
apply (force simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
apply (auto intro: normxor-simp2 elim: normed-XOR simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done
qed
next
assume  $a \neq b1$ 
thus ?thesis
proof cases
assume  $a < b1$ 
thus ?thesis using prems
apply auto
apply (auto intro: normxor-simp2 elim: normed-XOR simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
done
next
assume  $\neg (a < b1)$ 
have sb1: standard  $b1$  using <normed ( $b1 \oplus b2$ )> apply (rule normed-XOR) .
hence b1lea:  $b1 < a$  using anb nab1 by auto
thus ?thesis
proof cases
assume  $b1=c$ 
thus ?thesis using prems by (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
next
assume  $b1 \neq c$ 
show ?thesis proof cases
assume  $b1 < c$ 
thus ?thesis using prems
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-com intro: normxor-XORnz2 normxor-XORnz
elim: normed-XOR)

```

```

done
next
assume  $\neg b1 < c$ 
hence  $c < b1$  using  $b1nc$  by auto
thus ?thesis using prems
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
  apply (rule normxor-XORnz2)
  apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
done
qed
qed
qed
qed

lemma normxor-simp4-com[simp]:
 $\llbracket a < \text{first } c \vee c = \text{ZERO}; \text{standard } a; b \neq \text{ZERO} \rrbracket$ 
 $\implies (a \oplus b) \otimes c = a \odot (b \otimes c)$ 
apply (case-tac standard c)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
apply (case-tac c)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def first-def)
done

lemma normxor-assoc2-x-x-x:
assumes a1-assoc: !!B C.  $\llbracket \text{normed } B; \text{normed } C \rrbracket \implies (a1 \otimes B) \otimes C = a1 \otimes B \otimes C$ 
and a2-assoc: !!B C.  $\llbracket \text{normed } B; \text{normed } C \rrbracket \implies (a2 \otimes B) \otimes C = a2 \otimes B \otimes C$ 
and b1-assoc: !!C.  $\text{normed } C \implies ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b1) \otimes C = (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \otimes C)$ 
and b2-assoc: !!C.  $\text{normed } C \implies ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2) \otimes C = (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b2 \otimes C)$ 
and c1-assoc:  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c1 = (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c1)$ 
and c2-assoc:  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c2 = (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2)$ 
and normed (a1 ⊕ a2)
and normed (b1 ⊕ b2)
and normed (c1 ⊕ c2)
shows  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) = (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2))$ 

proof -
have sa1: standard a1 using `normed (a1 ⊕ a2)` by (rule normed-XOR)
have sb1: standard b1 using `normed (b1 ⊕ b2)` by (rule normed-XOR)
have sc1: standard c1 using `normed (c1 ⊕ c2)` by (rule normed-XOR)
show ?thesis proof cases
  assume a1=b1
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume b1=c1

```

```

  hence  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) = (a2 \otimes b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)$ 
using prems by auto
  also have ... =  $c1 \odot ((a2 \otimes b2) \otimes c2)$  using prems(7-) apply -
apply (erule normed-XOR2)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard normxor-com)
apply (subst normxor-simp4-com)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac x=a2 and y=b2 in normxor-first)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: min-def split: split-if-asm)
done
  finally have R:  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) = c1 \odot ((a2 \otimes b2)$ 
 $\otimes c2)$ 
by auto
  have  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)) = (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b2 \otimes c2)$  using
prems
by auto
  also have ... =  $c1 \odot (a2 \otimes (b2 \otimes c2))$  using prems(7-) apply -
apply (erule normed-XOR2) apply (erule normed-XOR2) apply (erule normed-XOR2)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard normxor-com)
apply (subst normxor-simp4-com)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac x=b2 and y=c2 in normxor-first)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: min-def split: split-if-asm)
done
  also have ... =  $c1 \odot ((a2 \otimes b2) \otimes c2)$  using prems(7-) apply -
apply (drule normed-xor-snd)+
by (simp only: a2-assoc)
  finally show ?thesis using R by simp
next
  assume  $b1 \neq c1$ 
  show ?thesis proof cases
  assume  $b1 < c1$ 
  show ?thesis using prems(7-) apply -
apply (frule normed-xor-fst-standard) back
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard a2-assoc elim: normed-XOR)
done
  next
  assume  $\neg b1 < c1$ 
hence c1leb1:  $c1 < b1$  using  $\neg b1 < c1$  by auto
hence  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) = a2 \otimes b2 \otimes c1 \oplus c2$ 
  using prems by (auto dest: normed-xor-snd)
also have ... =  $a2 \otimes (c1 \odot (b2 \otimes c2))$  using prems
  apply (subst normxor-simp4)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $c1 \odot (a2 \otimes (b2 \otimes c2))$  using prems  $\langle a1 = b1 \rangle$ 
  apply (subst normxor-simp8)
  apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
done
finally have L1:  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) =$ 

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 $c1 \odot (a2 \otimes (b2 \otimes c2))$  by auto
have  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)) =$ 
 $(b1 \oplus a2) \otimes c1 \odot (b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2$  using prems
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
also have ... =  $c1 \odot (b1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2)$  using prems(7-)
apply (subst normxor-simp8)
by (auto simp add: normxor-com elim: normed-XOR)
finally have R1:  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)) =$ 
 $c1 \odot (b1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2)$  by auto
have  $(a2 \otimes (b2 \otimes c2)) = (b1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2)$ 
proof cases
assume  $b1 < \text{first } c2$ 
have  $(b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2 = c2 \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)$  by (simp add: normxor-com)
also have ... =  $b1 \odot (c2 \otimes b2)$  using prems
apply (subst normxor-simp4)
by (auto simp add: normxor-com elim: normed-XOR)
finally have A:  $(b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2 = b1 \odot (c2 \otimes b2)$  by auto
have  $(b1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2) = (b1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \odot (c2 \otimes b2))$ 
using A by auto
also have ... =  $a2 \otimes (c2 \otimes b2)$  using prems(7-)
apply (subst normxor-simp5)
by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
finally show ?thesis by (auto simp add: normxor-com)
next
assume nb1lec2:  $\neg b1 < \text{first } c2$ 
show ?thesis proof cases
assume  $b1 = \text{first } c2$ 
have  $(b1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2) = ((b1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c2$  using
prems
by (simp only: c2-assoc)
thus ?thesis using prems apply simp apply (drule normed-xor-snd[where
b=b2])
apply (drule normed-xor-snd[where b=c2])
apply simp
done
next
assume  $b1 \neq \text{first } c2$ 
hence  $\text{first } c2 < b1$  using nb1lec2 by auto
thus ?thesis using prems
apply (case-tac standard c2)
by (auto dest!: normed-xor-snd)
qed
qed
thus ?thesis using L1 R1 by simp
qed
qed
next
assume a1nb1:  $a1 \neq b1$ 
show ?thesis proof cases

```

```

assume a1 < b1
show ?thesis proof cases
assume b1 = c1
have R1: (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ ((b1 ⊕ b2) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)) =
  (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ b2 ⊗ c2 using prems(7–)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
have ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) =
  (a1 ⊕ (a2 ⊗ (c1 ⊕ b2))) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) using prems(7–)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... = a1 ⊕ ((a2 ⊗ (c1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)) using prems(7–)
  apply (subst normxor-simp10)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... = a1 ⊕ (a2 ⊗ ((c1 ⊕ b2) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)))
  using (normed (b1 ⊕ b2)) (normed (c1 ⊕ c2)) b1=c1
  by (auto simp add: a2-assoc)
also have ... = a1 ⊕ (a2 ⊗ (b2 ⊗ c2)) using prems(7–)
  apply (subst normxor-simp11)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... = (b2 ⊗ c2) ⊗ (a1 ⊕ a2) using prems(7–)
  apply (subst normxor-simp4) prefer 3
  apply (force elim: normed-XOR) prefer 2
  apply (force elim: normed-XOR) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: normxor-com)
  apply auto
  apply (frule normed-xor-snd) back
  apply (drule-tac x=b2 and y=c2 in normxor-first)
  apply (force elim: normed-XOR)
  apply (force elim: normed-XOR)
  apply (subgoal-tac c1 < first b2 ∧ c1 < first c2)
  apply (auto simp add: min-def split: split-if-asm)
  done
also have ... = (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ b2 ⊗ c2
  by (auto simp add: normxor-com)
finally show ?thesis using R1 by simp
  next
assume b1 ≠ c1
show ?thesis proof cases
assume b1 < c1
have ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) =
  (a1 ⊕ a2 ⊗ b1 ⊕ b2) ⊗ c1 ⊕ c2 using prems(7–)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... = (c1 ⊕ c2) ⊗ (a1 ⊕ a2 ⊗ b1 ⊕ b2) using prems(7–)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-com)
also have ... = a1 ⊕ ((c1 ⊕ c2) ⊗ (a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2))) using prems(7–)
  apply (subst normxor-simp8)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... = a1 ⊕ ((a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)) using prems(7–)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-com)
also have ... = a1 ⊕ (a2 ⊗ ((b1 ⊕ b2) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)))

```

```

using <normed (b1 ⊕ b2)> <normed (c1 ⊕ c2)>
by (auto simp add: a2-assoc)
also have ... = a1 ⊕ ((a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2 ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)))) using prems(7-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
finally have L1: ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) =
  a1 ⊕ ((a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2 ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)))) by auto

have (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ ((b1 ⊕ b2) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)) =
  (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ b1 ⊕ b2 ⊗ c1 ⊕ c2 using prems(7-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... = a1 ⊕ (a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2 ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2))) using prems(7-)
  apply (subst normxor-simp9)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
finally show ?thesis using L1 by auto
next
assume ¬ b1 < c1
hence c1leb1: c1 < b1 using prems(7-) by auto
show ?thesis proof cases
  assume a1=c1
  have ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) =
    (c1 ⊕ (a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2))) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) using prems(7-) c1leb1
    by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
  also have ... = (c1 ⊕ c2) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ (a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)))
    by (auto simp add: normxor-com)
  also have ... = c2 ⊗ (a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) using prems(7-) c1leb1
    apply (subst normxor-simp5)
    by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
  finally have R: ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) =
    c2 ⊗ (a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) by auto

have (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ ((b1 ⊕ b2) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2)) =
  (c1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ ((b1 ⊕ b2) ⊗ c2)) using prems(7-) c1leb1
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... = a2 ⊗ ((b1 ⊕ b2) ⊗ c2) using prems(7-) c1leb1
  apply (subst normxor-simp5)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... = (a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ c2
  using <normed (b1 ⊕ b2)> <normed (c1 ⊕ c2)> apply -
  apply (drule normed-xor-snd[where b=c2])
  by (simp only: a2-assoc)
also have ... = c2 ⊗ (a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) by (simp only: normxor-com)
finally show ?thesis using R by simp
next
assume a1 ≠ c1
show ?thesis proof cases
  assume a1 < c1
  have ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) =
    (a1 ⊕ (a2 ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2))) ⊗ (c1 ⊕ c2) using prems(7-) c1leb1
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)

```

```

also have ... = ( $c_1 \oplus c_2$ )  $\otimes$  ( $a_1 \odot (a_2 \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2))$ )
by (simp only: normxor-com)
also have ... =  $a_1 \odot ((c_1 \oplus c_2) \otimes (a_2 \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2)))$ 
using prems(7-) c1leb1
apply (subst normxor-simp8)
by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $a_1 \odot ((a_2 \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2)) \otimes (c_1 \oplus c_2))$ 
by (simp only: normxor-com)
also have ... =  $a_1 \odot (a_2 \otimes ((b_1 \oplus b_2) \otimes (c_1 \oplus c_2)))$ 
using <normed (b1 ⊕ b2)> <normed (c1 ⊕ c2)>
by (simp only: a2-assoc)
also have ... =  $a_1 \odot (a_2 \otimes (c_1 \odot ((b_1 \oplus b_2) \otimes c_2)))$ 
using prems(7-) c1leb1
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
finally have R: ( $(a_1 \oplus a_2) \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2)$ )  $\otimes (c_1 \oplus c_2)$  =
 $a_1 \odot (a_2 \otimes (c_1 \odot ((b_1 \oplus b_2) \otimes c_2)))$  by auto
have ( $a_1 \oplus a_2$ )  $\otimes ((b_1 \oplus b_2) \otimes (c_1 \oplus c_2))$  =
 $(a_1 \oplus a_2) \otimes (c_1 \odot ((b_1 \oplus b_2) \otimes c_2))$  using prems(7-) c1leb1
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $a_1 \odot (a_2 \otimes (c_1 \odot ((b_1 \oplus b_2) \otimes c_2)))$ 
using prems(7-) c1leb1
apply (subst normxor-simp9)
by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
finally show ?thesis using R by simp
next
assume  $\neg a_1 < c_1$ 
hence c1lea1:  $c_1 < a_1$  using prems(7-) by auto
have ( $(a_1 \oplus a_2) \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2)$ )  $\otimes (c_1 \oplus c_2)$  =
 $(a_1 \odot (a_2 \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2))) \otimes (c_1 \oplus c_2)$ 
using prems(7-) c1lea1 c1leb1
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $(c_1 \oplus c_2) \otimes (a_1 \odot (a_2 \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2)))$ 
by (simp only: normxor-com)
also have ... =  $c_1 \odot (c_2 \otimes (a_1 \odot (a_2 \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2))))$ 
using prems(7-) c1lea1 c1leb1
apply (subst normxor-simp12)
by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
finally have R: ( $(a_1 \oplus a_2) \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2)$ )  $\otimes (c_1 \oplus c_2)$  =
 $c_1 \odot (c_2 \otimes (a_1 \odot (a_2 \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2))))$  by simp
have ( $a_1 \oplus a_2$ )  $\otimes ((b_1 \oplus b_2) \otimes (c_1 \oplus c_2))$  =
 $(a_1 \oplus a_2) \otimes (c_1 \odot ((b_1 \oplus b_2) \otimes c_2))$ 
using prems(7-) c1lea1 c1leb1
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $c_1 \odot ((a_1 \oplus a_2) \otimes ((b_1 \oplus b_2) \otimes c_2))$ 
using prems(7-) c1lea1 c1leb1
apply (subst normxor-simp7)
by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $c_1 \odot (((a_1 \oplus a_2) \otimes (b_1 \oplus b_2)) \otimes c_2)$ 
by (simp only: c2-assoc)

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also have ... =  $c1 \odot ((a1 \odot (a2 \otimes (b1 \oplus b2))) \otimes c2)$ 
using prems(7-) c1lea1 c1leb1
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
also have ... =  $c1 \odot (c2 \otimes (a1 \odot (a2 \otimes (b1 \oplus b2))))$ 
by (simp only: normxor-com)
finally show ?thesis using R by simp
qed
qed
qed
qed
next
assume  $\neg a1 < b1$ 
hence  $b1 < a1$  using a1nb1 by auto
show ?thesis proof cases
assume b1=c1
have R:  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)) =$ 
 $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b2 \otimes c2)$  using prems(7-)
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)

have  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) =$ 
 $(c1 \odot (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)$  using prems(7-)
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $(c1 \oplus c2) \otimes (c1 \odot (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2)$ 
by (auto simp add: normxor-com)
also have ... =  $c2 \otimes ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2)$  using prems(7-)
apply (subst normxor-simp5)
by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b2 \otimes c2)$ 
using `normed (c1 \oplus c2)` apply -
apply (drule normed-xor-snd[where b=c2])
by (auto simp add: normxor-com b2-assoc[THEN sym])
finally show ?thesis using R by auto
next
assume b1 ≠ c1
show ?thesis proof cases
assume b1 < c1
have  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) =$ 
 $(b1 \odot (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)$  using prems(7-)
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $(c1 \oplus c2) \otimes (b1 \odot (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2)$ 
by (auto simp add: normxor-com)
also have ... =  $b1 \odot ((c1 \oplus c2) \otimes ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2))$  using prems(7-)
apply (subst normxor-simp8)
by (auto simp add: first-def elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $b1 \odot ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b2 \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)))$  using `normed (c1 \oplus c2)` apply -
by (auto simp add: normxor-com b2-assoc[THEN sym])
finally have R:  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) =$ 
 $b1 \odot ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b2 \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)))$  by auto

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```

have  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)) =$ 
     $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \odot (b2 \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)))$  using prems(7-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $b1 \odot ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b2 \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)))$  using prems(7-)
  apply (subst normxor-simp8)
  by (auto simp add: first-def elim: normed-XOR)

finally show ?thesis using R by simp
next
  assume  $\neg b1 < c1$ 
  hence c1leb1:  $c1 < b1$  using prems(7-) by auto
  hence  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) =$ 
     $(b1 \odot (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2) \otimes c1 \oplus c2$  using prems(7-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $c1 \odot ((b1 \odot (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2) \otimes c2)$ 
  using prems(7-) c1leb1
  apply (subst normxor-simp4) defer
  apply (force elim: normed-XOR)
  apply (force elim: normed-XOR)
  apply force
  apply (force elim: normed-XOR simp add: first-def XORnz-def)
  done
finally have R:  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) =$ 
   $c1 \odot ((b1 \odot (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2) \otimes c2)$  by simp
have  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)) =$ 
   $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (c1 \odot ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2))$  using prems(7) c1leb1
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $c1 \odot ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2))$ 
  using prems(7-) c1leb1
  apply (subst normxor-simp7)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $c1 \odot (((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c2)$  using prems(7-)
  by (simp only: c2-assoc)
also have ... =  $c1 \odot ((b1 \odot ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b2)) \otimes c2)$ 
  using prems(7-) c1leb1
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
  done
finally show ?thesis using R by simp
qed
  qed
  qed
  qed
qed

```

**lemma** normxor-assoc2-s-x-x:

assumes  $b1\text{-assoc}: !!C. \text{normed } C \implies (a \otimes b1) \otimes C = a \otimes (b1 \otimes C)$

and  $b2\text{-assoc}: !!C. \text{normed } C \implies (a \otimes b2) \otimes C = a \otimes (b2 \otimes C)$

and  $c1\text{-assoc}: (a \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c1 = a \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c1)$

```

and      c2-assoc:  $(a \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c2 = a \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2)$ 
and      normed a and standard a
and      normed  $(b1 \oplus b2)$ 
and      normed  $(c1 \oplus c2)$ 
shows  $(a \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) = a \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2))$ 
proof -
  have sb1: standard b1 using ⟨normed  $(b1 \oplus b2)$ ⟩ by (rule normed-XOR)
  have sc1: standard c1 using ⟨normed  $(c1 \oplus c2)$ ⟩ by (rule normed-XOR)
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume a = b1
    show ?thesis proof cases
      assume b1 = c1
      hence  $(a \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) = b2 \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)$  using prems(5-)
    by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
      also have ... = c1  $\odot$  (b2  $\otimes$  c2) using prems(5-)
      apply (subst normxor-simp4)
      by auto
      finally have R:  $(a \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) = c1 \odot (b2 \otimes c2)$  by auto
      have a  $\otimes$   $((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)) = c1 \otimes b2 \otimes c2$  using prems(5-)
    by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
      also have ... = c1  $\odot$  (b2  $\otimes$  c2) using prems(5-) apply -
      apply (simp only: normxor-com[where x=c1])
      apply (subst normxor-simp6) back
      apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
      apply (frule normed-xor-snd)
      apply (drule-tac x=b2 and y=c2 in normxor-first)
      apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: {b1=c1} min-def split: split-if-asm)
      done
      finally show ?thesis using R by auto
    next
      assume b1  $\neq$  c1
      show ?thesis proof cases
        assume b1 < c1
        thus ?thesis using prems(5-) by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
        next
          assume  $\neg b1 < c1$ 
          hence le: c1 < b1 using prems(5-) by auto
          have  $(a \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) = b2 \otimes c1 \oplus c2$  using prems(5-)
            by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
          also have ... = c1  $\odot$  (b2  $\otimes$  c2) using prems(5-)
            apply (subst normxor-simp4)
            by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
          finally have R:  $(a \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) = c1 \odot (b2 \otimes c2)$  by auto
          have a  $\otimes$   $((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2)) = b1 \otimes c1 \odot (b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2$  using
            prems(5-)
            by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
          also have ... = c1  $\odot$  (b1  $\otimes$   $((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c2)$ ) using prems(5-)
            apply (subst normxor-simp8)
            by (auto elim: normed-XOR)

```

```

also have ... =  $c1 \odot ((b1 \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c2)$ 
  by (simp only: c2-assoc[simplified `a=b1`])
also have ... =  $c1 \odot (b2 \otimes c2)$  using prems(5-) apply -
  apply (frule normed-xor-fst-standard)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
finally show ?thesis using R by auto
qed
qed
next
assume a≠b1
show ?thesis proof cases
  assume a < b1
  show ?thesis proof cases
  assume b1=c1
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
  apply (simp only: normxor-com[where x=a])
  apply (subst normxor-simp6) back back
  apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: normxor-com)
  apply (frule normed-xor-snd)
  apply (frule-tac x=b2 and y=c2 in normxor-first)
  apply (force elim: normed-XOR)
  apply force
  apply (rule xt1(8))
  apply assumption
  apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: first-def)
done
next
assume b1≠c1
show ?thesis proof cases
  assume b1 < c1
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
  apply (simp only: normxor-com[where x=a])
  apply (subst normxor-simp6) back back
  apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: normxor-com)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def XORnz-def)
  apply (case-tac b1, auto)
done
next
assume ¬ b1 < c1
hence c1 < b1 using prems(5-) by auto
show ?thesis proof cases
  assume a=c1
  thus ?thesis using prems(5-) by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
next
assume a≠c1
show ?thesis proof cases
  assume a < c1

```

```

    thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
  apply (simp only: normxor-com[where x=a])
  apply (subst normxor-simp6) back back
  apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: normxor-com)
  apply (auto simp add: first-def XORnz-def)
  apply (case-tac c1, auto)
  done
next
  assume  $\neg a < c1$ 
  hence  $c1 < a$  using prems(5-) by auto
  thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
  apply (subst normxor-simp8)
  apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: normxor-com)
  apply (simp add: normxor-com[where x=c2])
  apply (simp only: c2-assoc[THEN sym])
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
  done
  qed
qed
qed
qed
next
  assume  $\neg a < b1$ 
  hence  $b1 < a$  using prems(5-) by auto
  show ?thesis proof cases
assume  $b1 = c1$ 
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard normxor-com)
  apply (subst normxor-simp5)
  apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
  apply (simp add: normxor-com[where x=c2])
  apply (drule normed-xor-snd) back
  apply (simp add: b2-assoc[THEN sym])
  done
next
  assume  $b1 \neq c1$ 
  show ?thesis proof cases
  assume  $b1 < c1$ 
  thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard normxor-com)
    apply (simp add: normxor-com[where x=c1  $\oplus$  c2])
    apply (subst normxor-simp10)
    apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
    apply (subst normxor-simp8)
    apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
    apply (simp add: b2-assoc)
    done

```

```

next
  assume  $\neg b1 < c1$ 
  hence  $c1 < b1$  using  $\text{prems}(5-)$  by auto
  thus ?thesis using  $\text{prems}(5-)$ 
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard normxor-com)
    apply (subst normxor-simp9)
    apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
    apply (subst normxor-simp8) back
    apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
    apply (simp add: normxor-com[where y=b1 ⊕ b2])
    apply (simp add: c2-assoc[THEN sym])
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard normxor-com)
    done
  qed
  qed
  qed
  qed
  qed
lemma normxor-assoc2-x-s-x:
  assumes a1-assoc:  $\text{!!}B\ C.\ [\text{normed } B; \text{normed } C] \implies (a1 \otimes B) \otimes C = a1 \otimes (B \otimes C)$ 
  and a2-assoc:  $\text{!!}B\ C.\ [\text{normed } B; \text{normed } C] \implies (a2 \otimes B) \otimes C = a2 \otimes (B \otimes C)$ 
  and c1-assoc:  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b) \otimes c1 = (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b \otimes c1)$ 
  and c2-assoc:  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b) \otimes c2 = (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b \otimes c2)$ 
  and normed ( $a1 \oplus a2$ )
  and normed b and standard b
  and normed ( $c1 \oplus c2$ )
  shows  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b) \otimes (c1 \oplus c2) = (a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b \otimes (c1 \oplus c2))$ 
proof –
  have sa1: standard a1 using normed ( $a1 \oplus a2$ ) by (rule normed-XOR)
  have sc1: standard c1 using normed ( $c1 \oplus c2$ ) by (rule normed-XOR)
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume a1 = b
    show ?thesis proof cases
      assume b = c1
      thus ?thesis using  $\text{prems}(5-)$  apply –
      apply (erule normed-XOR) apply (erule normed-XOR)
      apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
      done
    next
      assume b ≠ c1
      show ?thesis proof cases
      assume b < c1
      thus ?thesis using  $\text{prems}(5-)$  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
      next
        assume  $\neg b < c1$ 
        hence le:  $c1 < b$  using  $\text{prems}(5-)$  by auto

```

```

thus ?thesis using prems(5-) apply -
  apply (erule normed-XOR) apply (erule normed-XOR)
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
  apply (simp only: c2-assoc[simplified `a1=b`, THEN sym])
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
    qed
  qed
next
  assume a1 ≠ b
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume a1 < b
    show ?thesis proof cases
      assume b=c1
      thus ?thesis using prems(5-) apply -
        apply (erule normed-XOR2) apply (erule normed-XOR2)
        apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
        apply (simp only: a2-assoc[simplified `b=c1`])
        apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
        done
      next
      assume b ≠ c1
      show ?thesis proof cases
        assume b < c1
        thus ?thesis using prems(5-) apply -
          apply (erule normed-XOR2) apply (erule normed-XOR2)
          apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
          apply (auto simp add: a2-assoc normxor-standard)
          done
      next
      assume ¬ b < c1
      hence c1 < b using prems(5-) by auto
      show ?thesis proof cases
        assume a1=c1
        thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
          apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
          apply (subst normxor-simp5)
          apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
          apply (simp only: normxor-com)
          apply (subst normxor-simp5)
          apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: normxor-com[where x=c2])
          apply (drule normed-xor-snd[where b=c2])
          apply (auto simp add: a2-assoc)
          done
      next
      assume a1 ≠ c1
      show ?thesis proof cases
        assume a1 < c1
        thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
          apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)

```

```

apply (subst normxor-simp9)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
apply (simp only: normxor-com[where y=c1 ⊕ c2])
apply (subst normxor-simp7)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
apply (simp only: normxor-com[where x=c1 ⊕ c2])
apply (auto simp add: a2-assoc)
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)

next
  assume ¬ a1 < c1
  hence c1 < a1 using prems(5-) by auto
  thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
apply (subst normxor-simp7)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
apply (simp only: c2-assoc[THEN sym])
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
apply (simp add: normxor-com[where y=c1 ⊕ c2])
apply (subst normxor-simp9)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: normxor-com)
done
qed
qed
qed
qed
next
  assume ¬ a1 < b
  hence b < a1 using prems(5-) by auto
  show ?thesis proof cases
assume b=c1
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard normxor-com)
done
next
assume b≠c1
show ?thesis proof cases
assume b < c1
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard normxor-com)
done
next
assume ¬ b < c1
hence c1 < b using prems(5-) by auto
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard normxor-com)
apply (subst normxor-simp7)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
apply (simp add: c2-assoc[THEN sym])
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard normxor-com)

```

```

done
qed
qed
qed
qed
qed
qed

lemma normxor-assoc2-x-x-s:
assumes a1-assoc: !!B C. [ normed B; normed C ]  $\Rightarrow$  (a1  $\otimes$  B)  $\otimes$  C = a1
 $\otimes$  B  $\otimes$  C
and a2-assoc: !!B C. [ normed B; normed C ]  $\Rightarrow$  (a2  $\otimes$  B)  $\otimes$  C = a2  $\otimes$ 
B  $\otimes$  C
and b1-assoc: !!C. normed C  $\Rightarrow$  ((a1  $\oplus$  a2)  $\otimes$  b1)  $\otimes$  C = (a1  $\oplus$  a2)  $\otimes$ 
(b1  $\otimes$  C)
and b2-assoc: !!C. normed C  $\Rightarrow$  ((a1  $\oplus$  a2)  $\otimes$  b2)  $\otimes$  C = (a1  $\oplus$  a2)  $\otimes$ 
(b2  $\otimes$  C)
and normed (a1  $\oplus$  a2)
and normed (b1  $\oplus$  b2)
and normed c and standard c
shows ((a1  $\oplus$  a2)  $\otimes$  (b1  $\oplus$  b2))  $\otimes$  c = (a1  $\oplus$  a2)  $\otimes$  ((b1  $\oplus$  b2)  $\otimes$  c)
proof -
have sa1: standard a1 using `normed (a1  $\oplus$  a2)` by (rule normed-XOR)
have sb1: standard b1 using `normed (b1  $\oplus$  b2)` by (rule normed-XOR)
show ?thesis proof cases
assume a1=b1
hence A: ((a1  $\oplus$  a2)  $\otimes$  (b1  $\oplus$  b2))  $\otimes$  c = (a2  $\otimes$  b2)  $\otimes$  c using prems(5-)
by auto
show ?thesis proof cases
assume b1 = c
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
apply (subst normxor-simp6) back
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR intro: normed-normxor)
apply (frule normed-xor-snd)
apply (drule-tac x=a2 and y=b2 in normxor-first)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: min-def split: split-if-asm)
apply (simp only: normxor-com[where y=b2])
apply (subst normxor-simp4)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR intro: normed-normxor)
done
next
assume b1  $\neq$  c
show ?thesis proof cases
assume b1 < c
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
apply (subst normxor-simp5)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)

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apply (drule normed-xor-snd) back
apply (simp add: a2-assoc)
done
next
assume  $\neg b1 < c$ 
hence cleb1:  $c < b1$  using prems(5-) by auto
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
apply (subst normxor-simp6) back
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR intro: normed-normxor)
apply (frule normed-xor-snd)
apply (drule-tac x=a2 and y=b2 in normxor-first)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR simp add: min-def split: split-if-asm)
done
qed
qed
next
assume  $a1 \neq b1$ 
show ?thesis proof cases
  assume  $a1 < b1$ 
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume  $b1 = c$ 
    have A:  $(a1 \odot a2 \otimes c \oplus b2) \otimes c =$ 
       $a1 \odot ((a2 \otimes (c \oplus b2)) \otimes c)$  using prems(5-)
    apply (simp only: normxor-com[where y=c])
    apply (subst normxor-simp8)
    by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
    show ?thesis using prems(5-)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
    apply (simp only: A a2-assoc)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
    apply (simp only: normxor-com[where y=b2])
    apply (subst normxor-simp4)
    by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
  next
  assume  $b1 \neq c$ 
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume  $b1 < c$ 
    have  $(a1 \odot a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c =$ 
       $a1 \odot ((a2 \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c)$  using prems(5-)
    apply (simp only: normxor-com[where y=c])
    apply (subst normxor-simp8)
    by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
    also have ... =  $a1 \odot (a2 \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c))$  using normed c normed (b1
       $\oplus b2)$ 
    by (simp only: a2-assoc)
    also have ... =  $a1 \odot (a2 \otimes (b1 \odot (b2 \otimes c)))$  using prems(5-)
    by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
    finally have A:  $(a1 \odot a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c = a1 \odot (a2 \otimes (b1 \odot (b2 \otimes c)))$ 
  
```

```

    by auto
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
apply (subst normxor-simp12)
apply (auto elim: normed-XOR)
done
next
assume  $\neg b1 < c$ 
hence  $c < b1$  using prems(5-) by auto
show ?thesis proof cases
assume  $a1=c$ 
have  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c = (c \odot a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c$ 
    using prems(5-) by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
also have ... =  $a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2$  using prems(5-)
    by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
finally have  $R: ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c = a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2$  by auto
have  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c) = a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2$  using prems(5-)
    by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
thus ?thesis using R by simp
next
assume  $a1 \neq c$ 
show ?thesis proof cases
assume  $a1 < c$ 
have  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c = (a1 \odot a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c$ 
using prems(5-) by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
also have ... =  $c \otimes (a1 \odot (a2 \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)))$  by (simp only: normxor-com)
also have ... =  $a1 \odot (c \otimes (a2 \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)))$  using prems(5-)
apply (subst normxor-simp8)
by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $a1 \odot ((a2 \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c)$  by (simp only: normxor-com)
also have ... =  $a1 \odot (a2 \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c))$  using (normed (b1 \oplus b2))
    (normed c)
by (simp only: a2-assoc)
also have ... =  $a1 \odot (a2 \otimes (c \oplus (b1 \oplus b2)))$  using prems(5-)
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
finally have  $R: ((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c = a1 \odot (a2 \otimes (c \oplus (b1 \oplus b2)))$  by simp
have  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c) = a1 \odot (a2 \otimes (c \oplus (b1 \oplus b2)))$ 
using prems(5-) by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
thus ?thesis using R by simp
next
assume  $\neg a1 < c$ 
hence clea1:  $c < a1$  using prems(5-) by auto
have  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c = (a1 \odot a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c$ 
using prems(5-)
by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
also have ... =  $c \odot (a1 \odot a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2)$  using prems(5-)
apply (subst normxor-simp14)
by (auto elim: normed-XOR)

```

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finally have R:  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c = c \odot (a1 \odot a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2)$ 
by simp
  have  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c) = c \odot a1 \odot a2 \otimes b1 \oplus b2$  using
prems(5-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
    thus ?thesis using R by simp
  qed
qed
qed
qed
qed
next
assume  $\neg a1 < b1$ 
hence b1lea1:  $b1 < a1$  using prems(5-) by auto
show ?thesis proof cases
assume b1=c
thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard)
next
assume b1≠c
show ?thesis proof cases
assume b1 < c
show ?thesis proof cases
assume a1=c
have  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c = (b1 \odot ((c \oplus a2) \otimes b2)) \otimes c$  using
prems(5-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $c \otimes (b1 \odot ((c \oplus a2) \otimes b2))$  by (simp only: normxor-com)
also have ... =  $b1 \odot (c \otimes ((c \oplus a2) \otimes b2))$  using prems(5-)
  apply (subst normxor-simp8)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $b1 \odot (((c \oplus a2) \otimes b2) \otimes c)$  by (simp only: normxor-com)
also have ... =  $b1 \odot ((c \oplus a2) \otimes (b2 \otimes c))$  using (normed c) (normed (a1
⊕ a2))
  by (simp only: b2-assoc ⟨a1=c⟩[THEN sym])
finally have R:  $((a1 \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \oplus b2)) \otimes c = b1 \odot ((c \oplus a2) \otimes (b2 \otimes
c))$  by simp
  have  $(a1 \oplus a2) \otimes ((b1 \oplus b2) \otimes c) = (c \oplus a2) \otimes (b1 \odot (b2 \otimes c))$  using
prems(5-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
also have ... =  $b1 \odot ((c \oplus a2) \otimes (b2 \otimes c))$  using prems(5-)
  apply (subst normxor-simp7)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
finally show ?thesis using R by simp
next
assume a1≠c
show ?thesis proof cases
assume a1 < c
show ?thesis proof cases
assume a1=b1

```

```

thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
  next
  assume a1 ≠ b1
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume a1 < b1
    thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
      by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
  next
  assume ¬ a1 < b1
  hence b1 < a1 using prems(5-) by auto
  thus ?thesis using prems(5-)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
    apply (subst normxor-simp7)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
    apply (simp only: normxor-com[where y=c])
    apply (subst normxor-simp8)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
    apply (simp only: normxor-com[where x=c])
    apply (simp only: b2-assoc)
    done
  qed
  qed
  next
  assume ¬ a1 < c
  hence c < a1 using prems(5-) by auto
  have ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ c = (b1 ⊕ (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ b2) ⊗ c using
  prems(5-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
  also have ... = c ⊗ (b1 ⊕ (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ b2) by (simp only: normxor-com)
  also have ... = b1 ⊕ (c ⊗ ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ b2)) using prems(5-)
  apply (subst normxor-simp8)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
  finally have R: ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (b1 ⊕ b2)) ⊗ c = b1 ⊕ (c ⊗ ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗
  b2)) by simp
  have (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ ((b1 ⊕ b2) ⊗ c) = (a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (b1 ⊕ (b2 ⊗ c)) using
  prems(5-)
  by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
  also have ... = b1 ⊕ ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ (b2 ⊗ c)) using prems(5-)
  apply (subst normxor-simp7)
  by (auto elim: normed-XOR)
  also have ... = b1 ⊕ (((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ b2) ⊗ c) using ⟨normed (a1 ⊕ a2)⟩
  ⟨normed c⟩
  by (simp only: b2-assoc)
  also have ... = b1 ⊕ (c ⊗ ((a1 ⊕ a2) ⊗ b2)) by (simp only: normxor-com)
  finally show ?thesis using R by simp
  qed
  qed
  next

```

```

assume  $\neg b1 < c$ 
hence cleb1:  $c < b1$  using prems(5–) by auto
  thus ?thesis using prems(5–)
    by (auto simp add: normxor-standard elim: normed-XOR)
qed
  qed
  qed
  qed
qed

lemma normxor-assoc2:
  assumes normedx: normed X
  and normedy: normed Y
  and normedz: normed Z
  shows  $(X \otimes Y) \otimes Z = X \otimes (Y \otimes Z)$  using prems
proof (induct X arbitrary: Y Z rule: normed-induct2)
  case Zero thus ?case by auto
next
  case (Standard a)
  have  $\forall Z. \text{normed } Z \longrightarrow (a \otimes Y) \otimes Z = a \otimes Y \otimes Z$ 
  proof (rule-tac P=%Y.  $\forall Z. \text{normed } Z \longrightarrow (a \otimes Y) \otimes Z = a \otimes (Y \otimes Z)$  in
  normed-induct2)
    show normed Y using prems by auto
  next
  {
    fix Z :: fmsg
    assume normed Z
    have  $(a \otimes \text{ZERO}) \otimes Z = a \otimes \text{ZERO} \otimes Z$  by auto
  } thus  $\forall Z. \text{normed } Z \longrightarrow (a \otimes \text{ZERO}) \otimes Z = a \otimes \text{ZERO} \otimes Z$  by auto
next
  fix x :: fmsg
  assume normed x and standard x
  {
    fix x a Z :: fmsg
    assume normed Z and normed x and standard x and normed a and standard
    a
    have  $(a \otimes x) \otimes Z = a \otimes x \otimes Z$ 
    proof (rule-tac P=%Z.  $(a \otimes x) \otimes Z = a \otimes (x \otimes Z)$  in normed-induct2)
    show normed Z using prems by auto
    next
    show  $(a \otimes x) \otimes \text{ZERO} = a \otimes x \otimes \text{ZERO}$  using prems by auto
    next
    fix z :: fmsg
    assume normed z and standard z
    show  $(a \otimes x) \otimes z = a \otimes x \otimes z$  using prems by (auto simp add: normxor-standard
    XORnz-def)
    next
    fix ca cb :: fmsg
    assume normed ca and  $(a \otimes x) \otimes ca = a \otimes x \otimes ca$  and standard ca and

```

```

normed cb and ( $a \otimes x$ )  $\otimes cb = a \otimes x \otimes cb$  and
ca < first cb and cb ≠ ZERO
thus ( $a \otimes x$ )  $\otimes ca \oplus cb = a \otimes x \otimes ca \oplus cb$  using prems apply -
apply (rule normxor-assoc2-s-s-x)
apply force apply force apply force apply force defer
apply force apply force
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force
apply force apply force apply force apply force
done
qed
} thus  $\forall Z. \text{normed } Z \rightarrow (a \otimes x) \otimes Z = a \otimes x \otimes Z$  using prems by auto
next
fix ba bb :: fmsg
assume normed ba and  $\forall Z. \text{normed } Z \rightarrow (a \otimes ba) \otimes Z = a \otimes ba \otimes Z$  and
standard ba and
normed bb and  $\forall Z. \text{normed } Z \rightarrow (a \otimes bb) \otimes Z = a \otimes bb \otimes Z$  and ba
< first bb and
bb ≠ ZERO
show  $\forall Z. \text{normed } Z \rightarrow (a \otimes (ba \oplus bb)) \otimes Z = a \otimes (ba \oplus bb) \otimes Z$ 
proof (auto)
fix Z :: fmsg
assume normed Z
have ba-assoc: !!Z. normed Z  $\implies (a \otimes ba) \otimes Z = a \otimes ba \otimes Z$  using prems
by auto
have bb-assoc: !!Z. normed Z  $\implies (a \otimes bb) \otimes Z = a \otimes bb \otimes Z$  using prems
by auto
show ( $a \otimes (ba \oplus bb)$ )  $\otimes Z = a \otimes (ba \oplus bb) \otimes Z$ 
proof (rule-tac P=%Z. ( $a \otimes (ba \oplus bb)$ )  $\otimes Z = a \otimes ((ba \oplus bb) \otimes Z)$  in
normed-induct2)
show normed Z using prems by auto
next
show ( $a \otimes ba \oplus bb$ )  $\otimes ZERO = a \otimes (ba \oplus bb) \otimes ZERO$  by auto
next
fix c :: fmsg
assume normed c and standard c
thus ( $a \otimes ba \oplus bb$ )  $\otimes c = a \otimes (ba \oplus bb) \otimes c$  using prems ba-assoc bb-assoc
apply -
apply (rule normxor-assoc2-s-x-s)
apply force apply force defer apply force apply force
apply (erule ba-assoc[where Z=c])
apply (erule bb-assoc[where Z=c])
apply (rule normed.Xor)
apply force apply force apply force apply force apply force
done
next
fix ca cb :: fmsg
assume normed ca and ( $a \otimes ba \oplus bb$ )  $\otimes ca = a \otimes (ba \oplus bb) \otimes ca$  and standard
ca and
normed cb and ( $a \otimes ba \oplus bb$ )  $\otimes cb = a \otimes (ba \oplus bb) \otimes cb$  and ca < first

```

```

cb and
  cb ≠ ZERO
show (a ⊗ ba ⊕ bb) ⊗ (ca ⊕ cb) = a ⊗ (ba ⊕ bb) ⊗ (ca ⊕ cb) using prems
  ba-assoc bb-assoc
apply –
apply (rule normxor-assoc2-s-x-x) defer defer
apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
apply (erule ba-assoc)
apply (erule bb-assoc)
done
qed
qed
qed
thus ?case using prems by auto
next
  case (Xor aa ab)
  have ∀ Z. normed Z → ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ Y) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ Y ⊗ Z
  proof (rule-tac P=%Y. ∀ Z. normed Z → ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ Y) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ (Y ⊗ Z) in normed-induct2)
    show normed Y using prems by auto
  next
  {
    fix Z :: fmsg
    assume normed Z
    have ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ZERO) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ZERO ⊗ Z by auto
  } thus ∀ Z. normed Z → ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ZERO) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ZERO
  ⊗ Z by auto
  next
  fix b :: fmsg
  assume normed b and standard b
  {
    fix Z :: fmsg
    assume normed Z
    have ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b ⊗ Z using prems
    proof (rule-tac P=%Z. ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ (b ⊗ Z) in
    normed-induct2)
    show normed Z using prems by auto
  next
  show ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b) ⊗ ZERO = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b ⊗ ZERO using prems by auto
  next
  fix c :: fmsg
  assume normed c and standard c
  show ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b) ⊗ c = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b ⊗ c using prems apply –
  apply (rule normxor-assoc2-x-s-s)
  apply force apply force apply force apply force defer

```

```

apply force apply force
apply (rule normed.Xor)
apply force apply force
apply force apply force apply force
done
next
fix ca cb :: fmsg
assume normed ca and ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b) ⊗ ca = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b ⊗ ca and
standard ca
and normed cb and ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b) ⊗ cb = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b ⊗ cb
and ca < first cb and cb ≠ ZERO
show ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b) ⊗ (ca ⊕ cb) = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b ⊗ (ca ⊕ cb) using prems
apply -
  apply (rule normxor-assoc2-x-s-x)
  apply force apply force apply force apply force defer
  apply force apply force
  apply (rule normed.Xor)
  apply force apply force apply force apply force apply force
  apply (rule normed.Xor)
  apply force apply force apply force apply force apply force
done
qed
}
thus ∀ Z. normed Z → ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ b ⊗ Z by auto
next
fix ba bb :: fmsg
assume normed ba and ∀ Z. normed Z → ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ba) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕
ab) ⊗ ba ⊗ Z and
standard ba and normed bb and
∀ Z. normed Z → ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ bb) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ bb ⊗ Z and
ba < first bb and bb ≠ ZERO
show ∀ Z. normed Z → ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ba ⊕ bb) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ (ba ⊕
bb) ⊗ Z
proof (safe)
  fix Z :: fmsg
  assume normed Z
  have ba-assoc: !!Z. normed Z ⇒ ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ba) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ba
  ⊗ Z using prems by auto
  have bb-assoc: !!Z. normed Z ⇒ ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ bb) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ bb
  ⊗ Z using prems by auto
  show ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ba ⊕ bb) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ (ba ⊕ bb) ⊗ Z
  proof (rule-tac P=%Z. ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ (ba ⊕ bb)) ⊗ Z = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ((ba ⊕
  bb) ⊗ Z) in normed-induct2)
  show normed Z using prems by auto
next
show ((aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ ba ⊕ bb) ⊗ ZERO = (aa ⊕ ab) ⊗ (ba ⊕ bb) ⊗ ZERO by
auto
next
fix c :: fmsg

```

```

assume normed c and standard c
thus ((aa  $\oplus$  ab)  $\otimes$  ba  $\oplus$  bb)  $\otimes$  c = (aa  $\oplus$  ab)  $\otimes$  (ba  $\oplus$  bb)  $\otimes$  c using prems
ba-assoc bb-assoc apply -
  apply (rule normxor-assoc2-x-x-s)
  defer defer defer defer
  apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force
  apply force apply force
  apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force
  apply force apply force apply force apply force
  apply (erule prems(5)) apply force
  apply (erule prems(8)) apply force
  apply (erule ba-assoc)
  apply (erule bb-assoc)
  done
  next
fix ca cb :: fmsg
assume normed ca and ((aa  $\oplus$  ab)  $\otimes$  ba  $\oplus$  bb)  $\otimes$  ca = (aa  $\oplus$  ab)  $\otimes$  (ba  $\oplus$  bb)
 $\otimes$  ca
  and standard ca and
  normed cb and ((aa  $\oplus$  ab)  $\otimes$  ba  $\oplus$  bb)  $\otimes$  cb = (aa  $\oplus$  ab)  $\otimes$  (ba  $\oplus$  bb)  $\otimes$  cb
  and ca < first cb and cb ≠ ZERO
show ((aa  $\oplus$  ab)  $\otimes$  ba  $\oplus$  bb)  $\otimes$  (ca  $\oplus$  cb) = (aa  $\oplus$  ab)  $\otimes$  (ba  $\oplus$  bb)  $\otimes$  (ca  $\oplus$  cb)
using prems ba-assoc bb-assoc
apply -
  apply (rule normxor-assoc2-x-x-x)
  apply (erule prems(5)) apply force
  apply (erule prems(8)) apply force
  apply (erule ba-assoc)
  apply (erule bb-assoc)
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
  apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
  apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
  done
  qed
  qed
  qed
thus ?case using prems by auto
qed

lemma equiv-imp-norm: x ≈ y ==> norm x = norm y
  apply (erule xor-eq.induct)
  apply (auto)
  apply (rule normxor-assoc2[THEN sym])
  apply (auto simp add: normxor-com)

```

```

apply (auto intro: normed-norm)
done

lemma normxor-equiv:
  [ normed a; normed b ]
  ==> XOR a b ≈ normxor a b
proof (induct a arbitrary: b rule: normed-induct2)
  case (Standard x)
  show ?case using prems apply -
    apply (rule normed-induct2[where P=%b. XOR x b ≈ normxor x b])
    apply force
    apply force
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=b ⊕ a in Xor-cong-trans)
    apply force
    apply force
    apply (rule-tac Xor-assoc-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=ZERO and B1=a in Xor-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force
    apply force
    apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=ZERO and B1=b in Xor-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force apply force
    apply (rule xor-eq.symm)
    apply (rule-tac A1=a and B1=x ⊕ b in Xor-cong-trans)
    apply force
    apply (rule xor-eq.symm) apply force
    apply (rule Xor-com-trans)
    apply (rule xor-eq.symm)
    apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=b ⊕ a in Xor-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force
    apply (rule-tac Xor-assoc-trans) apply force
    done
next
  case Zero
  show ?case using prems by auto
next
  case (Xor x y)
  show ?case using <normed b>
  proof (induct b rule: normed-induct2[where P=%b. XOR (XOR x y) b ≈ normxor (XOR x y) b])
    case Zero
    show ?case using prems by auto
  next
    case (Standard z)
    show ?case using prems(1,3,4,6-) thm prems apply -
      apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
      apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ z ≈ y ⊗ z) prefer 2
      apply (erule prems(5))

```

```

apply simp
apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=ZERO in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=y ⊕ x and B1=x in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force
apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (rule-tac A1=y and B1=ZERO in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force
apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ z ≈ y ⊗ z) prefer 2
apply (auto intro: prems)
apply (rule xor-eq.symm)
apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=y ⊕ z in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply (rule xor-eq.symm) apply force
apply force
done

next
case (Xor u v)
show ?case using prems(1,3,4,6-)
apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def split: split-if-asm)

apply (rule-tac A1=x ⊕ y and B1=v ⊕ x in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force
apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans)
apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=x in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force

apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans)
apply (rule-tac A1=y and B1=v in Xor-cong-trans)
apply (rule-tac A1=y ⊕ x and B1=x in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force
apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (rule-tac A1=y and B1=ZERO in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force
apply force apply force
apply (erule prems(5)) defer

apply (rule xor-eq.symm)
apply (rule-tac A1=u and B1=(x ⊕ y) ⊕ v in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply (rule xor-eq.symm, force)
apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans)
apply (rule-tac A1=(x ⊕ y) ⊕ u and B1=v in Xor-cong-trans) prefer 3
apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2) apply force prefer 2 apply force
apply (rule Xor-com-trans) apply force defer

apply (rule xor-eq.symm)
apply (rule-tac A1=u and B1=(x ⊕ y) ⊕ v in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply (rule xor-eq.symm, force)

```

```

apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans)
apply (rule-tac A1=(x ⊕ y) ⊕ u and B1=v in Xor-cong-trans) prefer 3
apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2) apply force prefer 2 apply force
apply (rule Xor-com-trans) apply force

apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ≈ y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=ZERO in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force defer

apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ≈ y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=ZERO in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force defer

apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ≈ y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=ZERO in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force defer

apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ≈ y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=ZERO in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force

apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ≈ y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force

apply (rule-tac A1=x ⊕ y and B1=v ⊕ u in Xor-cong-trans)
apply auto
apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans)
apply (rule-tac A1=ZERO and B1=u in Xor-cong-trans)

```

```

apply auto

apply (rule-tac A1=x ⊕ y and B1=v ⊕ u in Xor-cong-trans)
apply auto
apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans)
apply (rule-tac A1=ZERO and B1=u in Xor-cong-trans)
apply auto

apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ≈ y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force

apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ≈ y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force

apply (rule Xor-assoc-trans2)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ≈ y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (rule normed.Xor) apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x in Xor-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force

done
qed
qed

lemma norm-equiv: x ≈ norm x
apply (induct x)
apply (auto intro: xor-eq.refl)
apply (erule xor-eq.Hash-cong)
apply (erule xor-eq.MPair-cong)
apply force
apply (erule xor-eq.Crypt-cong)
apply (rule-tac A1=norm x1 and B1=norm x2 in Xor-cong-trans)
apply auto
apply (rule normxor-equiv)
apply (rule normed-norm)+
done

```

```

lemma norm-imp-equiv: norm x = norm y ==> x ≈ y
  apply (rule xor-eq.trans)
  apply (rule norm-equiv)
  apply (rule xor-eq.symm)
  apply simp
  apply (rule norm-equiv)
done

lemma equiv-norm: (x ≈ y) = (norm x = norm y)
  apply auto
  apply (auto intro: norm-imp-equiv equiv-imp-norm)
done

end

```

```
theory MessageTheoryXor2 imports MessageTheoryXor begin
```

## 9.6 parts, subterms, and quotient type

```

typedef msg = {m | m. normed m}
  apply (rule-tac x=NUMBER 1 in exI)
  apply force
done

```

### definition

```

Agent :: agent ⇒ msg
where
Agent a = Abs-msg (AGENT a)

```

### definition

```

Number :: int ⇒ msg
where
Number i = Abs-msg (NUMBER i)

```

### definition

```

Real :: real ⇒ msg
where
Real i = Abs-msg (REAL i)

```

### definition

```

Key :: key ⇒ msg
where
Key i = Abs-msg (KEY i)

```

### definition

```

Hash :: msg ⇒ msg
where
Hash m = Abs-msg (HASH (Rep-msg m))

```

```

definition
  MPair :: msg  $\Rightarrow$  msg  $\Rightarrow$  msg
  where
    MPair a b = Abs-msg (MPAIR (Rep-msg a) (Rep-msg b))

definition
  Crypt :: key  $\Rightarrow$  msg  $\Rightarrow$  msg
  where
    Crypt k m = Abs-msg (CRYPT k (Rep-msg m))

definition
  Xor :: msg  $\Rightarrow$  msg  $\Rightarrow$  msg
  where
    Xor a b = Abs-msg (norm ((Rep-msg a)  $\oplus$  (Rep-msg b)))

definition
  Zero :: msg
  where
    Zero = Abs-msg ZERO

definition
  Nonce :: agent  $\Rightarrow$  nat  $\Rightarrow$  msg
  where
    Nonce a n = Abs-msg (NONCE a n)

interpretation MESSAGE-THEORY-DATA Key Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number
  apply (unfold-locales)
  done

lemma normed-Rep-msg[simp,intro]: normed (Rep-msg m)
  apply (subgoal-tac Rep-msg m  $\in$  msg) prefer 2
  apply (rule Rep-msg)
  apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
  done

lemma Abs-msg-normed[simp]: normed m  $\implies$  Rep-msg (Abs-msg m) = m
  apply (rule Abs-msg-inverse)
  apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
  done

inductive-set
  fparts :: fmsg set  $\Rightarrow$  fmsg set
  for H :: fmsg set
  where
    Inj [intro]: X  $\in$  H  $\implies$  X  $\in$  fparts H
    | Fst: MPAIR X Y  $\in$  fparts H  $\implies$  X  $\in$  fparts H
    | Snd: MPAIR X Y  $\in$  fparts H  $\implies$  Y  $\in$  fparts H
    | Ctext: CRYPT k M  $\in$  fparts H  $\implies$  M  $\in$  fparts H

```

```

| Xor1:       $X \oplus Y \in fparts H \implies X \in fparts H$ 
| Xor2:       $X \oplus Y \in fparts H \implies Y \in fparts H$ 

lemma normed-fparts:
   $\llbracket Y \in fparts \{X\}; \text{normed } X \rrbracket \implies \text{normed } Y$ 
  apply (erule fparts.induct)
  apply auto
  apply (erule normed-MPAIR)
  apply (auto elim: normed-MPAIR normed-HASH normed-XOR normed-CRYPT)
done

lemma fparts-inj:
   $X \in H \implies X \in fparts H$ 
  apply (erule fparts.Inj)
done

lemma fparts-singleton:
   $X \in fparts H \implies \exists Y \in H. X \in fparts \{Y\}$ 
  apply (erule fparts.induct)
  apply (auto elim: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2
          fparts.Ctext)
done

lemma fparts-mono:
   $G \subseteq H \implies fparts G \subseteq fparts H$ 
  apply auto
  apply (erule fparts.induct)
  apply (auto elim: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2
          fparts.Ctext)
done

lemma fparts-idem:
   $fparts(fparts H) = fparts H$ 
  apply auto
  apply (erule fparts.induct)
  apply (auto elim: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2
          Hash fparts.Ctext)
done

interpretation fparts: MESSAGE-THEORY-SUBTERM-NOTION fparts
  apply (unfold-locales)
  apply (erule fparts-inj)
  apply (erule fparts-singleton)
  apply (erule fparts-mono)
  apply (rule fparts-idem)
done

```

### 9.6.1 rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages

```

lemma fparts-insert-AGENT [simp]:
  fparts (insert (AGENT agt) H) = insert (AGENT agt) (fparts H)
  apply (rule fparts.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fparts.induct, auto dest: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Ctext
          fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)
done

lemma fparts-insert-NONCE [simp]:
  fparts (insert (NONCE B N) H) = insert (NONCE B N) (fparts H)
  apply (rule fparts.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fparts.induct, auto dest: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Ctext
          fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)
done

lemma fparts-insert-NUMBER [simp]:
  fparts (insert (NUMBER N) H) = insert (NUMBER N) (fparts H)
  apply (rule fparts.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fparts.induct, auto dest: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Ctext
          fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)
done

lemma fparts-insert-Real [simp]:
  fparts (insert (REAL N) H) = insert (REAL N) (fparts H)
  apply (rule fparts.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fparts.induct, auto dest: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Ctext
          fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)
done

lemma fparts-insert-KEY [simp]:
  fparts (insert (KEY K) H) = insert (KEY K) (fparts H)
  apply (rule fparts.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fparts.induct, auto dest: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Ctext
          fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)
done

lemma fparts-insert-ZERO [simp]:
  fparts (insert (ZERO) H) = insert ZERO (fparts H)
  apply (rule fparts.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fparts.induct, auto dest: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Ctext
          Hash fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)
done

lemma fparts-insert-HASH [simp]:
  fparts (insert (HASH X) H) = insert (HASH X) (fparts H)
  apply (rule equalityI)
  apply (rule subsetI)
  apply (erule fparts.induct, auto dest: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Ctext
          fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)

```

**done**

```
lemma fparts-insert-CRYPT [simp]:  
  fparts (insert (CRYPT K X) H) = insert (CRYPT K X) (fparts (insert X  
H))  
  apply (rule equalityI)  
  apply (rule subsetI)  
  apply (erule fparts.induct, auto dest: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Ctext  
          fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)  
  apply (blast intro: fparts.Ctext)
```

**done**

```
lemma fparts-insert-MPAIR [simp]:  
  fparts (insert (MPAIR X Y) H) =  
    insert (MPAIR X Y) (fparts (insert X (insert Y H)))  
  apply (rule equalityI)  
  apply (rule subsetI)  
  apply (erule fparts.induct, auto dest: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Ctext  
          fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)  
  apply (blast intro: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd)+  
done
```

```
lemma fparts-insert-XOR [simp]:  
  fparts (insert (X ⊕ Y) H) =  
    insert (X ⊕ Y) (fparts (insert X (insert Y H)))  
  apply (rule equalityI)  
  apply (rule subsetI)  
  apply (erule fparts.induct, auto dest: fparts.Fst fparts.Snd fparts.Ctext  
          fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)  
  apply (blast intro: fparts.Xor1 fparts.Xor2)+  
done
```

### 9.6.2 fsubterms

**inductive-set**

*fsubterms* :: *fmsg set* => *fmsg set*

**for** *H* :: *fmsg set*

**where**

<i>Inj</i> [intro]:	$X \in H$	$\implies X \in \text{fsubterms } H$
<i>Fst</i> :	$\text{MPAIR } X \ Y \in \text{fsubterms } H$	$\implies X \in \text{fsubterms } H$
<i>Snd</i> :	$\text{MPAIR } X \ Y \in \text{fsubterms } H$	$\implies Y \in \text{fsubterms } H$
<i>Ctext</i> :	$\text{CRYPT } k \ M \in \text{fsubterms } H$	$\implies M \in \text{fsubterms } H$
<i>Hash</i> :	$\text{HASH } M \in \text{fsubterms } H$	$\implies M \in \text{fsubterms } H$
<i>Xor1</i> :	$X \oplus Y \in \text{fsubterms } H$	$\implies X \in \text{fsubterms } H$
<i>Xor2</i> :	$X \oplus Y \in \text{fsubterms } H$	$\implies Y \in \text{fsubterms } H$

**lemma** normed-fsubterms:

```
  [ Y ∈ fsubterms {X}; normed X ] ==> normed Y  
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct)
```

```

apply auto
apply (erule normed-MPAIR)
apply (auto elim: normed-MPAIR normed-HASH normed-XOR normed-CRYPT)
done

lemma fsubterms-inj:
   $X \in H \implies X \in \text{fsubterms } H$ 
  apply (erule fsubterms.Inj)
done

lemma fsubterms-singleton:
   $X \in \text{fsubterms } H \implies \exists Y \in H. X \in \text{fsubterms } \{Y\}$ 
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct)
  apply (auto elim: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2
            fsubterms.Ctext fsubterms.Hash)
done

lemma fsubterms-mono:
   $G \subseteq H \implies \text{fsubterms } G \subseteq \text{fsubterms } H$ 
  apply auto
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct)
  apply (auto elim: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2
            fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Ctext)
done

lemma fsubterms-idem:
   $\text{fsubterms } (\text{fsubterms } H) = \text{fsubterms } H$ 
  apply auto
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct)
  apply (auto elim: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2
            fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Ctext)
done

interpretation fsubterms: MESSAGE-THEORY-SUBTERM-NOTION fsubterms
  apply (unfold-locales)
  apply (erule fsubterms-inj)
  apply (erule fsubterms-singleton)
  apply (erule fsubterms-mono)
  apply (rule fsubterms-idem)
done

```

### 9.6.3 rewrite rules for pulling out atomic messages

```

lemma fsubterms-insert-AGENT [simp]:
   $\text{fsubterms } (\text{insert } (\text{AGENT } agt) H) = \text{insert } (\text{AGENT } agt) (\text{fsubterms } H)$ 
  apply (rule fsubterms.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct, auto dest: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
            fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)
done

```

```

lemma fsubterms-insert-NONCE [simp]:
  fsubterms (insert (NONCE B N) H) = insert (NONCE B N) (fsubterms H)
  apply (rule fsubterms.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct, auto dest: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
          fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)
done

lemma fsubterms-insert-NUMBER [simp]:
  fsubterms (insert (NUMBER N) H) = insert (NUMBER N) (fsubterms H)
  apply (rule fsubterms.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct, auto dest: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
          fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)
done

lemma fsubterms-insert-Real [simp]:
  fsubterms (insert (REAL N) H) = insert (REAL N) (fsubterms H)
  apply (rule fsubterms.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct, auto dest: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
          fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)
done

lemma fsubterms-insert-KEY [simp]:
  fsubterms (insert (KEY K) H) = insert (KEY K) (fsubterms H)
  apply (rule fsubterms.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct, auto dest: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
          fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)
done

lemma fsubterms-insert-ZERO [simp]:
  fsubterms (insert (ZERO) H) = insert ZERO (fsubterms H)
  apply (rule fsubterms.insert-eq-I)
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct, auto dest: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
          fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)
done

lemma fsubterms-insert-HASH [simp]:
  fsubterms (insert (HASH X) H) = insert (HASH X) (fsubterms (insert X H))
  apply (rule equalityI)
  apply (rule subsetI)
  apply (erule fsubterms.induct, auto dest: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
          fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)
  apply (blast intro: fsubterms.Hash)
done

lemma fsubterms-insert-CRYPT [simp]:
  fsubterms (insert (CRYPT K X) H) = insert (CRYPT K X) (fsubterms (insert
X H))
  apply (rule equalityI)

```

```

apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule fsubterms.induct, auto dest: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
         fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)
apply (blast intro: fsubterms.Ctext)
done

lemma fsubterms-insert-MPAIR [simp]:
  fsubterms (insert (MPAIR X Y) H) =
    insert (MPAIR X Y) (fsubterms (insert X (insert Y H)))
apply (rule equalityI)
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule fsubterms.induct, auto dest: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
         fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)
apply (blast intro: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd)+
done

lemma fsubterms-insert-XOR [simp]:
  fsubterms (insert (X ⊕ Y) H) =
    insert (X ⊕ Y) (fsubterms (insert X (insert Y H)))
apply (rule equalityI)
apply (rule subsetI)
apply (erule fsubterms.induct, auto dest: fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
         fsubterms.Hash fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)
apply (blast intro: fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2)+
done

```

#### 9.6.4 parts

**definition**

*parts :: msg set ⇒ msg set*

**where**

*parts H = { Abs-msg m | m . m ∈ fparts (Rep-msg‘H)}*

```

lemma parts-inj1:
  X ∈ H ⇒ X ∈ parts H
apply (unfold parts-def)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=Rep-msg X in exI)
apply (auto simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
done

```

```

lemma parts-singleton1:
  X ∈ parts H ⇒ ∃ Y∈H. X ∈ parts {Y}
apply (unfold parts-def)
apply auto
apply (drule fparts-singleton)
by auto

```

```

lemma parts-mono1:

```

```

 $G \subseteq H \implies \text{parts } G \subseteq \text{parts } H$ 
apply (unfold parts-def)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac  $x=m$  in exI)
apply (subgoal-tac (Rep-msg`G)  $\subseteq$  (Rep-msg`H)) prefer 2
apply force
apply (drule fparts-mono)
apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply (erule rev-subsetD)
apply force
done

lemma vimage-inside:
 $f`\{g m \mid m. p m\} = \{f (g m) \mid m . p m\}$ 
by auto

lemma parts-idem1:
 $\text{parts} (\text{parts } H) = \text{parts } H$ 
apply (unfold parts-def)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac  $x=m$  in exI) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac  $x=m$  in exI)
apply (auto simp add: vimage-inside)
apply (subgoal-tac
 $\exists nm \in \{\text{Rep-msg} (\text{Abs-msg } m) \mid m. m \in \text{fparts} (\text{Rep-msg`H})\}. m \in \text{fparts}\{nm\}$ )
prefer 2
apply (rule-tac  $x=m$  in bexI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac  $x=m$  in exI)
apply auto
apply (subst Abs-msg-normed)
apply auto
apply (drule fparts-singleton, auto)
apply (drule normed-fparts)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac
 $\{\text{Rep-msg} (\text{Abs-msg } ma)\} \subseteq \{\text{Rep-msg} (\text{Abs-msg } m) \mid m. m \in \text{fparts} (\text{Rep-msg`H})\}$ )
apply (drule fparts-mono)
apply (erule rev-subsetD) back
apply force
apply force

apply (drule fparts-singleton)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac  $ma \in msg$ )
apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inverse) prefer 2

```

```

apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (drule-tac X=ma in fparts-singleton)
apply auto
apply (erule normed-fparts)
apply (auto simp add: Rep-msg)
apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ fparts (fparts (Rep-msg ` H)))
apply (force simp add: fparts-idem)
apply (subgoal-tac {ma} ⊆ fparts (Rep-msg ` H)) prefer 2
apply force
apply (drule fparts-mono)
apply (erule rev-subsetD)
apply force
done

```

### 9.6.5 simplification rules for parts

```

lemma parts-Number[simp]: parts {Number i} = {Number i}
  apply (auto simp add: parts-def) prefer 2
  apply (rule-tac x=NUMBER i in exI)
  apply auto prefer 2
  apply (rule fparts.Inj)
  apply (auto simp add: Number-def)
  apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
  apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac normed (NUMBER i))
  apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
  apply force
  apply force
done

lemma parts-Real[simp]: parts {Real i} = {Real i}
  apply (auto simp add: parts-def) prefer 2
  apply (rule-tac x=REAL i in exI)
  apply auto prefer 2
  apply (rule fparts.Inj)
  apply (auto simp add: Real-def)
  apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
  apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac normed (REAL i))
  apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
  apply force
  apply force
done

lemma parts-Nonce[simp]: parts {Nonce a i} = {Nonce a i}
  apply (auto simp add: parts-def) prefer 2
  apply (rule-tac x=NONCE a i in exI)
  apply auto prefer 2
  apply (rule fparts.Inj)

```

```

apply (auto simp add: Nonce-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (NONCE a i))
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
apply force
apply force
done

lemma parts-Key[simp]: parts {Key k} = {Key k}
apply (auto simp add: parts-def) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=KEY k in exI)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fparts.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: Key-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (KEY k))
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
apply force
apply force
done

lemma parts-Agent[simp]: parts {Agent a} = {Agent a}
apply (auto simp add: parts-def) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=AGENT a in exI)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fparts.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: Agent-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (AGENT a))
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
apply force
apply force
done

lemma parts-Hash[simp]: parts {Hash h} = {Hash h}
apply (auto simp add: parts-def) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=HASH (Rep-msg h) in exI)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fparts.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: Hash-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (HASH (Rep-msg h))) prefer 2
apply auto
done

```

```

lemma fparts-mono-elem:
   $\llbracket X \in \text{fparts } H; H \subseteq G \rrbracket \implies X \in \text{fparts } G$ 
  apply (drule fparts-mono)
  by (erule rev-subsetD)

lemma parts-MPair[simp]: parts {MPair a b} = {MPair a b}  $\cup$  parts {a}  $\cup$  parts {b}
  apply (auto simp add: parts-def) prefer 2
  apply (rule-tac x=MPAIR (Rep-msg a) (Rep-msg b) in exI)
  apply auto prefer 2
  apply (rule fparts.Inj)
  apply (auto simp add: MPair-def)
  apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
  apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac normed (MPAIR (Rep-msg a) (Rep-msg b))) prefer 2
  apply auto
  apply (drule fparts-singleton)
  apply auto
  apply (subgoal-tac normed (MPAIR (Rep-msg a) (Rep-msg b))) prefer 2
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
  apply (rule conjI)
  apply force
  apply (rule disjI2)
  apply (erule fparts-mono-elem)
  apply force

  apply (subgoal-tac normed (MPAIR (Rep-msg a) (Rep-msg b))) prefer 2
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
  apply (rule conjI)
  apply force
  apply (rule disjI2)
  apply (erule fparts-mono-elem)
  apply force
done

lemma parts-Crypt[simp]: parts {Crypt k m} = {Crypt k m}  $\cup$  parts {m}
  apply (auto simp add: parts-def) prefer 2
  apply (rule-tac x=CRYPT k (Rep-msg m) in exI)
  apply auto prefer 2
  apply (rule fparts.Inj)
  apply (auto simp add: Crypt-def)
  apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
  apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac normed (CRYPT k (Rep-msg m))) prefer 2
  apply auto
  apply (subgoal-tac normed (CRYPT k (Rep-msg m))) prefer 2
  apply auto

```

**done**

```
interpretation parts: MESSAGE-THEORY-PARTS Crypt Nonce MPair Hash
Number Key parts
  apply (unfold-locales)
  apply (erule parts-inj1)
  apply (erule parts-singleton1)
  apply (erule parts-mono1)
  apply (rule parts-idem1)
done
```

### 9.6.6 subterms

**definition**

*subterms* :: msg set  $\Rightarrow$  msg set

**where**

*subterms*  $H = \{ \text{Abs-msg } m \mid m . m \in f\text{subterms} (\text{Rep-msg}^* H) \}$

**lemma** *subterms-inj1*:

```
 $X \in H \implies X \in \text{subterms } H$ 
  apply (unfold subterms-def)
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac  $x=\text{Rep-msg } X$  in exI)
  apply (auto simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
```

**done**

**lemma** *subterms-singleton1*:

```
 $X \in \text{subterms } H \implies \exists Y \in H. X \in \text{subterms } \{Y\}$ 
  apply (unfold subterms-def)
  apply auto
  apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
```

**by** auto

**lemma** *subterms-mono1*:

```
 $G \subseteq H \implies \text{subterms } G \subseteq \text{subterms } H$ 
  apply (unfold subterms-def)
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac  $x=m$  in exI)
  apply (subgoal-tac ( $\text{Rep-msg}^* G \subseteq (\text{Rep-msg}^* H)$ ) prefer 2)
  apply force
  apply (drule fsubterms-mono)
  apply (rule conjI)
  apply force
  apply (erule rev-subsetD)
  apply force
```

**done**

**lemma** *subterms-idem1*:

$\text{subterms} (\text{subterms } H) = \text{subterms } H$

```

apply (unfold subterms-def)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=m in exI) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
apply (auto simp add: vimage-inside)
apply (subgoal-tac
       $\exists nm \in \{Rep\text{-}msg (Abs\text{-}msg m) \mid m. m \in fsubterms (Rep\text{-}msg ' H)\}. m \in fsubterms \{nm\}$ )
      prefer 2
      apply (rule-tac x=m in bexI)
      apply auto
      apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
      apply auto
      apply (subst Abs-msg-normed)
      apply auto
      apply (drule fsubterms-singleton, auto)
      apply (drule normed-fsubterms)
      apply auto
      apply (subgoal-tac
               $\{Rep\text{-}msg (Abs\text{-}msg ma)\} \subseteq \{Rep\text{-}msg (Abs\text{-}msg m) \mid m. m \in fsubterms (Rep\text{-}msg ' H)\}$ )
      apply (drule fsubterms-mono)
      apply (erule rev-subsetD) back
      apply force
      apply force

      apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
      apply auto
      apply (subgoal-tac ma ∈ msg)
      apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inverse) prefer 2
      apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
      apply (drule-tac X=ma in fsubterms-singleton)
      apply auto
      apply (erule normed-fsubterms)
      apply (auto simp add: Rep-msg)
      apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ fsubterms (fsubterms (Rep-msg ' H)))
      apply (force simp add: fsubterms-idem)
      apply (subgoal-tac {ma} ⊆ fsubterms (Rep-msg ' H)) prefer 2
      apply force
      apply (drule fsubterms-mono)
      apply (erule rev-subsetD)
      apply force
done

```

### 9.6.7 simplification rules for subterms

```

lemma subterms-Number[simp]: subterms {Number i} = {Number i}
  apply (auto simp add: subterms-def) prefer 2
  apply (rule-tac x=NUMBER i in exI)

```

```

apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fsubterms.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: Number-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (NUMBER i))
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
apply force
apply force
done

lemma subterms-Real[simp]: subterms {Real i} = {Real i}
apply (auto simp add: subterms-def) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=REAL i in exI)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fsubterms.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: Real-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (REAL i))
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
apply force
apply force
done

lemma subterms-Nonce[simp]: subterms {Nonce a i} = {Nonce a i}
apply (auto simp add: subterms-def) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=NONCE a i in exI)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fsubterms.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: Nonce-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (NONCE a i))
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
apply force
apply force
done

lemma subterms-Key[simp]: subterms {Key k} = {Key k}
apply (auto simp add: subterms-def) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=KEY k in exI)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fsubterms.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: Key-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (KEY k))
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)

```

```

apply force
apply force
done

lemma subterms-Agent[simp]: subterms {Agent a} = {Agent a}
apply (auto simp add: subterms-def) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=AGENT a in exI)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fsubterms.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: Agent-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (AGENT a))
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
apply force
apply force
done

lemma subterms-Hash[simp]: subterms {Hash h} = {Hash h} ∪ subterms {h}
apply (auto simp add: subterms-def) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=HASH (Rep-msg h) in exI)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fsubterms.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: Hash-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (HASH (Rep-msg h))) prefer 2
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac normed (HASH (Rep-msg h))) prefer 2
apply auto
done

lemma fsubterms-mono-elem:
  [ X ∈ fsubterms H; H ⊆ G ] ⇒ X ∈ fsubterms G
apply (drule fsubterms-mono)
by (erule rev-subsetD)

lemma subterms-MPair[simp]: subterms {MPair a b} = {MPair a b} ∪ subterms {a} ∪ subterms {b}
apply (auto simp add: subterms-def) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=MPAIR (Rep-msg a) (Rep-msg b) in exI)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fsubterms.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: MPair-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (MPAIR (Rep-msg a) (Rep-msg b))) prefer 2
apply auto
apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)

```

```

apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac normed (MPAIR (Rep-msg a) (Rep-msg b))) prefer 2
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply (rule disjI2)
apply (erule fsubterms-mono-elem)
apply force

apply (subgoal-tac normed (MPAIR (Rep-msg a) (Rep-msg b))) prefer 2
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply (rule disjI2)
apply (erule fsubterms-mono-elem)
apply force
done

lemma subterms-Crypt[simp]: subterms {Crypt k m} = {Crypt k m} ∪ subterms {m}
apply (auto simp add: subterms-def) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac x=CRYPT k (Rep-msg m) in exI)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (rule fsubterms.Inj)
apply (auto simp add: Crypt-def)
apply (subst Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (CRYPT k (Rep-msg m))) prefer 2
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac normed (CRYPT k (Rep-msg m))) prefer 2
apply auto
done

lemma Abs-eq-normed[dest]: [ Abs-msg a = Abs-msg b; normed a; normed b ] ==>
a = b ∧ normed b
apply (subgoal-tac Rep-msg (Abs-msg a) = Rep-msg (Abs-msg b)) prefer 2
apply force
apply (thin-tac Abs-msg a = Abs-msg b)
apply (force simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
done

lemma fparts-fsubterms-Abs-msg:
[ m' ∈ fparts (Rep-msg ' H); Abs-msg m' = Abs-msg m; m ∈ fsubterms (Rep-msg ' H) ]
==> m = m'
apply (drule fparts-singleton)
apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)

```

```

apply auto
apply (drule normed-fsubterms)
apply force
apply (drule normed-fparts)
apply auto
done

interpretation subterms: MESSAGE-THEORY-SUBTERM Crypt Nonce MPair
Hash Number parts Key subterms
apply (unfold-locales)
apply (erule subterms-inj1)
apply (erule subterms-singleton1)
apply (erule subterms-mono1)
apply (rule subterms-idem1)
apply (unfold parts-def subterms-def)
apply auto
apply (erule fparts.induct)
apply (auto intro: fsubterms.Inj fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
fsubterms.Hash
          fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2
          dest: fparts-fsubterms-Abs-msg)
done

```

### 9.6.8 results about parts and subterms

**notation** MPair ((2{-, / -}))

**notation** MACM ((4Hash[-] /-) [0, 1000])

#### inductive

xor-red :: fmmsg => fmmsg => bool (- ~> - [60,60])

#### where

Xor-assoc-1[intro]: ( $(X \oplus (Y \oplus Z)) \sim > ((X \oplus Y) \oplus Z)$ ) |

Xor-assoc-2[intro]: ( $((X \oplus Y) \oplus Z) \sim > (X \oplus (Y \oplus Z))$ ) |

Xor-com[intro]:  $X \oplus Y \sim > Y \oplus X$  |

Xor-Zero[intro]:  $X \oplus \text{ZERO} \sim > X$  |

Xor-cancel[intro]:  $X \sim > Y ==> X \oplus Y \sim > \text{ZERO}$  |

MPair-cong:  $\llbracket X \sim > A ; Y \sim > B \rrbracket \implies \text{MPAIR } X Y \sim > \text{MPAIR } A B$  |

Hash-cong:  $X \sim > Y ==> \text{HASH } X \sim > \text{HASH } Y$  |

Crypt-cong:  $M \sim > N ==> \text{CRYPT } K M \sim > \text{CRYPT } K N$  |

Xor-cong:  $\llbracket X \sim > A ; Y \sim > B \rrbracket \implies X \oplus Y \sim > A \oplus B$  |

refl[intro]:  $X \sim > X$  |

trans:  $\llbracket X \sim > Y ; Y \sim > Z \rrbracket ==> X \sim > Z$

**lemma** xor-red-imp-xor-eq:  $X \sim > Y \implies X \approx Y$

**apply** (erule xor-red.induct)

**apply** auto

```

apply (rule xor-eq.symm)
apply (rule xor-eq.Xor-assoc)
apply (auto intro: xor-eq.MPair-cong xor-eq.Hash-cong
          xor-eq.Crypt-cong xor-eq.Xor-cong xor-eq.trans)
done

lemma set-reorder-XOR:
  {X, Y ⊕ Z} = {Y ⊕ Z, X}
by auto

lemma set-reorder-insert:
  insert X (insert Y H) = insert Y (insert X H)
by auto

lemma set-reorder-insert-ZERO:
  insert X (insert ZERO H) = insert ZERO (insert X H)
by auto

lemma fsubterms-reduce-NONCE[rule-format]:
  [ A ~> B; NONCE C N ∈ fsubterms {B} ] ⇒ NONCE C N ∈ fsubterms {A}
  apply (induct A B rule: xor-red.induct)
  apply (auto simp add: set-reorder-XOR)

  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert-ZERO)
  apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
  apply (auto elim: fsubterms.insertI)
  apply (rule fsubterms-mono[THEN subsetD]) prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply force
  apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
  apply (auto elim: fsubterms.insertI)
  apply (rule fsubterms.mono[THEN subsetD]) prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply force
done

lemma fsubterms-reduce-AGENT[rule-format]:
  [ A ~> B; AGENT C ∈ fsubterms {B} ] ⇒ AGENT C ∈ fsubterms {A}
  apply (induct A B rule: xor-red.induct)
  apply (auto simp add: set-reorder-XOR)

  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert-ZERO)

```

```

apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
apply (auto elim: fsubterms.insertI)
apply (rule fsubterms-mono[THEN subsetD]) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force
apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
apply (auto elim: fsubterms.insertI)
apply (rule fsubterms.mono[THEN subsetD]) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force
done

```

```

lemma fsubterms-reduce-KEY[rule-format]:
 $\llbracket A \sim > B; KEY k \in fsubterms \{B\} \rrbracket \implies KEY k \in fsubterms \{A\}$ 
apply (induct A B rule: xor-red.induct)
apply (auto simp add: set-reorder-XOR)

apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert-ZERO)

```

```

apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
apply (auto elim: fsubterms.insertI)
apply (rule fsubterms-mono[THEN subsetD]) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force

apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
apply (auto elim: fsubterms.insertI)
apply (rule fsubterms-mono[THEN subsetD]) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force
done

```

```

lemma fparts-reduce-KEY[rule-format]:
 $\llbracket A \sim > B; KEY k \in fparts \{B\} \rrbracket \implies KEY k \in fparts \{A\}$ 
apply (induct A B rule: xor-red.induct)
apply (auto simp add: set-reorder-XOR)

apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert-ZERO)

apply (drule fparts-singleton)

```

```

apply (auto elim: fparts.insertI)
apply (rule fparts-mono[THEN subsetD]) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force

apply (drule fparts-singleton)
apply (auto elim: fparts.insertI)
apply (rule fparts-mono[THEN subsetD]) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force
done

lemma fparts-reduce-NONCE[rule-format]:
   $\llbracket A \simgt B; \text{NONCE } a \text{ na} \in \text{fparts } \{B\} \rrbracket \implies \text{NONCE } a \text{ na} \in \text{fparts } \{A\}$ 
  apply (induct A B rule: xor-red.induct)
  apply (auto simp add: set-reorder-XOR)

  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert-ZERO)

  apply (drule fparts-singleton)
  apply (auto elim: fparts.insertI)
  apply (rule fparts-mono[THEN subsetD]) prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply force

  apply (drule fparts-singleton)
  apply (auto elim: fparts.insertI)
  apply (rule fparts-mono[THEN subsetD]) prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply force
done

lemma fparts-reduce-CRYPT[rule-format]:
   $\llbracket A \simgt B; \text{CRYPT } k \text{ msig} \in \text{fparts } \{B\} \rrbracket$ 
   $\implies \exists \text{ msig'}. \text{CRYPT } k \text{ msig}' \in \text{fparts } \{A\} \wedge \text{msig}' \simgt \text{msig}$ 
  apply (induct A B arbitrary: msig rule: xor-red.induct)
  apply (rule-tac x=msig in exI)
  apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)

  apply (rule-tac x=msig in exI)
  apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)

```

```

apply (rule-tac  $x=msig$  in exI)
apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)
apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)

apply (rule-tac  $x=msig$  in exI)
apply (simp add: set-reorder-insert-ZERO)
apply force

apply force

prefer 2
apply simp prefer 4
apply force prefer 3

apply simp
apply (drule fparts-singleton)
apply safe
apply clarsimp
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fparts \{X\} \wedge msig' \simgt msig$ )
prefer 2
apply force
apply clarify
apply (rule-tac  $x=msig'$  in exI)
apply (force intro: fparts-mono-elem)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fparts \{Y\} \wedge msig' \simgt msig$ )
prefer 2
apply force
apply clarify
apply (rule-tac  $x=msig'$  in exI)
apply (force intro: fparts-mono-elem)

apply clarsimp
apply (drule fparts-singleton)
apply safe
apply clarsimp
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fparts \{X\} \wedge msig' \simgt msig$ )
prefer 2
apply force
apply clarify
apply (rule-tac  $x=msig'$  in exI)
apply (force intro: fparts-mono-elem)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fparts \{Y\} \wedge msig' \simgt msig$ )
prefer 2
apply force
apply clarify
apply (rule-tac  $x=msig'$  in exI)
apply (force intro: fparts-mono-elem)

apply (case-tac CRYPT k msig = CRYPT K N)

```

```

apply (rule-tac  $x=M$  in exI)
apply force
apply auto

apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fparts \{Y\} \wedge msig' \simgt msig$ )
prefer 2
apply force
apply clarify
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig''. CRYPT k msig'' \in fparts \{X\} \wedge msig'' \simgt msig'$ )
prefer 2
apply force
apply clarify
apply (rule-tac  $x=msig''$  in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply (rule xor-red.trans)
apply auto
done

lemma fsubterms-reduce-CRYPT[rule-format]:
 $\llbracket A \simgt B; CRYPT k msig \in fsubterms \{B\} \rrbracket$ 
 $\implies \exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fsubterms \{A\} \wedge msig' \simgt msig$ 
apply (induct A B arbitrary: msig rule: xor-red.induct)
apply (rule-tac  $x=msig$  in exI)
apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)
apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)

apply (rule-tac  $x=msig$  in exI)
apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)
apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)

apply (rule-tac  $x=msig$  in exI)
apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)
apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)

apply (rule-tac  $x=msig$  in exI)
apply (simp add: set-reorder-insert-ZERO)
apply force

apply force

prefer 2
apply simp prefer 4
apply force prefer 3

apply simp
apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
apply safe
apply clarsimp

```

```

apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fsubterms \{X\} \wedge msig' \sim > msig$ )
prefer 2
  apply force
  apply clarify
  apply (rule-tac  $x=msig'$  in exI)
  apply (force intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)
  apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fsubterms \{Y\} \wedge msig' \sim > msig$ )
prefer 2
  apply force
  apply clarify
  apply (rule-tac  $x=msig'$  in exI)
  apply (force intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)

apply clarsimp
apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
apply safe
applyclarsimp
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fsubterms \{X\} \wedge msig' \sim > msig$ )
prefer 2
  apply force
  apply clarify
  apply (rule-tac  $x=msig'$  in exI)
  apply (force intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)
  apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fsubterms \{Y\} \wedge msig' \sim > msig$ )
prefer 2
  apply force
  apply clarify
  apply (rule-tac  $x=msig'$  in exI)
  apply (force intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)

apply (case-tac  $CRYPT k msig = CRYPT K N$ )
  apply (rule-tac  $x=M$  in exI)
  apply force
  apply auto

apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig'. CRYPT k msig' \in fsubterms \{Y\} \wedge msig' \sim > msig$ )
prefer 2
  apply force
  apply clarify
  apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists msig''. CRYPT k msig'' \in fsubterms \{X\} \wedge msig'' \sim > msig'$ )
  prefer 2
    apply force
    apply clarify
    apply (rule-tac  $x=msig''$  in exI)
    apply (rule conjI)
    apply force
    apply (rule xor-red.trans)
    apply auto

```

**done**

```
lemma fsubterms-reduce-HASH[rule-format]:
  [A ~> B; HASH m ∈ fsubterms {B}]
  ==> ∃ m'. HASH m' ∈ fsubterms {A} ∧ m' ~> m
  apply (induct A B arbitrary: m rule: xor-red.induct)
  apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
  apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)

  apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
  apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)

  apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
  apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)
  apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)

  apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
  apply (simp add: set-reorder-insert-ZERO)
  apply force

  apply force prefer 3
  apply force prefer 4
  apply force

  apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
  apply auto

  apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
  apply auto
  apply (subgoal-tac ∃ m'. HASH m' ∈ fsubterms {X} ∧ m' ~> m) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (elim exE)
  apply (rule-tac x=m' in exI)
  apply (force intro: intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)

  apply (subgoal-tac ∃ m'. HASH m' ∈ fsubterms {Y} ∧ m' ~> m) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (elim exE)
  apply (rule-tac x=m' in exI)
  apply (force intro: intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)

  apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
  apply auto
  apply (subgoal-tac ∃ m'. HASH m' ∈ fsubterms {X} ∧ m' ~> m) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (elim exE)
  apply (rule-tac x=m' in exI)
```

```

apply (force intro: intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists m'. \text{HASH } m' \in \text{fsubterms } \{Y\} \wedge m' \sim > m) prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (rule-tac  $x=m'$  in exI)
apply (force intro: intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)

apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists m'. \text{HASH } m' \in \text{fsubterms } \{Y\} \wedge m' \sim > m) prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists m''. \text{HASH } m'' \in \text{fsubterms } \{X\} \wedge m'' \sim > m'$ ) prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (rule-tac  $x=m''$  in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply auto
apply (erule xor-red.trans)
apply force
done

lemma fsubterms-reduce-MPAIR[rule-format]:

$$\begin{aligned} & [\![ M \sim > N; \text{MPAIR } a b \in \text{fsubterms } \{N\} ]\!] \\ & \implies \exists a' b'. \text{MPAIR } a' b' \in \text{fsubterms } \{M\} \wedge a' \sim > a \wedge b' \sim > b \\ & \text{apply (induct } M N \text{ arbitrary: } a b \text{ rule: xor-red.induct)} \\ & \text{apply (rule-tac } x=a \text{ in } \text{exI}, \text{rule-tac } x=b \text{ in } \text{exI}) \\ & \text{apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)} \\ & \text{apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)} \\ \\ & \text{apply (rule-tac } x=a \text{ in } \text{exI}, \text{rule-tac } x=b \text{ in } \text{exI}) \\ & \text{apply (simp add: set-reorder-XOR)} \\ & \text{apply (force simp add: set-reorder-insert)} \\ \\ & \text{apply (rule-tac } x=a \text{ in } \text{exI}, \text{rule-tac } x=b \text{ in } \text{exI}) \\ & \text{apply (simp add: set-reorder-ZERO)} \\ & \text{apply force} \\ \\ & \text{apply force prefer 3} \\ & \text{apply force prefer 4} \\ & \text{apply force defer} \\ \\ & \text{apply (drule } \text{fsubterms-singleton)} \\ & \text{apply auto} \end{aligned}$$$$ 
```

```

apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists a' b'. \text{MPAIR } a' b' \in \text{fsubterms } \{X\} \wedge a' \sim> a \wedge b' \sim>$ 
b) prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (rule-tac  $x=a'$  in exI, rule-tac  $x=b'$  in exI)
apply (force intro: intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists a' b'. \text{MPAIR } a' b' \in \text{fsubterms } \{Y\} \wedge a' \sim> a \wedge b' \sim>$ 
b) prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (rule-tac  $x=a'$  in exI, rule-tac  $x=b'$  in exI)
apply (force intro: intro: fsubterms-mono-elem

apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists a' b'. \text{MPAIR } a' b' \in \text{fsubterms } \{Y\} \wedge a' \sim> a \wedge b' \sim>$ 
b) prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists a'' b''. \text{MPAIR } a'' b'' \in \text{fsubterms } \{X\} \wedge a'' \sim> a' \wedge b'' \sim> b'$  prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (rule-tac  $x=a''$  in exI, rule-tac  $x=b''$  in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply auto
apply (erule xor-red.trans)
apply force
apply (erule xor-red.trans)
apply force

apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists a' b'. \text{MPAIR } a' b' \in \text{fsubterms } \{X\} \wedge a' \sim> a \wedge b' \sim>$ 
b) prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (rule-tac  $x=a'$  in exI, rule-tac  $x=b'$  in exI)
apply (intro conjI)
apply (rule disjI2)
apply (force intro: intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)
apply force
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists a' b'. \text{MPAIR } a' b' \in \text{fsubterms } \{Y\} \wedge a' \sim> a \wedge b' \sim>$ 
b) prefer 2
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (rule-tac  $x=a'$  in exI, rule-tac  $x=b'$  in exI)
apply (intro conjI)

```

```

apply (rule disjI2)
apply (force intro: intro: fsubterms-mono-elem)
apply force
apply force
done

lemmas Red-com-trans = xor-red.trans[OF xor-red.Xor-com]
lemmas Red-Zero2-trans[intro] = xor-red.trans[OF xor-red.Xor-Zero]
lemmas Red-Zero1-trans[intro] = Red-Zero2-trans[THEN Red-com-trans]
lemmas Red-assoc1-trans = xor-red.Xor-assoc-1 [THEN xor-red.trans]
lemmas Red-assoc2-trans = xor-red.Xor-assoc-2 [THEN xor-red.trans]
lemmas Red-cong-trans = xor-red.Xor-cong [THEN xor-red.trans]

lemma normxor-reduce:
  [| normed a; normed b |] ==> XOR a b ~> normxor a b
proof (induct a arbitrary: b rule: normed-induct2)
  case Zero
  show ?case using prems by auto
next
  case (Standard x)
  show ?case using prems apply -
    apply (rule normed-induct2[where P=%b. x ⊕ b ~> x ⊗ b])
    apply force
    apply force
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=b ⊕ a in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force
    apply force
    apply (rule-tac Red-assoc1-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=ZERO and B1=a in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force
    apply force
    apply (rule Red-assoc1-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=ZERO and B1=b in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force apply force
    apply (rule Red-assoc1-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=a ⊕ x and B1=b in Red-cong-trans)
    apply (rule Red-com-trans)
    apply force apply force
    apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=a and B1=x ⊗ b in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force+
  done
next
  case (Xor x y)
  show ?case using <normed b>
  proof (induct b rule: normed-induct2[where P=%b. (x ⊕ y) ⊕ b ~> (x ⊕ y)
  ⊗ b])
    case Zero

```

```

show ?case using prems by auto
next
  case (Standard z)
  show ?case using prems(1,3,4,6-) thm prems apply -
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def)
    apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ z ~> y ⊗ z) prefer 2
    apply (erule prems(5))
    apply simp
    apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=ZERO in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force apply force
    apply (rule-tac A1=y ⊕ x and B1=x in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force
    apply force
    apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=y and B1=ZERO in Red-cong-trans)
    apply auto
    apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ z ~> y ⊗ z) prefer 2
    apply (auto intro: prems)
    apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=y ⊗ z in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force apply force
    done
next
  case (Xor u v)
  show ?case using prems(1,3,4,6-)
    apply (auto simp add: normxor-standard XORnz-def split: split-if-asm)

    apply (rule-tac A1=x ⊕ y and B1=v ⊕ x in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force
    apply (rule Red-assoc1-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=x and B1=x in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force apply force

    apply (rule Red-assoc1-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=y and B1=v in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force
    apply (erule prems(5))

    apply (rule-tac A1=x ⊕ y and B1=v ⊕ u in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force
    apply (rule Red-assoc1-trans)
    apply (rule-tac A1=ZERO and B1=u in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force
    apply force

    apply (rule-tac A1=x ⊕ y and B1=v ⊕ u in Red-cong-trans)
    apply force apply force
    apply (rule Red-assoc1-trans)

```

```

apply (rule-tac A1=(x ⊕ y) ⊗ v and B1=u in Red-cong-trans)
apply force apply force
apply (rule Red-com-trans)
apply force

apply (rule-tac A1=x ⊕ y and B1=v ⊕ u in Red-cong-trans)
apply force apply force
apply (rule Red-assoc1-trans)
apply (rule-tac A1=ZERO and B1=u in Red-cong-trans)
apply force apply force apply force

apply (rule-tac A1=x ⊕ y and B1=v ⊕ u in Red-cong-trans)
apply force apply force
apply (rule Red-assoc1-trans)
apply (rule-tac A1=(x ⊕ y) ⊗ v and B1=u in Red-cong-trans)
apply force apply force
apply (rule Red-com-trans)
apply force

apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ~> y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (erule normed.Xor)
apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x in Red-cong-trans)
apply force apply assumption
apply force

apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ~> y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (erule normed.Xor)
apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x in Red-cong-trans)
apply force apply assumption
apply force

apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ~> y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (erule normed.Xor)
apply force apply force apply force apply force
apply (rule-tac A1=x in Red-cong-trans)
apply force apply assumption
apply force

apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ~> y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))

```

```

apply (erule normed.Xor)
apply force apply force apply force apply force
  apply (rule-tac A1=x in Red-cong-trans)
  apply force apply assumption
  apply force

apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ~> y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (erule normed.Xor)
apply force apply force apply force apply force
  apply (rule-tac A1=x in Red-cong-trans)
  apply force apply assumption
  apply force

apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ~> y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (erule normed.Xor)
apply force apply force apply force apply force
  apply (rule-tac A1=x in Red-cong-trans)
  apply force apply assumption
  apply force

apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ~> y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (erule normed.Xor)
apply force apply force apply force apply force
  apply (rule-tac A1=x in Red-cong-trans)
  apply force apply assumption
  apply force

apply (rule Red-assoc2-trans)
apply (subgoal-tac y ⊕ u ⊕ v ~> y ⊗ u ⊕ v) prefer 2
apply (rule prems(5))
apply (erule normed.Xor)
apply force apply force apply force apply force
  apply (rule-tac A1=x in Red-cong-trans)
  apply force apply assumption
  apply force
done
qed
qed

lemma norm-reduce: x ~> norm x
apply (induct x)
apply (auto intro: xor-red.refl)
apply (erule xor-red.Hash-cong)

```

```

apply (erule xor-red.MPair-cong)
apply force
apply (erule xor-red.Crypt-cong)
apply (rule-tac A1=norm x1 and B1=norm x2 in Red-cong-trans)
apply auto
apply (rule normxor-reduce)
apply (rule normed-norm) +
done

```

### 9.6.9 fparts/subterm and norm interaction

```

lemma fsubterms-norm-NONCE:
  [ NONCE C N ∈ fsubterms {norm B} ] ⇒ NONCE C N ∈ fsubterms {B}
  apply (rule fsubterms-reduce-NONCE)
  prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply (rule norm-reduce)
done

lemma fsubterms-norm-KEY:
  [ KEY k ∈ fsubterms {norm B} ] ⇒ KEY k ∈ fsubterms {B}
  apply (rule fsubterms-reduce-KEY)
  prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply (rule norm-reduce)
done

lemma fsubterms-norm-AGENT:
  [ AGENT C ∈ fsubterms {norm B} ] ⇒ AGENT C ∈ fsubterms {B}
  apply (rule fsubterms-reduce-AGENT)
  prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply (rule norm-reduce)
done

lemma fparts-norm-KEY:
  [ KEY k ∈ fparts {norm B} ] ⇒ KEY k ∈ fparts {B}
  apply (rule fparts-reduce-KEY)
  prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply (rule norm-reduce)
done

lemma fparts-norm-NONCE:
  [ NONCE a na ∈ fparts {norm B} ] ⇒ NONCE a na ∈ fparts {B}
  apply (rule fparts-reduce-NONCE)
  prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply (rule norm-reduce)

```

**done**

```
lemma fsubterms-norm-CRYPT:  
  [ ] CRYPT k m ∈ fsubterms {norm X} ] ⇒ ∃ m'. CRYPT k m' ∈ fsubterms  
  {X} ∧ norm m' = m  
  apply (subgoal-tac X ~> norm X) prefer 2  
  apply (rule norm-reduce)  
  apply (drule fsubterms-reduce-CRYPT)  
  apply assumption  
  apply auto  
  apply (rule-tac x=msig' in exI)  
  apply (rule conjI)  
  apply force  
  apply (drule xor-red-imp-xor-eq)  
  apply (drule equiv-imp-norm)  
  apply (subgoal-tac normed m)  
  apply (force simp add: norm-normed-id)  
  apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ fsubterms {norm X})  
  apply (erule normed-fsubterms)  
  apply (rule normed-norm)  
  apply (erule fsubterms.Ctext)  
done
```

```
lemma fsubterms-norm-HASH:  
  [ ] HASH m ∈ fsubterms {norm X} ] ⇒ ∃ m'. HASH m' ∈ fsubterms {X} ∧  
  norm m' = m  
  apply (subgoal-tac X ~> norm X) prefer 2  
  apply (rule norm-reduce)  
  apply (drule fsubterms-reduce-HASH)  
  apply assumption  
  apply auto  
  apply (rule-tac x=m' in exI)  
  apply (rule conjI)  
  apply force  
  apply (drule xor-red-imp-xor-eq)  
  apply (drule equiv-imp-norm)  
  apply (subgoal-tac normed m)  
  apply (force simp add: norm-normed-id)  
  apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ fsubterms {norm X})  
  apply (erule normed-fsubterms)  
  apply (rule normed-norm)  
  apply (erule fsubterms.Hash)  
done
```

```
lemma fsubterms-norm-MPAIR:  
  [ ] MPAIR a b ∈ fsubterms {norm X} ] ⇒ ∃ a' b'. MPAIR a' b' ∈ fsubterms  
  {X} ∧ norm a' = a ∧ norm b' = b  
  apply (subgoal-tac X ~> norm X) prefer 2  
  apply (rule norm-reduce)
```

```

apply (drule fsubterms-reduce-MPAIR)
apply assumption
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=a' in exI, rule-tac x=b' in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply auto
apply (drule xor-red-imp-xor-eq)
apply (drule equiv-imp-norm)
apply (subgoal-tac normed a)
apply (force simp add: norm-normed-id)
apply (subgoal-tac a ∈ fsubterms {norm X})
apply (erule normed-fsubterms)
apply (rule normed-norm)
apply (erule fsubterms.Fst)
apply (drule xor-red-imp-xor-eq) back
apply (drule equiv-imp-norm)
apply (subgoal-tac normed b)
apply (force simp add: norm-normed-id)
apply (subgoal-tac b ∈ fsubterms {norm X})
apply (erule normed-fsubterms)
apply (rule normed-norm)
apply (erule fsubterms.Snd)
done

```

## 9.7 message derivation

### inductive-set

```

 $DM :: agent \Rightarrow msg\ set \Rightarrow msg\ set$ 
for  $A :: agent$  and  $H :: msg\ set$  where
  Inj [intro,simp]:  $X \in H \implies X \in DM A H$ 
  | Fst:  $MPair\ X\ Y \in DM\ A\ H \implies X \in DM\ A\ H$ 
  | Snd:  $MPair\ X\ Y \in DM\ A\ H \implies Y \in DM\ A\ H$ 
  | Nonce [intro]:  $Nonce\ A\ n \in DM\ A\ H$ 
  | Agent [intro]:  $Agent\ agt \in DM\ A\ H$ 
  | Number [intro]:  $Number\ n \in DM\ A\ H$ 
  | Real [intro]:  $Real\ n \in DM\ A\ H$ 
  | Hash [intro]:  $X \in DM\ A\ H \implies Hash\ X \in DM\ A\ H$ 
  | MPair [intro]:  $\|X \in DM\ A\ H; Y \in DM\ A\ H\| \implies MPair\ X\ Y \in DM\ A\ H$ 
  | Crypt [intro]:  $\|X \in DM\ A\ H; Key(K) \in DM\ A\ H\| \implies Crypt\ K\ X \in DM\ A\ H$ 
  | Xor [intro]:  $\|X \in DM\ A\ H; Y \in DM\ A\ H\| \implies Xor\ X\ Y \in DM\ A\ H$ 
  | Decrypt:
     $\|Crypt\ K\ X \in DM\ A\ H; Key(invKey\ K) \in DM\ A\ H\| \implies X \in DM\ A\ H$ 

```

**lemmas** constructor-defs = Nonce-def Number-def Key-def Agent-def Hash-def  
 MPair-def Crypt-def Xor-def Real-def Zero-def

### 9.7.1 Freeness of all constructors besides Xor

```
lemma Nonce-Number-ineq: Nonce a na ≠ Number n
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Nonce-Key-ineq: Nonce a na ≠ Key k
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Nonce-Zero-ineq: Nonce a na ≠ Zero
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Nonce-Agent-ineq: Nonce a na ≠ Agent b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Nonce-Real-ineq: Nonce a na ≠ Real b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Nonce-Hash-ineq: Nonce a na ≠ Hash h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Nonce-MACM-ineq: Nonce a na ≠ Hash[k] x
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs MACM-def dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Nonce-MPair-ineq: Nonce a na ≠ MPair x y
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Nonce-Crypt-ineq: Nonce a na ≠ Crypt k m
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Key-Number-ineq: Key k ≠ Number n
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Key-Zero-ineq: Key k ≠ Zero
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Key-Agent-ineq: Key k ≠ Agent b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Key-Real-ineq: Key k ≠ Real b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Key-Hash-ineq: Key k ≠ Hash h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Key-MACM-ineq: Key k ≠ Hash[kh] h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs MACM-def dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Key-MPair-ineq: Key k ≠ MPair x y
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)
```

```

lemma Key-Crypt-ineq: Key k' ≠ Crypt k m
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Crypt-Number-ineq: Crypt k m ≠ Number n
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Crypt-Zero-ineq: Crypt k m ≠ Zero
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Crypt-Agent-ineq: Crypt k m ≠ Agent b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Crypt-Real-ineq: Crypt k m ≠ Real b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Crypt-Hash-ineq: Crypt k m ≠ Hash h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Crypt-MACM-ineq: Crypt k m ≠ Hash[hk] h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs MACM-def dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Crypt-MPair-ineq: Crypt k m ≠ MPair x y
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Number-Agent-ineq: Number n ≠ Agent b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Number-Real-ineq: Number n ≠ Real b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Number-Hash-ineq: Number n ≠ Hash h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Number-Zero-ineq: Number n ≠ Zero
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Number-MACM-ineq: Number n ≠ Hash[hk] h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs MACM-def dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Number-MPair-ineq: Number n ≠ MPair x y
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Agent-Real-ineq: Agent a ≠ Real b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Agent-Zero-ineq: Agent a ≠ Zero
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Agent-Hash-ineq: Agent a ≠ Hash h

```

```

by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Agent-MACM-ineq: Agent a ≠ Hash[hk] h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs MACM-def dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Agent-MPair-ineq: Agent a ≠ MPair x y
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Real-Hash-ineq: Real a ≠ Hash h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Real-MACM-ineq: Real a ≠ Hash[hk] h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs MACM-def dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Real-MPair-ineq: Real a ≠ MPair x y
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Real-Zero-ineq: Real a ≠ Zero
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Hash-MPair-ineq: Hash h ≠ MPair x y
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Hash-Zero-ineq: Hash h ≠ Zero
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma MACM-Hash-ineq: Hash[hk] m ≠ Hash h
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs MACM-def dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemmas constructors-ineq = Nonce-Number-ineq Nonce-Key-ineq Nonce-Agent-ineq
Nonce-Real-ineq Nonce-Zero-ineq
Nonce-Hash-ineq Nonce-MACM-ineq Nonce-MPair-ineq
Nonce-Crypt-ineq
Key-Number-ineq Key-Agent-ineq Key-Real-ineq Key-Hash-ineq
Key-Zero-ineq
Key-MACM-ineq Key-MPair-ineq Key-Crypt-ineq
Crypt-Number-ineq Crypt-Zero-ineq
Crypt-Agent-ineq Crypt-Real-ineq Crypt-Hash-ineq
Crypt-MACM-ineq
Crypt-MPair-ineq Number-Agent-ineq Number-Real-ineq
Number-Hash-ineq Number-Zero-ineq
Number-MACM-ineq Number-MPair-ineq Agent-Real-ineq
Agent-Hash-ineq Agent-Zero-ineq
Agent-MACM-ineq Agent-MPair-ineq Real-Hash-ineq
Real-MACM-ineq Real-Zero-ineq
Real-MPair-ineq Hash-MPair-ineq Hash-Zero-ineq
MACM-Hash-ineq

declare constructors-ineq[iff]

```

```

declare constructors-ineq[symmetric,iff]

lemma Nonce-inject[dest!]: Nonce a na = Nonce b nb  $\implies$  a = b  $\wedge$  na = nb
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Key-inject[dest!]: Key ka = Key kb  $\implies$  ka = kb
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Agent-inject[dest!]: Agent a = Agent b  $\implies$  a = b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Number-inject[dest!]: Number a = Number b  $\implies$  a = b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Real-inject[dest!]: Real a = Real b  $\implies$  a = b
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

lemma Rep-msg-inj[dest]: Rep-msg a = Rep-msg b  $\implies$  a = b
  apply (drule-tac f=Abs-msg in arg-cong)
  apply (auto simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
done

lemma Hash-inject[dest!]: Hash a = Hash b  $\implies$  a = b
  apply (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed Rep-msg-inj)
done

lemma MPair-inject[dest!]: MPair a b = MPair c d  $\implies$  a = c  $\wedge$  b = d
  apply (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed Rep-msg-inj)
done

lemma Crypt-inject[dest!]: Crypt ka ma = Crypt kb mb  $\implies$  ka = kb  $\wedge$  ma = mb
  apply (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed Rep-msg-inj)
done

lemma parts-mono-elem:
   $\llbracket X \in \text{parts } H; H \subseteq G \rrbracket \implies X \in \text{parts } G$ 
  apply (drule parts.mono)
by (erule rev-subsetD)

lemma subterms-mono-elem:
   $\llbracket X \in \text{subterms } H; H \subseteq G \rrbracket \implies X \in \text{subterms } G$ 
  apply (drule subterms.mono)
by (erule rev-subsetD)

lemma Rep-Abs-norm[simp]: Rep-msg (Abs-msg (norm x)) = norm x
  apply (subgoal-tac normed (norm x)) prefer 2
  apply (rule normed-norm)
  apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
done

```

### 9.7.2 interaction of DM with subterms/parts

```

lemma nonce-DM-subterms-nonce:
  [[ Nonce B NB ∈ subterms (DM A H); A ≠ B ]]
  ==> Nonce B NB ∈ subterms H
  apply (drule subterms.singleton)
  apply auto
  apply (erule rev-mp)
  apply (rotate-tac 1)
  apply (erule rev-mp)
  apply (erule DM.induct)
  apply (auto elim: subterms-mono-elem)
  apply (auto simp add: subterms-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac m=NONCE B NB) prefer 2
  apply (rule sym)
  apply (simp add: Nonce-def)
  apply (drule normed-fsubterms)
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (rule-tac x=NONCE B NB in exI)
  apply (unfold Xor-def)
  apply (simp only: Rep-Abs-norm)
  apply (drule fsubterms-norm-NONCE)
  apply auto
  apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
  apply auto
done

```

```

lemma nonce-DM-parts-nonce:
  [[ Nonce B NB ∈ parts (DM A H); A ≠ B ]]
  ==> Nonce B NB ∈ parts H
  apply (drule parts.singleton)
  apply auto
  apply (erule rev-mp)
  apply (rotate-tac 1)
  apply (erule rev-mp)
  apply (erule DM.induct)
  apply (auto elim: parts-mono-elem)
  apply (auto simp add: parts-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac m=NONCE B NB) prefer 2
  apply (rule sym)
  apply (simp add: Nonce-def)
  apply (drule normed-fparts)
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (rule-tac x=NONCE B NB in exI)
  apply (unfold Xor-def)
  apply (simp only: Rep-Abs-norm)
  apply (drule fparts-norm-NONCE)
  apply auto

```

```

apply (drule fparts-singleton)
apply auto
done

lemma key-DM-parts-key:
  [ Key k ∈ parts (DM A H) ]
  ==> Key k ∈ parts H
apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (rotate-tac 1)
apply (erule rev-mp)
apply (erule DM.induct)
apply (auto elim: parts-mono-elem)
apply (auto simp add: parts-def)
apply (subgoal-tac m=KEY k) prefer 2
apply (rule sym)
apply (simp add: Key-def)
apply (drule normed-fparts)
apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac x=KEY k in exI)
apply (unfold Xor-def)
apply (simp only: Rep-Abs-norm)
apply (drule fparts-norm-KEY)
apply auto
apply (drule fparts-singleton)
apply auto
done

declare normed-norm[iff]

lemma crypt-DM-parts-crypt-key:
  [ Crypt k m ∈ subterms (DM A H) ]
  ==> Crypt k m ∈ subterms H ∨ Key k ∈ parts H
apply (drule subterms.singleton)
apply auto
apply (rotate-tac 1)
apply (erule rev-mp)
apply (erule rev-mp)
apply (erule DM.induct)
apply (auto elim: subterms-mono-elem)
apply (rotate-tac 2)
apply (erule contrapos-np)
apply (rule-tac A=A in key-DM-parts-key)
apply force
apply (simp add: subterms-def)
apply (unfold Xor-def)
apply (elim exE conjE)
apply (simp only: Rep-Abs-norm)

```

```

apply (simp only: Crypt-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (CRYPT k (Rep-msg m))) prefer 2
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac normed ma) prefer 2
apply (frule normed-fsubterms)
apply force
apply force
apply (drule Abs-eq-normed)
apply force
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac CRYPT k (Rep-msg m))
  ∈ fsubterms {MessageTheoryXor.norm (Rep-msg X ⊕ Rep-msg
Ya)})}
apply (drule fsubterms-norm-CRYPT) prefer 2
apply force
apply auto
apply (drule fsubterms.singleton) back
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac norm m' = m') prefer 2
apply (rule norm-normed-id)
apply (rule normed-fsubterms)
apply (erule fsubterms.Ctext)
apply force
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac norm m' = m') prefer 2
apply (rule norm-normed-id)
apply (rule normed-fsubterms)
apply (erule fsubterms.Ctext)
apply force
apply force
done

```

```

lemma mac-DM-parts-mac-key:
  [ Hash (MPair (Key k) m) ∈ subterms (DM A H) ]
  ==> Hash (MPair (Key k) m) ∈ subterms H ∨ Key k ∈ parts H
apply (drule subterms.singleton)
apply auto
apply (rotate-tac 1)
apply (erule rev-mp)
apply (erule rev-mp)
apply (erule DM.induct)
apply (auto elim: subterms-mono-elem)
apply (rotate-tac 1)
apply (erule contrapos-np)
apply (rule-tac A=A in key-DM-parts-key)
apply (drule DM.Fst)
apply (erule parts.inj)
apply (simp add: subterms-def)
apply (unfold Xor-def)

```

```

apply (elim exE conjE)
apply (simp only: Rep-Abs-norm)
apply (simp only: Hash-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (HASH (Rep-msg {Key k, m}))) prefer 2
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac normed ma) prefer 2
apply (frule normed-fsubterms)
apply force
apply force
apply (drule Abs-eq-normed)
apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac x=HASH (Rep-msg {Key k, m}) in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply (clar simp simp only: Zero-def)
apply (drule fsubterms-norm-HASH)
apply (elim exE conjE)
apply auto
apply (drule fsubterms.singleton)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac norm m' = m') prefer 2
apply (rule norm-normed-id)
apply (rule normed-fsubterms)
apply (erule fsubterms.Hash)
apply force
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac norm m' = m') prefer 2
apply (rule norm-normed-id)
apply (rule normed-fsubterms)
apply (erule fsubterms.Hash)
apply force
apply force
done

inductive-set LowHamXor :: msg set
where
  Agent: (Agent a) ∈ LowHamXor
  | Number: (Number n) ∈ LowHamXor
  | Real: (Real r) ∈ LowHamXor
  | Zero: Zero ∈ LowHamXor
  | Xor: [ a ∈ LowHamXor; b ∈ LowHamXor ] ==> Xor a b ∈ LowHamXor

lemma parts-Key-Xor: Key k ∈ parts {Xor a b} ==> Key k ∈ parts {a,b}
apply (simp add: parts-def Key-def)
apply auto
apply (unfold Xor-def)
apply (subgoal-tac (MessageTheoryXor.norm (Rep-msg a ⊕ Rep-msg b)) ∈ msg)
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inverse) prefer 2

```

```

apply (simp only: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (norm (Rep-msg a ⊕ Rep-msg b))) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: normed-norm)
apply force
apply (rule-tac x = m in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac KEY k ∈ msg)
apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ msg)
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inject) defer
apply (subgoal-tac normed m)
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (rule normed-fparts)
apply assumption
apply force
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac m = KEY k) defer

apply force
apply (simp only:)
apply (drule fparts-norm-KEY)
apply force
done

```

```

lemma subterms-Key-Xor: Key k ∈ subterms {Xor a b} ==> Key k ∈ subterms
{a,b}
apply (simp add: subterms-def Key-def)
apply auto
apply (unfold Xor-def)
apply (subgoal-tac (MessageTheoryXor.norm (Rep-msg a ⊕ Rep-msg b)) ∈ msg)
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inverse) prefer 2
apply (simp only: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (norm (Rep-msg a ⊕ Rep-msg b))) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: normed-norm)
apply force
apply (rule-tac x = m in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac KEY k ∈ msg)
apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ msg)
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inject) defer
apply (subgoal-tac normed m)
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (rule normed-fsubterms)
apply assumption
apply force
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac m = KEY k) defer

```

```

apply force
apply (simp only:)
apply (drule fsubterms-norm-KEY)
apply force
done

lemma subterms-Nonce-Xor: Nonce D ND ∈ subterms {Xor a b} ==> Nonce D
ND ∈ subterms {a,b}
  apply (simp add: subterms-def Nonce-def)
  apply auto
  apply (unfold Xor-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac (MessageTheoryXor.norm (Rep-msg a ⊕ Rep-msg b)) ∈ msg)
  apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inverse) prefer 2
  apply (simp only: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac normed (norm (Rep-msg a ⊕ Rep-msg b))) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: normed-norm)
  apply force
  apply (rule-tac x = m in exI)
  apply (rule conjI)
  apply force
  apply (subgoal-tac NONCE D ND ∈ msg)
  apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ msg)
  apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inject) defer
  apply (subgoal-tac normed m)
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (rule normed-fsubterms)
  apply assumption
  apply force
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac m = NONCE D ND) defer

  apply force
  apply (simp only:)
  apply (drule fsubterms-norm-NONCE)
  apply force
done

lemma subterms-Hash-Xor: Hash m ∈ subterms {Xor a b} ==> Hash m ∈ sub-
terms {a,b}
  apply (simp add: subterms-def Hash-def)
  apply auto
  apply (unfold Xor-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac (MessageTheoryXor.norm (Rep-msg a ⊕ Rep-msg b)) ∈ msg)
  apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inverse) prefer 2
  apply (simp only: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac normed (norm (Rep-msg a ⊕ Rep-msg b))) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: normed-norm)
  apply force

```

```

apply (rule-tac  $x = ma$  in  $exI$ )
apply (rule  $\text{conj}I$ )
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{HASH}(\text{Rep-msg } m) \in msg$ )
apply (subgoal-tac  $ma \in msg$ )
apply (simp only:  $\text{Abs-msg-inject}$ ) defer
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{normed } ma$ )
apply (force simp add:  $\text{msg-def}$ )
apply (rule  $\text{normed-fsubterms}$ )
apply assumption
apply force
apply (force simp add:  $\text{msg-def}$ )
apply (subgoal-tac  $ma = \text{HASH}(\text{Rep-msg } m)$ ) defer

apply force
apply (simp only:)
apply (drule  $\text{fsubterms-norm-HASH}$ )
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{normed } (\text{HASH } m')$ ) prefer 2
apply (drule  $\text{fsubterms-singleton}$ )
apply auto
apply (rule  $\text{normed-fsubterms}$ )
apply force
apply force
apply (rule  $\text{normed-fsubterms}$ )
apply force
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{normed } m'$ )
apply (simp add:  $\text{norm-normed-id}$ )
apply (subgoal-tac  $m' = \text{norm } m'$ )
apply force
apply (drule  $\text{norm-normed-id}$ )
apply force
done

```

**lemma**  $\text{subterms-Crypt-Xor}: \text{Crypt } c d \in \text{subterms } \{\text{Xor } a b\} \implies \text{Crypt } c d \in \text{subterms } \{a, b\}$

```

apply (simp add:  $\text{subterms-def Crypt-def}$ )
apply auto
apply (unfold  $\text{Xor-def}$ )
apply (subgoal-tac  $(\text{MessageTheoryXor.norm}(\text{Rep-msg } a \oplus \text{Rep-msg } b)) \in msg$ )
apply (simp only:  $\text{Abs-msg-inverse}$ ) prefer 2
apply (simp only:  $\text{msg-def}$ )
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{normed } (\text{norm}(\text{Rep-msg } a \oplus \text{Rep-msg } b))$ ) prefer 2
apply (force simp add:  $\text{normed-norm}$ )
apply force
apply (rule-tac  $x = m$  in  $exI$ )

```

```

apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac CRYPT c (Rep-msg d) ∈ msg)
apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ msg)
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inject) defer
apply (subgoal-tac normed m)
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (rule normed-fsubterms)
apply assumption
apply force
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac m = CRYPT c (Rep-msg d)) defer

apply force
apply (simp only:)
apply (drule fsubterms-norm-CRYPT)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac normed (CRYPT c m')) prefer 2
apply (drule fsubterms-singleton)
apply auto
apply (rule normed-fsubterms)
apply force
apply force
apply (rule normed-fsubterms)
apply force
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac normed m')
apply (simp add: norm-normed-id)
apply (subgoal-tac m' = norm m')
apply force
apply (drule norm-normed-id)
apply force
done

lemma parts-Zero[simp]: parts {Zero} = {Zero}
  apply (auto simp add: parts-def Zero-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac normed ZERO, auto)+
done

lemma subterms-Zero[simp]: subterms {Zero} = {Zero}
  apply (auto simp add: subterms-def Zero-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac normed ZERO, auto)+
done

lemma key-notin-parts-LowHam: ¬ (Key k ∈ parts LowHamXor)
proof -
  {
    fix x :: msg

```

```

fix y :: msg
assume y ∈ LowHamXor and x ∈ parts {y}
hence ∀ k. x ≠ Key k
proof (induct y)
  case (Agent a)
    show ?case using prems by simp
next
  case (Number r)
    show ?case using prems by simp
next
  case Zero
    show ?case using prems by simp
next
  case (Real r)
    show ?case using prems by simp
next
  case (Xor a b)
    show ?case using prems
    apply auto
    apply (drule parts-Key-Xor)
    apply (drule-tac H={a,b} in parts.singleton)
    by auto
qed
}
thus ?thesis apply -
  apply auto
  apply (drule parts.singleton)
  apply auto
  done
qed

```

```

lemma key-notin-subterms-LowHam: ¬ (Key k ∈ subterms LowHamXor)
proof -
  {
    fix x :: msg
    fix y :: msg
    assume y ∈ LowHamXor and x ∈ subterms {y}
    hence ∀ k. x ≠ Key k
    proof (induct y)
      case (Agent a)
        show ?case using prems by simp
    next
      case (Number r)
        show ?case using prems by simp
    next
      case Zero
        show ?case using prems by simp
    next
      case (Real r)

```

```

show ?case using prems by simp
next
  case (Xor a b)
  show ?case using prems
    apply auto
    apply (drule subterms-Key-Xor)
    apply (drule-tac H={a,b} in subterms.singleton)
      by auto
  qed
}
thus ?thesis apply -
  apply auto
  apply (drule subterms.singleton)
  apply auto
  done
qed

lemma nonce-notin-subterms-LowHam:  $\neg (\text{Nonce } D \text{ ND} \in \text{subterms LowHamXor})$ 
proof -
{
  fix x :: msg
  fix y :: msg
  assume y  $\in$  LowHamXor and x  $\in$  subterms {y}
  hence  $\forall D \text{ ND}. x \neq \text{Nonce } D \text{ ND}$ 
  proof (induct y)
    case (Agent a)
    show ?case using prems by simp
  next
    case (Number r)
    show ?case using prems by simp
  next
    case Zero
    show ?case using prems by simp
  next
    case (Real r)
    show ?case using prems by simp
  next
    case (Xor a b)
    show ?case using prems
      apply auto
      apply (drule subterms-Nonce-Xor)
      apply (drule-tac H={a,b} in subterms.singleton)
        by auto
    qed
}
thus ?thesis apply -
  apply auto
  apply (drule subterms.singleton)
  apply auto

```

```

done
qed

lemma hash-notin-subterms-LowHam:  $\neg (\text{Hash } m \in \text{subterms } \text{LowHamXor})$ 
proof -
{
fix x :: msg
fix y :: msg
assume y ∈ LowHamXor and x ∈ subterms {y}
hence  $\forall D \text{ ND}. x \neq \text{Hash } m$ 
proof (induct y)
case (Agent a)
show ?case using prems by simp
next
case Zero
show ?case using prems by simp
next
case (Number r)
show ?case using prems by simp
next
case (Real r)
show ?case using prems by simp
next
case (Xor a b)
show ?case using prems
apply auto
apply (drule subterms-Hash-Xor)
apply (drule-tac H={a,b} in subterms.singleton)
by auto
qed
}
thus ?thesis apply -
apply auto
apply (drule subterms.singleton)
apply auto
done
qed

lemma crypt-notin-subterms-LowHam:  $\neg (\text{Crypt } m \text{ } m' \in \text{subterms } \text{LowHamXor})$ 
proof -
{
fix x :: msg
fix y :: msg
assume y ∈ LowHamXor and x ∈ subterms {y}
hence  $\forall D \text{ ND}. x \neq \text{Crypt } m \text{ } m'$ 
proof (induct y)
case (Agent a)
show ?case using prems by simp

```

```

next
  case (Number r)
  show ?case using prems by simp
next
  case Zero
  show ?case using prems by simp
next
  case (Real r)
  show ?case using prems by simp
next
  case (Xor a b)
  show ?case using prems
    apply auto
    apply (drule subterms-Crypt-Xor)
    apply (drule-tac H={a,b} in subterms.singleton)
    by auto
qed
}
thus ?thesis apply -
  apply auto
  apply (drule subterms.singleton)
  apply auto
done
qed

fun
  fcomponents :: fmsg => fmsg set
  where
    fcomponents (MPAIR a b) = fcomponents a ∪ fcomponents b
    | fcomponents m          = {m}

definition
  components :: msg set => msg set
  where
    components H = { Abs-msg m | m n . m ∈ fcomponents (Rep-msg n) ∧ n ∈ H }

lemma norm-Rep[simp]:
  norm (Rep-msg m) = Rep-msg m
  apply (subgoal-tac normed (Rep-msg m))
  apply (auto simp add: norm-normed-id)
done

lemma Xor-Zero: Xor a Zero = a
  apply (auto simp add: Xor-def Zero-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac normed ZERO)
  apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)

```

```

apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac normed (Rep-msg a)) prefer 2
apply force
apply (simp add: norm-normed-id)
apply (simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
done

lemma Xor-comm: Xor A B = Xor B A
apply (auto simp add: Xor-def normxor-com)
done

lemma Xor-assoc: Xor (Xor A B) C = Xor A (Xor B C)
apply (auto simp add: Xor-def)
apply (subgoal-tac (Rep-msg A ⊗ Rep-msg B) ∈ msg)
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inverse) prefer 2
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (rule normed-normxor)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac (Rep-msg B ⊗ Rep-msg C) ∈ msg)
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inverse) prefer 2
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (rule normed-normxor)
apply auto
apply (simp add: normxor-assoc2)
done

lemma Xor-comm2: Xor A (Xor B C) = Xor B (Xor A C)
apply (subst Xor-assoc[THEN sym])
apply (simp add: Xor-comm[of A B])
apply (simp add: Xor-assoc)
done

lemma Xor-reduce[simp]: Xor A (Xor A B) = B
apply (auto simp add: Xor-def)
apply (subgoal-tac (Rep-msg A ⊗ Rep-msg B) ∈ msg)
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-inverse) prefer 2
apply (auto simp add: msg-def)
apply (rule normed-normxor)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac Rep-msg A ⊗ Rep-msg A ⊗ Rep-msg B
                  = norm (Rep-msg A ⊕ Rep-msg A ⊕ Rep-msg B)) prefer 2
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac norm (Rep-msg A ⊕ Rep-msg A ⊕ Rep-msg B)
                  ≈ Rep-msg A ⊕ Rep-msg A ⊕ Rep-msg B) prefer 2
apply (rule norm-equiv[THEN xor-eq.symm])
apply (subgoal-tac Rep-msg A ⊕ Rep-msg A ⊕ Rep-msg B ≈ Rep-msg B) prefer
2
apply simp
apply (rule-tac Y=ZERO ⊕ Rep-msg B in xor-eq.trans)

```

```

apply (rule xor-eq.trans[OF xor-eq.Xor-assoc])
apply (rule xor-eq.Xor-cong)
apply force
apply force
apply force
apply (simp add: equiv-norm)
apply (simp only: Rep-msg-inverse)
done

lemma Xor-reduce2[simp]: Xor A (Xor B A) = B
apply (simp add: Xor-comm2 Xor-comm Xor-assoc)
done

lemmas Xor-rewrite = Xor-assoc Xor-comm Xor-comm2

lemma fcomponents-imp-fparts:  $x \in \text{fcomponents } m \implies x \in \text{fparts } \{m\}$ 
apply (induct m)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac H={m1,m2} in fparts.trans)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac H={m1,m2} in fparts.trans)
apply auto
done

lemma A1:  $x \in \text{components } S \implies x \in \text{parts } S$ 
apply (auto simp add: components-def parts-def)
apply (rule-tac x=m in exI)
apply auto
apply (drule fcomponents-imp-fparts)
apply (drule-tac H=Rep-msg`S in fparts.trans)
apply auto
done

lemma key-fcomponents-fparts:
KEY k  $\in$  fparts {m}  $\implies \exists n \in \text{fcomponents } m. \text{KEY } k \in \text{fparts } \{n\}$ 
apply (induct m)
apply auto
apply (drule fparts.singleton)
apply auto
done

lemma normed-fcomponents:
 $\llbracket Y \in \text{fcomponents } X; \text{normed } X \rrbracket \implies \text{normed } Y$ 
apply (induct X)
apply auto
apply (auto elim: normed-MPAIR)
done

```

```

lemma A2: Key k ∈ parts S  $\implies \exists m \in components S. Key k \in parts \{m\}$ 
  apply (auto simp add: Key-def parts-def components-def)
  apply (drule fparts.singleton)
  apply auto
  apply (frule normed-fparts)
  apply force
  apply (subgoal-tac KEY k ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (drule-tac f=Rep-msg in HOL.arg-cong)
  apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
  apply (drule key-fcomponents-fparts)
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac x=Abs-msg n in exI)
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac x=KEY k in exI)
  apply (subgoal-tac n ∈ msg)
  apply (auto dest: normed-fcomponents simp add: Abs-msg-inverse msg-def)
  done

lemma nonce-fcomponents-fsubterms:
  NONCE A NA ∈ fsubterms {m}  $\implies \exists n \in fcomponents m. NONCE A NA \in fsubterms \{n\}$ 
  apply (induct m)
  apply auto
  apply (drule fsubterms.singleton)
  apply auto
  done

lemma hash-fcomponents-fsubterms:
  HASH c ∈ fsubterms {m}  $\implies \exists n \in fcomponents m. HASH c \in fsubterms \{n\}$ 
  apply (induct m)
  apply auto
  apply (drule fsubterms.singleton)
  apply auto
  done

lemma crypt-fcomponents-fsubterms:
  CRYPT K M ∈ fsubterms {m}  $\implies \exists n \in fcomponents m. CRYPT K M \in fsubterms \{n\}$ 
  apply (induct m)
  apply auto
  apply (drule fsubterms.singleton)
  apply auto
  done

lemma A3: Nonce A N ∈ subterms S  $\implies \exists m \in components S. Nonce A N \in$ 

```

```

subterms {m}
apply (auto simp add: Nonce-def subterms-def components-def)
apply (drule fsubterms.singleton)
apply auto
apply (frule normed-fsubterms)
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac NONCE A N ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (drule-tac f=Rep-msg in HOL.arg-cong)
apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (drule nonce-fcomponents-fsubterms)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=Abs-msg n in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=NONCE A N in exI)
apply (subgoal-tac n ∈ msg)
apply (auto dest: normed-fcomponents simp add: Abs-msg-inverse msg-def)
done

lemma A4: Hash c ∈ subterms S  $\implies$   $\exists m \in \text{components } S. \text{Hash } c \in \text{subterms } \{m\}$ 
apply (auto simp add: Hash-def subterms-def components-def)
apply (drule fsubterms.singleton)
apply auto
apply (frule normed-fsubterms)
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac HASH (Rep-msg c) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (drule-tac f=Rep-msg in HOL.arg-cong)
apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (drule hash-fcomponents-fsubterms)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=Abs-msg n in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=HASH (Rep-msg c) in exI)
apply (subgoal-tac n ∈ msg)
apply (auto dest: normed-fcomponents simp add: Abs-msg-inverse msg-def)
done

lemma A5: Crypt k p ∈ subterms S  $\implies$   $\exists M \in \text{components } S. \text{Crypt } k p \in \text{subterms } \{M\}$ 
apply (auto simp add: Crypt-def subterms-def components-def)
apply (drule fsubterms.singleton)
apply auto
apply (frule normed-fsubterms)
apply force

```

```

apply (subgoal-tac CRYPT k (Rep-msg p) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac m ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (drule-tac f=Rep-msg in HOL.arg-cong)
apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (drule crypt-fcomponents-fsubterms)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=Abs-msg n in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=CRYPT k (Rep-msg p) in exI)
apply (subgoal-tac n ∈ msg)
apply (auto dest: normed-fcomponents simp add: Abs-msg-inverse msg-def)
done

interpretation MESSAGE-DERIVATION Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number parts
subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components Key
apply (unfold-locales)
apply (erule nonce-DM-subterms-nonce, force)
apply (erule nonce-DM-parts-nonce, force)
apply (erule key-DM-parts-key)
apply (erule crypt-DM-parts-crypt-key)
apply (erule mac-DM-parts-mac-key)

apply (rule-tac x=Xor X Y in bexI)
apply (simp add: Xor-rewrite)
apply simp
apply (simp add: Xor-rewrite)

apply (drule parts-Key-Xor)
apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac G=LowHamXor in parts-mono-elem)
apply (auto simp add: key-notin-parts-LowHam)

apply (drule subterms-Key-Xor)
apply (drule subterms.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac G=LowHamXor in subterms-mono-elem)
apply (auto simp add: key-notin-subterms-LowHam)

apply (drule subterms-Nonce-Xor)
apply (drule subterms.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac G=LowHamXor in subterms-mono-elem)
apply (auto simp add: nonce-notin-subterms-LowHam)

apply (drule subterms-Crypt-Xor)
apply (drule subterms.singleton)

```

```

apply auto
apply (drule-tac G=LowHamXor in subterms-mono-elem)
apply (auto simp add: crypt-notin-subterms-LowHam)

apply (drule subterms-Hash-Xor)
apply (drule subterms.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac G=LowHamXor in subterms-mono-elem)
apply (auto simp add: hash-notin-subterms-LowHam)

apply (auto intro: A1 A2 A3 A4 A5)
done

end

```

```

theory MessageTheoryXor3 imports MessageTheoryXor2 begin

fun
  ffactors :: fmsg  $\Rightarrow$  fmsg set
  where
    ffactors (XOR a b) = ffactors a  $\cup$  ffactors b
  | ffactors (a) = {a}

definition
  factors :: msg  $\Rightarrow$  msg set
  where
    factors m  $\equiv$  {Abs-msg a | a . a  $\in$  ffactors (Rep-msg m)}

inductive
  out-context :: msg  $\Rightarrow$  msg  $\Rightarrow$  msg  $\Rightarrow$  bool
  where
    Base[intro]:  $\llbracket t = m; c \neq m \rrbracket \implies \text{out-context } t c m$  |
    Hash[intro]:  $\llbracket \text{out-context } t c X; c \neq \text{Hash } X \rrbracket \implies \text{out-context } t c (\text{Hash } X)$ 
  | Crypt[intro]:  $\llbracket \text{out-context } t c X; c \neq \text{Crypt } k X \rrbracket \implies \text{out-context } t c (\text{Crypt } k X)$  |
    PairL[intro]:  $\llbracket \text{out-context } t c X; c \neq \{X, Y\} \rrbracket \implies \text{out-context } t c (\{X, Y\})$ 
  | PairR[intro]:  $\llbracket \text{out-context } t c Y; c \neq \{X, Y\} \rrbracket \implies \text{out-context } t c (\{X, Y\})$ 
  | Xor[intro]:  $\llbracket \text{out-context } t c m; m \in \text{factors } X; m \neq X ; c \neq X \rrbracket \implies \text{out-context } t c X$ 

```

```

lemma out-context-inverse:
  out-context t c m
   $\implies m \neq c$ 
   $\wedge (m = t \vee (\exists X. m = Hash X \wedge out-context t c X) \vee (\exists k X. m = Crypt k X \wedge out-context t c X) \vee (\exists X Y. m = \{X, Y\} \wedge (out-context t c X \vee out-context t c Y)) \vee (\exists X \in factors m. m \neq X \wedge (out-context t c X)))$ 
  apply (induct rule: out-context.induct)
  by auto

lemma out-context-nonce[simp]: out-context (Nonce A NA) (Hash (Nonce A NA))
  (Nonce A NA)
  by auto

lemma  $\neg (out-context (Nonce A NA) (Hash (Nonce A NA)) (Hash (Nonce A NA)))$ 
  apply auto
  apply (drule out-context-inverse)
  apply auto
  done

lemma factors-Agent[simp]: factors (Agent a) = {Agent a}
  apply (subgoal-tac AGENT a ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (auto simp add: Agent-def factors-def Abs-msg-inverse)
  done

lemma factors-Zero[simp]: factors (Zero) = {Zero}
  apply (subgoal-tac ZERO ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (auto simp add: Zero-def factors-def Abs-msg-inverse)
  done

lemma factors-Real[simp]: factors (Real a) = {Real a}
  apply (subgoal-tac REAL a ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (auto simp add: Real-def factors-def Abs-msg-inverse)
  done

lemma factors-Number[simp]: factors (Number n) = {Number n}
  apply (subgoal-tac NUMBER n ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (auto simp add: Number-def factors-def Abs-msg-inverse)
  done

lemma factors-Nonce[simp]: factors (Nonce A NA) = {Nonce A NA}

```

```

apply (subgoal-tac NONCE A NA ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (auto simp add: Nonce-def factors-def Abs-msg-inverse)
done

lemma factors-Key[simp]: factors (Key k) = {Key k}
apply (subgoal-tac KEY k ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (auto simp add: Key-def factors-def Abs-msg-inverse)
done

lemma factors-Hash[simp]: factors (Hash m) = {Hash m}
apply (subgoal-tac HASH (Rep-msg m) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (auto simp add: Hash-def factors-def Abs-msg-inverse)
done

lemma factors-MPair[simp]: factors {A,B} = {{A,B}}
apply (subgoal-tac MPAIR (Rep-msg A) (Rep-msg B) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (auto simp add: MPair-def factors-def Abs-msg-inverse)
done

lemma factors-Crypt[simp]: factors (Crypt K X) = {Crypt K X}
apply (subgoal-tac CRYPT K (Rep-msg X) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (auto simp add: Crypt-def factors-def Abs-msg-inverse)
done

lemma ffactors-fsubterms:
  [normed y; a ∈ ffactors y] ⟹ a ∈ fsubterms {y}
apply (induct rule: normed.induct)
apply auto
apply (erule contrapos-np) back
apply (rule fsubterms.mono-elem)
apply auto
apply (erule contrapos-np) back
apply (rule fsubterms.mono-elem)
apply auto
done

lemma factors-subset-subterms:
  factors t ⊆ subterms {t}
apply (case-tac t)
apply (auto simp add: factors-def subterms-def msg-def)
apply (rule-tac x=a in exI)
apply clarsimp
apply (erule ffactors-fsubterms)

```

```

by auto

lemma factors-imp-subterms: a ∈ factors b ⇒ a ∈ subterms {b}
  apply (insert factors-subset-subterms[where t=b])
  by auto

lemma out-context-imp-subterms:
  out-context t c m ⇒ t ∈ subterms {m}
  apply (erule out-context.induct)
  apply auto
  apply (drule factors-imp-subterms)
  apply (drule subterms.trans)
  apply auto
  done

lemma ffactors-xor-red:
  x ≈> y ⇒ (∀ t. t ∈ ffactors y → ((∃ t'. (t' ≈ t) ∧ t' ∈ ffactors x)) ∨ t ≈ ZERO))
  apply (erule xor-red.induct)
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force
  apply auto

  apply (rule xor-eq.MPair-cong)
  apply (auto dest: xor-red-imp-xor-eq)

  apply (rule xor-eq.Hash-cong)
  apply (auto dest: xor-red-imp-xor-eq)

  apply (rule xor-eq.Crypt-cong)
  apply (auto dest: xor-red-imp-xor-eq)

  apply (erule-tac x=t in allE) back
  apply auto
  apply (erule-tac x=t' in alle)
  apply auto

  apply (rule-tac x=t'a in exI)
  apply auto
  apply (erule xor-eq.trans)
  apply auto

  apply (subgoal-tac t ≈ ZERO)
  apply force
  apply (rule xor-eq.symm)
  apply (rule xor-eq.trans) prefer 2

```

```

apply assumption
apply (erule xor-eq.symm)
done

lemma ffactors-normed:
   $\llbracket t \in \text{ffactors } s; \text{normed } s \rrbracket \implies \text{normed } t$ 
  apply (frule ffactors-fsubterms)
  apply force
  apply (drule normed-fsubterms)
  by auto

lemma normed-xoreq:  $\llbracket x \approx y; \text{normed } x; \text{normed } y \rrbracket \implies x = y$ 
  apply (drule equiv-imp-norm)
  apply (simp add: norm-normed-id)
  done

lemma factors-Xor:  $A \in \text{factors } (\text{Xor } X \ Y)$ 
   $\implies A \in \text{factors } X \vee A \in \text{factors } Y \vee A = \text{Zero}$ 
  apply (subgoal-tac (norm (XOR (Rep-msg X) (Rep-msg Y)) ∈ msg))
  prefer 2
  apply (simp add: msg-def normed-norm del: norm.simps)
  apply (auto simp add: Xor-def factors-def Abs-msg-inverse Zero-def simp del:
  norm.simps)
  apply (rule-tac x=a in exI, auto simp del: norm.simps)
  apply (subgoal-tac (Rep-msg X ⊕ Rep-msg Y) ∼> norm (Rep-msg X ⊕ Rep-msg
  Y))
  apply (drule ffactors-xor-red)
  apply (auto simp del: norm.simps) prefer 2
  apply (rule norm-reduce)
  apply (erule-tac x=a in alle)
  apply (erule-tac x=a in alle)
  apply (auto simp del: norm.simps)

  apply (subgoal-tac t' = a)
  apply force
  apply (erule normed-xoreq)
  apply (erule ffactors-normed)
  apply force
  apply (erule ffactors-normed)
  apply force

  apply (subgoal-tac t' = a)
  apply force
  apply (erule normed-xoreq)
  apply (erule ffactors-normed)
  apply force
  apply (erule ffactors-normed)
  apply force

```

```

apply (subgoal-tac  $a = \text{ZERO}$ )
apply force
apply (erule normed-xoreq)
apply (erule ffactors-normed)
apply force
apply force
done

lemma Zero-MPair-ineq:  $\text{Zero} \neq \text{MPair } x \ y$ 
by (auto simp add: constructor-defs dest!: Abs-eq-normed)

declare Zero-MPair-ineq[iff]
declare Zero-MPair-ineq[symmetric, iff]

lemma factors-Xor-Crypt:
 $Xor \ X \ Y = Crypt \ k \ m \implies Crypt \ k \ m \in \text{factors } X \vee Crypt \ k \ m \in \text{factors } Y$ 
apply (subgoal-tac  $Crypt \ k \ m \in \text{factors } (Xor \ X \ Y)$ ) prefer 2
apply (force)
apply (drule factors-Xor)
apply auto
done

lemma factors-Xor-MPair:
 $Xor \ X \ Y = \{\! \{ A, B \} \! \} \implies \{\! \{ A, B \} \! \} \in \text{factors } X \vee \{\! \{ A, B \} \! \} \in \text{factors } Y$ 
apply (subgoal-tac  $\{\! \{ A, B \} \! \} \in \text{factors } (Xor \ X \ Y)$ ) prefer 2
apply (force)
apply (drule factors-Xor)
apply auto
done

lemma factors-Xor-Nonce:
 $Xor \ X \ Y = \text{Nonce } A \ NA \implies \text{Nonce } A \ NA \in \text{factors } X \vee \text{Nonce } A \ NA \in \text{factors } Y$ 
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{Nonce } A \ NA \in \text{factors } (Xor \ X \ Y)$ ) prefer 2
apply (force)
apply (drule factors-Xor)
by auto

lemma factors-Xor-Hash:
 $Xor \ X \ Y = \text{Hash } A \implies \text{Hash } A \in \text{factors } X \vee \text{Hash } A \in \text{factors } Y$ 
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{Hash } A \in \text{factors } (Xor \ X \ Y)$ ) prefer 2
apply (force)
apply (drule factors-Xor)
by auto

lemma factors-LowHam:

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```

 $\llbracket d \in LowHamXor; x \in factors\ d \rrbracket \implies x \in (\text{range Agent} \cup \{\text{Zero}\} \cup \text{range Number} \cup \text{range Real})$ 
apply (induct rule: LowHamXor.induct)
apply auto
apply (drule factors-Xor)
apply auto
done

lemma out-context-distort:
 $\llbracket d \in LowHamXor; \text{out-context } (\text{Nonce } B \text{ } NB) \text{ } (\text{Hash } \{\text{Nonce } B \text{ } NB, \text{Agent } B\}) \\ Xor\ m\ d \rrbracket \implies \text{out-context } (\text{Nonce } B \text{ } NB) \text{ } (\text{Hash } \{\text{Nonce } B \text{ } NB, \text{Agent } B\}) \text{ } m$ 
apply (drule out-context-inverse)
apply auto
apply (frule factors-Xor-Nonce)
apply auto
apply (case-tac m = Nonce B NB)
apply force
apply (rule out-context.Xor) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force
apply force
apply force
apply (auto dest: factors-LowHam)

apply (frule factors-Xor-Hash)
apply auto
apply (case-tac m = Hash X)
apply force
apply (rule out-context.Xor) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force
apply force
apply force
apply (auto dest: factors-LowHam)

apply (frule factors-Xor-Crypt)
apply auto
apply (case-tac m = Crypt k X)
apply force
apply (rule out-context.Xor) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force
apply force
apply force
apply (auto dest: factors-LowHam)

apply (frule factors-Xor-MPair)
apply auto

```

```

apply (case-tac m = {X, Y})
  apply force
apply (rule out-context.Xor) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force
apply force
apply force
apply (auto dest: factors-LowHam)

apply (frule factors-Xor-MPair)
apply auto
apply (case-tac m = {X, Y})
  apply force
apply (rule out-context.Xor) prefer 2
apply assumption
apply force
apply force
apply force
apply (auto dest: factors-LowHam)

apply (drule factors-Xor)
apply auto prefer 3
apply (drule out-context-inverse)
apply auto

apply (case-tac X = m, auto)
apply (case-tac X = m, auto)
apply (drule factors-LowHam)
apply assumption
apply (drule out-context-inverse)
apply auto
done

lemma ffactors-not-xor:
x ∈ ffactors y ==> {x} = ffactors x
apply (induct y arbitrary: x)
apply auto
done

lemma factors-not-xor:
x ∈ factors y ==> factors x = {x}
apply (simp add: factors-def)
apply (elim exE conjE)
apply (subgoal-tac a ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (simp add: msg-def)
apply (rule ffactors-normed)
apply force
apply force

```

```

apply clarsimp
apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (drule ffactors-not-xor [THEN sym])
apply auto
done

lemma Xor-ZeroL[simp]: Xor Zero a = a
apply (auto simp add: Xor-def Zero-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed ZERO)
apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac normed (Rep-msg a)) prefer 2
apply force
apply (simp add: norm-normed-id)
apply (simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
done

lemma ffactors-Zero-imp-Zero:
  [| normed X; ZERO ∈ ffactors X |] ==> X = ZERO
apply (induct rule: normed.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma factors-Zero-imp-Zero:
  Zero ∈ factors X ==> X = Zero
apply (auto simp add: factors-def Zero-def)
apply (subgoal-tac ZERO ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac a ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (drule ffactors-normed)
apply force
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inject)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (Rep-msg X))
apply (drule ffactors-Zero-imp-Zero)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac Abs-msg (Rep-msg X) = Abs-msg ZERO) prefer 2
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac Abs-msg (Rep-msg X) = X)
apply force
apply (rule Rep-msg-inverse)
done

lemma n:
  [| normed a;
     normed b;
     standard a ∨ standard b;
     (ffactors a ∩ ffactors b) = {}];

```

```

ZERO ∉ ffactors a ∪ ffactors b ]]
⇒ ffactors (normxor a b) = ffactors a ∪ ffactors b ∧ normxor a b ≠ ZERO
proof (induct a arbitrary: b rule: normed.induct)
case (Agent aa)
thus ?case
  apply (induct b rule: normed.induct)
  apply (case-tac aa = a)
  apply simp
  apply (force split: split-if-asm)
  apply clarsimp
  done
next
case (Xor u v)
from ⟨normed b⟩ show ?case using prems proof (induct b rule: normed.induct)
case (Agent a)
thus ?case apply –
  apply clarsimp
  done
next
case (Xor f g)
from ⟨standard (u ⊕ v) ∨ standard (f ⊕ g)⟩ show ?case by auto
next
case Zero
from ⟨ZERO ∉ ffactors (u ⊕ v) ∪ ffactors ZERO⟩ show ?case by auto
next
case (Nonce c d)
thus ?case by clarsimp
next
case (Key k)
thus ?case by clarsimp
next
case (Hash h)
thus ?case by clarsimp
next
case (MPair f g)
thus ?case by clarsimp
next
case (Crypt k m)
thus ?case by clarsimp
next
case (Real m)

```



```

apply (force split: split-if-asm)
apply clarsimp
done
next
  case (Real rr)
  thus ?case using prems
    apply (induct b rule: normed.induct)
    apply (force split: split-if-asm)
    apply (force split: split-if-asm)
    apply (force split: split-if-asm)
    apply (case-tac rr = r)
    apply simp
    apply (force split: split-if-asm)
    apply clarsimp
done
next
  case (Nonce nn aa)
  thus ?case using prems
    apply (induct b rule: normed.induct)
    apply (force split: split-if-asm)
    apply (force split: split-if-asm)
    apply (force split: split-if-asm)
    apply (force split: split-if-asm)
    apply (case-tac NONCE nn aa = NONCE n t)
    apply simp
    apply (force split: split-if-asm)
    apply clarsimp
done
next
  case Zero
  from <ZERO ∉ ffactors ZERO ∪ ffactors b> show ?case by auto
next
  case (Crypt kk mm)
  from <normed b> show ?case using prems
    apply (induct b rule: normed.induct)

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```

apply (force split: split-if-asm)
apply (case-tac CRYPT mm kk = CRYPT k m)
  apply simp
apply (force split: split-if-asm)
apply clar simp
done
next
case (MPair aa bb)
from <normed b> show ?case using prems
  apply (induct b rule: normed.induct)
  apply (force split: split-if-asm)
  apply (case-tac MPAIR aa bb = MPAIR a b)
    apply simp
  apply (force split: split-if-asm)
  apply (force split: split-if-asm)
  apply clar simp
done
qed

lemma m:
  [ normed X;
    NONCE A NA ∈ ffactors X;
    ZERO ∈ ffactors X
  ] ==> ffactors (X ⊗ NONCE A NA) = (ffactors X ∪ ffactors (NONCE A NA))
  ∧ X ⊗ (NONCE A NA) ≠ ZERO
  apply (rule n)
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force
  apply auto
done

lemma ffactors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm:
  [ normed X; NONCE P NP ∈ ffactors X ] ==>
    (ffactors (ZERO ⊗ (NONCE P NP)) = {NONCE P NP} ∧ X = ZERO)
    ∨ ffactors (X ⊗ (NONCE P NP)) = {NONCE P NP} ∪ ffactors X

```

```

apply (case-tac  $X = \text{ZERO}$ )
apply clarsimp
apply (case-tac  $\text{ZERO} \in \text{ffactors } X$ )
apply (drule ffactors-Zero-imp-Zero)
apply force
apply force
apply (frule m)
apply simp
apply simp
apply simp
done

lemma factors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm:
 $\llbracket \text{Nonce } P \text{ NP} \notin \text{factors } X \rrbracket \implies$ 
  ( $\text{factors}(\text{Xor Zero}(\text{Nonce } P \text{ NP})) = \{\text{Nonce } P \text{ NP}\} \wedge X = \text{Zero}$ )
   $\vee \text{factors}(\text{Xor } X(\text{Nonce } P \text{ NP})) = \{\text{Nonce } P \text{ NP}\} \cup \text{factors } X$ 
apply (unfold factors-def Xor-def Zero-def Nonce-def)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{ZERO} \in \text{msg}$ ) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{Rep-msg } X \in \text{msg}$ ) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac  $\text{NONCE } P \text{ NP} \in \text{msg}$ ) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (Rep-msg X)) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (drule-tac  $P=P$  and  $NP=NP$  in ffactors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm)
apply force
apply clarsimp
apply (elim disjE)
apply clarsimp
apply (drule-tac  $f=\text{Abs-msg}$  in HOL.arg-cong)
apply (simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
apply (subgoal-tac (Rep-msg  $X \otimes \text{NONCE } P \text{ NP}$ )  $\in \text{msg}$ ) prefer 2
  apply (simp add: msg-def)
apply (rule normed-normxor)
apply simp
apply simp
apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply force
done

lemma hash-ffactors:
 $\llbracket \text{normed } X;$ 
 $\text{normed } (\text{HASH } Y);$ 
 $\text{HASH } Y \notin \text{ffactors } X;$ 
 $\text{ZERO} \notin \text{ffactors } X$ 
 $\rrbracket \implies \text{ffactors}(X \otimes \text{HASH } Y) = (\text{ffactors } X \cup \text{ffactors } (\text{HASH } Y)) \wedge X \otimes (\text{HASH } Y) \neq \text{ZERO}$ 

```

```

apply (rule n)
apply force
apply force
apply force
apply auto
done

lemma ffactors-Xor-hash-not-subterm:
  [ normed X; normed (HASH Y); HASH Y ∉ ffactors X ] ==>
    (ffactors (ZERO ⊗ (HASH Y)) = {HASH Y} ∧ X = ZERO)
    ∨ ffactors (X ⊗ (HASH Y)) = {HASH Y} ∪ ffactors X
apply (case-tac X=ZERO)
apply clarsimp
apply (case-tac ZERO ∈ ffactors X)
apply (drule ffactors-Zero-imp-Zero)
apply force
apply force
apply (frule hash-ffactors)
apply simp
apply simp
apply simp
apply simp
done

lemma factors-Xor-hash-not-subterm:
  [ Hash Y ∉ factors X ] ==>
    (factors (Xor Zero (Hash Y)) = {Hash Y} ∧ X = Zero)
    ∨ factors (Xor X (Hash Y)) = {Hash Y} ∪ factors X
apply (unfold factors-def Xor-def Zero-def Hash-def)
apply (subgoal-tac ZERO ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac Rep-msg X ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac HASH (Rep-msg Y) ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (Rep-msg X)) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (drule-tac Y=Rep-msg Y in ffactors-Xor-hash-not-subterm)
apply force
apply clarsimp
apply (elim disjE)
apply clarsimp
apply (drule-tac f=Abs-msg in HOL.arg-cong)
apply (simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
apply (subgoal-tac (Rep-msg X ⊗ HASH (Rep-msg Y)) ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (simp add: msg-def)
  apply (rule normed-normxor)
  apply simp

```

```

apply simp
apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply force
done

lemma out-context-not[dest]:
  (out-context (Nonce (Honest P) NP) (Hash {Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent (Honest P)}))
   (Hash {Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent (Honest P)})) ==> False
  apply (drule out-context-inverse)
  apply auto
  done

lemma subterms-Nonce-Nonce:
  Nonce (Honest A) NA ≠ Nonce (Honest B) NB
  ==> Nonce (Honest A) NA ∈ subterms {Xor (Nonce (Honest A) NA) (Nonce (Honest B) NB)}
  apply (rule factors-imp-subterms)
  apply (simp add: Xor-comm[where A=Nonce (Honest A) NA])
  apply (subgoal-tac Nonce (Honest A) NA ∉ factors (Nonce (Honest B) NB))
  apply (drule factors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm)
  apply auto
  done

lemma subterms-xor-nonce-hash:
  subterms {Xor (Nonce B NB) (Hash m)}
  = insert (Xor (Nonce B NB) (Hash m))
    (insert (Nonce B NB) (subterms {Hash m}))
  apply (simp only: Nonce-def Hash-def Xor-def subterms-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac NONCE B NB ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac HASH (Rep-msg m) ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac norm
    (Rep-msg (Abs-msg (NONCE B NB)) ⊕
     Rep-msg (Abs-msg (HASH (Rep-msg m)))) ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (simp only: msg-def)
  apply (simp del: norm.simps)
  apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
  apply (rule-tac x=ma in exI)
  apply (auto split: split-if-asm)
  apply (drule fsubterms.singleton)
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac x=ma in exI)
  apply (auto split: split-if-asm)
  apply (drule-tac H={Rep-msg m, NONCE B NB} in fsubterms.trans)
  apply force
  apply force
done

```

```

lemma components-MPair[simp]:
  components {MPair a b} = components {a} ∪ components {b}
  apply (subgoal-tac MPAIR (Rep-msg a) (Rep-msg b) ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac (Rep-msg a) ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac (Rep-msg b) ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (auto simp add: MPair-def components-def)
  apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
  done

lemma components-non-pair:
  ∀ X Y. m ≠ MPair X Y ⇒ components {m} = {m}
  apply (subgoal-tac Rep-msg m ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (simp add: components-def MPair-def)
  apply (case-tac Rep-msg m)
  apply auto
  apply (auto dest: HOL.arg-cong[where f=Abs-msg] simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
  apply (drule HOL.arg-cong[where f=Abs-msg])
  apply (auto simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
  apply (erule-tac x=Abs-msg fmmsg1 in allE)
  apply (erule-tac x=Abs-msg fmmsg2 in allE)
  apply (subgoal-tac fmmsg1 ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def elim: normed-MPAIR)
  apply (subgoal-tac fmmsg2 ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def elim: normed-MPAIR)
  apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)

  apply (drule HOL.arg-cong[where f=Abs-msg])
  apply (auto simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
  apply (erule-tac x=Abs-msg fmmsg1 in allE)
  apply (erule-tac x=Abs-msg fmmsg2 in allE)
  apply (subgoal-tac fmmsg1 ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def elim: normed-MPAIR)
  apply (subgoal-tac fmmsg2 ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def elim: normed-MPAIR)
  apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)

  apply (drule HOL.arg-cong[where f=Abs-msg])
  apply (auto simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
  apply (erule-tac x=Abs-msg fmmsg1 in allE)
  apply (erule-tac x=Abs-msg fmmsg2 in allE)
  apply (subgoal-tac fmmsg1 ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def elim: normed-MPAIR)
  apply (subgoal-tac fmmsg2 ∈ msg) prefer 2

```

```

apply (force simp add: msg-def elim: normed-MPAIR)
apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
done

lemma components-nonce[simp]:
components {Nonce A NA} = {Nonce A NA}
by (rule components-non-pair, auto)

lemma components-crypt[simp]:
components {Crypt k m} = {Crypt k m}
by (rule components-non-pair, auto)

lemma components-hash[simp]:
components {Hash m} = {Hash m}
by (rule components-non-pair, auto)

lemma components-xor-n-n-a:
components {Xor (Nonce A NA) (Xor (Nonce B NB) (Agent C))} 
= {Xor (Nonce A NA) (Xor (Nonce B NB) (Agent C))} 
apply (rule components-non-pair)
apply (subgoal-tac NONCE A NA ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac NONCE B NB ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac AGENT C ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (auto simp add: Xor-def MPAIR-def Nonce-def Agent-def simp del: norm.simps)
apply (subgoal-tac MPAIR (Rep-msg X) (Rep-msg Y) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (norm
(Rep-msg (Abs-msg (NONCE A NA)) ⊕
norm
(Rep-msg (Abs-msg (NONCE B NB)) ⊕ Rep-msg (Abs-msg (AGENT
C)))))) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)

apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse split: split-if-asm)
apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inject XORnz-def)
done

lemma Key-parts-Xor[dest]:
Key k ∈ parts {Xor X Z} ⇒ Key k ∈ parts {X, Z}
apply (auto simp add: Key-def parts-def)
apply (drule-tac f=Rep-msg in HOL.arg-cong)
apply (subgoal-tac normed m) prefer 2
apply (erule normed-fparts)
apply auto

```

```

apply (subgoal-tac normed (KEY k))
apply auto
apply (unfold Xor-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (norm (Rep-msg X ⊕ Rep-msg Z))) prefer 2
apply force
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
apply (drule fparts-norm-KEY)
by auto

lemma Xor-same-arg:
assumes P: Xor a b = Xor a c
shows b = c
proof -
have A: b = Xor (Xor a b) a by (simp add: Xor-rewrite)
have B: Xor (Xor a c) a = c by (simp add: Xor-rewrite)
show ?thesis using P apply -
  apply (subst A)
  apply (subst P)
  apply (subst B)
  by simp
qed

```

```

lemma sig-subterms:
Crypt k M ∈ subterms {Xor X Y}
==> Crypt k M ∈ subterms {X, Y}
apply (auto simp add: Crypt-def subterms-def MPair-def)
apply (subgoal-tac Rep-msg M ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac CRYPT k (Rep-msg M) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (drule-tac f=Rep-msg in HOL.arg-cong)
apply (subgoal-tac normed m) prefer 2
apply (erule normed-fsubterms)
apply force
apply auto
apply (simp add: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (rule-tac x=CRYPT k (Rep-msg M) in exI)
apply auto
apply (unfold Xor-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (norm (Rep-msg X ⊕ Rep-msg Y))) prefer 2
apply (rule normed-norm)
apply (simp only: Abs-msg-normed)
apply (drule fsubterms-norm-CRYPT)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac m' = Rep-msg M)
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac normed m')
apply (simp only: norm-normed-id)

```

```

apply (subgoal-tac  $m' \in fsubterms \{Rep\text{-}msg X, Rep\text{-}msg Y\}$ ) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac  $G=\{CRYPT k m'\}$  in fsubterms.trans)
apply force
apply force
apply (drule-tac  $X=m'$  in fsubterms.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac  $Y=m'$  in normed-fsubterms, auto)
apply (drule-tac  $Y=m'$  in normed-fsubterms, auto)
done

lemma parts-in-subterms:
 $x \in parts S \implies x \in subterms S$ 
apply (unfold parts-def subterms-def)
apply (auto)
apply (rule-tac  $x=m$  in exI)
apply auto
apply (erule fparts.induct)
apply (auto intro: fsubterms.Inj fsubterms.Fst fsubterms.Snd fsubterms.Ctext
fsubterms.Hash
      fsubterms.Xor1 fsubterms.Xor2
      dest: fparts-fsubterms-Abs-msg)
done

lemma subterms-component-trans:
 $\llbracket X \in subterms\{Y\}; Y \in components\{Z\} \rrbracket \implies X \in subterms\{Z\}$ 
apply (rule-tac subterms.trans)
apply simp
apply (drule components-subset-parts)
apply auto
apply (erule parts-in-subterms)
done

lemma xor-nz[simp]:  $b \neq ZERO \implies a \odot b = a \oplus b$ 
apply (case-tac b)
apply auto
done

lemma fsubterms-xor-nonce-right:
 $\llbracket \begin{aligned} &normed b; \\ &normed a; \\ &NONCE A NA \in fsubterms\{b\}; \\ &NONCE A NA \notin fsubterms\{a\} \end{aligned} \rrbracket \implies NONCE A NA \in fsubterms\{norm(a \oplus HASH b)\}$ 
apply (auto simp add: norm-normed-id)
apply (induct a)
apply (auto split: split-if-asm)
apply (erule fsubterms.trans, force)
apply (erule fsubterms.trans, force)

```

```

apply (erule fsubterms.trans, force)
apply (erule fsubterms.trans, force)
apply (erule fsubterms.trans, force)
apply (erule fsubterms.trans, force) defer
apply (erule fsubterms.trans, force)
apply (rule-tac G={HASH b} in fsubterms.trans)
apply force
apply force
apply (erule fsubterms.trans, force)
apply (rule-tac G={HASH b} in fsubterms.trans)
apply force
apply force
apply (erule fsubterms.trans, force)
apply (erule fsubterms.trans, force)
apply (drule-tac H={b,a2} in fsubterms.trans)
apply force
apply force defer
apply (rule-tac G={HASH b} in fsubterms.trans)
apply force
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac normed a2) prefer 2
apply (rule normed-xor-snd)
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac NONCE A NAnotin fsubterms {a2}) prefer 2
apply clarsimp
apply (drule-tac H={a1,a2} in fsubterms.trans) back
apply force
apply force
apply auto
apply (subst xor-nz)
apply force
apply auto
apply (erule-tac fsubterms.trans)
apply force
done

```

```

lemma subterms-xor-nonce-right:
  [| Nonce A NAnotin subterms {a} |]
  ==> Nonce A NAin subterms {Xor a (Hash {| Nonce A NA, Agent B |})}
  apply (auto simp del: norm.simps simp add: subterms-def Xor-def Hash-def
Nonce-def Agent-def MPair-def)
  apply (rule-tac x=NONCE A NA in exI)
  apply (auto simp del: norm.simps)
  apply (subgoal-tac AGENT Bin msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (auto simp only: Abs-msg-inverse)
  apply (subgoal-tac NONCE A NAin msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)

```

```

apply (auto simp only: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (subgoal-tac MPAIR (NONCE A NA) (AGENT B) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (auto simp only: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (subgoal-tac HASH (MPAIR (NONCE A NA) (AGENT B)) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (auto simp only: Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (rule fsubterms-xor-nonce-right)
apply auto
done

end

```

## 10 The Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality

```

theory CauchySchwarz
imports Complex-Main
begin

```

## 11 Abstract

The following document presents a formalised proof of the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality for the specific case of  $R^n$ . The system used is Isabelle/Isar.

*Theorem:* Take  $V$  to be some vector space possessing a norm and inner product, then for all  $a, b \in V$  the following inequality holds:  $|a \cdot b| \leq \|a\| * \|b\|$ . Specifically, in the Real case, the norm is the Euclidean length and the inner product is the standard dot product.

## 12 Formal Proof

### 12.1 Vector, Dot and Norm definitions.

This section presents definitions for a real vector type, a dot product function and a norm function.

#### 12.1.1 Vector

We now define a vector type to be a tuple of (function, length). Where the function is of type  $nat \Rightarrow real$ . We also define some accessor functions and appropriate notation.

```
type-synonym vector = (nat⇒real) * nat
```

**definition**

```
ith :: vector ⇒ nat ⇒ real ((((-) [80,100] 100) where
  ith v i = fst v i)
```

**definition**

```
vlen :: vector ⇒ nat where
  vlen v = snd v
```

Now to access the second element of some vector  $v$  the syntax is  $v_2$ .

### 12.1.2 Dot and Norm

We now define the dot product and norm operations.

**definition**

```
dot :: vector ⇒ vector ⇒ real (infixr · 60) where
  dot a b = (∑ j ∈ {1..(vlen a)}. aj*bj)
```

**definition**

```
norm :: vector ⇒ real (||-|| 100) where
  norm v = sqrt (∑ j ∈ {1..(vlen v)}. vj2)
```

**notation (HTML output)**

```
norm (||-|| 100)
```

Another definition of the norm is  $\|v\| = \sqrt{v \cdot v}$ . We show that our definition leads to this one.

**lemma** *norm-dot*:

```
||v|| = sqrt (v·v)
```

**proof** –

```
have sqrt (v·v) = sqrt (∑ j ∈ {1..(vlen v)}. vj*vj) unfolding dot-def by simp
also with real-sq have ... = sqrt (∑ j ∈ {1..(vlen v)}. vj2) by simp
also have ... = ||v|| unfolding norm-def by simp
finally show ?thesis ..
```

**qed**

A further important property is that the norm is never negative.

**lemma** *norm-pos*:

```
||v|| ≥ 0
```

**proof** –

```
have ∀ j. vj2 ≥ 0 unfolding ith-def by auto
hence ∀ j ∈ {1..(vlen v)}. vj2 ≥ 0 by simp
with setsigma-nonneg have (∑ j ∈ {1..(vlen v)}. vj2) ≥ 0 .
with real-sqrt-ge-zero have sqrt (∑ j ∈ {1..(vlen v)}. vj2) ≥ 0 .
thus ?thesis unfolding norm-def .
```

**qed**

We now prove an intermediary lemma regarding double summation.

```

lemma double-sum-aux:
  fixes f::nat  $\Rightarrow$  real
  shows
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j)) =$ 
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (f k * g j + f j * g k) / 2))$ 
proof -
  have
     $2 * (\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j)) =$ 
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j)) +$ 
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j))$ 
    by simp
  also have
    ... =
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j)) +$ 
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f j * g k))$ 
    by (simp only: double-sum-equiv)
  also have
    ... =
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j + f j * g k))$ 
    by (auto simp add: setsum-addf)
  finally have
     $2 * (\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j)) =$ 
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j + f j * g k)) .$ 
hence
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j)) =$ 
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (f k * g j + f j * g k))) * (1/2)$ 
    by auto
  also have
    ... =
     $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (f k * g j + f j * g k)) * (1/2))$ 
    by (simp add: setsum-right-distrib mult-commute)
  finally show ?thesis by (auto simp add: inverse-eq-divide)
qed

```

The final theorem can now be proven. It is a simple forward proof that uses properties of double summation and the preceding lemma.

```

theorem CauchySchwarzReal:
  fixes x::vector
  assumes vlen x = vlen y
  shows |x·y|  $\leq \|x\| * \|y\|$ 
proof -
  have |x·y|^2  $\leq (\|x\| * \|y\|)^2$ 
proof -

```

We can rewrite the goal in the following form ...

```

have ( $\|x\| * \|y\|$ )^2 - |x·y|^2  $\geq 0$ 
proof -
  obtain n where nx: n = vlen x by simp
  with (vlen x = vlen y) have ny: n = vlen y by simp

```

{

Some preliminary simplification rules.

```

have  $\forall j \in \{1..n\}. x_j^2 \geq 0$  by simp
hence  $(\sum j \in \{1..n\}. x_j^2) \geq 0$  by (rule setsum-nonneg)
hence  $xp: (\sqrt{(\sum j \in \{1..n\}. x_j^2)})^2 = (\sum j \in \{1..n\}. x_j^2)$ 
      by (rule real-sqrt-pow2)

have  $\forall j \in \{1..n\}. y_j^2 \geq 0$  by simp
hence  $(\sum j \in \{1..n\}. y_j^2) \geq 0$  by (rule setsum-nonneg)
hence  $yp: (\sqrt{(\sum j \in \{1..n\}. y_j^2)})^2 = (\sum j \in \{1..n\}. y_j^2)$ 
      by (rule real-sqrt-pow2)

```

The main result of this section is that  $(\|x\| * \|y\|)^2$  can be written as a double sum.

```

have
   $(\|x\| * \|y\|)^2 = \|x\|^2 * \|y\|^2$ 
  by (simp add: real-sq-exp)
also from nx ny have
  ... =  $(\sqrt{(\sum j \in \{1..n\}. x_j^2)})^2 * (\sqrt{(\sum j \in \{1..n\}. y_j^2)})^2$ 
  unfolding norm-def by auto
also from xp yp have
  ... =  $(\sum j \in \{1..n\}. x_j^2) * (\sum j \in \{1..n\}. y_j^2)$ 
  by simp
also from setsum-product have
  ... =  $(\sum k \in \{1..n\}. (\sum j \in \{1..n\}. (x_k^2 * (y_j^2))))$ .
finally have
   $(\|x\| * \|y\|)^2 = (\sum k \in \{1..n\}. (\sum j \in \{1..n\}. (x_k^2 * (y_j^2))))$ .
}
moreover
{

```

We also show that  $|x \cdot y|^2$  can be expressed as a double sum.

```

have
   $|x \cdot y|^2 = (x \cdot y)^2$ 
  by simp
also from nx have
  ... =  $(\sum j \in \{1..n\}. x_j * y_j)^2$ 
  unfolding dot-def by simp
also from real-sq have
  ... =  $(\sum j \in \{1..n\}. x_j * y_j) * (\sum j \in \{1..n\}. x_j * y_j)$ 
  by simp
also from setsum-product have
  ... =  $(\sum k \in \{1..n\}. (\sum j \in \{1..n\}. (x_k * y_k) * (x_j * y_j)))$ .
finally have
   $|x \cdot y|^2 = (\sum k \in \{1..n\}. (\sum j \in \{1..n\}. (x_k * y_k) * (x_j * y_j)))$ .
}

```

We now manipulate the double sum expressions to get the required inequality.

**ultimately have**

```


$$(\|x\| * \|y\|)^2 - |x \cdot y|^2 =$$


$$(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (x_k^2 * (y_j^2))) -$$


$$(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (x_k * y_k) * (x_j * y_j)))$$

by simp
also have

$$\dots =$$


$$(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} ((x_k^2 * y_j^2) + (x_j^2 * y_k^2)) / 2) -$$


$$(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (x_k * y_k) * (x_j * y_j)))$$

by (simp only: double-sum-aux)
also have

$$\dots =$$


$$(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} ((x_k^2 * y_j^2) + (x_j^2 * y_k^2)) / 2 - (x_k * y_k) * (x_j * y_j)))$$

by (auto simp add: setsum-subtractf)
also have

$$\dots =$$


$$(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (\text{inverse } 2) * 2 *$$


$$(((x_k^2 * y_j^2) + (x_j^2 * y_k^2)) * (1/2) - (x_k * y_k) * (x_j * y_j)))$$

by auto
also have

$$\dots =$$


$$(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (\text{inverse } 2) * (2 *$$


$$(((x_k^2 * y_j^2) + (x_j^2 * y_k^2)) * (1/2) - (x_k * y_k) * (x_j * y_j))))$$

by (simp only: mult-assoc)
also have

$$\dots =$$


$$(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (\text{inverse } 2) *$$


$$(((x_k^2 * y_j^2) + (x_j^2 * y_k^2)) * 2 * (\text{inverse } 2) - 2 * (x_k * y_k) * (x_j * y_j)))$$

by (auto simp add: ring-distrib mult-assoc)
also have

$$\dots =$$


$$(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (\text{inverse } 2) *$$


$$(((x_k^2 * y_j^2) + (x_j^2 * y_k^2)) - 2 * (x_k * y_k) * (x_j * y_j)))$$

by (simp only: mult-assoc, simp)
also have

$$\dots =$$


$$(\text{inverse } 2) * (\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} ((x_k^2 * y_j^2) + (x_j^2 * y_k^2)) - 2 * (x_k * y_k) * (x_j * y_j)))$$

by (simp only: setsum-right-distrib)
also have

$$\dots =$$


$$(\text{inverse } 2) * (\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (x_k * y_j - x_j * y_k)^2))$$

by (simp only: power2-diff real-sq-exp, auto simp add: mult-ac)
also have  $\dots \geq 0$ 
proof -
{  

  fix k::nat  

  have  $\forall j \in \{1..n\}. (x_k * y_j - x_j * y_k)^2 \geq 0$  by simp  

  hence  $(\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} (x_k * y_j - x_j * y_k)^2) \geq 0$  by (rule setsum-nonneg)  

}

```

```

hence  $\forall k \in \{1..n\}. (\sum j \in \{1..n\}. (x_k * y_j - x_j * y_k)^2) \geq 0$  by simp
hence  $(\sum k \in \{1..n\}. (\sum j \in \{1..n\}. (x_k * y_j - x_j * y_k)^2)) \geq 0$ 
      by (rule setsigma-nonneg)
      thus ?thesis by simp
qed
finally show  $(\|x\| * \|y\|)^2 - |x \cdot y|^2 \geq 0$  .
qed
thus ?thesis by simp
qed
moreover have  $0 \leq \|x\| * \|y\|$ 
  by (auto simp add: norm-pos_intro: mult-nonneg-nonneg)
ultimately show ?thesis by (rule power2-le-imp-le)
qed

end

```

## 13 Physical Distance and Communication Distance

```
theory Distance imports Event CauchySchwarz begin
```

some general lemmas about the reals

```
lemma real-add-mult-distrib2:
```

```
  fixes x::real
```

```
  shows  $x * (y + z) = x * y + x * z$ 
```

```
proof -
```

```
  have  $x * (y + z) = (y + z) * x$  by simp
```

```
  also have ... =  $y * x + z * x$  by (simp add: ring-distrib)
```

```
  also have ... =  $x * y + x * z$  by simp
```

```
  finally show ?thesis .
```

```
qed
```

```
lemma real-add-mult-distrib-ex:
```

```
  fixes x::real
```

```
  shows  $(x + y) * (z + w) = x * z + y * z + x * w + y * w$ 
```

```
proof -
```

```
  have  $(x + y) * (z + w) = x * (z + w) + y * (z + w)$  by (simp add: ring-distrib)
```

```
  also have ... =  $x * z + x * w + y * z + y * w$  by (simp add: real-add-mult-distrib2)
```

```
  finally show ?thesis by simp
```

```
qed
```

```
lemma real-sub-mult-distrib-ex:
```

```
  fixes x::real
```

```
  shows  $(x - y) * (z - w) = x * z - y * z - x * w + y * w$ 
```

```
proof -
```

```
  have  $zw: (z - w) = (z + -w)$  by simp
```

```
  have  $(x - y) * (z - w) = (x + -y) * (z + -w)$  by simp
```

```
  also have ... =  $x * (z - w) + -y * (z - w)$  by (simp add: ring-distrib)
```

```
  also from zw have ... =  $x * (z + -w) + -y * (z + -w)$ 
```

```

apply -
apply (erule subst)
by simp
also have ... =  $x*z + x*-w + -y*z + -y*-w$  by (simp add: real-add-mult-distrib2)
finally show ?thesis by simp
qed

```

```

lemma setsum-product-expand:
fixes f::nat  $\Rightarrow$  real
shows ( $\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f j$ ) * ( $\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} g j$ ) = ( $\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j)$ )
by (simp add: setsum-right-distrib setsum-left-distrib) (rule setsum-commute)

```

```
lemmas real-sq-exp = power-mult-distrib [where 'a = real and ?n = 2]
```

```

lemma real-diff-exp:
fixes x::real
shows  $(x - y)^2 = x^2 + y^2 - 2*x*y$ 
proof -
have  $(x - y)^2 = (x-y)*(x-y)$  by (simp only: real-sq)
also from real-sub-mult-distrib-ex have ... =  $x*x - x*y - y*x + y*y$  by simp
finally show ?thesis by (auto simp add: real-sq)
qed

```

```

lemma double-sum-equiv:
fixes f::nat  $\Rightarrow$  real
shows
 $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f k * g j)) =$ 
 $(\sum_{k \in \{1..n\}} (\sum_{j \in \{1..n\}} f j * g k))$ 
by (rule setsum-commute)

```

some physical constants of our model: the speed of light and sound, dimension of the space (2 or 3, but we can prove everything for n)

```

consts
vu :: real
vc :: real
sdim :: nat

specification (vc)
vc-pos: vc > 0
by (rule-tac x=1 in exI, arith)

specification (vu)
vu-pos: vu > 0
by (rule-tac x=1 in exI, arith)

```

*loc* returns the location of an agent as a real vector of dimension *sdim*

```

consts
loc :: agent  $\Rightarrow$  vector

```

**specification** (*loc*)  
*loc-dim*: *vlen* (*loc A*) = *sdim*  
**by** (*rule-tac* *x*= $\lambda A$ . ( $\lambda n.$  0, *sdim*) **in** *exI*, *auto simp add*: *vlen-def*)

we need vector subtraction for deriving the pseudometric from the real-norm  
**definition**  
 $\text{minusv} :: \text{vector} \Rightarrow \text{vector} \Rightarrow \text{vector}$  (- -: - 100) **where**  
 $\text{minusv } v w = (\lambda n. v_n - w_n, \text{sdim})$

we need vector addition in some proofs  
**definition**  
 $\text{plusv} :: \text{vector} \Rightarrow \text{vector} \Rightarrow \text{vector}$  (- +: - 100) **where**  
 $\text{plusv } v w = (\lambda n. v_n + w_n, \text{sdim})$

relative physical distance between two agents, derived from location function  
**definition**  
 $\text{pdist} :: [\text{agent}, \text{agent}] \Rightarrow \text{real}$   
**where**  
 $\text{pdist } A B = \| \text{loc } A -: \text{loc } B \|$

Line-of-Sight communication distance with speed of light  
**definition**  
 $\text{cdistl} :: [\text{agent}, \text{agent}] \Rightarrow \text{real}$   
**where**  
 $\text{cdistl } A B = \text{pdist } A B / vc$

*pdist* is a pseudometric

**lemma** *pdist-noneg*:  
 $\text{pdist } A B \geq 0$   
**by** (*unfold pdist-def*, *rule norm-pos*)

**lemma** *square-minus-comm*:  
 $((a::\text{real}) - b)^2 = (b - a)^2$

**proof** –  
**have**  $(a - b)^2 = (a - b)*(a - b)$  **by** (*simp add*: *real-sq*)  
**also have**  $\dots = a*a - a*b - b*a + b*b$  **by** (*simp add*: *real-sub-mult-distrib-ex*)  
**also have**  $\dots = b*b - b*a - a*b + a*a$  **by** *simp*  
**also have**  $\dots = (b - a)*(b - a)$  **by** (*simp add*: *real-sub-mult-distrib-ex*)  
**also have**  $\dots = (b - a)^2$  **by** (*simp add*: *real-sq*)  
**finally show** *?thesis* **by** *assumption*  
**qed**

**lemma** *pdist-symm*:  
 $\text{pdist } A B = \text{pdist } B A$   
**by** (*unfold pdist-def* *norm-def* *minusv-def* *vlen-def* *ith-def*, *simp add*: *square-minus-comm*)

```

definition
  zerov :: vector where
    zerov = (λn. 0, sdim)

lemma vequal:
  [ vlen v = vlen w; fst v = fst w ]  $\implies$  v = w
  by (case-tac v, simp add: vlen-def)

lemma zerov-zero-plus:
  loc A +: zerov = loc A
  apply (simp add: plusv-def zerov-def ith-def vlen-def)
  apply (rule vequal)
  apply (simp add: loc-dim)
  apply (simp add: vlen-def)
  by (simp)

lemma minus-equal-zero:
  loc A -: loc A = zerov
  by (auto simp add: minusv-def zerov-def ith-def vlen-def)

lemma pdist-equal-zero: pdist A A = 0
  apply (simp add: pdist-def)
  apply (simp add: minusv-def)
  apply (simp add: norm-def)
  apply (simp add: ith-def)
  done

lemma minusv-comm:
  loc A +: loc B = loc B +: loc A
  by (simp add: plusv-def ith-def, rule ext, simp)

lemma v-assoc1:
  loc A +: (loc B -: loc B) = (loc A -: loc B) +: loc B
  apply (simp add: minus-equal-zero)
  apply (simp only: zerov-zero-plus)
  apply (simp add: plusv-def minusv-def)
  apply (simp add: ith-def)
  apply (rule vequal)
  apply (simp add: loc-dim)
  apply (simp add: vlen-def)
  by simp

lemma v-assoc2:
  ((loc A -: loc B) +: loc B) -: loc C = (loc A -: loc B) +: (loc B -: loc C)
  apply (auto simp add: plusv-def minusv-def)
  by (rule ext, auto simp add: ith-def)

lemma norm-triangle:

```

```

assumes vdim: vlen v = sdim and wdim: vlen w = sdim
shows ‖v +: w‖ ≤ ‖v‖ + ‖w‖
using vdim wdim
proof -
have ‖v +: w‖ ^2 ≤ (‖v‖ + ‖w‖) ^2 proof -
have ‖v +: w‖ ^2 = (∑ k ∈ {1..sdim}. (v_k + w_k) ^2) using norm-pos
  apply (simp add: norm-def plusv-def ith-def vlen-def)
  by (auto simp add: norm-def ith-def vlen-def)
also have ... = (∑ k ∈ {1..sdim}. (v_k + w_k)*(v_k + w_k))
  by (auto simp add: real-sq)
also have ... = (∑ k ∈ {1..sdim}. v_k*v_k + v_k*w_k
  + w_k*v_k + w_k*w_k)
  by (auto simp add: real-add-mult-distrib-ex)
also have ... = (∑ k ∈ {1..sdim}. v_k*v_k)
  + (∑ k ∈ {1..sdim}. v_k*w_k)
  + (∑ k ∈ {1..sdim}. w_k*v_k)
  + (∑ k ∈ {1..sdim}. w_k*w_k)
  by (simp only: setsum-addf)
also have ... = ‖v‖ ^2 + (w·v) + (v·w) + ‖w‖ ^2 using vdim wdim apply -
  apply (insert norm-pos, auto simp add: norm-def real-sqrt-pow2 dot-def)
  apply (auto simp add: real-sq)
  by (case-tac v, case-tac w, auto simp add: real-sqrt-pow2 vlen-def)
also have ... = ‖v‖ ^2 + (w·v) + (w·v) + ‖w‖ ^2 using vdim wdim apply -
  by (auto simp add: dot-def mult-commute)
also have ... = ‖v‖ ^2 + 2*(w·v) + ‖w‖ ^2 by auto
also have ... ≤ ‖v‖ ^2 + 2*|w·v| + ‖w‖ ^2 by auto
also have ... ≤ ‖v‖ ^2 + 2*||v||*||w|| + ‖w‖ ^2
  apply (simp add: mult-commute[of ‖v‖ ‖w‖])
  apply (rule CauchySchwarzReal)
  by (insert vdim wdim, auto)
also have ... = ||v||*||v|| + ||v||*||w|| + ||w||*||v|| + ||w||*||w|| by (auto simp
add: real-sq)
also have ... = (||v|| + ||w||)*(||v|| + ||w||) by (auto simp add: real-add-mult-distrib-ex)
also have ... = (||v|| + ||w||) ^2 by (auto simp add: real-sq)
finally show ?thesis by auto
qed
thus ?thesis apply - apply (rule power2-le-imp-le) by (auto simp add: norm-pos)
qed

```

```

lemma pdist-triangle:
pdist A C ≤ pdist A B + pdist B C
proof -
have ‖loc A -: loc C‖ ≤ ‖loc A -: loc B‖ + ‖loc B -: loc C‖
proof -
have ‖loc A -: loc C‖ = ‖(loc A +: zerov) -: loc C‖
  by (auto simp add: zerov-zero-plus)
also have ... = ‖(loc A +: (loc B -: loc B)) -: loc C‖
  by (auto simp add: minus-equal-zero)
also have ... = ‖((loc A -: loc B) +: loc B) -: loc C‖

```

```

    by (auto simp add: v-assoc1)
  also have ... =  $\|(loc A -: loc B) +: (loc B -: loc C)\|$ 
    by (auto simp add: v-assoc2)
  also have ...  $\leq \|loc A -: loc B\| + \|loc B -: loc C\|$ 
  proof -
    have vlen ( $loc A -: loc B$ ) = sdim by (auto simp add: minusv-def vlen-def)
    moreover
      have vlen ( $loc B -: loc C$ ) = sdim by (auto simp add: minusv-def vlen-def)
      ultimately show ?thesis by (simp add: norm-triangle)
    qed
    finally show ?thesis by auto
  qed
  thus ?thesis by (auto simp add: pdist-def)
qed

```

cdistl is also a pseudometric

```

lemma cdistl-noneg:
  cdistl A B  $\geq 0$ 
apply (auto simp add: cdistl-def)
by (auto simp add: mult-imp-le-div-pos vc-pos norm-pos pdist-noneg)

```

```

lemma cdistl-symm:
  cdistl A B = cdistl B A
by (auto simp add: vc-pos norm-pos pdist-symm cdistl-def)

```

```

lemma cdistl-triangle:
  cdistl A C  $\leq$  cdistl A B + cdistl B C
proof -
  have  $1/vc * pdist A C \leq 1/vc * (pdist A B + pdist B C)$ 
  apply -
  apply (rule-tac c=vc in mult-left-le-imp-le)
  by (auto simp add: vc-pos pdist-triangle pdist-noneg)
  hence  $1/vc * pdist A C \leq 1/vc * pdist A B + 1/vc * pdist B C$ 
    by (simp only: real-add-mult-distrib2)
  thus ?thesis by (simp add: cdistl-def)
qed

```

lower bound on direct communication distance of two agents, None if they can not communicate directly

```

consts
  cdistM :: [transmitter, receiver]  $\Rightarrow$  real option

```

```

definition
  cdist :: [transmitter, receiver]  $\Rightarrow$  real
  where
    cdist T R  $\equiv$  the (cdistM T R)

```

communication faster-than-light not possible

```

specification (cdistM)
  noflt: cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) = None ∨
    the (cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j)) ≥ cdistl A B
  cdistnoneg: cdistM TA RB = None ∨ (the (cdistM TA RB) ≥ 0)
  by (rule-tac x=λA B. None in exI, auto)

lemma cdistnoneg-some:
  assumes some: cdistM TA RB = Some y
  shows 0 ≤ y using some
  proof –
    have cdistM TA RB = None ∨ (the (cdistM TA RB) ≥ 0) apply – by (rule
    cdistnoneg)
    with some have the (cdistM TA RB) ≥ 0 by auto
    with some show ?thesis by auto
  qed

lemma noflt-some:
  assumes some: cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) ≠ None
  shows cdistl A B ≤ the (cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j))
  proof –
    from noflt have or: cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) = None ∨
      cdistl A B ≤ the (cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j)) by auto
    show ?thesis
    proof (cases)
      assume cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) = None with some show ?thesis by
      contradiction
      next
        assume cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) ≠ None with or show ?thesis by auto
        qed
    qed

lemma noflt-some2:
  cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) = Some y ==>
  cdistl A B ≤ the (cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j))
  apply (insert noflt-some)
  apply auto
  apply (subgoal-tac cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) ≠ None) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (drule noflt-some)
  apply auto
  done

end

```

## 14 Primes

```

theory Primes
imports ~~/src/HOL/GCD
begin

```

```

class prime = one +
  fixes prime :: 'a ⇒ bool

instantiation nat :: prime
begin

  definition prime-nat :: nat ⇒ bool
    where prime-nat p = (1 < p ∧ (∀ m. m dvd p --> m = 1 ∨ m = p))

  instance ..

  end

  instantiation int :: prime
  begin

    definition prime-int :: int ⇒ bool
      where prime-int p = prime (nat p)

    instance ..

    end

```

### 14.1 Set up Transfer

```

lemma transfer-nat-int-prime:
  (x::int) >= 0 ==> prime (nat x) = prime x
  unfolding gcd-int-def lcm-int-def prime-int-def by auto

declare transfer-morphism-nat-int[transfer add return:
  transfer-nat-int-prime]

lemma transfer-int-nat-prime: prime (int x) = prime x
  unfolding gcd-int-def lcm-int-def prime-int-def by auto

declare transfer-morphism-int-nat[transfer add return:
  transfer-int-nat-prime]

```

### 14.2 Primes

```

lemma prime-odd-nat: prime (p::nat) ==> p > 2 ==> odd p
  unfolding prime-nat-def
  by (metis gcd-lcm-complete-lattice-nat.bot-least nat-even-iff-2-dvd nat-neq-iff odd-1-nat)

lemma prime-odd-int: prime (p::int) ==> p > 2 ==> odd p
  unfolding prime-int-def
  apply (frule prime-odd-nat)
  apply (auto simp add: even-nat-def)
  done

```

```

lemma prime-ge-0-nat [elim]: prime (p::nat)  $\implies$  p  $\geq$  0
  unfolding prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-gt-0-nat [elim]: prime (p::nat)  $\implies$  p  $>$  0
  unfolding prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-ge-1-nat [elim]: prime (p::nat)  $\implies$  p  $\geq$  1
  unfolding prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-gt-1-nat [elim]: prime (p::nat)  $\implies$  p  $>$  1
  unfolding prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-ge-Suc-0-nat [elim]: prime (p::nat)  $\implies$  p  $\geq$  Suc 0
  unfolding prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-gt-Suc-0-nat [elim]: prime (p::nat)  $\implies$  p  $>$  Suc 0
  unfolding prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-ge-2-nat [elim]: prime (p::nat)  $\implies$  p  $\geq$  2
  unfolding prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-ge-0-int [elim]: prime (p::int)  $\implies$  p  $\geq$  0
  unfolding prime-int-def prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-gt-0-int [elim]: prime (p::int)  $\implies$  p  $>$  0
  unfolding prime-int-def prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-ge-1-int [elim]: prime (p::int)  $\implies$  p  $\geq$  1
  unfolding prime-int-def prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-gt-1-int [elim]: prime (p::int)  $\implies$  p  $>$  1
  unfolding prime-int-def prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-ge-2-int [elim]: prime (p::int)  $\implies$  p  $\geq$  2
  unfolding prime-int-def prime-nat-def by auto

lemma prime-int-altdef: prime (p::int) = (1  $<$  p  $\wedge$  ( $\forall$  m  $\geq$  0. m dvd p  $\longrightarrow$ 
  m = 1  $\vee$  m = p))
  using prime-nat-def [transferred]
  apply (cases p  $\geq$  0)
  apply blast
  apply (auto simp add: prime-ge-0-int)
  done

lemma prime-imp-coprime-nat: prime (p::nat)  $\implies$   $\neg$  p dvd n  $\implies$  coprime p n

```

```

apply (unfold prime-nat-def)
apply (metis gcd-dvd1-nat gcd-dvd2-nat)
done

lemma prime-imp-coprime-int: prime (p::int) ==> ~ p dvd n ==> coprime p n
apply (unfold prime-int-altdef)
apply (metis gcd-dvd1-int gcd-dvd2-int gcd-ge-0-int)
done

lemma prime-dvd-mult-nat: prime (p::nat) ==> p dvd m * n ==> p dvd m ∨ p dvd
n
by (blast intro: coprime-dvd-mult-nat prime-imp-coprime-nat)

lemma prime-dvd-mult-int: prime (p::int) ==> p dvd m * n ==> p dvd m ∨ p dvd
n
by (blast intro: coprime-dvd-mult-int prime-imp-coprime-int)

lemma prime-dvd-mult-eq-nat [simp]: prime (p::nat) ==>
p dvd m * n = (p dvd m ∨ p dvd n)
by (rule iffI, rule prime-dvd-mult-nat, auto)

lemma prime-dvd-mult-eq-int [simp]: prime (p::int) ==>
p dvd m * n = (p dvd m ∨ p dvd n)
by (rule iffI, rule prime-dvd-mult-int, auto)

lemma not-prime-eq-prod-nat: (n::nat) > 1 ==> ~ prime n ==>
EX m k. n = m * k & 1 < m & m < n & 1 < k & k < n
unfolding prime-nat-def dvd-def apply auto
by (metis mult-commute linorder-neq-iff linorder-not-le mult-1
n-less-n-mult-m one-le-mult-iff less-imp-le-nat)

lemma not-prime-eq-prod-int: (n::int) > 1 ==> ~ prime n ==>
EX m k. n = m * k & 1 < m & m < n & 1 < k & k < n
unfolding prime-int-altdef dvd-def
apply auto
by (metis div-mult-self1-is-id div-mult-self2-is-id
int-div-less-self int-one-le-iff-zero-less zero-less-mult-pos less-le)

lemma prime-dvd-power-nat [rule-format]: prime (p::nat) -->
n > 0 --> (p dvd x^n --> p dvd x)
by (induct n rule: nat-induct) auto

lemma prime-dvd-power-int [rule-format]: prime (p::int) -->
n > 0 --> (p dvd x^n --> p dvd x)
apply (induct n rule: nat-induct)
apply auto
apply (frule prime-ge-0-int)
apply auto
done

```

### 14.2.1 Make prime naively executable

```

lemma zero-not-prime-nat [simp]: ~prime (0::nat)
  by (simp add: prime-nat-def)

lemma zero-not-prime-int [simp]: ~prime (0::int)
  by (simp add: prime-int-def)

lemma one-not-prime-nat [simp]: ~prime (1::nat)
  by (simp add: prime-nat-def)

lemma Suc-0-not-prime-nat [simp]: ~prime (Suc 0)
  by (simp add: prime-nat-def One-nat-def)

lemma one-not-prime-int [simp]: ~prime (1::int)
  by (simp add: prime-int-def)

lemma prime-nat-code [code]:
  prime (p::nat)  $\longleftrightarrow$  p > 1  $\wedge$  ( $\forall n \in \{1 <.. < p\}$ .  $\sim n \text{ dvd } p$ )
  apply (simp add: Ball-def)
  apply (metis less-not-refl prime-nat-def dvd-triv-right not-prime-eq-prod-nat)
  done

lemma prime-nat-simp:
  prime (p::nat)  $\longleftrightarrow$  p > 1  $\wedge$  ( $\forall n \in \text{set } [2..<p]$ .  $\neg n \text{ dvd } p$ )
  by (auto simp add: prime-nat-code)

lemmas prime-nat-simp-number-of [simp] = prime-nat-simp [of number-of m,
standard]

lemma prime-int-code [code]:
  prime (p::int)  $\longleftrightarrow$  p > 1  $\wedge$  ( $\forall n \in \{1 <.. < p\}$ .  $\sim n \text{ dvd } p$ ) (is ?L = ?R)
proof
  assume ?L
  then show ?R
  by (clar simp simp: prime-gt-1-int) (metis int-one-le-iff-zero-less prime-int-altdef
less-le)
next
  assume ?R
  then show ?L by (clar simp simp: Ball-def) (metis dvdI not-prime-eq-prod-int)
qed

lemma prime-int-simp: prime (p::int)  $\longleftrightarrow$  p > 1  $\wedge$  ( $\forall n \in \text{set } [2..p - 1]$ .  $\sim n \text{ dvd } p$ )
  by (auto simp add: prime-int-code)

lemmas prime-int-simp-number-of [simp] = prime-int-simp [of number-of m, stan-
dard]

lemma two-is-prime-nat [simp]: prime (2::nat)

```

by simp

```
lemma two-is-prime-int [simp]: prime (2::int)
  by simp
```

A bit of regression testing:

```
lemma prime(97::nat) by simp
lemma prime(97::int) by simp
lemma prime(997::nat) by eval
lemma prime(997::int) by eval
```

```
lemma prime-imp-power-coprime-nat: prime (p::nat) ==> ~ p dvd a ==> coprime
a (p^m)
```

```
  apply (rule coprime-exp-nat)
  apply (subst gcd-commute-nat)
  apply (erule (1) prime-imp-coprime-nat)
done
```

```
lemma prime-imp-power-coprime-int: prime (p::int) ==> ~ p dvd a ==> coprime
a (p^m)
```

```
  apply (rule coprime-exp-int)
  apply (subst gcd-commute-int)
  apply (erule (1) prime-imp-coprime-int)
done
```

```
lemma primes-coprime-nat: prime (p::nat) ==> prime q ==> p ≠ q ==> coprime
p q
```

```
  apply (rule prime-imp-coprime-nat, assumption)
  apply (unfold prime-nat-def)
  apply auto
done
```

```
lemma primes-coprime-int: prime (p::int) ==> prime q ==> p ≠ q ==> coprime p
q
```

```
  apply (rule prime-imp-coprime-int, assumption)
  apply (unfold prime-int-altdef)
  apply (metis int-one-le-iff-zero-less less-le)
done
```

```
lemma primes-imp-powers-coprime-nat:
  prime (p::nat) ==> prime q ==> p ~ q ==> coprime (p^m) (q^n)
  by (rule coprime-exp2-nat, rule primes-coprime-nat)
```

```
lemma primes-imp-powers-coprime-int:
  prime (p::int) ==> prime q ==> p ~ q ==> coprime (p^m) (q^n)
  by (rule coprime-exp2-int, rule primes-coprime-int)
```

```
lemma prime-factor-nat: n ≠ (1::nat) ==> ∃ p. prime p ∧ p dvd n
```

```

apply (induct n rule: nat-less-induct)
apply (case-tac n = 0)
using two-is-prime-nat
apply blast
apply (metis One-nat-def dvd.order-trans dvd-refl less-Suc0 linorder-neqE-nat
    nat-dvd-not-less neq0-conv prime-nat-def)
done

```

One property of coprimality is easier to prove via prime factors.

```

lemma prime-divprod-pow-nat:
assumes p: prime (p::nat) and ab: coprime a b and pab: p ^n dvd a * b
shows p ^n dvd a ∨ p ^n dvd b
proof-
{ assume n = 0 ∨ a = 1 ∨ b = 1 with pab have ?thesis
  apply (cases n=0, simp-all)
  apply (cases a=1, simp-all)
  done }
moreover
{ assume n: n ≠ 0 and a: a≠1 and b: b≠1
  then obtain m where m: n = Suc m by (cases n) auto
  from n have p dvd p ^n apply (intro dvd-power) apply auto done
  also note pab
  finally have pab': p dvd a * b.
  from prime-dvd-mult-nat[OF p pab]
  have p dvd a ∨ p dvd b .
  moreover
  { assume pa: p dvd a
    from coprime-common-divisor-nat [OF ab, OF pa] p have ¬ p dvd b by auto
    with p have coprime b p
      by (subst gcd-commute-nat, intro prime-imp-coprime-nat)
    then have pnb: coprime (p ^n) b
      by (subst gcd-commute-nat, rule coprime-exp-nat)
    from coprime-dvd-mult-nat[OF pnb pab] have ?thesis by blast }
  moreover
  { assume pb: p dvd b
    have pnba: p ^n dvd b*a using pab by (simp add: mult-commute)
    from coprime-common-divisor-nat [OF ab, of p] pb p have ¬ p dvd a
      by auto
    with p have coprime a p
      by (subst gcd-commute-nat, intro prime-imp-coprime-nat)
    then have pna: coprime (p ^n) a
      by (subst gcd-commute-nat, rule coprime-exp-nat)
    from coprime-dvd-mult-nat[OF pna pnba] have ?thesis by blast }
  ultimately have ?thesis by blast }
ultimately show ?thesis by blast
qed

```

### 14.3 Infinitely many primes

```

lemma next-prime-bound:  $\exists (p:\text{nat}). \text{prime } p \wedge n < p \wedge p \leq \text{fact } n + 1$ 
proof-
  have f1:  $\text{fact } n + 1 \neq 1$  using fact-ge-one-nat [of n] by arith
  from prime-factor-nat [OF f1]
  obtain p where prime p and p dvd fact n + 1 by auto
  then have p ≤ fact n + 1 apply (intro dvd-imp-le) apply auto done
  { assume p ≤ n
    from ⟨prime p⟩ have p ≥ 1
    by (cases p, simp-all)
    with ⟨p ≤ n⟩ have p dvd fact n
    by (intro dvd-fact-nat)
    with ⟨p dvd fact n + 1⟩ have p dvd fact n + 1 - fact n
    by (rule dvd-diff-nat)
    then have p dvd 1 by simp
    then have p ≤ 1 by auto
    moreover from ⟨prime p⟩ have p > 1 by auto
    ultimately have False by auto}
  then have n < p by presburger
  with ⟨prime p⟩ and ⟨p ≤ fact n + 1⟩ show ?thesis by auto
qed

lemma bigger-prime:  $\exists p. \text{prime } p \wedge p > (n:\text{nat})$ 
using next-prime-bound by auto

lemma primes-infinite:  $\neg (\text{finite } \{(p:\text{nat}). \text{prime } p\})$ 
proof
  assume finite {(p:nat). prime p}
  with Max-ge have (EX b. (ALL x : {(p:nat). prime p}. x ≤ b))
  by auto
  then obtain b where ALL (x:nat). prime x → x ≤ b
  by auto
  with bigger-prime [of b] show False
  by auto
qed

end

```

## 15 Permutations

```

theory Permutation
imports Main Multiset
begin

inductive
perm :: "'a list => 'a list => bool (- <~> - [50, 50] 50)
where

```

```

Nil [intro!]: [] <~~> []
| swap [intro!]: y # x # l <~~> x # y # l
| Cons [intro!]: xs <~~> ys ==> z # xs <~~> z # ys
| trans [intro]: xs <~~> ys ==> ys <~~> zs ==> xs <~~> zs

```

```

lemma perm-refl [iff]: l <~~> l
  by (induct l) auto

```

### 15.1 Some examples of rule induction on permutations

```

lemma xperm-empty-imp: [] <~~> ys ==> ys = []
  by (induct xs == []::'a list ys pred: perm) simp-all

```

This more general theorem is easier to understand!

```

lemma perm-length: xs <~~> ys ==> length xs = length ys
  by (induct pred: perm) simp-all

```

```

lemma perm-empty-imp: [] <~~> xs ==> xs = []
  by (drule perm-length) auto

```

```

lemma perm-sym: xs <~~> ys ==> ys <~~> xs
  by (induct pred: perm) auto

```

### 15.2 Ways of making new permutations

We can insert the head anywhere in the list.

```

lemma perm-append-Cons: a # xs @ ys <~~> xs @ a # ys
  by (induct xs) auto

```

```

lemma perm-append-swap: xs @ ys <~~> ys @ xs
  apply (induct xs)
    apply simp-all
  apply (blast intro: perm-append-Cons)
  done

```

```

lemma perm-append-single: a # xs <~~> xs @ [a]
  by (rule perm.trans [OF - perm-append-swap]) simp

```

```

lemma perm-rev: rev xs <~~> xs
  apply (induct xs)
    apply simp-all
  apply (blast intro!: perm-append-single intro: perm-sym)
  done

```

```

lemma perm-append1: xs <~~> ys ==> l @ xs <~~> l @ ys
  by (induct l) auto

```

```

lemma perm-append2: xs <~~> ys ==> xs @ l <~~> ys @ l
  by (blast intro!: perm-append-swap perm-append1)

```

### 15.3 Further results

```

lemma perm-empty [iff]: ( $\emptyset \sim\sim xs$ ) = ( $xs = \emptyset$ )
  by (blast intro: perm-empty-imp)

lemma perm-empty2 [iff]: ( $xs \sim\sim \emptyset$ ) = ( $xs = \emptyset$ )
  apply auto
  apply (erule perm-sym [THEN perm-empty-imp])
  done

lemma perm-sing-imp:  $ys \sim\sim xs \implies xs = [y] \implies ys = [y]$ 
  by (induct pred: perm) auto

lemma perm-sing-eq [iff]: ( $ys \sim\sim [y]$ ) = ( $ys = [y]$ )
  by (blast intro: perm-sing-imp)

lemma perm-sing-eq2 [iff]: ( $[y] \sim\sim ys$ ) = ( $ys = [y]$ )
  by (blast dest: perm-sym)

```

### 15.4 Removing elements

```

lemma perm-remove:  $x \in set ys \implies ys \sim\sim x \# remove1 x ys$ 
  by (induct ys) auto

```

Congruence rule

```

lemma perm-remove-perm:  $xs \sim\sim ys \implies remove1 z xs \sim\sim remove1 z ys$ 
  by (induct pred: perm) auto

lemma remove-hd [simp]:  $remove1 z (z \# xs) = xs$ 
  by auto

lemma cons-perm-imp-perm:  $z \# xs \sim\sim z \# ys \implies xs \sim\sim ys$ 
  by (drule-tac z = z in perm-remove-perm) auto

lemma cons-perm-eq [iff]: ( $z \# xs \sim\sim z \# ys$ ) = ( $xs \sim\sim ys$ )
  by (blast intro: cons-perm-imp-perm)

lemma append-perm-imp-perm:  $zs @ xs \sim\sim zs @ ys \implies xs \sim\sim ys$ 
  apply (induct zs arbitrary: xs ys rule: rev-induct)
  apply (simp-all (no-asn-use))
  apply blast
  done

lemma perm-append1-eq [iff]: ( $zs @ xs \sim\sim zs @ ys$ ) = ( $xs \sim\sim ys$ )
  by (blast intro: append-perm-imp-perm perm-append1)

lemma perm-append2-eq [iff]: ( $xs @ zs \sim\sim ys @ zs$ ) = ( $xs \sim\sim ys$ )
  apply (safe intro!: perm-append2)
  apply (rule append-perm-imp-perm)

```

```

apply (rule perm-append-swap [THEN perm.trans])
  — the previous step helps this blast call succeed quickly
apply (blast intro: perm-append-swap)
done

lemma multiset-of-eq-perm: (multiset-of xs = multiset-of ys) = (xs <~~> ys)
apply (rule iffI)
apply (erule-tac [2] perm.induct, simp-all add: union-ac)
apply (erule rev-mp, rule-tac x=ys in spec)
apply (induct-tac xs, auto)
apply (erule-tac x = remove1 a x in allE, drule sym, simp)
apply (subgoal-tac a ∈ set x)
apply (drule-tac z=a in perm.Cons)
apply (erule perm.trans, rule perm-sym, erule perm-remove)
apply (drule-tac f=set-of in arg-cong, simp)
done

lemma multiset-of-le-perm-append:
  multiset-of xs ≤ multiset-of ys ↔ (∃zs. xs @ zs <~~> ys)
apply (auto simp: multiset-of-eq-perm[THEN sym] mset-le-exists-conv)
apply (insert surj-multiset-of, drule surjD)
apply (blast intro: sym)+
done

lemma perm-set-eq: xs <~~> ys ==> set xs = set ys
by (metis multiset-of-eq-perm multiset-of-eq-setD)

lemma perm-distinct-iff: xs <~~> ys ==> distinct xs = distinct ys
apply (induct pred: perm)
  apply simp-all
  apply fastforce
apply (metis perm-set-eq)
done

lemma eq-set-perm-remdups: set xs = set ys ==> remdups xs <~~> remdups ys
apply (induct xs arbitrary: ys rule: length-induct)
apply (case-tac remdups xs, simp, simp)
apply (subgoal-tac a : set (remdups ys))
  prefer 2 apply (metis set.simps(2) insert-iff set-remdups)
apply (drule split-list) apply(elim exE conjE)
apply (drule-tac x=list in spec) apply(erule impE) prefer 2
apply (drule-tac x=ysa@zs in spec) apply(erule impE) prefer 2
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac a#list <~~> a#ysa@zs)
  apply (metis Cons-eq-appendI perm-append-Cons trans)
apply (metis Cons Cons-eq-appendI distinct.simps(2)
  distinct-remdups distinct-remdups-id perm-append-swap perm-distinct-iff)
apply (subgoal-tac set (a#list) = set (ysa@a#zs) & distinct (a#list) & distinct
  (ysa@a#zs))

```

```

apply (fastforce simp add: insert-ident)
apply (metis distinct-remdups set-remdups)
apply (subgoal-tac length (remdups xs) < Suc (length xs))
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac length (remdups xs) ≤ length xs)
apply simp
apply (rule length-remdups-leq)
done

lemma perm-remdups-iff-eq-set: remdups x <^~> remdups y = (set x = set y)
by (metis List.set-remdups perm-set-eq eq-set-perm-remdups)

lemma permutation-Ex-bij:
assumes xs <^~> ys
shows ∃f. bij-betw f {..

```

```

qed
next
  case (trans xs ys zs)
  then obtain f g where
    bij: bij-betw f {..<length xs} {..<length ys} bij-betw g {..<length ys} {..<length zs} and
      perm: ∀ i < length xs. xs ! i = ys ! (f i) ∀ i < length ys. ys ! i = zs ! (g i) by blast
    show ?case
  proof (intro exI[of - g o f] conjI allI impI)
    show bij-betw (g o f) {..<length xs} {..<length zs}
    using bij by (rule bij-betw-trans)
    fix i assume i < length xs
    with bij have f i < length ys unfolding bij-betw-def by force
    with ⟨i < length xs⟩ show xs ! i = zs ! (g o f) i
      using trans(1,3)[THEN perm-length] perm by force
  qed
qed
end

```

## 16 Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic (unique factorization into primes)

```

theory Factorization
imports Main ~~/src/HOL/Number-Theory/Primes ~~/src/HOL/Library/Permutation
begin

```

### 16.1 Definitions

**definition**

```

primel :: nat list => bool where
  primel xs = (∀ p ∈ set xs. prime p)

```

**primrec**

```

nondec :: nat list => bool

```

**where**

```

  nondec [] = True

```

```

  | nondec (x # xs) = (case xs of [] => True | y # ys => x ≤ y ∧ nondec xs)

```

**primrec**

```

prod :: nat list => nat

```

**where**

```

  prod [] = Suc 0

```

```

  | prod (x # xs) = x * prod xs

```

**primrec**

```

oinsert :: nat => nat list => nat list

```

```

where
  oinsert x [] = [x]
  | oinsert x (y # ys) = (if x ≤ y then x # y # ys else y # oinsert x ys)
primrec
  sort :: nat list => nat list
  where
    sort [] = []
    | sort (x # xs) = oinsert x (sort xs)

```

## 16.2 Arithmetic

```

lemma one-less-m: (m::nat) ≠ m * k ==> m ≠ Suc 0 ==> Suc 0 < m
  apply (cases m)
  apply auto
  done

lemma one-less-k: (m::nat) ≠ m * k ==> Suc 0 < m * k ==> Suc 0 < k
  apply (cases k)
  apply auto
  done

lemma mult-left-cancel: (0::nat) < k ==> k * n = k * m ==> n = m
  apply auto
  done

lemma mn-eq-m-one: (0::nat) < m ==> m * n = m ==> n = Suc 0
  apply (cases n)
  apply auto
  done

lemma prod-mn-less-k:
  (0::nat) < n ==> 0 < k ==> Suc 0 < m ==> m * n = k ==> n < k
  apply (induct m)
  apply auto
  done

```

## 16.3 Prime list and product

```

lemma prod-append: prod (xs @ ys) = prod xs * prod ys
  apply (induct xs)
  apply (simp-all add: mult-assoc)
  done

lemma prod-xy-prod:
  prod (x # xs) = prod (y # ys) ==> x * prod xs = y * prod ys
  apply auto
  done

lemma primel-append: primel (xs @ ys) = (primel xs ∧ primel ys)

```

```

apply (unfold prime-nat-def primel-def)
apply auto
done

lemma prime-primel: prime n ==> primel [n] ∧ prod [n] = n
apply (unfold primel-def)
apply auto
done

lemma prime-nd-one: prime p ==> ¬ p dvd Suc 0
apply (unfold prime-nat-def dvd-def)
apply auto
done

lemma hd-dvd-prod: prod (x # xs) = prod ys ==> x dvd (prod ys)
by (metis dvd-mult-left dvd-refl prod.simps(2))

lemma primel-tl: primel (x # xs) ==> primel xs
apply (unfold primel-def)
apply auto
done

lemma primel-hd-tl: (primel (x # xs)) = (prime x ∧ primel xs)
apply (unfold primel-def)
apply auto
done

lemma primes-eq: prime (p::nat) ==> prime q ==> p dvd q ==> p = q
apply (unfold prime-nat-def)
apply auto
done

lemma primel-one-empty: primel xs ==> prod xs = Suc 0 ==> xs = []
apply (cases xs)
apply (simp-all add: primel-def prime-nat-def)
done

lemma prime-g-one: prime p ==> Suc 0 < p
apply (unfold prime-nat-def)
apply auto
done

lemma prime-g-zero: prime p ==> (0 :: nat) < p
apply (unfold prime-nat-def)
apply auto
done

lemma primel-nempty-g-one:
primel xs ==> xs ≠ [] ==> Suc 0 < prod xs

```

```

apply (induct xs)
apply simp
apply (fastsimp simp: primel-def prime-nat-def elim: one-less-mult)
done

lemma primel-prod-gz: primel xs ==> 0 < prod xs
apply (induct xs)
apply (auto simp: primel-def prime-nat-def)
done

```

## 16.4 Sorting

```

lemma nondec-oinsert: nondec xs ==> nondec (oinsert x xs)
apply (induct xs)
apply simp
apply (case-tac xs)
apply (simp-all cong del: list.weak-case-cong)
done

lemma nondec-sort: nondec (sort xs)
apply (induct xs)
apply simp-all
apply (erule nondec-oinsert)
done

lemma x-less-y-oinsert: x ≤ y ==> l = y # ys ==> x # l = oinsert x l
apply simp-all
done

lemma nondec-sort-eq [rule-format]: nondec xs → xs = sort xs
apply (induct xs)
apply safe
apply simp-all
apply (case-tac xs)
apply simp-all
apply (case-tac xs)
apply simp
apply (rule-tac y = aa and ys = list in x-less-y-oinsert)
apply simp-all
done

lemma oinsert-x-y: oinsert x (oinsert y l) = oinsert y (oinsert x l)
apply (induct l)
apply auto
done

```

## 16.5 Permutation

```

lemma perm-primel [rule-format]: xs <~~> ys ==> primel xs --> primel ys
apply (unfold primel-def)

```

```

apply (induct set: perm)
  apply simp
  apply simp
  apply (simp (no-asm))
  apply blast
  apply blast
done

lemma perm-prod:  $xs <^{\sim\sim}> ys \implies \prod xs = \prod ys$ 
  apply (induct set: perm)
    apply (simp-all add: mult-ac)
  done

lemma perm-subst-oinsert:  $xs <^{\sim\sim}> ys \implies oinsert a xs <^{\sim\sim}> oinsert a ys$ 
  apply (induct set: perm)
    apply auto
  done

lemma perm-oinsert:  $x \# xs <^{\sim\sim}> oinsert x xs$ 
  apply (induct xs)
  apply auto
done

lemma perm-sort:  $xs <^{\sim\sim}> sort xs$ 
  apply (induct xs)
  apply (auto intro: perm-oinsert elim: perm-subst-oinsert)
done

lemma perm-sort-eq:  $xs <^{\sim\sim}> ys \implies sort xs = sort ys$ 
  apply (induct set: perm)
    apply (simp-all add: oinsert-x-y)
  done

```

## 16.6 Existence

```

lemma ex-nondec-lemma:
  primel xs ==>  $\exists ys. \text{primel } ys \wedge \text{nondec } ys \wedge \prod ys = \prod xs$ 
  apply (blast intro: nondec-sort perm-prod perm-primel perm-sort perm-sym)
done

lemma not-prime-ex-mk:
  Suc 0 < n  $\wedge \neg \text{prime } n \implies$ 
   $\exists m k. \text{Suc } 0 < m \wedge \text{Suc } 0 < k \wedge m < n \wedge k < n \wedge n = m * k$ 
  apply (unfold prime-nat-def dvd-def)
  apply (auto intro: n-less-m-mult-n n-less-n-mult-m one-less-m one-less-k)
done

lemma split-primel:
  primel xs ==> primel ys ==>  $\exists l. \text{primel } l \wedge \prod l = \prod xs * \prod ys$ 

```

```

apply (rule exI)
apply safe
apply (rule-tac [2] prod-append)
apply (simp add: primel-append)
done

lemma factor-exists [rule-format]: Suc 0 < n --> ( $\exists l. \text{primel } l \wedge \text{prod } l = n$ )
apply (induct n rule: nat-less-induct)
apply (rule impI)
apply (case-tac prime n)
apply (rule exI)
apply (erule prime-primel)
apply (cut-tac n = n in not-prime-ex-mk)
apply (auto intro!: split-primel)
done

lemma nondec-factor-exists: Suc 0 < n ==>  $\exists l. \text{primel } l \wedge \text{nondec } l \wedge \text{prod } l = n$ 
apply (erule factor-exists [THEN exE])
apply (blast intro!: ex-nondec-lemma)
done

```

## 16.7 Uniqueness

```

lemma prime-dvd-mult-list [rule-format]:
  prime p ==> p dvd (prod xs) --> ( $\exists m. m : \text{set } xs \wedge p \text{ dvd } m$ )
apply (induct xs)
apply (force simp add: prime-nat-def)
apply (force dest: prime-dvd-mult-nat)
done

lemma hd-xs-dvd-prod:
  primel (x # xs) ==> primel ys ==> prod (x # xs) = prod ys
  ==>  $\exists m. m \in \text{set } ys \wedge x \text{ dvd } m$ 
apply (rule prime-dvd-mult-list)
apply (simp add: primel-hd-tl)
apply (erule hd-dvd-prod)
done

lemma prime-dvd-eq: primel (x # xs) ==> primel ys ==> m ∈ set ys ==> x
dvd m ==> x = m
apply (rule primes-eq)
apply (auto simp add: primel-def primel-hd-tl)
done

lemma hd-xs-eq-prod:
  primel (x # xs) ==>
  primel ys ==> prod (x # xs) = prod ys ==> x ∈ set ys
apply (frule hd-xs-dvd-prod)

```

```

apply auto
apply (drule prime-dvd-eq)
  apply auto
done

lemma perm-primel-ex:
  primel (x # xs) ==>
    primel ys ==> prod (x # xs) = prod ys ==> ∃ l. ys <~> (x # l)
  apply (rule exI)
  apply (rule perm-remove)
  apply (erule hd-xs-eq-prod)
  apply simp-all
done

lemma primel-prod-less:
  primel (x # xs) ==>
    primel ys ==> prod (x # xs) = prod ys ==> prod xs < prod ys
  by (metis less-asym linorder-neqE-nat mult-less-cancel2 nat-0-less-mult-iff
      nat-less-le nat-mult-1 prime-nat-def primel-hd-tl primel-prod-gz prod.simps(2))

lemma prod-one-empty:
  primel xs ==> p * prod xs = p ==> prime p ==> xs = []
  apply (auto intro: primel-one-empty simp add: prime-nat-def)
done

lemma uniq-ex-aux:
  ∀ m. m < prod ys --> (∀ xs ys. primel xs ∧ primel ys ∧
    prod xs = prod ys ∧ prod xs = m --> xs <~> ys) ==>
  primel list ==> primel x ==> prod list = prod x ==> prod x < prod ys
  ==> x <~> list
  apply simp
done

lemma factor-unique [rule-format]:
  ∀ xs ys. primel xs ∧ primel ys ∧ prod xs = prod ys ∧ prod xs = n
  --> xs <~> ys
  apply (induct n rule: nat-less-induct)
  apply safe
  apply (case-tac xs)
  apply (force intro: primel-one-empty)
  apply (rule perm-primel-ex [THEN exE])
    apply simp-all
  apply (rule perm.trans [THEN perm-sym])
  apply assumption
  apply (rule perm.Cons)
  apply (case-tac x = [])
  apply (metis perm-prod perm-refl prime-primel primel-hd-tl primel-tl prod-one-empty)
  apply (metis nat-0-less-mult-iff nat-mult-eq-cancel1 perm-primel perm-prod primel-prod-gz
        primel-prod-less primel-tl prod.simps(2))

```

```

done

lemma perm-nondec-unique:
  xs <~> ys ==> nondec xs ==> nondec ys ==> xs = ys
  by (metis nondec-sort-eq perm-sort-eq)

theorem unique-prime-factorization [rule-format]:
   $\forall n. \text{Suc } 0 < n \dashrightarrow (\exists !l. \text{primel } l \wedge \text{nondec } l \wedge \text{prod } l = n)$ 
  by (metis factor-unique nondec-factor-exists perm-nondec-unique)

end

```

**theory** NatEmbed **imports** Main Divides Power Factorization **begin**

We want to find a function f, such that f(x,y) not equal to f(u,v) if the set with x and y is not equal to the set with u and v. The reason is to find a key distribution function, assign to every pair of agents a shared secret key, such that they differ for every distinct pair of agents.

In contrast to Paulson's construct, where there is only one intruder and therefore only a injective function from nat to nat is needed, for our case we need to have symmetric keys for all (even dishonest) pairs of users. This requires an injective function from Agents x Agents to Keys, both types (Agents and Keys) are type synonyms for natural numbers.

Another way of modelling this would be to define an additional datatype for shared symmetric keys and using the injectivity of the datatype constructor.

**definition**

primefactors ::nat  $\Rightarrow$  nat  $\Rightarrow$  nat list

**where**

primefactors a b = (if a < b  
 then (replicate (a+1) 2)@(replicate (b+1) 3)  
 else (replicate (b+1) 2)@(replicate (a+1) 3))

**lemma** two-repl-prime: primeel (replicate n 2)
 **by** (simp add: primeel-def)

**lemma** three-is-prime: prime (3::nat)
 **apply** (auto simp add: prime-nat-def)
 **apply** (frule dvd-imp-le)
 **apply** simp
 **apply** (case-tac m)
 **apply** simp
 **apply** (case-tac nat)
 **apply** simp
 **apply** (case-tac nata)
 **apply** simp

```

apply arith+
done

lemma three-repl-prime:prime ((replicate n 3)@((replicate m 3)))
  by (simp add: prime-def)

lemma factor-prime:prime ((replicate n 2)@((replicate m 3)))
  apply (simp add: prime-append)
  apply (rule conjI)
  apply (rule two-repl-prime)
  apply (rule three-repl-prime)
done

lemma replicate-comp:
  assumes replicate n m = a # list
  shows a = m using prems
by (induct n, auto)

lemma nondec-replicate:
  assumes nondec (replicate n m)
  shows nondec (m # (replicate n m)) using prems
by (case-tac n, auto)

lemma replicate-nondec:nondec (replicate n m)
proof (induct n arbitrary: m)
  case 0 show ?case by simp
next
  case (Suc n m) from this show ?case apply -
    apply (simp only: replicate-Suc)
    apply (rule nondec-replicate)
    apply auto
  done
qed

lemma nondec-replicate-append:
  assumes A: n ≤ m
  shows nondec( (replicate k n) @ (replicate l m)) using A
proof (induct k arbitrary: l)
  case 0 show ?case by (simp ,rule replicate-nondec)
next
  case (Suc k) then show ?case
    apply (simp only: replicate-Suc)
    apply (simp only: append-Cons)
    apply (simp only: nondec.simps(2))
    apply (cases replicate k n @ replicate l m)
    apply simp
    apply auto

```

```

apply (cases k)
apply simp
apply (drule replicate-comp)
apply arith
apply auto
done
qed

lemma rep-two-three-nondec:nondec ((replicate n 2)@((replicate m 3)))
by (rule nondec-replicate-append, arith)

lemma primefactors-primrel:primel (primefactors a b)
apply (unfold primefactors-def)
apply (simp only: split-if)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (rule impI)
apply (rule factor-prime)
apply (rule impI)
apply (rule factor-prime)
done

lemma primefactors-nondec:nondec (primefactors a b)
apply (unfold primefactors-def)
apply (simp only: split-if)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (rule impI)
apply (rule rep-two-three-nondec)
apply (rule impI)
apply (rule rep-two-three-nondec)
done

lemma primefactors-not-empty:primefactors a b ≠ []
by (unfold primefactors-def, cases a, cases b, auto)

lemma prod-prim-ge0:prod (primefactors a b) > Suc 0
by (rule primel-nempty-g-one, rule primefactors-primrel, rule primefactors-not-empty)

lemma prod-primefactors-equal:
assumes A:prod (primefactors a b) = prod (primefactors c d)
shows (primefactors a b) = (primefactors c d) using A
apply -
apply (insert prod-prim-ge0 [of a b])
apply (frule-tac n=prod (primefactors a b) in unique-prime-factorization)
apply (insert primefactors-nondec [of a b])
apply (insert primefactors-primrel [of a b])
apply auto
apply (insert primefactors-nondec [of c d])

```

```

apply (insert primefactors-primrel [of c d])
apply auto
done

lemma c:
assumes a ≠ b and
replicate n1 a @ replicate m1 b =
replicate n2 a @ replicate m2 b
shows n1 = n2 using prems
proof (cases m1 = 0 ∨ m2 = 0)
case True show ?thesis using prems
apply auto
apply (case-tac m2>0)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac f=%x. drop n2 x in HOL.arg-cong)
apply auto
apply (case-tac m1>0)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac f=%x. drop n1 x in HOL.arg-cong)
apply auto
done
next
case False
hence m1: m1 > 0 and m2: m2 > 0 by auto
show ?thesis proof cases
assume n1 = n2
thus ?thesis by auto
next
assume neq: n1 ≠ n2
let ?l1 = replicate n1 a @ replicate m1 b
let ?l2 = replicate n2 a @ replicate m2 b
show ?thesis proof cases
assume n1 < n2
have A: ?l1!n1 = b using m1 apply -
apply (rule-tac ys=drop 1 (replicate m1 b) in List.nth-via-drop)
apply auto
apply (case-tac m1, auto)
done
have B: ?l2!n1 = a using prems apply -
apply (rule-tac ys=drop (n1+1) ?l2 in List.nth-via-drop)
apply auto
apply (cases n2-n1)
apply auto
done
hence a = b using A B (?l1=?l2)
apply (drule-tac f=%x. x !n1 in HOL.arg-cong)
by simp
thus ?thesis using ⟨a≠b⟩ by auto
next

```

```

assume  $\neg (n1 < n2)$ 
hence  $n2 : n2 < n1$  using neq by auto
have  $A : ?l2!n2 = b$  using m2 apply -
apply (rule-tac ys=drop 1 (replicate m2 b) in List.nth-via-drop)
apply auto
apply (case-tac m2)
by auto
have  $B : ?l1!n2 = a$  using n2 m1 m2 apply -
apply (rule-tac ys=drop (n2+1) ?l1 in List.nth-via-drop)
apply auto
apply (cases n1-n2)
apply auto
done
hence  $a = b$  using A B ⟨?l1=?l2⟩
apply (drule-tac f=%x. x !n2 in HOL.arg-cong)
by simp
thus ?thesis using ⟨a≠b⟩ by auto
qed
qed
qed

```

```

lemma replicate-append-length:
assumes replicate n1 a @ replicate m1 b =
replicate n2 a @ replicate m2 b and
 $a \neq b$ 
shows  $n1 = n2 \wedge m1 = m2$  using prems
apply -
apply (frule c)
apply assumption
apply (rule conjI)
by auto

```

```

lemma primefactors-unique:
assumes A:primefactors a b = primefactors c d
shows {a,b} = {c,d} using A
apply (unfold primefactors-def)
apply (simp del: replicate.simps split: split-if-asm)
apply (auto dest: replicate-append-length simp del:replicate.simps)
done

```

```

lemma prod-primf-is-emb:
assumes prod (primefactors a b) = prod (primefactors c d)
shows {a,b} = {c,d} using prems
proof -
assume A: prod (primefactors a b) = prod (primefactors c d)
have B: (primefactors a b) = (primefactors c d) using A by (rule prod-primefactors-equal)
from B show ?thesis by (rule primefactors-unique)

```

**qed**

```
lemma two-set-equal:
  [] {a,b} = {c,d};
  [] [a = c; b = d] ==> P;
  [] [b = c; a = d] ==> P
  [] ==> P
  apply (subgoal-tac a ∈ {c,d}) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (subgoal-tac b ∈ {c,d}) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (case-tac a=c)
  apply (case-tac b=d)
  apply force
  apply (case-tac b=c)
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (case-tac a=d)
  apply force
  apply force
done

lemma eq-imp-primef-eq:
  assumes A:{a,b} = {c,d}
  shows primefactors a b = primefactors c d using prems
  apply -
  apply (erule two-set-equal)
  apply (unfold primefactors-def)
  apply (simp split: split-if-asm)
  apply auto
done

lemma eq-imp-prod-eq:
  assumes A:{a,b} = {c,d}
  shows prod (primefactors a b) = prod (primefactors c d) using prems
  by (auto dest: eq-imp-primef-eq)

lemma f-inj-prod-inj:
  assumes A :prod (primefactors (f a) (f b))= prod (primefactors (f c) (f d))
  and B:inj f
  shows {a,b} = {c,d} using prems
  apply -
  apply (drule prod-primf-is-emb)
  apply (simp add: inj-on-def)
  apply (drule two-set-equal)
  apply auto
done

lemma f-inj-primef-eq:
```

```

assumes A:{a,b} = {c,d}
and   B:inj f
shows prod (primefactors (f a) (f b)) = prod (primefactors (f c) (f d)) using
prems
apply -
apply (erule two-set-equal)
apply (unfold primefactors-def)
apply (simp split: split-if-asm)
apply auto
done

end

```

## 17 Initial knowledge of Agents (Key distributions)

```
theory Public imports Event MessageTheory NatEmbed begin
```

### 17.1 Asymmetric Keys

```
datatype keymode = Signature | Encryption
```

#### consts

```
publicKey :: [keymode,agent] => key
```

#### abbreviation

```
pubEK :: agent => key where
pubEK == publicKey Encryption
```

#### abbreviation

```
pubSK :: agent => key where
pubSK == publicKey Signature
```

#### abbreviation

```
privateKey :: [keymode, agent] => key where
privateKey b A == invKey (publicKey b A)
```

#### abbreviation

```
priEK :: agent => key where
priEK A == privateKey Encryption A
```

#### abbreviation

```
priSK :: agent => key where
priSK A == privateKey Signature A
```

The function symKey returns for every pair agents a shared secret key. The axiom symmetric-SymKey ensures that the returned key is a symmetric key.

```
consts symKey :: [agent,agent] => key
```

**axioms**

— The keys returned by the function `symKey` are symmetric keys  
 $\text{symmetric-SymKey}[\text{simp}]: \text{invKey}(\text{symKey } A\ B) = \text{symKey } A\ B$

**specification(`symKey`)**

*injective-symKey:*

$\text{symKey } A\ B = \text{symKey } C\ D \implies \{A,B\} = \{C,D\}$

*com-SymKey:*

$\{A,B\} = \{C,D\} \implies \text{symKey } A\ B = \text{symKey } C\ D$

```

apply (rule exI [of - %A B. prod (primefactors (agent-case ( $\lambda n. 2*n$ ) ( $\lambda m. 2*m + 1$ ) A) (agent-case ( $\lambda n. 2*n$ ) ( $\lambda m. 2*m + 1$ ) B))])
apply (rule conjI)
apply (rule allI)+
apply (rule impI)
apply (erule f-inj-prod-inj)
apply simp
apply (simp add: inj-on-def split: agent.split)
apply auto
apply arith+
apply (erule f-inj-primef-eq)
apply (simp add: inj-on-def split: agent.split)
apply auto
apply (arith)+
done

```

By freeness of agents, no two agents have the same key. Since  $\text{True} \neq \text{False}$ , no agent has identical signing and encryption keys

**specification(`publicKey`)**

*injective-publicKey:*

$\text{publicKey } b\ A = \text{publicKey } c\ A' \implies b=c \ \& \ A=A'$

**apply** (**rule** *exI* [*of* -

$\%b\ A. \text{agent-case}(\lambda n. n*4) (\lambda n. n*4 + 2)\ A + \text{keymode-case}\ 0\ 1\ b]$ )

**apply** (**auto** *simp add: inj-on-def split: agent.split keymode.split*)

**apply** *arith +*

**done**

**axioms**

*privateKey-neq-publicKey [iff]:*  $\text{privateKey } b\ A \neq \text{publicKey } c\ A'$

*privateKey-neq-symKey [iff]:*  $\text{privateKey } b\ A \neq \text{symKey } C\ D$

*pubKey-neq-symKey [iff]:*  $\text{publicKey } b\ A \neq \text{symKey } C\ D$

**lemmas** *publicKey-neq-privateKey = privateKey-neq-publicKey [THEN not-sym]*  
**declare** *publicKey-neq-privateKey [iff]*

**lemmas** *symKey-neq-privateKey = privateKey-neq-symKey [THEN not-sym]*  
**declare** *symKey-neq-privateKey [iff]*

```

lemmas symKey-neq-publicKey = privateKey-neq-symKey [THEN not-sym]
declare symKey-neq-publicKey [iff]

lemma publicKey-inject [iff]: (publicKey b A = publicKey c A') = (b=c & A=A')
by (blast dest!: injective-publicKey)

```

### 17.1.1 Inverse of keys

```

lemma invKey-eq [simp]: (invKey K = invKey K') = (K=K')
apply safe

```

```

apply (drule-tac arg-cong [where f=invKey], simp)
done

```

```

lemma invKey-image-eq [simp]: (invKey x ∈ invKey ` A) = (x ∈ A)
apply auto
done

```

```

lemma publicKey-image-eq [simp]:
  (publicKey b x ∈ publicKey c ` AA) = (b=c & x ∈ AA)
by auto

```

```

lemma privateKey-notin-image-publicKey [simp]: privateKey b x ∉ publicKey c ` AA
by auto

```

```

lemma privateKey-image-eq [simp]:
  (privateKey b A ∈ invKey ` publicKey c ` AS) = (b=c & A ∈ AS)
by auto

```

```

lemma publicKey-notin-image-privateKey [simp]:
  publicKey b A ∉ invKey ` publicKey c ` AS
by auto

```

## 17.2 Locales for Public Key Distribution, Shared Symmetric Keys, and Nonces

```

locale INITSTATE-PKSIG = INITSTATE - - - - - - - - - Key for Key :: nat
⇒ 'msg +
assumes priSK-known-self: Key (priSK A) ∈ initState A
assumes priSK-notknown-other-subterms: A ≠ B ⇒ Key (priSK B) ∉ subterms
(initState A)
assumes pubSK-known: Key (pubSK A) ∈ initState B
assumes priSK-not-used: Crypt (priSK A) X ∉ subterms (initState B)

```

```

lemma (in INITSTATE-PKSIG) priSK-notknown-other:
  A ≠ B ⇒ Key (priSK B) ∉ initState A
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac Key (priSK B) ∉ subterms (initState A))

```

```

prefer 2
apply (rule priSK-notknown-other-subterms)
apply force
apply (rotate-tac 2)
apply (erule contrapos-np)
apply (erule subsetD2)
apply (rule subterms.increasing)
done

locale INITSTATE-PKENC = INITSTATE - - - - - Key for Key :: 
nat ⇒ 'msg +
assumes priEK-known-self: Key (priEK A) ∈ initState A
assumes priEK-notknown-other-subterms: A ≠ B ⇒ Key (priEK B) ∉ sub-
terms (initState A)
assumes pubEK-known: Key (pubEK A) ∈ initState B
assumes priEK-not-used: Crypt (priEK A) X ∉ subterms (initState B)

lemma (in INITSTATE-PKENC) priEK-notknown-other:
A ≠ B ⇒ Key (priEK B) ∉ initState A
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac Key (priEK B) ∉ subterms (initState A))
prefer 2
apply (rule priEK-notknown-other-subterms)
apply force
apply (rotate-tac 2)
apply (erule contrapos-np)
apply (erule subsetD2)
apply (rule subterms.increasing)
done

locale INITSTATE-SYMKEYS = INITSTATE - - - - - Key for Key :: 
nat ⇒ 'msg +
assumes symKey-known-self: !!B. Key (symKey A B) ∈ initState A
assumes symKey-notknown-other-subterms:
[ A ≠ B; A ≠ C ] ⇒ Key (symKey B C) ∉ subterms (initState A)
assumes symKey-not-used: Crypt (symKey A B) X ∉ subterms (initState C)
assumes symKey-not-used-MAC: Hash (MPair (Key (symKey A B)) X) ∉
subterms (initState C)

lemma (in INITSTATE-SYMKEYS) priEK-notknown-other:
[ A ≠ B; A ≠ C ] ⇒ Key (symKey B C) ∉ initState A
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac Key (symKey B C) ∉ subterms (initState A))
prefer 2
apply (erule symKey-notknown-other-subterms)
apply force
apply (rotate-tac 2)
apply (erule contrapos-np)

```

```

apply (erule subsetD2)
apply (rule subterms.increasing)
done

locale INITSTATE-NONONCE = INITSTATE - - - - - Key for Key :: 
nat ⇒ 'msg +
assumes no-nonce-initState-subterms [simp]: Nonce B NA ∉ subterms (initState A)

lemma (in INITSTATE-NONONCE) no-nonce-initState:
Nonce B NA ∉ initState A
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac Nonce B NA ∉ subterms (initState A))
prefer 2
apply (rule no-nonce-initState-subterms)
apply (rotate-tac 2)
apply (erule contrapos-np)
apply (erule subsetD2)
apply (rule subterms.increasing)
done

lemma (in INITSTATE-NONONCE) nonce-knowsI-nonce-received:
assumes A: X ∈ knowsI A tr and
B: Nonce B NA ∈ subterms {X}
shows ∃ t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr
using A B
proof -
from A have C: (EX t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr) ∨ X ∈ initState A
by (intro knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState, auto)
let ?A = EX t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr
show ?thesis
proof cases
assume ?A
thus ?thesis by auto
next
assume ¬ ?A
with C have D: X ∈ initState A by clarsimp
have Nonce B NA ∉ initState A
apply auto
apply (drule subterms.inj)
apply (erule contrapos-pp)
apply (rule no-nonce-initState-subterms)
done
with B have X ∉ initState A
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac Nonce B NA ∉ subterms (initState A))
apply force
apply (erule-tac G={X} in subterms.trans)
apply force

```

```

done
with D show ?thesis by contradiction
qed
qed

lemma (in INITSTATE) subterms-knowsI:
  X ∈ subterms (knowsI A tr)  $\implies$ 
    ( $\exists t Y i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) Y) \in set tr \wedge X \in subterms \{Y\}$ )  $\vee X \in subterms (initState A)$ 
  apply (drule subterms.singleton)
  apply auto
  apply (drule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState)
  apply auto
  apply (drule-tac subterms.inj, drule-tac H=initState A in subterms.trans, auto)
done

lemma (in INITSTATE) parts-knowsI:
  X ∈ parts (knowsI A tr)  $\implies$ 
    ( $\exists t Y i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) Y) \in set tr \wedge X \in parts \{Y\}$ )  $\vee X \in parts (initState A)$ 
  apply (drule parts.singleton)
  apply auto
  apply (drule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState)
  apply auto
  apply (drule-tac parts.inj, drule-tac H=initState A in parts.trans, auto)
done

locale INITSTATE-NONONCE-PARTS = INITSTATE - - - - - Key for
  Key :: nat  $\Rightarrow$  'msg +
  assumes no-nonce-initState-parts [simp]: Nonce B NA  $\notin$  parts (initState A)

lemma (in INITSTATE-NONONCE-PARTS) no-nonce-initState:
  Nonce B NA  $\notin$  initState A
  apply auto
  apply (subgoal-tac Nonce B NA  $\notin$  parts (initState A))
  prefer 2
  apply (rule no-nonce-initState-parts)
  apply (rotate-tac 2)
  apply (erule contrapos-np)
  apply (erule subsetD2)
  apply (rule parts.increasing)
done

lemma (in INITSTATE-NONONCE-PARTS) nonce-knowsI-nonce-received-parts:
  assumes A: X ∈ knowsI A tr and
    B: Nonce B NA  $\in$  parts {X}
  shows  $\exists t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) \in set tr$ 
  using A B
proof –

```

```

from A have C: ( $\exists X \ i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) \in set tr \vee X \in initState A$ )
  by (intro knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState, auto)
let ?A =  $\exists X \ i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) \in set tr$ 
show ?thesis
proof cases
  assume ?A
  thus ?thesis by auto
next
  assume  $\neg ?A$ 
  with C have D:  $X \in initState A$  by clarsimp
  have Nonce B NA  $\notin initState A$ 
    apply auto
    apply (drule parts.inj)
    apply (erule contrapos-pp)
    apply (rule no-nonce-initState-parts)
    done
  with B have X  $\notin initState A$ 
    apply auto
    apply (subgoal-tac Nonce B NA  $\in parts (initState A)$ )
    apply force
    apply (erule-tac G={X} in parts.trans)
    apply force
    done
  with D show ?thesis by contradiction
qed
qed
end

```

## 18 Derivation of Messages

theory *MessageDerivation* imports *Public* begin

### 18.1 Derivation of Nonces

```

lemma (in INITSTATE-NONONCE) othernonce-gen-received:
  assumes A: Nonce B NB  $\in subterms \{X\}$  and ineq:  $A \neq B$  and
         B:  $X \in DM A$  (knowsI A tr)
  shows  $\exists t i Y. (t, Recv (Rx A i) Y) \in set tr \wedge$  Nonce B NB  $\in subterms \{Y\}$ 
  using A B ineq
  apply -
  apply (subgoal-tac Nonce B NB  $\in subterms (knowsI A tr)$ )
  prefer 2
  apply (rule-tac A=A in nonce-subterms-DM-nonce)
  apply (subgoal-tac  $\{X\} \subseteq DM A$  (knowsI A tr))
  apply (drule subterms.mono)
  apply (erule subsetD)
  apply force
  apply force

```

```

apply force
apply (drule subterms.singleton) back
apply (auto)
apply (drule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState)
apply (erule disjE)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac H=initState A and G={ Y} in subterms.trans)
apply force
apply (insert no-nonce-initState-subterms, auto)
done

lemma (in INITSTATE-NONONCE-PARTS) othenonce-gen-received-parts:
assumes A: Nonce B NB ∈ parts {X} and ineq: A≠B and
      B: X ∈ DM A (knowsI A tr)
shows ∃ t i Y. (t, Recv (Rx A i) Y) ∈ set tr ∧ Nonce B NB ∈ parts {Y}
using A B ineq
apply -
apply (subgoal-tac Nonce B NB ∈ parts (knowsI A tr))
prefer 2
apply (rule-tac A=A in nonce-parts-DM-nonce)
apply (subgoal-tac {X} ⊆ DM A (knowsI A tr))
apply (drule parts.mono)
apply (erule subsetD)
apply force
apply force
apply force
apply (drule parts.singleton) back
apply (auto)
apply (drule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState)
apply (erule disjE)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac H=initState A and G={ Y} in parts.trans)
apply force
apply (insert no-nonce-initState-parts, auto)
done

```

## 18.2 Derivation of Signatures

context INITSTATE-PKSIG begin

```

lemma sig-knowsI-sig-received:
assumes A: X ∈ knowsI A tr and AnotB: A ≠ (Honest B) and
      B: Crypt (priSK (Honest B)) msig ∈ subterms {X}
shows ∃ t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr
using A B AnotB
apply -
apply (drule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState)
apply (erule disjE)

```

```

apply auto
apply (drule-tac H=initState A and G={X} in subterms.trans)
apply force
apply (insert priSK-not-used, auto)
done

end

end

```

## 19 Inductively defined Systems parameterized by Protocols

```
theory System imports Distance MessageDerivation begin
```

### 19.1 Protocol independent Facts

```

fun
maxtime :: 'msg trace ⇒ time
where
maxtime [] = (0::real)
| maxtime (x#xs) = max (fst x) (maxtime xs)

case distinction needed for some proofs

lemma set-two-elem-cases:
assumes trxa: eva ∈ set (x#tr) and trxb: evb ∈ set (x#tr)
assumes ina-inb: [ eva ∈ set tr; evb ∈ set tr ] ⇒ P tr eva evb x
assumes ina-eqb: [ eva ∈ set tr; evb = x ; eva ≠ x ] ⇒ P tr eva evb x
assumes eqa-inb: [ eva = x ; evb ∈ set tr; evb ≠ x ] ⇒ P tr eva evb x
assumes eqa-eqb: [ eva = x ; evb = x ] ⇒ P tr eva evb x
shows P tr eva evb x
proof cases
assume ina: eva ∈ set tr
show ?thesis
proof cases
assume evb ∈ set tr
from this ina ina-inb show ?thesis by auto
next
assume evb ∉ set tr
from this trxb have eqb: evb = x by auto
show ?thesis
proof cases
assume eva = x
from this eqb eqa-eqb show ?thesis by auto
next
assume eva ≠ x
from this ina-eqb eqb ina show ?thesis by auto
qed

```

```

qed
next
  assume eva  $\notin$  set tr
  from this trxa have eqa: eva = x by auto
  show ?thesis
  proof cases
    assume evb  $\notin$  set tr
    from this trxb have evb = x by auto
    from this eqa eqa-eqb show ?thesis by auto
  next
    assume  $\neg$  evb  $\notin$  set tr — ugly
    then have inb: evb  $\in$  set tr by simp
    show ?thesis
    proof cases
      assume evb = x
      from this eqa eqa-eqb show ?thesis by auto
    next
      assume evb  $\neq$  x
      from this eqa-inb eqa inb show ?thesis by auto
    qed
  qed
qed

fun
  beforeEvent :: [(time * 'msg event), 'msg trace]  $\Rightarrow$  'msg trace
where
  beforeEvent e (x#xs) = (if x = e  $\wedge$  (e  $\notin$  set xs) then xs else beforeEvent e xs) |
  beforeEvent e [] = []

lemma beforeEvent-Send-Recv [simp]:
  beforeEvent (ta, Send A ma L) ((tb, Recv B mb) # tra)
  = beforeEvent (ta, Send A ma L) (tra)
  by (auto simp add: beforeEvent.simps)

lemma beforeEvent-Send-Claim [simp]:
  beforeEvent (ta, Send A ma L) ((tb, Claim B mb) # tra)
  = beforeEvent (ta, Send A ma L) (tra)
  by (auto simp add: beforeEvent.simps)

lemma beforeEvent-Send-other [simp]:
  [] ma  $\neq$  mb []
   $\implies$  beforeEvent (ta, Send A ma La) ((tb, Send B mb Lb) # tra) = beforeEvent
  (ta, Send A ma La) tra
  apply (auto simp add: beforeEvent.simps)
done

lemma beforeEvent-send-other2 [simp]:
  [] ta = tb  $\longrightarrow$  A = B  $\longrightarrow$  La = Lb  $\longrightarrow$  ma  $\neq$  mb []
   $\implies$  beforeEvent (ta, Send A ma La) ((tb, Send B mb Lb) # tra) = beforeEvent

```

```
(ta, Send A ma La) tra
  apply (auto simp add: beforeEvent.simps)
done
```

```
lemma beforeEvent-same [simp]:
  e ∉ set tr ⟹ beforeEvent e (e # tr) = tr
  apply (auto simp add: beforeEvent.simps)
done
```

### 19.1.1 Simplification rules for the used Set and beforeEvent

```
lemma (in MESSAGE-DERIVATION) used-beforeEvent:
  X ∉ used evs ⟹ X ∉ used (beforeEvent ev evs)
proof (induct evs rule: trace-induct)
  case 1 thus ?case by auto
next
  case (2 t ev evs) thus ?case by (auto split: event.split-asm)
qed
```

```
lemma beforeEvent-subset:
  x ∈ set (beforeEvent y xs) ⟹ x ∈ set xs
  apply (induct xs, auto split: split-if-asm)
done
```

```
lemma (in INITSTATE) fresh-mono[intro]:
  m ∉ usedI (beforeEvent e (x#tr)) ⟹ m ∉ usedI (beforeEvent e tr)
  apply (auto simp add: usedI-def split: split-if-asm)
  apply (drule Used-imp-send-parts)
  apply (elim exE conjE)
  apply (drule beforeEvent-subset)
  apply (drule Send-imp-parts-used)
by auto
```

time increases monotonically in traces

```
lemma maxtime-non-negative [intro, simp]:
  maxtime l >= 0
proof (induct l rule: trace-induct)
  case 1 show ?case by auto
next
  case 2 thus ?case by auto
qed
```

```
lemma maxtime-geq-elem:
  assumes maxtime tr ≤ t and (t', ev) ∈ set tr
  shows t' ≤ t using prems
proof (induct tr rule: trace-induct)
  case 1 thus ?case by auto
next
```

```

case (? t ev tr)
  thus ?case by (auto)
qed

```

## 19.2 Protocols and the parameterized System Definition

**types**

```

friendid = nat
transmitterid = nat
receiveiverid = nat

```

"clocktime A t" returns the time of agent A's clock at time t

**consts**

```

clocktime :: friendid ⇒ time ⇒ time

```

**fun**

```

occursAt :: 'msg event ⇒ agent

```

**where**

```

| occursAt (Send (Tx A i) m L) = A
| occursAt (Recv (Rx A i) m) = A
| occursAt (Claim A m) = A

```

**definition**

```

view :: [friendid, 'msg trace] ⇒ 'msg trace

```

**where**

```

view A tr = [(clocktime A t, ev) . (t, ev) ← tr, occursAt ev = (Honest A)]

```

**lemma** view-occurs-at:

```

(t, ev) ∈ set (view A tr) ⇒ occursAt ev = (Honest A)

```

**by** (auto split: event.split split-if-asm simp add: occursAt.simps view-def)

**lemma** view-subset:

```

snd'(set (view A tr)) ⊆ snd'(set tr)

```

**apply** (auto simp add: view-def\_def split: split-if-asm)

**by** force

**lemma** (in INITSTATE) used-view-subset:

```

used (view A tr) ⊆ used tr

```

**apply** (induct tr)

**apply** (force simp add: view-def used.simps split: split-if-asm)

**apply** (auto simp add: used.simps split: event.split)

**apply** (auto simp add: view-def split: split-if-asm)

**done**

**lemma** (in INITSTATE-NONONCE) Used-imp-subterm-Send:

```

assumes u: Nonce A NA ∈ used tr

```

**shows** a: ∃ t B i X L. (t, Send (Tx B i) X L) ∈ set tr ∧ Nonce A NA ∈ subterms

{X} using u

**proof** (induct tr rule: trace-induct)

```

case 1 thus ?case by (auto simp add: used.simps)
next
  case (?ts x xs)
  with prems show ?case
    apply (auto simp add: used.simps split: split-if-asm event.split-asm)
    apply (rule-tac x=ts in exI, case-tac transmitter)
    apply (rule-tac x=agent in exI, rule-tac x=nat in exI)
    apply (rule-tac x=msg in exI)
    apply auto
    apply (rule-tac x=t in exI)
    apply (rule-tac x=B in exI)
    apply (rule-tac x=i in exI)
    apply (rule-tac x=X in exI)
    by auto
  qed

```

protocols return protoEvents to ensure that protocols only create events for the agent running the protocol

```
datatype 'msg protoEv = SendEv transmitterid 'msg list | ClaimEv
```

a protocol step returns the set of events that can be executed by the agent executing the step

```

types
  'msg step = ['msg trace, friendid, time]  $\Rightarrow$  ('msg * 'msg protoEv) set
  'msg proto = ('msg step) set

```

```

fun
  createEv :: [friendid, 'msg protoEv, 'msg]  $\Rightarrow$  'msg event
where
  createEv fid (SendEv txid L) m = Send (Tx (Honest fid) txid) m L
  | createEv fid ClaimEv m = Claim (Honest fid) m

```

Construct the set of possible events (following the rules of the protocol) as a set of events, for a given trace tr

```
locale INITSTATE-DM = MESSAGE-THEORY-DM + INITSTATE
```

```

locale PROTOCOL = INITSTATE-DM - - - - - Key for Key :: nat  $\Rightarrow$  'msg
+
  fixes proto :: 'msg proto

```

```

inductive-set (in PROTOCOL)
  sys :: 'msg trace set
where
  Nil [intro] : []  $\in$  sys
  | Fake:
    [ tr  $\in$  sys; t  $\geq$  maxtime tr;
      X  $\in$  DM (Intruder I) (knowsI (Intruder I) tr) ]
     $\Rightarrow$  (t, Send (Tx (Intruder I) j) X []) # tr  $\in$  sys

```

```

| Con :
  [] tr ∈ sys; trecv >= maxtime tr;
    ( ∀ X ∈ components {M}.
      ( ∃ tsend A i M' L.
        ∃ Y ∈ components {M'} .
          ( ((tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) ∈ set tr) ∧
            (cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) = Some tab) ∧
            (trecv ≥ tsend + tab) ∧
            (distort X Y ∈ LowHam)))) )
  []
  ==> (trecv, Recv (Rx B j) M) # tr ∈ sys
| Proto :
  [] tr ∈ sys; t >= maxtime tr;
    step ∈ proto; (m,pEv) ∈ step (view A tr) A (clocktime A t);
    m ∈ DM (Honest A) (knowsI (Honest A) tr) []
  ==> ((t,createEv A pEv m)#tr) ∈ sys

```

default transmitter/receiver

**abbreviation**

*Tr A* == *Tx A 0*

**abbreviation**

*Rec A* ≡ *Rx A 0*

**abbreviation**

*Tu A* == *Tx A 1*

**abbreviation**

*Ru A* ≡ *Rx A 1*

**end**

## 20 Protocol-independent Invariants of the System

**theory** *SystemInvariants* **imports** *System* **begin**

### 20.1 Some Simple Lemmas

```

lemma createEv-no-Recv [simp,intro]: Recv A m ≠ createEv fid pev m'
  apply (cases pev)
  by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)

```

These hold for all protocols

prefix closed

```

lemma (in PROTOCOL) prefix-closed-sys-H:
  [] (a#as) ∈ sys ==> tl (a#as) ∈ sys
  apply (rule-tac x=(a#as) in sys.induct)

```

```

apply (auto)
done

lemma (in PROTOCOL) prefix-closed-sys:  $\llbracket (a \# as) \in sys \rrbracket \implies as \in sys$ 
  apply (subst tl.simps [THEN sym])
  apply (rule prefix-closed-sys-H)
by (auto)

time in traces increases (not strictly) monotonically

lemma (in PROTOCOL) tracetime-non-negative:
  assumes A:  $tr \in sys$  and B:  $(t, ev) \in set tr$ 
  shows  $0 \leq t$  using A B
proof (induct tr arbitrary: t ev rule: sys.induct)
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr trecv M B j tab t ev)
    have mt: maxtime tr  $\geq 0$  by auto
    show ?case
    proof cases
      assume (t, ev) = (trecv, Recv (Rx B j) M)
      hence teq: trecv = t by auto
      thus ?case using prems(4-)
        apply (case-tac tr)
        apply auto
        apply (subgoal-tac  $0 \leq a$ )
        apply auto
        done
    next
      assume (t, ev)  $\neq$  (trecv, Recv (Rx B j) M)
      with prems have (t, ev)  $\in set tr$  by auto
      thus ?case using Con.hyps by auto
    qed
  next
    case (Fake tr ts X I j)
      have mt: maxtime tr  $\geq 0$  by auto
      show ?case
      proof cases
        assume P:  $\exists I j L. (t, ev) = (ts, Send (Tx (Intruder I) j) X L)$ 
        with P obtain I j L where (t, ev) = (ts, Send (Tx (Intruder I) j) X L)
          by auto
        hence teq: ts = t by auto
        with prems mt show ?case by arith
      next
        assume  $\neg (\exists I j L. (t, ev) = (ts, Send (Tx (Intruder I) j) X L))$ 
        with prems have (t, ev)  $\in set tr$  by auto
        thus ?case using Fake.hyps by auto
      qed
    next
      case (Proto tr t' step m pEv A')

```

```

have mt: maxtime tr ≥ 0 by auto
show ?case
proof cases
  assume (t,ev) = (t', createEv A' pEv m)
  hence teq: t' = t by auto
  with prems mt show ?case by arith
next
  assume (t,ev) ≠ (t', createEv A' pEv m)
  with prems have (t,ev) ∈ set tr by auto
  thus ?case using Proto.hyps by auto
qed
qed

lemma (in PROTOCOL) tracetime-increases:
assumes A: tr ∈ sys and B: tr=(t,ev) # trtl
shows t ≥ maxtime trtl using A B
proof (induct tr arbitrary: t ev trtl rule: sys.induct)
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr trecv)
  hence t=trecv and tr=trtl by auto
  with prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Fake tr ts X I j)
  hence t=ts and tr=trtl by auto
  with prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Proto tr t' step m pEv A')
  hence t=t' and tr=trtl by auto
  with prems show ?case by auto
qed

lemma (in PROTOCOL) maxtime-cons:
c ≤ maxtime (tr) ==> c ≤ maxtime (ev # tr)
apply auto
done

a suffix of a trace removing all events after a certain event is still a valid
trace

lemma (in PROTOCOL) proto-before-event:
[ tr ∈ sys; e ∈ set tr ] ==> (beforeEvent e tr) ∈ sys
apply (induct tr)
apply (force)
apply (rule-tac P=%tr. (beforeEvent e tr) ∈ sys in sys.induct)
by (auto simp add: beforeEvent.simps)

lemma (in PROTOCOL) not-beforeEvent-later:
assumes A: (ta, eva) ∉ set (beforeEvent (tb, evb) tr) and

```

```

B: (ta, eva) ∈ set tr and C: (tb, evb) ∈ set tr and p: tr ∈ sys
shows tb ≤ ta using A B C p
proof (induct tr rule: trace-induct)
  case 1
    from prems show ?thesis by (force)
  next
    case (? t ev xs)
      show ?thesis
      proof cases
        assume (t,ev)=(tb,evb) ∧ (tb,evb) ∉ set xs
        with prems show ?thesis by clar simp
      next
        assume n: ¬ ((t,ev)=(tb,evb) ∧ (tb,evb) ∉ set xs)
        with prems have (ta, eva) ∉ set (beforeEvent (tb, evb) xs) by auto
        with n ⟨(tb, evb) ∈ set ((t, ev) # xs)⟩
          have bxs: (tb,evb) ∈ set xs by auto
          show ?thesis
          proof cases
            assume (t,ev)=(ta,eva)
            with ((t,ev)=(ta,eva)) prems have ((ta,eva) # xs) ∈ sys by auto
            with bxs have ta ≥ maxtime xs apply – apply (rule tracetime-increases)
          by auto
            then also have ... ≥ tb using ⟨(tb, evb) ∈ set xs⟩
            apply – apply (erule maxtime-geq-elem) by auto
            thus ?thesis .
        next
          assume (t,ev)≠(ta,eva)
          with prems have (ta,eva) ∈ set tr by auto
          with prems have xs ∈ sys by (auto intro: prefix-closed-sys)
          with prems show ?thesis by auto
          qed
        qed
      qed

```

**lemma (in PROTOCOL) beforeEvent-earlier:**

```

assumes tr ∈ sys and ta < tb and (tb,b) ∈ set tr and (ta,a) ∈ set tr
shows (ta,a) ∈ set (beforeEvent (tb,b) tr) using prems
apply (rotate-tac 1)
apply (erule contrapos-pp)
apply (subgoal-tac ta ≥ tb)
apply force
apply (erule not-beforeEvent-later)
apply auto
apply (insert prems, auto)
done

```

**lemma (in PROTOCOL) beforeEvent-cons-event-delayed:**

```

assumes a: tr ∈ sys and
       b: e ∈ set tr

```

```

shows (e#beforeEvent e tr) ∈ sys using a b
proof (induct tr rule: sys.induct)
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (Fake tr ti Y I j)
  show ?case proof cases
    assume e = (ti, Send (Tx (Intruder I) j) Y [])
    thus ?case using prems apply auto by (rule sys.Fake, auto)
next
  assume e ≠ (ti, Send (Tx (Intruder I) j) Y []) thus ?case using prems by
auto
qed
next
  case (Con tr trecv X D j)
  let ?ev = (trecv, Recv (Rx D j) X)
  show ?case proof cases
    assume e = ?ev thus ?case using prems apply auto by (rule sys.Con, auto)
next
  assume e ≠ ?ev thus ?thesis using prems by auto
qed
next
  case (Proto tr t step m pEv A)
  let ?ev=(t, createEv A pEv m)
  show ?case proof cases
    assume e = ?ev
    thus ?thesis using prems apply auto by (rule sys.Pseudo)
next
  assume e ≠ ?ev thus ?case using prems by auto
qed
done

lemma (in PROTOCOL) beforeEvent-maxtime:
assumes del: tr ∈ sys and
      ev: (tev,ev) ∈ set tr
shows maxtime (beforeEvent (tev,ev) tr) ≤ tev using del ev
apply (induct tr rule: sys.induct)
apply auto
done

lemma beforeEvent-prefix:
assumes a: ev ∈ set (e#beforeEvent e tr) and
      b: e ∈ set tr
shows ev ∈ set tr using a b
apply (induct tr, auto split: split-if-asm)
done

lemma view-elem-ex:
(t,ev) ∈ (set (view A tr)) ==> ∃ t'. (t',ev) ∈ (set tr)
by (auto simp add: view-def split: split-if-asm)

```

```

lemma view-elem-at-ex:
   $\llbracket (t, ev) \in set tr; occursAt ev = Honest A \rrbracket \implies$ 
   $\exists t'. (t', ev) \in (set (view A tr))$ 
apply (induct tr)
by (auto simp add: view-def split: split-if-asm)

definition
  timetrans :: [friendid, 'msg trace] => 'msg trace where
    timetrans A tr = [(clocktime A t, ev) . (t, ev) ← tr]

lemma send-a-view-a-u:
  ((t, Send (Tu (Honest A)) m L) ∈ set (view A tr)) ≡
  ((t, Send (Tu (Honest A)) m L) ∈ set (timetrans A tr))
apply (rule HOL.eq-reflection)
apply (auto simp add: view-def occursAt.simps timetrans-def split: split-if-asm)
done

lemma recv-a-view-a-u:
  ((t, Recv (Ru (Honest A)) m) ∈ set (view A tr)) ≡
  ((t, Recv (Ru (Honest A)) m) ∈ set (timetrans A tr))
apply (rule HOL.eq-reflection)
apply (auto simp add: view-def occursAt.simps timetrans-def split: split-if-asm)
done

lemma send-a-view-a-r:
  ((t, Send (Tr (Honest A)) m L) ∈ set (view A tr)) ≡
  ((t, Send (Tr (Honest A)) m L) ∈ set (timetrans A tr))
apply (rule HOL.eq-reflection)
apply (auto simp add: view-def occursAt.simps timetrans-def split: split-if-asm)
done

lemma recv-a-view-a-r:
  ((t, Recv (Rec (Honest A)) m) ∈ set (view A tr)) ≡
  ((t, Recv (Rec (Honest A)) m) ∈ set (timetrans A tr))
apply (rule HOL.eq-reflection)
apply (auto simp add: view-def occursAt.simps timetrans-def split: split-if-asm)
done

lemma view-subset-timetrans:
  set (view A tr) ⊆ set (timetrans A tr)
apply (auto simp add: timetrans-def view-def)
done

lemma timetrans-snd [simp]:
  snd`set (timetrans A tr) = snd`set tr
apply (auto simp add: timetrans-def view-def)
apply (rule-tac x=(a,b) in rev-image-eqI, auto)

```

**done**

```
lemma trace-weaken:
   $\exists tb. (tb, ev) \in set tr \implies \exists tb. (tb, ev) \in set (tev\#tr)$ 
by auto

lemma (in INITSTATE) usedI-timetrans [simp]:
  usedI (timetrans A tr) = usedI tr
apply auto
apply (rule usedI-mono-snd)
apply (rule timetrans-snd [THEN equalityD1], auto)
apply (rule usedI-mono-snd)
apply (rule timetrans-snd [THEN equalityD2], auto)
done

a receive is always preceded by the corresponding send

lemma (in PROTOCOL) send-before-recv [rule-format, intro]:
assumes rang:  $tr \in sys$  and
  recv:  $(tb, Recv RB M) \in set tr$  and
  comp:  $X \in components \{M\}$ 
shows  $\exists A i tsend L M'.$ 
   $\exists Y \in components \{M'\}.$ 
   $(tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) \in set tr \wedge$ 
  distort X Y  $\in LowHam \wedge$ 
  cdistM (Tx A i) RB  $\neq None \wedge$ 
  tsend  $\leq tb - cdist (Tx A i) RB$ 
using rang recv
proof (induct rule: sys.induct)
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next case Fake thus ?case using prems apply -
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac x =A in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =i in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =tsend in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =L in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =M' in exI)
  by auto
next case (Proto step m' pEv A' tr) thus ?case using prems
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac x =A in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =i in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =tsend in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =L in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =M' in exI)
  by auto
next
  case (Con tr trecv N B j tab)
  show ?case
  proof cases
```

```

assume (tb, Recv RB M) = (trecv, Recv (Rx B j) N)
hence RB=Rx B j tb = trecv M=N by auto
thus ?thesis using prems(3--)
  apply –
  apply (erule-tac x=X in ballE) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (elim exE bexE)
  apply (rule-tac x =A in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =i in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =tsend in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =L in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x =M' in exI)
  apply auto
  apply (auto simp add: cdist-def)
  done
next
  assume (tb, Recv RB M) ≠ (trecv, Recv (Rx B j) N)
  hence (tb, Recv RB M) ∈ set tr using prems by auto
    with Con.hyps(2) show ?thesis by auto
  qed
qed

lemma (in PROTOCOL) send-before-recv-notime [ intro]:
  assumes rang: tr ∈ sys and
    recv: (tb, Recv RB M) ∈ set tr and
    comp: X ∈ components {M}
  shows ∃ A i tsend L M'.
    ∃ Y ∈ components {M'}.
    (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) ∈ set tr ∧ distort X Y ∈ LowHam
  using rang recv comp
  apply –
  apply (drule send-before-recv)
  apply simp
  apply auto
  apply (intro exI)
  apply auto
  done

end

```

```

theory SystemSimps imports SystemInvariants begin

```

We now define simplifications for the protocol rule for some important subclasses of protocols: 1. executable protocols: - do not need the "m : derivMessagesI (Honest A) tr" in the assumptions - the view can be simplified to: "[(t + clocktime A,ev) . (t, ev) ⌜- tr]" 2. time invariant protocols: time translation can also be removed from view

we need the additional sys parameter because the inductive set sys defined in the imported protocol locale is not available in the locale declaration: (see C. Ballarin: Tutorial to Locales and Locale Interpretation) so we give a (possibly) different sys parameter here and also can't use derivMessagesI here

```

===
(  $\bigwedge tr t step m pEv A.$ 
   $\llbracket tr \in sys-param; P tr; maxtime tr \leq t;$ 
     $step \in proto; (m,pEv) \in step (timetrans A tr) A (clocktime A t) \rrbracket$ 
   $\implies P ((t,createEv A pEv m)\#tr))$ 
apply (rule Pure.equal-intr-rule)
apply (auto simp add: events-occur-at)
done

end

theory SystemOrigination imports SystemSimps begin

definition
  messagesProtoTrHonest :: ['msg proto,'msg trace,friendid,time]  $\Rightarrow$  'msg set where
    messagesProtoTrHonest proto tr fid t ==
      fst('Union (( $\lambda step.$  step (view fid tr) fid t)'proto))

definition
  messagesProto :: ['msg proto]  $\Rightarrow$  'msg set where
    messagesProto proto == (UN tr fid t. messagesProtoTrHonest proto tr fid t)

definition
  messagesProtoTr :: ['msg proto,'msg trace]  $\Rightarrow$  'msg set where
    messagesProtoTr proto tr == (UN fid t. messagesProtoTrHonest proto tr fid t)

lemmas messagesProtoDefs = messagesProto-def messagesProtoTrHonest-def
          messagesProtoTr-def

```

## 20.2 Signature Creation and Key Knowledge by Dishonest Users

```

locale PROTOCOL-SYMKEYS-NOKEYS = PROTOCOL + INITSTATE-SYMKEYS +
+
assumes protoSendNoKeys:
  !!A B tr. Key (symKey A B)  $\in$  parts (messagesProtoTr proto tr)  $\implies$ 
     $\exists C t i M.$  (t, Recv (Rx C i) M)  $\in$  set tr  $\wedge$  Key (symKey A B)  $\in$  parts {M}

locale PROTOCOL-PKSIG-NOKEYS = PROTOCOL + INITSTATE-PKSIG +
assumes protoSendNoKeys:
  !!B tr. Key (priSK (Honest B))  $\in$  parts (messagesProtoTr proto tr)  $\implies$ 
     $\exists C t i M.$  (t, Recv (Rx C i) M)  $\in$  set tr  $\wedge$  Key (priSK (Honest B))  $\in$  parts {M}

```

Here, we need a separate lemmas that states that  $B \neq A$  cannot derive a key of  $A$  if its not already in parts.

**lemma** (in PROTOCOL-PKSIG-NOKEYS) keys-not-send-received:

```

assumes rang:  $tr \in sys$  and
         $sr: (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M L) \in set tr \vee (trecv, Recv (Rx A i) M) \in set$ 
tr
shows  $Key (priSK (Honest B)) \notin parts \{M\}$ 
using rang sr
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B M i L tsend trecv rule: sys.induct)
case Nil
thus ?case by auto
next
case (Fake tr mintr mintr I j)
let ?x = (mintr, Send (Tx (Intruder I) j) mintr []) and
?eva = (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M L) and
?evb = (trecv, Recv (Rx A i) M)
show ?case
proof cases
assume ?evb ∈ set (?x # tr)
hence ?evb ∈ set tr by auto
with prems show ?case apply – apply (rule Fake.hyps(2)) by (auto)
next
assume  $\neg (\exists evb \in set (\exists x \# tr) \exists evb \in set (x \# tr))$ 
with  $\langle \exists eva \in set (\exists x \# tr) \vee \exists evb \in set (\exists x \# tr) \rangle$ 
have ?eva ∈ set (?x # tr) by auto
show ?case
proof cases
assume ?x=?eva
hence M=mintr and Intruder I=A and i=j by auto
hence xdy: M ∈ DM A (knowsI A tr) using prems by auto
show ?case
proof cases
assume Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∈ parts {M}
hence ex:  $\exists Z \in knowsI A tr. Key (priSK (Honest B)) \in parts \{Z\}$ 
using xdy (Intruder I=A) apply –
apply (subgoal-tac Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∈ parts (DM A (knowsI A tr)))
apply (drule key-parts-DM-key)
apply (drule parts.singleton) back
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac {M} ⊆ (DM (Intruder I) (knowsI (Intruder I) tr)))
apply (drule parts.mono)
apply (erule subsetD)
by auto
then obtain Z where knowsIz:  $Z \in knowsI A tr$ 
and partsz:  $Key (priSK (Honest B)) \in parts \{Z\}$  by auto
have ex:  $(\exists t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) Z) \in set tr) \vee Z \in initState A$ 
using knowsIz apply – apply (rule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState) by
auto
from partsz (Intruder I=A) have Z ∉ initState A apply auto
apply (drule-tac H=initState (Intruder I) in parts.trans) apply force
apply (drule parts-subset-subterms[THEN subsetD])
apply (auto simp add: priSK-notknown-other-subterms)

```

```

done
with ex have  $\exists t k. (t, Recv (Rx A k) Z) \in set tr$  by auto
then obtain t k where  $recvtr: (t, Recv (Rx A k) Z) \in set tr$  by auto
with prems have  $Key (priSK (Honest B)) \notin parts \{Z\}$ 
apply – apply (rule Fake.hyps(2)) by auto
with partsz show ?thesis by contradiction
qed
next
assume ?x ≠ ?eva
with (?eva ∈ set (?x # tr)) have ?eva ∈ set tr by auto
with prems show ?case apply – apply (rule Fake.hyps(2)) by auto
qed
qed
next
case (Con tr tcrecv N D j)
let ?x = (tcrecv, Recv (Rx D j) N) and
?eva=(tsend, Send (Tx A i) M L) and ?evb=(trecv, Recv (Rx A i) M)

show ?case proof cases
assume Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∉ parts {M}
thus ?case by auto
next
assume  $\neg (Key (priSK (Honest B)) \notin parts \{M\})$ 
hence Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∈ parts {M} by simp
hence  $\exists X \in components \{M\}. Key (priSK (Honest B)) \in parts \{X\}$  using
prems(3–) apply –
apply (rule key-components-parts)
by auto

then obtain X where comp-X:  $X \in components \{M\}$  and key-part:  $Key (priSK (Honest B)) \in parts \{X\}$ 
by auto
show ?case
proof cases
assume ?eva ∈ set (?x # tr)
hence ?eva ∈ set tr by auto
thus Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∉ parts {M} apply –
apply (rule-tac M=M in prems(5)) by auto
next
assume  $\neg (?eva \in set (?x \# tr))$ 
with (?eva ∈ set (?x # tr) ∨ ?evb ∈ set (?x # tr)) have ?evb ∈ set (?x # tr)
by auto
show ?case
proof cases
assume ?x=?evb

hence N = M by auto
with prems have ?x#tr ∈ sys apply – apply (rule sys.Con) by (auto)
with (?x=?evb) have ?evb#tr ∈ sys by auto

```

```

hence  $\exists C k \text{tcsend } Lc M'.$ 
     $\exists Y \in \text{components } \{M'\}.$ 
         $(\text{tcsend}, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } C k) M' Lc) \in \text{set } (?x\#tr)$ 
         $\wedge (\text{distort } X Y \in \text{LowHam})$ 
         $\wedge \text{cdistM } (\text{Tx } C k) (\text{Rx } A i) \neq \text{None}$ 
         $\wedge \text{tcsend} \leq \text{trecv} - \text{cdist } (\text{Tx } C k) (\text{Rx } A i)$  using prems(3-)
apply –
apply (rule send-before-receive)
apply simp
apply force
apply (rule comp-X)
done
then obtain  $C k \text{tcsend } Lc M' Y$ 
    where  $\text{send-}M': (\text{tcsend}, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } C k) M' Lc) \in \text{set } (?x\#tr)$ 
    and  $\text{comp-}M': Y \in \text{components } \{M'\}$  and  $\text{distX}: \text{distort } X Y \in \text{LowHam}$ 
by auto
    hence  $p1: (\text{tcsend}, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } C k) M' Lc) \in \text{set } tr$  by auto
    obtain  $d$  where  $d \in \text{LowHam}$  and  $X = \text{distort } Y d$  using distX apply –
        apply (drule distort-LowHam)
        apply auto
        done
    hence  $p2: \text{Key } (\text{priSK } (\text{Honest } B)) \in \text{parts } \{Y\}$  using key-part
        apply simp
        apply (drule key-parts-distortion)
        by auto
    hence  $p2: \text{Key } (\text{priSK } (\text{Honest } B)) \in \text{parts } \{M'\}$  using comp-M' apply –
        apply (drule-tac H={M'} in parts.trans)
        apply (drule components-subset-parts)
        apply simp
        by assumption
    thus  $?case$  using prems(4-)  $p1$ 
        apply –
        apply auto
        apply force
        done
next
    assume  $?x \neq ?evb$ 
    with  $(?evb \in \text{set } (?x\#tr))$  have  $?evb \in \text{set } tr$  by auto
    thus  $?case$  apply – apply (rule prems(5)) by auto
    qed
qed
qed
next
    case (Proto tr t' step m pEv A')
    let  $?x = (t', \text{createEv } A' pEv m)$  and
         $?eva=(\text{tsend}, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } A i) M L)$  and  $?evb=(\text{trecv}, \text{Recv } (\text{Rx } A i) M)$ 
    show  $?case$ 
    proof cases — Recv event already in prefix of the trace, use IH

```

```

assume ?evb ∈ set (?x # tr)
hence ?evb ∈ set tr by (auto simp add: createEv.simps)
thus ?case
  apply – apply (rule Proto.hyps(2) [where M=M and B=B]) by auto
next — Send event in trace
  assume ¬ (?evb ∈ set (?x # tr))
  with (?eva ∈ set (?x # tr) ∨ ?evb ∈ set (?x # tr)) have ?eva ∈ set (?x #
tr)
    by auto
  show ?case
  proof (cases pEv)
    fix tid list assume eveq: pEv = SendEv tid list
    show ?case
    proof cases
      assume eqeva: ?eva=?x
      — send event added by Proto rule, use proto_nokeys
      with prems eqeva have ?x#tr ∈ sys apply – apply (rule sys_PROTO)
        by (auto)
      moreover
        with eqeva have ?eva ∈ set (?x#tr) by auto
        ultimately show ?case using eqeva
          apply auto
          apply (subgoal-tac M=m) defer apply (case-tac pEv, force, force)
          apply (subgoal-tac M ∈ parts (messagesProtoTr proto tr))
          apply (subgoal-tac Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∈ parts (messagesProtoTr
proto tr))
          apply auto defer
          apply (rule parts.elem-trans) apply (auto) defer
          apply (drule protoSendNoKeys)
          apply auto
          apply (subgoal-tac Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∉ parts {M})
            apply force
          apply (rule prems(5))
          apply auto
          apply (auto simp add: messagesProtoDefs)
          apply (insert prems(7–))
          apply (rule-tac x=A' in exI, rule-tac x=clocktime A' t' in exI,
            rule-tac x=step in bexI)
          apply (auto)
          apply (subgoal-tac {m} ⊆ (fst ` step (view A' tr) A' (clocktime A' t')))
          apply auto
          apply force
          done
next
  assume ?eva≠?x
  with (?eva ∈ set (?x # tr)) have ?eva ∈ set tr by auto
  with Proto.hyps(2) [where M=M and B=B and L=L] show ?case by
  (auto)
qed

```

```

next
  assume pEv = ClaimEv
  hence ?x≠?eva by auto
  with (?eva ∈ set (?x#tr)) have ?eva ∈ set tr by auto
  with Proto.hyps(2) [where M=M and B=B and L=L] show ?case by
  (auto)
  qed
  qed
  qed

lemma tuple-fst-elem:
  (a,b) ∈ H  $\implies$  a ∈ fst' H
  apply (auto simp add: image-def)
  apply (rule-tac x=(a,b) in bexI)
  apply auto
done

lemma (in PROTOCOL-SYMKEYS-NOKEYS) keys-not-send-received:
  assumes rang: tr ∈ sys and
    sr: (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M L) ∈ set tr ∨ (trecv, Recv (Rx A i) M) ∈ set
    tr
  shows Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C)) ∉ parts {M}
  using rang sr
  proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B M i L tsend trecv rule: sys.induct)
  case Nil
  thus ?case by auto
next
  case (Fake tr tintr mintr I j)
  let ?x = (tintr, Send (Tx (Intruder I) j) mintr []) and
    ?eva = (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M L) and
    ?evb = (trecv, Recv (Rx A i) M)
  show ?case
  proof cases
    assume ?evb ∈ set (?x # tr)
    hence ?evb ∈ set tr by auto
    with prems show ?case apply – apply (rule Fake.hyps(2)) by auto
next
  assume  $\neg$  (?evb ∈ set (?x # tr))
  with (?eva ∈ set (?x # tr) ∨ ?evb ∈ set (?x # tr))
  have ?eva ∈ set (?x # tr) by auto
  show ?case
  proof cases
    assume ?x=?eva
    hence M=mintr and Intruder I=A and i=j by auto
    hence xdy: M ∈ DM A (knowsI A tr) using prems by auto
    show ?case
  proof cases
    assume Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C)) ∈ parts {M}

```

```

  hence ex:  $\exists Z \in \text{knowsI } A \text{ tr}. \text{Key}(\text{symKey}(\text{Honest } B)(\text{Honest } C)) \in \text{parts } \{Z\}$ 
  using xdy <Intruder I=A> apply -
    apply (subgoal-tac Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C))  $\in$  parts (DM A
(knowsI A tr)))
    apply (drule key-parts-DM-key)
    apply (drule parts.singleton) back
    apply auto
    apply (subgoal-tac {M}  $\subseteq$  (DM (Intruder I) (knowsI (Intruder I) tr)))
    apply (drule parts.mono)
    apply (erule subsetD)
    by auto
  then obtain Z where knowsIz:  $Z \in \text{knowsI } A \text{ tr}$ 
    and partsz:  $\text{Key}(\text{symKey}(\text{Honest } B)(\text{Honest } C)) \in \text{parts } \{Z\}$  by
  auto
  have ex:  $(\exists t i. (t, \text{Recv}(Rx A i) Z) \in \text{set tr}) \vee Z \in \text{initState } A$ 
  using knowsIz apply - apply (rule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState) by
  auto
  from partsz <Intruder I=A> have Z  $\notin$  initState A apply auto
  apply (drule-tac H=initState (Intruder I) in parts.trans) apply force
  apply (drule parts-subset-subterms[THEN subsetD])
  apply (auto simp add: symKey-notknown-other-subterms)
  done
  with ex have  $\exists t k. (t, \text{Recv}(Rx A k) Z) \in \text{set tr}$  by auto
  then obtain t k where recvtr:  $(t, \text{Recv}(Rx A k) Z) \in \text{set tr}$  by auto
  with prems have  $\text{Key}(\text{symKey}(\text{Honest } B)(\text{Honest } C)) \notin \text{parts } \{Z\}$ 
  apply - apply (rule Fake.hyps(2)) by auto
  with partsz show ?thesis by contradiction
  qed
  next
  assume ?x=?eva
  with (?eva  $\in$  set (?x#tr)) have ?eva  $\in$  set tr by auto
  with prems show ?case apply - apply (rule Fake.hyps(2)) by auto
  qed
  qed
  next
  case (Con tr tcrecv N D j)
  let ?x = (tcrecv, Recv (Rx D j) N) and
    ?eva=(tsend, Send (Tx A i) M L) and ?evb=(trecv, Recv (Rx A i) M)

  show ?case proof cases
    assume Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C))  $\notin$  parts {M}
    thus ?case by auto
  next
  assume  $\neg (\text{Key}(\text{symKey}(\text{Honest } B)(\text{Honest } C)) \notin \text{parts } \{M\})$ 
  hence Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C))  $\in$  parts {M} by simp
  hence  $\exists X \in \text{components } \{M\}. \text{Key}(\text{symKey}(\text{Honest } B)(\text{Honest } C)) \in \text{parts } \{X\}$  using prems(3-) apply -
    apply (rule key-components-parts)

```

by auto

```
then obtain X where comp-X:  $X \in components\{M\}$ 
  and key-part: Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C))  $\in parts\{X\}$ 
  by auto
show ?case
proof cases
  assume ?eva  $\in set(\{x \# tr\})$ 
  hence ?eva  $\in set tr$  by auto
  thus Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C))  $\notin parts\{M\}$  apply -
    apply (rule-tac M=M in prems(5)) by auto
next
  assume  $\neg (\{eva \in set(\{x \# tr\})\})$ 
  with  $(\{eva \in set(\{x \# tr\}) \vee evb \in set(\{x \# tr\})\})$  have ?evb  $\in set(\{x \# tr\})$ 
  by auto
show ?case
proof cases
  assume ?x=?evb
  hence N = M by auto
  with prems have ?x#tr  $\in sys$  apply - apply (rule sys.Con) by (auto)
  with  $(?x=?evb)$  have ?evb#tr  $\in sys$  by auto

  hence  $\exists C k tcsend Lc M'$ .
     $\exists Y \in components\{M'\}.$ 
       $(tcsend, Send(Tx C k) M' Lc) \in set(\{x#tr\})$ 
       $\wedge (distort X Y \in LowHam)$ 
       $\wedge cdistM(Tx C k) (Rx A i) \neq None$ 
       $\wedge tcsend \leq trecv - cdist(Tx C k) (Rx A i)$  using prems(3-)
  apply -
  apply (rule send-before-rev)
  apply simp
  apply force
  apply (rule comp-X)
done
then obtain E k tcsend Lc M' Y
  where send-M':  $(tcsend, Send(Tx E k) M' Lc) \in set(\{x#tr\})$ 
  and comp-M':  $Y \in components\{M'\}$  and distX:  $distort X Y \in LowHam$ 
by auto
hence p1:  $(tcsend, Send(Tx E k) M' Lc) \in set tr$  by auto
obtain d where d  $\in LowHam$  and X = distort Y d using distX apply -
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply auto
done
hence p2: Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C))  $\in parts\{Y\}$  using key-part
  apply simp
  apply (drule key-parts-distortion)
  by auto
hence p2: Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C))  $\in parts\{M'\}$  using
```

```

comp-M' apply -
  apply (drule-tac H={M'}) in parts.trans)
  apply (drule components-subset-parts)
  apply simp
  by assumption
thus ?case using prems(4-) p1
  apply -
  apply auto
  apply force
  done
next
  assume ?x≠?evb
  with (?evb ∈ set (?x#tr)) have ?evb ∈ set tr by auto
  thus ?case apply - apply (rule prems(5)) by auto
  qed
qed
qed
next
  case (Proto tr t' step m pEv A')
  let ?x = (t', createEv A' pEv m) and
    ?eva=(tsend, Send (Tx A i) M L) and ?evb=(trecv, Recv (Rx A i) M)
  show ?case
  proof cases — Recv event already in prefix of the trace, use IH
    assume ?evb ∈ set (?x # tr)
    hence ?evb ∈ set tr by (auto simp add: createEv.simps)
    thus ?case
      apply - apply (rule Proto.hyps(2) [where M=M and B=B]) by auto
  next — Send event in trace
    assume ¬ (?evb ∈ set (?x # tr))
    with (?eva ∈ set (?x # tr) ∨ ?evb ∈ set (?x # tr)) have ?eva ∈ set (?x #
tr)
      by auto
    show ?case
    proof (cases pEv)
      fix tid list assume eveq: pEv = SendEv tid list
      show ?case
      proof cases
        assume eqeva: ?eva=?x
        — send event added by Proto rule, use proto_nokeys
        with prems eqeva have ?x#tr ∈ sys apply - apply (rule sys_PROTO)
          by (auto)
        moreover
        with eqeva have ?eva ∈ set (?x#tr) by auto
        ultimately show ?case using eqeva
          apply -
        apply auto
      apply (subgoal-tac Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C)) ∈ parts (messagesProtoTr
proto tr))
      apply (drule protoSendNoKeys)

```

```

apply auto prefer 2
apply (auto simp add: messagesProtoTr-def messagesProtoTrHonest-def MACM-def
       split: event.split split-if dest: parts.fst-set)
apply (insert prems(7,8))
apply (case-tac pEv, auto)
apply (rule-tac x=A' in exI) apply (rule-tac x=clocktime A' t' in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=step in bexI) prefer 2
apply force
apply (rule parts.mono-elem)
apply force
apply auto
apply (drule tuple-fst-elem)
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C))notin parts {M}) prefer
2
apply (rule Proto.hyps(2))
apply force
apply force
done
next
assume ?eva ≠ ?x
with (?eva ∈ set (?x # tr)) have ?eva ∈ set tr by auto
with Proto.hyps(2) [where M=M and B=B and L=L] show ?case by
auto
qed
next
assume pEv = ClaimEv
hence ?x ≠ ?eva by auto
with (?eva ∈ set (?x#tr)) have ?eva ∈ set tr by auto
with Proto.hyps(2) [where M=M and B=B and L=L] show ?case by
auto
qed
qed
qed
qed

lemma (in PROTOCOL-PKSIG-NOKEYS) key-not-known:
assumes sys-proto: tr ∈ sys and neq: A ≠ Honest B
shows Key (priSK (Honest B))notin parts (knowsI A tr) using sys-proto
proof auto
assume Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∈ parts (knowsI A tr)
hence ∃ X ∈ knowsI A tr. Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∈ parts {X}
by (rule parts.singleton)
then obtain X where X ∈ knowsI A tr
and partsx: Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∈ parts {X} by auto
hence ex: (∃ t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr) ∨ X ∈ initState A
apply – apply (rule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState) by auto
show False proof cases
assume ∃ t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr
then obtain t i where (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr by auto

```

```

with sys-proto have Key (priSK (Honest B)) ∉ parts {X} apply -
  apply (rule keys-not-send-received) by (auto)
with partsx show False by auto
next
  assume ¬(∃ t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr)
  with ex have kinit: X ∈ initState A by auto
  from neq partsx have X ∉ initState A
    apply auto
    apply (drule-tac H=initState A in parts.trans) apply simp
    apply force
    apply (drule parts-subset-subterms[THEN subsetD])
    apply (auto dest: priSK-notknown-other-subterms)
    done
  with kinit show False by contradiction
qed
qed

```

```

lemma (in PROTOCOL-SYMKEYS-NOKEYS) key-not-known:
assumes sys-proto: tr ∈ sys and neq: A ∉ {Honest B, Honest C}
shows Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C)) ∉ parts (knowsI A tr) using
sys-proto
proof auto
  assume Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C)) ∈ parts (knowsI A tr)
  hence ∃ X ∈ knowsI A tr. Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C)) ∈ parts {X}
    by (rule parts.singleton)
  then obtain X where X ∈ knowsI A tr
    and partsx: Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C)) ∈ parts {X} by
  auto
  hence ex: (∃ t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr) ∨ X ∈ initState A
    apply – apply (rule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState) by auto
  show False proof cases
    assume ∃ t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr
    then obtain t i where (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr by auto
    with sys-proto have Key (symKey (Honest B) (Honest C)) ∉ parts {X} apply
    –
      apply (rule keys-not-send-received) by (auto)
      with partsx show False by auto
    next
      assume ¬(∃ t i. (t, Recv (Rx A i) X) ∈ set tr)
      with ex have kinit: X ∈ initState A by auto
      from neq partsx have X ∉ initState A
        apply auto
        apply (drule-tac H=initState A in parts.trans) apply force
        apply (drule parts-subset-subterms[THEN subsetD])
        apply (auto dest: symKey-notknown-other-subterms)
        done
      with kinit show False by contradiction
qed

```

qed

```

lemma (in PROTOCOL-PKSIG-NOKEYS) sig-generate-sig-received:
assumes sys-proto:  $tr \in sys$  and  $syn: m \in DM B (knowsI B tr)$ 
and  $sig: Crypt(priSK(Honest A)) msig \in subterms \{m\}$ 
and  $neq: B \neq Honest A$ 
shows  $\exists trs X i. (trs, Recv(Rx B i) X) \in set tr$ 
 $\wedge Crypt(priSK(Honest A)) msig \in subterms \{X\}$ 
using sys-proto syn sig neq
proof -
from syn sig
have sig-or-key:  $Crypt(priSK(Honest A)) msig \in subterms (knowsI B tr)$ 
 $\vee Key(priSK(Honest A)) \in parts (knowsI B tr)$ 
using prems
apply -
apply (subgoal-tac Crypt(priSK(Honest A)) msig \in subterms (DM B (knowsI B tr))) prefer 2
apply (erule rev-subsetD)
apply (rule subterms.mono)
apply force
apply auto
apply (drule sig-subterms-DM-sig-or-key)
apply auto
done
hence Crypt(priSK(Honest A)) msig \in subterms (knowsI B tr)
using key-not-known prems by auto
hence  $\exists X \in knowsI B tr. Crypt(priSK(Honest A)) msig \in subterms \{X\}$ 
by (auto intro: subterms.singleton)
then obtain X where knowsX:  $X \in knowsI B tr$ 
and sigX:  $Crypt(priSK(Honest A)) msig \in subterms \{X\}$ 
by auto
hence ( $\exists t i. (t, Recv(Rx B i) X) \in set tr$ )
apply -
apply (drule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac H=initState B in subterms.trans)
apply (insert priSK-not-used, auto)
done
thus ?thesis using sigX by auto
qed

lemma (in PROTOCOL-SYMKEYS-NOKEYS) mac-generate-mac-received:
assumes sys-proto:  $tr \in sys$  and  $syn: m \in DM B (knowsI B tr)$ 
and  $sig: Hash(MPair(Key(symKey(Honest C)) (Honest D))) mmac \in subterms \{m\}$ 
and  $neq: B \notin \{Honest C, Honest D\}$ 
shows  $\exists trs X i. (trs, Recv(Rx B i) X) \in set tr$ 
 $\wedge Hash(MPair(Key(symKey(Honest C)) (Honest D))) mmac \in$ 

```

```

subterms {X}
  using sys-proto syn sig neq
proof -
let ?key = (Key (symKey (Honest C) (Honest D)))
let ?mac = Hash (MPair ?key mmac)
from syn sig
have sig-or-key: ?mac ∈ subterms (knowsI B tr)
  ∨ ?key ∈ parts (knowsI B tr)
using prems
apply (subgoal-tac ?mac ∈ subterms (DM B (knowsI B tr)))
apply (drule mac-subterms-DM-mac-or-key)
apply auto
apply (erule rev-subsetD)
apply (rule subterms.mono, auto)
done
hence ?mac ∈ subterms (knowsI B tr)
using key-not-known prems by auto
hence ∃ X ∈ knowsI B tr. ?mac ∈ subterms {X}
  by (auto intro: subterms.singleton)
then obtain X where knowsX: X ∈ knowsI B tr
  and sigX: ?mac ∈ subterms {X}
  by auto
hence (∃ t i. (t, Recv (Rx B i) X) ∈ set tr)
apply -
apply (drule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac H=initState B in subterms.trans)
apply force
apply (insert symKey-not-used-MAC)
apply auto
done
thus ?thesis using sigX by auto
qed

```

```

lemma (in MESSAGE-DERIVATION) components-subset-subterms:
  x ∈ components S ⇒ x ∈ subterms S
apply (drule components-subset-parts)
apply (erule parts-in-subterms)
done

```

```
locale PROTOCOL-NONONCE = INITSTATE-NONONCE + PROTOCOL
```

```

lemma (in PROTOCOL-NONONCE) nonce-orig-not-before:
  assumes A: (ta, Send A X La) ∈ set tr and B: Nonce C NC ∈ subterms {X}
  and
    C: Nonce C NC ∉ used (beforeEvent (tb, Send B Y Lb) tr)
  shows (ta, Send A X La) ∉ set (beforeEvent (tb, Send B Y Lb) tr) using A B C
proof cases
  assume (ta, Send A X La) ∈ set (beforeEvent (tb, Send B Y Lb) tr)

```

```

with B have Nonce C NC ∈ used (beforeEvent (tb, Send B Y Lb) tr) apply -
  apply (rule Send-imp-parts-used)
  by auto
thus ?thesis using C by contradiction
next
  assume (ta, Send A X La) ∉ set (beforeEvent (tb, Send B Y Lb) tr)
  thus ?thesis .
qed

lemma (in PROTOCOL-NONONCE) nonce-send-owner-first:
  assumes a: tr ∈ sys and b: (tb, Send (Tx B i) mb Lb) ∈ set tr and
         c: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {mb} and d: A ≠ B
  shows ∃j ta ma La. (ta, Send (Tx A j) ma La) ∈ set tr ∧ Nonce A NA ∈ subterms
         {ma}
  using a b c d
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B tb mb i NA Lb rule: sys.induct)
— trace equal to: @{term (tc + tab, Recv D mc) # tr
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr tcrev-l M-l B-l j-l tab-l)
  hence oin: (tb, Send (Tx B i) mb Lb) ∈ set tr by auto
  with Con.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
next
  case (Fake tr tsend mspy I k)
  let ?x = (tsend, Send (Tx (Intruder I) k) mspy []) and
         ?evb = (tb, Send (Tx B i) mb Lb)

  show ?case
  proof cases
    assume ?x = ?evb
    hence mspy=mb and Intruder I=B by auto
    with prems
      have ∃t i Y. (t, Recv (Rx B i) Y) ∈ set tr ∧ Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {Y}
      apply -
      apply (rule othernonce-gen-received) by (auto)

    then obtain t k Y where (t, Recv (Rx B k) Y) ∈ set tr and
      Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {Y} by auto

    then obtain X where X ∈ components {Y} and Nonce A NA ∈ subterms
      {X} apply -
      apply (drule nonce-components-subterm)
      apply auto
      done

    with prems(5-) have
      ∃A i tsend L M'.
      ∃Z ∈ components {M'}.
      (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) ∈ set tr ∧

```

```


$$\text{distort } X Z \in \text{LowHam} \wedge \text{cdistM } (\text{Tx } A i) (\text{Rx } B k) \neq \text{None} \wedge \text{tsend} \leq t - \text{cdist } (\text{Tx } A i) (\text{Rx } B k)$$

apply –
apply (drule send-before-recv)
apply auto
done

then obtain  $C u \text{tcsend } Lc M' Z$ 
where  $p1: (\text{tcsend}, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } C u) M' Lc) \in \text{set } tr$ 
      and  $p2: \text{distort } X Z \in \text{LowHam}$ 
      and  $p3: Z \in \text{components } \{M'\}$ 
by auto
have  $p4: \text{Nonce } A NA \in \text{subterms } \{M'\}$  using  $p1 p2 p3 \langle \text{Nonce } A NA \in \text{subterms } \{X\} \rangle$  apply –
apply (drule distort-LowHam)
apply auto
apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
apply simp
apply (drule-tac  $H=\{M'\}$  in subterms.trans) back
apply auto
apply (erule components-subset-subterms)
done
show ?case
proof cases
assume  $A=C$ 
with  $p4 p1 p2 p3 \langle \text{Nonce } A NA \in \text{subterms } \{X\} \rangle$  show ?thesis
apply –
apply (rule-tac  $x=u$  in exI)
apply (rule-tac  $x=tcsend$  in exI)
apply (rule-tac  $x=M'$  in exI)
apply (rule-tac  $x=Lc$  in exI)
apply auto
done
next
assume  $A \neq C$ 
with prems  $\langle \text{Nonce } A NA \in \text{subterms } \{Y\} \rangle p4$ 
have  $\exists j ta ma La. (ta, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } A j) ma La) \in \text{set } tr$ 
       $\wedge \text{Nonce } A NA \in \text{subterms } \{ma\}$  apply –
apply (rule-tac  $B=C$  in prems(7))
apply simp defer
apply (auto)
done
then obtain  $j ta ma La$  where  $a: (ta, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } A j) ma La) \in \text{set } tr$  and
       $b: \text{Nonce } A NA \in \text{subterms } \{ma\}$  by auto
then have  $(ta, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } A j) ma La) \in \text{set } (?x\#tr)$  by auto
with prems show ?thesis by auto
qed
next
assume  $?x \neq ?evb$ 

```

```

with prems have ?evb ∈ set tr by auto
with prems have ∃j ta ma La. (ta, Send (Tx A j) ma La) ∈ set tr
    ∧ Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {ma} by auto
then obtain j ta ma La where a: (ta, Send (Tx A j) ma La) ∈ set tr and
    b: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {ma} by auto
then have (ta, Send (Tx A j) ma La) ∈ set (?x#tr) by auto
with prems show ?thesis by auto
qed
next
case (Proto tr tsend step m pEv C)
let ?x = (tsend, createEv C pEv m) and
    ?evb = (tb, Send (Tx B i) mb Lb)
show ?case
proof cases
    assume ?x = ?evb
    hence m=mb and Honest C=B
        apply – by (case-tac pEv, auto simp add: createEv.simps)+
    with prems
        have ∃t i Y. (t, Recv (Rx B i) Y) ∈ set tr ∧ Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {Y}
            apply – apply (rule othernonce-gen-received) by (auto)
        then obtain t k Y where (t, Recv (Rx B k) Y) ∈ set tr and
            Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {Y} by auto

        then obtain X where X ∈ components {Y} and Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {X}
            apply –
                apply (drule nonce-components-subterm)
                apply auto
            done

with prems(5–) have
    ∃A i tsend L M'.
        ∃Z ∈ components {M'}.
            (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) ∈ set tr ∧
            distort X Z ∈ LowHam ∧ cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B k) ≠ None ∧ tsend ≤
            t – cdist (Tx A i) (Rx B k)
        apply –
        apply (drule send-before-recv)
        apply auto
    done

then obtain C u tcsend Lc M' Z
where p1: (tcsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc) ∈ set tr
    and p2: distort X Z ∈ LowHam
    and p3: Z ∈ components {M'}
by auto

have p4: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {M'} using p1 p2 p3 ⟨Nonce A NA ∈
    subterms {X}⟩ apply –
    apply (drule distort-LowHam)

```

```

apply auto
apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
apply simp
apply (drule-tac H={M'} in subterms.trans) back
apply auto
apply (erule components-subset-subterms)
done

show ?case
proof cases
assume A=C
with p1 p2 p3 p4 <Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {Y}> show ?thesis
  apply -
  apply (rule-tac x=u in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=tcsend in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=M' in exI)
  by auto
next
assume A≠C
with prems <Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {Y}> p4
have ∃j ta ma La. (ta, Send (Tx A j) ma La) ∈ set tr
  ∧ Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {ma}
  apply -
  apply (rule-tac B=C in prems(7))
  apply simp defer
  apply auto
  done
then obtain j ta ma La where a: (ta, Send (Tx A j) ma La) ∈ set tr and
  b: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {ma} by auto
then have (ta, Send (Tx A j) ma La) ∈ set (?x#tr) by auto
with prems show ?thesis by auto
qed
next
assume ?x ≠ ?evb

with prems have ?evb ∈ set tr by auto
with prems have ∃j ta ma La. (ta, Send (Tx A j) ma La) ∈ set tr
  ∧ Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {ma} by auto
then obtain j ta ma La where a: (ta, Send (Tx A j) ma La) ∈ set tr and
  b: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {ma} by auto
then have (ta, Send (Tx A j) ma La) ∈ set (?x#tr) by auto
with prems show ?thesis by auto
qed
qed

```

**lemma (in PROTOCOL-NONONCE) Used-imp-subterms-Send-creator:**  
**assumes** a: Nonce A NA ∈ used tr **and** b: tr ∈ sys  
**shows** ∃i t X L. (t, Send (Tx A i) X L) ∈ set tr ∧ Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {X}

```

using a b
proof -
  from prems
    have  $\exists t B i X L. (t, \text{Send} (Tx B i) X L) \in \text{set tr} \wedge \text{Nonce A NA} \in \text{subterms} \{X\}$ 
    apply – apply (rule Used-imp-subterm-Send) by auto
    then obtain t B i X L
      where c:  $(t, \text{Send} (Tx B i) X L) \in \text{set tr}$  and d:  $\text{Nonce A NA} \in \text{subterms} \{X\}$ 
      apply auto
      done
    show ?thesis
    proof cases
      assume A=B
      with c d show ?thesis by auto
    next
      assume A≠B
      with prems show ?thesis apply – apply (rule nonce-send-owner-first) by
        auto
      qed
    qed

lemma (in PROTOCOL-NONONCE) nonce-used-view:
   $\llbracket tr \in sys; \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest A}) NA \in \text{used } tr \rrbracket$ 
   $\implies \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest A}) NA \in \text{used} (\text{view A } tr)$ 
  apply (drule Used-imp-subterms-Send-creator)
  apply (force, elim exE conjE)
  apply (drule view-elem-at-ex)
  apply force
  apply (elim exE)
  apply (rule-tac X=X and RA=Tx (Honest A) i and t=t' in subterms-set-used)
  apply auto
  done

```

Now we get to the first important property concerning the reply to messages including fresh nonces.

```

lemma (in PROTOCOL-NONONCE) fresh-nonce-earliest-send:
  assumes sys-proto:  $tr \in sys$  and aneqb:  $A \neq B$  and
    nafresh:  $\text{Nonce A NA} \notin \text{used} (\text{beforeEvent} (ta, \text{Send} (Tx A i) ma La) tr)$ 
  and
    na-in-ma:  $\text{Nonce A NA} \in \text{subterms} \{ma\}$  and
    na-in-mb:  $\text{Nonce A NA} \in \text{subterms} \{mb\}$  and
    eva:  $(ta, \text{Send} (Tx A i) ma La) \in \text{set tr}$  and evb:  $(tb, \text{Send} (Tx B j) mb Lb) \in \text{set tr}$ 
    shows tb – ta  $\geq cdistl A B$ 
    using sys-proto aneqb nafresh na-in-ma na-in-mb eva evb
  proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B ta tb ma mb La Lb i j NA rule: sys.induct)
    case Nil thus ?case by auto

```

— trace equal to: @{term (tc + tab, Recv D mc)#tr

```

next
  case (Con tr trecv-l M-l B-l j-l tab-l)
    hence oin: (ta, Send (Tx A i) ma La) ∈ set tr and
      rin: (tb, Send (Tx B j) mb Lb) ∈ set tr and
      nafresh: Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent (ta, Send (Tx A i) ma La) tr)
  by auto
  with Con.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)

— (tsend, Send Intruder I mspy)#tr
next
  case (Fake tr tsend mspy I k)
  let ?x = (tsend, Send (Tx (Intruder I) k) mspy []) and
    ?eva = (ta, Send (Tx A i) ma La) and ?evb = (tb, Send (Tx B j) mb Lb)

  note caserule = set-two-elem-cases [where eva=?eva and evb=?evb
                                         and tr=tr and x=?x]
  from prems show ?case
  proof (cases rule: caserule, simp, simp)
    case 3
    note ⟨?eva ∈ set tr⟩ and ⟨?evb ∈ set tr⟩
    moreover
    from Fake.preds have Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva tr)
    proof cases
      assume evaeq: ?eva = ?x and ?eva ∉ set tr
      with Fake.preds have Nonce A NA ∉ used tr by (clarsimp)
      with evaeq show ?thesis by (intro used-beforeEvent)
    next
      assume  $\neg (\text{?eva} = \text{?x} \wedge \text{?eva} \notin \text{set } \text{tr})$ 
      thus ?thesis using prems by auto
    qed
    ultimately show ?thesis using Fake.hyps Fake.preds by auto
  next
    case 4
    note ⟨?eva ∈ set tr⟩ and beq=⟨?evb = ?x⟩ and ⟨?eva ≠ ?x⟩
    with prems have Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {mspy} by auto
    with beq have Intruder I = B and tsend = tb and j=k by auto
    from ⟨Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {ma}⟩ ⟨?eva ∈ set tr⟩
    have Nonce A NA ∈ used tr apply – apply (rule Send-imp-parts-used) by auto
    with prems have  $\exists \text{trs } l \text{ X}. (\text{trs}, \text{Recv} (\text{Rx (Intruder I)} l) \text{ X}) \in \text{set } \text{tr} \wedge$ 
      Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {X}
    apply – apply (rule-tac X=mspy in othernonce-gen-received) by (auto)
    with beq obtain X l trs
    where recv: (trs, Recv (Rx B l) X) ∈ set tr and
      naX: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {X}
    by auto

    then obtain U where U ∈ components {X} and Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {U} apply –

```

```

apply (drule nonce-components-subterm)
apply auto
done

with prems(5-) have
   $\exists A i \text{tcsend } L M'.$ 
   $\exists Z \in \text{components } \{M'\}.$ 
   $(\text{tcsend}, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } A i) M' L) \in \text{set } tr \wedge$ 
   $\text{distort } U Z \in \text{LowHam} \wedge \text{cdistM } (\text{Tx } A i) (\text{Rx } B l) \neq \text{None} \wedge \text{tcsend} \leq$ 
   $\text{trs} - \text{cdist } (\text{Tx } A i) (\text{Rx } B l)$ 
  apply -
  apply (drule-tac M=X in send-before-recv)
  apply auto
  done

then obtain C u tcsend Lc M' Z
where p1: (tcsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc) ∈ set tr
  and p2: distort U Z ∈ LowHam
  and p3: Z ∈ components {M'}
  and p4: tcsend ≤ trs - cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l)
  and p5: cdistM (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≠ None
by auto

have p6: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {M'} using p1 p2 p3 ⟨Nonce A NA ∈
subterms {U}⟩ apply -
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply auto
  apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
  apply simp
  apply (drule-tac H={M'} in subterms.trans) back
  apply auto
  apply (erule components-subset-subterms)
  done

let ?evc=(tcsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc)
show ?thesis
proof cases
  assume A=C
  with prems ⟨?eva ≠ ?x⟩ have nafresh: Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva
tr)
  by auto
  with p1 p5 p6 naX ⟨A=C⟩ have ?evc ∉ set (beforeEvent ?eva tr)
  apply - apply (rule nonce-orig-not-before)
  apply simp
  by auto
  with prems p1 ⟨A=C⟩ have p7: tcsend ≥ ta
  apply - apply (rule not-beforeEvent-later)
  apply simp
  apply simp

```

```

apply simp
apply simp
done
from p4 p5 have cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≤ trs - tcsend by auto
with p4 p5 p7 also have p8: cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≤ trs - ta by auto
with ⟨maxtime tr <= tsend⟩ and ⟨tsend=tb⟩ and ⟨(trs, Recv (Rx B l) X) ∈
set tr⟩
have tbgeq: trs <= tb by (auto intro: maxtime-geq-elem)
with tbgeq p8 have p9: cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≤ tb - ta by auto
with p4 p5 have cdistl C B ≤ cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) apply -
apply (unfold cdist-def, rule noflt-some)
apply (insert p5)
by auto
with p9 ⟨A=C⟩ show ?thesis by auto
next — use induction hypothesis with Send A and Send C to bound trecv
assume A ≠ C
with p1 p4 p5 p6 and prems have cdistl A C ≤ tcsend - ta
apply - apply (rule Fake.hyps)
apply simp
apply simp
apply simp defer
apply simp
apply simp
apply auto
done
with p4 have dsmaller: cdistl A C ≤ trs - cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) - ta by
auto
with ⟨maxtime tr <= tsend⟩ and ⟨tsend=tb⟩ and ⟨(trs, Recv (Rx B l) X) ∈
set tr⟩
have tbgeq: trs <= tb by (auto intro: maxtime-geq-elem)
from p4 p5 have cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≥ cdistl C B apply -
by (unfold cdist-def, rule noflt-some)
from dsmaller p1 have a1: cdistl A C ≤ trs - ta - cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l)
by (arith)
also with ⟨cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≥ cdistl C B⟩
have ... ≤ trs - ta - cdistl C B by arith
finally have q: cdistl A C + cdistl C B ≤ trs - ta by auto
hence cdistl A C + cdistl C B ≤ trs - ta by auto
with cdistl-triangle have cdistl A B ≤ cdistl A C + cdistl C B by auto
hence cdistl A B ≤ cdistl A C + cdistl C B by auto
also with q have ... ≤ trs - ta by auto
also with tbgeq have ... ≤ tb - ta by auto
finally show ?thesis by auto
qed
next
case 5
note ⟨?evb ∈ set tr⟩ and ⟨?eva = ?x⟩ and ⟨?evb ≠ ?x⟩
hence A = Intruder I by auto
with ⟨Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {mb}⟩ have used: Nonce A NA ∈ used tr using

```

```

prems
  apply - apply (rule Send-imp-parts-used) by auto
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume ?eva ∈ set tr
    hence Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva tr) using prems by auto
    thus ?thesis using ⟨?evb ∈ set tr⟩ ⟨A≠B⟩ apply -
      apply (rule Fake.hyps(2))
      apply assumption+ prefer 4
      apply assumption
      apply (auto intro: prems)
      done
    next
    assume ?eva ∉ set tr
    with ⟨?eva = ?x⟩ used have Nonce A NA ∈ used (beforeEvent ?eva (?x#tr))
  by auto
    thus ?thesis using ⟨Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva (?x#tr))⟩
  by contradiction
  qed
next
case 6
  note ⟨?eva = ?x⟩ and ⟨?evb = ?x⟩ and ⟨A≠B⟩
  hence A = B by auto
  thus ?thesis using ⟨A≠B⟩ by contradiction
qed
next
case (Proto tr tsend step m pEv C)
let ?x = (tsend, createEv C pEv m) and
  ?eva = (ta, Send (Tx A i) ma La) and ?evb = (tb, Send (Tx B j) mb Lb)
note caserule = set-two-elem-cases [where eva=?eva and evb=?evb
  and tr=tr and x=?x]
from prems show ?case
proof (cases rule: caserule, simp, simp)
  case 3
  note ⟨?eva ∈ set tr⟩ and ⟨?evb ∈ set tr⟩
  show ?thesis
  proof cases
    assume evaeq: ?eva = ?x ∧ ?eva ∉ set tr
    with prems have Nonce A NA ∉ used tr by (clarsimp)
    hence Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva tr) by (intro used-beforeEvent)
    with prems ⟨?eva ∈ set tr⟩ and ⟨?evb ∈ set tr⟩ show ?thesis apply -
      apply (rule-tac ma=ma and mb=mb in Proto.hyps(2)) .
  next
    assume ¬ (?eva = ?x ∧ ?eva ∉ set tr)
    thus ?thesis using prems by auto
  qed
next
case 6
  note ⟨?eva = ?x⟩ and ⟨?evb = ?x⟩
  hence A = B apply auto apply (case-tac pEv) by auto

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```

thus ?thesis using ⟨A≠B⟩ by contradiction
next
  case 5
  note ⟨?evb ∈ set tr⟩ and ⟨?eva = ?x⟩ and ⟨?evb ≠ ?x⟩
  with ⟨Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {mb}⟩ have used: Nonce A NA ∈ used tr
    apply – apply (rule Send-imp-parts-used) by auto
  show ?thesis proof cases
    assume ?eva ∈ set tr
    hence Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva tr) using ⟨?eva = ?x⟩ prems
  by auto
    thus ?thesis using ⟨?evb ∈ set tr⟩ prems apply –
    apply (rule Proto.hyps(2)) prefer 6
    apply assumption+
    done
  next
    assume ?eva ∉ set tr
    with ⟨?eva = ?x⟩ used have Nonce A NA ∈ used (beforeEvent ?eva (?x#tr))
  by auto
    thus ?thesis using ⟨Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva (?x#tr))⟩
      by contradiction
    qed
  next
  case 4
  note ⟨?eva ∈ set tr⟩ and beq=⟨?evb = ?x⟩ and ⟨?eva ≠ ?x⟩
  with prems have Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {m}
    apply (case-tac pEv)
    apply auto done
  from ⟨?evb = ?x⟩ have ∃ k L. pEv = SendEv k L apply –
    apply (case-tac pEv) by auto
  then obtain k Le where pEv = SendEv k Le by auto
  with beq have Honest C=B and tsend = tb and j=k by (auto)

— either the nonce has been already sent or received
from ⟨Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {ma}⟩ ⟨?eva ∈ set tr⟩
  have Nonce A NA ∈ used tr apply – apply (rule Send-imp-parts-used) by
  auto
  with prems have ∃ trs l X. (trs, Recv (Rx B l) X) ∈ set tr ∧
    Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {X}
    apply – apply (rule-tac X=m in othernonce-gen-received) apply force
    apply force by (auto)
  with beq obtain X l trs
    where recv: (trs, Recv (Rx B l) X) ∈ set tr and
      naX: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {X}
  by auto

then obtain U where U ∈ components {X} and Nonce A NA ∈ subterms
{U} apply –
  apply (drule nonce-components-subterm)
  apply auto

```

**done**

**with** *prems(5–)* **have**

$\exists A i \text{tsend } L M'.$

$\exists Z \in \text{components } \{M'\}.$

$(\text{tsend}, \text{Send } (Tx A i) M' L) \in \text{set tr} \wedge$

$\text{distort } U Z \in \text{LowHam} \wedge \text{cdistM } (Tx A i) (Rx B l) \neq \text{None} \wedge \text{tsend} \leq \text{trs} - \text{cdist } (Tx A i) (Rx B l)$

**apply** –

**apply** (*drule-tac*  $M=X$  **in** *send-before-recv*)

**apply** *auto*

**done**

**then obtain**  $C u \text{tcsend } Lc M' Z$

**where**  $p1: (\text{tcsend}, \text{Send } (Tx C u) M' Lc) \in \text{set tr}$

**and**  $p2: \text{distort } U Z \in \text{LowHam}$

**and**  $p3: Z \in \text{components } \{M'\}$

**and**  $p4: \text{tcsend} \leq \text{trs} - \text{cdist } (Tx C u) (Rx B l)$

**and**  $p5: \text{cdistM } (Tx C u) (Rx B l) \neq \text{None}$

**by** *auto*

**have**  $p6: \text{Nonce } A NA \in \text{subterms } \{M'\}$  **using**  $p1 p2 p3 \langle \text{Nonce } A NA \in \text{subterms } \{U\} \rangle$  **apply** –

**apply** (*drule distort-LowHam*)

**apply** *auto*

**apply** (*drule nonce-not-LowHam*)

**apply** *simp*

**apply** (*drule-tac*  $H=\{M'\}$  **in** *subterms.trans*) **back**

**apply** *auto*

**apply** (*erule components-subset-subterms*)

**done**

**let**  $?evc = (\text{tcsend}, \text{Send } (Tx C u) M' Lc)$

**show**  $?thesis$

**proof** *cases*

**assume**  $A=C$

**with** *prems*  $\langle ?eva \neq ?x \rangle$  **have** *nafresh*:  $\text{Nonce } A NA \notin \text{used} (\text{beforeEvent } ?eva \text{ tr})$

**by** *auto*

**with**  $p1 p5 p6 naX \langle A=C \rangle$  **have**  $?evc \notin \text{set} (\text{beforeEvent } ?eva \text{ tr})$

**apply** – **apply** (*rule nonce-orig-not-before*)

**apply** *simp* **defer**

**apply** *simp*

**by** *auto*

**with** *prems*  $p1 \langle A=C \rangle$  **have**  $p7: \text{tcsend} \geq ta$

**apply** – **apply** (*rule not-beforeEvent-later*)

**apply** *simp* **apply** *simp*

**apply** *simp* **apply** *simp*

**done**

```

from p4 p5 have cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≤ trs - tcsend by auto
with p7 also have p8: cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≤ trs - ta by auto
with ⟨maxtime tr <= tsend⟩ and ⟨tsend=tb⟩
  and ⟨(trs, Recv (Rx B l) X) ∈ set tr⟩
have tbgeq: trs <= tb by (auto intro: maxtime-geq-elem)
with tbgeq p8 have p9: cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≤ tb - ta by auto
with p4 p5 have cdistl C B ≤ cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) apply -
  apply (unfold cdist-def, rule noflt-some)
  apply auto
  done
with p9 ⟨A=C⟩ show ?thesis by auto
next — use induction hypothesis with Send A and Send C to bound trecv
assume A ≠ C
hence cdistl A C ≤ tcsend - ta using p1 p6 and prems apply -
  apply (rule prems(10))
  apply simp
  apply simp defer defer
  apply simp
  apply simp
  by (auto)
with p4 have dsmaller: cdistl A C ≤ trs - cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) - ta by
auto
with ⟨maxtime tr <= tsend⟩ and ⟨tsend=tb⟩
  and ⟨(trs, Recv (Rx B l) X) ∈ set tr⟩
have tbgeq: trs <= tb by (auto intro: maxtime-geq-elem)
from p3 p5 have cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≥ cdistl C B apply -
  apply (unfold cdist-def, rule noflt-some)
  apply auto
  done
from dsmaller p1 have a1: cdistl A C ≤ trs - ta - cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l)
by (arith)
also with ⟨cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B l) ≥ cdistl C B⟩
  have ... ≤ trs - ta - cdistl C B by arith
finally have q: cdistl A C + cdistl C B ≤ trs - ta by auto
hence cdistl A C + cdistl C B ≤ trs - ta by auto
with cdistl-triangle have cdistl A B ≤ cdistl A C + cdistl C B by auto
hence cdistl A B ≤ cdistl A C + cdistl C B by auto
also with q have ... ≤ trs - ta by auto
also with tbgeq have ... ≤ tb - ta by auto
finally show ?thesis by auto
qed
qed
qed

```

**lemma (in PROTOCOL-PKSIG-NOKEYS)** *crypt-originates*:  
**assumes** sys-proto:  $tr \in sys$  and  
 mcsig: Crypt (priSK (Honest A)) msig ∈ subterms {mc} and

```

mcsent: (tc, Send (Tx C j) mc Lc) ∈ set tr
shows ∃ ta ma i La.
  (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) ma La) ∈ set tr
  ∧ (Crypt (priSK (Honest A)) msig) ∈ subterms {ma}
  ∧ (Crypt (priSK (Honest A)) msig)
    ≠ used (beforeEvent (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) ma La) tr)
using sys-proto mcsig mcsent
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A C j tc mc msig Lc rule: sys.induct)
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr trecv-l M-l B-l j-l tab-l)
  hence (tc, Send (Tx C j) mc Lc) ∈ set tr by auto
  with Con.hyps prems show ?case by auto

next
  case (Fake tr t-l I-l j-l A C j tc mc msig Lc)
  let ?sig = Crypt (priSK (Honest A)) msig and
    ?lastev = (t-l, Send (Tx (Intruder I-l) j-l) X-l []) and
    ?sendev = (tc, Send (Tx C j) mc Lc)

  show ?case
  proof cases
    assume xeq: ?sendev = ?lastev

    with xeq have C=Intruder I-l and mc=X-l and t-l=tc and j=j-l by auto
    — SIG in synth (Nonce I.. u analz (knowsI I tr) =l Recv X mit message =l
    Send C mit message =l IH
    with prems(5-) have ∃ trecv X i. (trecv, Recv (Rx C i) X) ∈ set tr
      ∧ ?sig ∈ subterms {X} apply -
      apply (rule sig-generate-sig-received)
      by auto
    then obtain X trecv l
    where ctr: (trecv, Recv (Rx C l) X) ∈ set tr and
      sigX: ?sig ∈ subterms {X} by auto

    then obtain U where U ∈ components {X} and ?sig ∈ subterms {U} apply
    —
      apply (drule crypt-components-subterm)
      apply auto
      done

    with prems(5-) have
      ∃ A i tsend L M'.
      ∃ Z ∈ components {M'}.
      (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) ∈ set tr ∧
      distort U Z ∈ LowHam ∧ cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx C l) ≠ None ∧ tsend ≤
      trecv − cdist (Tx A i) (Rx C l)
      apply -
      apply (drule-tac M=X in send-before-recv)

```

```

apply auto
done

then obtain D u tcsend Lc M' Z
where   p1: (tcsend, Send (Tx D u) M' Lc) ∈ set tr
        and p2: distort U Z ∈ LowHam
        and p3: Z ∈ components {M'}
        and p4: tcsend ≤ trecv - cdist (Tx D u) (Rx C l)
        and p5: cdistM (Tx D u) (Rx C l) ≠ None
by auto

have p6: ?sig ∈ subterms {M'} using p1 p2 p3 ⟨?sig ∈ subterms {U}⟩ apply
  —
    apply (drule distort-LowHam)
    apply auto
    apply (drule crypt-not-LowHam)
    apply simp
    apply (drule-tac H={M'} in subterms.trans) back
    apply auto
    apply (erule components-subset-subterms)
done

from ⟨maxtime tr <= t-l⟩ and ⟨t-l=tc⟩ and
  ⟨(trecv, Recv (Rx C l) X) ∈ set tr⟩
  have tr-tb: trecv <= tc by (auto intro: maxtime-geq-elem)
have sigm': ?sig ∈ subterms {M'}
  using p5 p6 p6 prems
  apply (auto)
done

thus ?thesis proof cases
  assume DA: D = Honest A
  thus ?thesis using prems DA sigm' apply —
    by auto
next
  assume nAB: D ≠ Honest A
  with p1 p2 p3 p4 p6 prems(4-) sigm' have ∃ te me i Le.
    (te, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) me Le) ∈ set tr
    ∧ ?sig ∈ subterms {me}
    ∧ ?sig ∉ used (beforeEvent (te, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) me Le) tr) apply
  —
    apply (drule Fake.hyps(2))
      apply simp
    apply auto
done

then obtain te me i E Le where intr: (te, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) me Le)
  ∈ set tr
    and sig: ?sig ∈ subterms {me}
    and fresh: (?sig ∉ used (beforeEvent (te, Send (Tx (Honest

```

```

A) i) me Le) tr))
  by auto
  thus ?thesis by auto
qed
next
assume ?sendev ≠ ?lastev
with prems have ?sendev ∈ set tr by auto
thus ?case using prems by auto
qed
next
case (Proto tr t-l step-l m-l pEv-l A-l A C j tc mc msig Lc)

let ?sig = Crypt (priSK (Honest A)) msig and
?lastev = (t-l, createEv A-l pEv-l m-l) and
?sendev = (tc, Send (Tx C j) mc Lc)

show ?case proof cases
assume xeq: ?lastev = ?sendev
with xeq prems have Ceq: C=Honest A-l and meq: mc=m-l and tceq: t-l=tc
apply auto
apply (case-tac pEv-l, auto)+
done
— SIG in synth (Nonce I.. u analz (knowsI I tr) =i Recv X mit message =i
Send C mit message =i IH
show ?thesis proof cases
assume ∃ te me i E Le. (te, Send (Tx E i) me Le) ∈ set tr ∧
?sig ∈ subterms {me}
thus ?thesis using prems Ceq meq tceq apply -
apply (elim exE conjE)
apply (drule Proto.hyps(2)) back back
apply simp
apply (elim exE conjE)
apply auto
done
next
assume notex: ¬ (∃ te me i E Le. (te, Send (Tx E i) me Le) ∈ set tr ∧
?sig ∈ subterms {me})
hence fresh: ?sig ∉ used (beforeEvent ?lastev (?lastev # tr))
proof cases
assume ?lastev ∈ set tr
thus ?thesis using notex xeq
apply auto
apply (drule Used-imp-send-parts)
apply auto
apply (drule beforeEvent-subset)
apply (case-tac A)
apply auto
apply (erule-tac x=t in allE, erule-tac x=X in allE)
apply auto

```

```

done
next
  assume ?lastev  $\notin$  set tr
  thus ?thesis using notex
    apply auto
    apply (drule Used-imp-send-parts)
    apply auto
    apply (case-tac A, auto)
      apply force
      done
qed
show ?thesis proof cases
  assume DAB: A = A-l
  thus ?thesis using prems xeq Ceq fresh
    apply (rule-tac x=tc in exI)
    apply (rule-tac x=mc in exI)
    apply (rule-tac x=j in exI)
    apply (rule-tac x=Lc in exI)
    apply (intro conjI) defer
      apply simp
      apply force
      apply (case-tac pEv-l)
      apply force
    apply force
    done
next
  assume nDAB: A  $\neq$  A-l
thus ?thesis using prems(4-) meq apply -
  apply (frule-tac tr=tr and m=mc in sig-generate-sig-received) prefer 2
    apply simp
  apply simp
    apply simp
  apply (elim exE conjE)
    apply (subgoal-tac  $\exists$  U in components {X}. ?sig in subterms {U}) prefer
2
    apply (erule crypt-components-subterm)
    apply (elim bxE)
  apply (drule send-before-recv)
  apply assumption
    apply assumption
  apply (elim exE conjE bxE)
    apply auto
  apply (erule-tac x=tSend in allE)
  apply (erule-tac x=M' in allE)
    apply (subgoal-tac ?sig in subterms {M'})
    apply auto
    apply (drule distort-LowHam)
    apply auto

```

```

apply (drule crypt-not-LowHam)
apply auto
thm subterms.trans
apply (drule-tac H={M'} and G={Y} in subterms.trans)
apply auto
apply (erule components-subset-subterms)
done
qed
qed
next
assume ?lastev ≠ ?sendev
with prems have ?sendev ∈ set tr by auto
thus ?thesis using prems apply -
  apply (drule-tac tc=tc and C=C and j=j and mc=mc in Proto.hyps(2))
  apply assumption
  apply auto
  done
qed
qed

```

**lemma (in PROTOCOL-NONONCE) fresh-nonce-earliest-recv:**

assumes sys-proto:  $tr \in sys$  and  
 $fresh: \text{Nonce } A \text{ NA}$   
 $\notin used(\text{beforeEvent}(ta, Send(Tx A i) ma La) tr)$  and  
 $manonce: \text{Nonce } A \text{ NA} \in subterms\{ma\}$  and  
 $mbnonce: \text{Nonce } A \text{ NA} \in subterms\{mb\}$  and  
 $masend: (ta, Send(Tx A i) ma La) \in set tr$  and  
 $mbrecv: (tb, Recv(Rx B j) mb) \in set tr$  and  
 $aneqb: A \neq B$   
shows  $tb - ta \geq cdistl A B$   
using sys-proto fresh manonce mbnonce masend mbrecv aneqb  
**proof** (induct tr arbitrary:  $A B ta tb ma mb La i j NA$  rule: sys.induct)  
case Nil thus ?case by auto  
— (tsend, Send Intruder I msp) # tr  
**next**  
 case (Fake tr tsend msp I k)  
 let ?x = (tsend, Send (Tx (Intruder I) k) msp []) and  
 ?eva = (ta, Send (Tx A i) ma La) and ?evb = (tb, Recv (Rx B j) mb)  
 note caserule = set-two-elem-cases [where eva=?eva and evb=?evb  
 and tr=tr and x=?x]  
 have evbneqx: ?evb ≠ ?x by auto  
 from prems show ?case  
**proof** (cases rule: caserule, simp, simp)  
 case 3

```

note (?eva ∈ set tr) and (?evb ∈ set tr)
show ?thesis
proof cases
  assume ?eva=?x ∧ ?eva ∉ set tr

  then obtain X where X ∈ components {mb} and Nonce A NA ∈ subterms
  {X} using prems apply –
    apply (drule nonce-components-subterm)
    apply auto
    done

  with prems(5–) have
    ∃A i tsend L M'.
    ∃Z∈components {M'}.
    (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) ∈ set tr ∧
    distort X Z ∈ LowHam ∧ cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) ≠ None ∧ tsend
    ≤ t – cdist (Tx A i) (Rx B j)
    apply –
    apply (drule send-before-recv)
    apply auto
    done

  then obtain C u tcsend Lc M' Z
  where p1: (tcsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc) ∈ set tr
    and p2: distort X Z ∈ LowHam
    and p3: Z ∈ components {M'}
  by auto

  have p4: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {M'} using p1 p2 p3 ⟨Nonce A NA ∈
  subterms {X}⟩ apply –
    apply (drule distort-LowHam)
    apply auto
    apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
    apply simp
    apply (drule-tac H={M'} in subterms.trans) back
    apply auto
    apply (erule components-subset-subterms)
    done

  from (?eva=?x ∧ ?eva ∉ set tr) ⟨Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva
  (?x#tr))⟩ have
    p5: Nonce A NA ∉ used tr by auto
  from p1 p2 p3 and ⟨Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {M'}⟩ have Nonce A NA ∈
  used tr
    apply – apply (rule Send-imp-parts-used)
    apply simp
    by auto
  with p5 show ?thesis by contradiction
  next

```

```

assume  $\neg (\text{?eva} = ?x \wedge \text{?eva} \notin \text{set } tr)$ 
with prems show ?thesis by auto
qed
next
case 6
note  $(\text{?eva} = ?x) \text{ and } (\text{?evb} = ?x)$ 
with evbneqx show ?thesis by auto
next
case 4
note  $(\text{?eva} \in \text{set } tr) \text{ and } \text{beq} = (\text{?evb} = ?x) \text{ and } (\text{?eva} \neq ?x)$ 
with evbneqx show ?thesis by auto
next
case 5
note  $(\text{?evb} \in \text{set } tr) \text{ and } (\text{?eva} = ?x) \text{ and } (\text{?evb} \neq ?x)$ 

thm prems
then obtain X where  $X \in \text{components } \{mb\}$  and Nonce A NA  $\in$  subterms {X}
using prems(5-) apply -
  apply (drule-tac S={mb} in nonce-components-subterm)
  apply auto
done

with prems(5-) have
 $\exists A i tsend L M'.$ 
 $\exists Z \in \text{components } \{M'\}.$ 
 $(tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) \in \text{set } tr \wedge$ 
 $\text{distort } X Z \in \text{LowHam} \wedge \text{cdistM } (Tx A i) (Rx B j) \neq \text{None} \wedge tsend \leq$ 
 $tb - \text{cdist } (Tx A i) (Rx B j)$ 
apply -
apply simp
apply (drule send-before-recv)
apply auto
done

then obtain C u tcsend Lc M' Z
where p1: (tcsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc)  $\in$  set tr
and p2: distort X Z  $\in$  LowHam
and p3: Z  $\in$  components {M'}
by auto

have p4: Nonce A NA  $\in$  subterms {M'} using p1 p2 p3  $\langle$ Nonce A NA  $\in$  subterms {X} $\rangle$  apply -
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply auto
  apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
  apply simp
  apply (drule-tac H={M'} in subterms.trans) back
  apply auto
  apply (erule components-subset-subterms)

```

```

done
show ?thesis proof cases
assume ?eva ∈ set tr
thus ?thesis using ⟨?evb ∈ set tr⟩⟨?eva=?x⟩ prems apply -
apply (rule Fake.hyps(2)) prefer 5
apply assumption
apply auto
done
next
assume ?eva ∉ set tr
with ⟨?eva=?x⟩ ⟨Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva (?x#tr))⟩ have
p5: Nonce A NA ∉ used tr by auto
from p1 p2 p3 p4 and ⟨Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {mb}⟩ have Nonce A NA
∈ used tr
apply – apply (rule Send-imp-parts-used)
apply auto
done
with p5 show ?thesis by contradiction
qed
qed

next
case (Proto tr tsend step m pEv C)
let ?x = (tsend, createEv C pEv m) and
?eva = (ta, Send (Tx A i) ma La) and ?evb = (tb, Recv (Rx B j) mb)
note caserule = set-two-elem-cases [where eva=?eva and evb=?evb
and tr=tr and x=?x]
have evbneqx: ?evb ≠ ?x by auto
from prems show ?case
proof (cases rule: caserule, simp, simp)
case 3
note ⟨?eva ∈ set tr⟩ and ⟨?evb ∈ set tr⟩
show ?thesis
proof cases
assume n: ?eva=?x ∧ ?eva ∉ set tr
then obtain X where X ∈ components {mb} and Nonce A NA ∈ subterms
{X} using prems apply –
apply (drule nonce-components-subterm)
apply auto
done

with prems(5–) have
∃ A i tsend L M'.
∃ Z ∈ components {M'}.
(tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) ∈ set tr ∧
distort X Z ∈ LowHam ∧ cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) ≠ None ∧ tsend
≤ tb – cdist (Tx A i) (Rx B j)
apply –

```

```

apply (drule send-before-recv)
apply auto
done

then obtain C u tcsend Lc M' Z
where   p1: (tcsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc) ∈ set tr
        and p2: distort X Z ∈ LowHam
        and p3: Z ∈ components {M'}
by auto

have p4: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {M'} using p1 p2 p3 ⟨Nonce A NA ∈
subterms {X}⟩ apply -
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply auto
  apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
  apply simp
  apply (drule-tac H={M'} in subterms.trans) back
  apply auto
  apply (erule components-subset-subterms)
done

from n ⟨Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva (?x#tr))⟩ have
  p5: Nonce A NA ∉ used tr by auto
from n p1 p3 p2 p4 ⟨Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {mb}⟩ have Nonce A NA ∈
used tr
  apply - apply (rule Send-imp-parts-used)
  apply simp
  by (auto dest: nonce-not-LowHam)
  with p5 show ?thesis by contradiction
next
  assume ¬ (?eva=?x ∧ ?eva ∉ set tr)
  with prems show ?thesis by auto
qed
next
  case 6
  note ⟨?eva = ?x⟩ and ⟨?evb = ?x⟩
  with evbneqx show ?thesis by auto
next
  case 4
  note ⟨?eva ∈ set tr⟩ and beq=⟨?evb = ?x⟩ and ⟨?eva ≠ ?x⟩
  with evbneqx show ?thesis by auto
next
  case 5
  note ⟨?evb ∈ set tr⟩ and ⟨?eva = ?x⟩ and ⟨?evb ≠ ?x⟩

then obtain X where X ∈ components {mb} and Nonce A NA ∈ subterms
{X} using prems(5-) apply -
  apply simp

```

```

apply (drule-tac S={mb} in nonce-components-subterm)
apply auto
done

with prems(5-) have
   $\exists A i \text{tsend } L M'.$ 
   $\exists Z \in \text{components } \{M'\}.$ 
   $(\text{tsend}, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } A \ i) \ M' \ L) \in \text{set } tr \wedge$ 
   $\text{distort } X \ Z \in \text{LowHam} \wedge \text{cdistM } (\text{Tx } A \ i) \ (\text{Rx } B \ j) \neq \text{None} \wedge \text{tsend}$ 
 $\leq tb - \text{cdist } (\text{Tx } A \ i) \ (\text{Rx } B \ j)$ 
apply -
apply simp
apply (drule-tac M=mb in send-before-recv)
apply auto
done

then obtain C u tcsend Lc M' Z
where   p1: (tcsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc) ∈ set tr
        and p2: distort X Z ∈ LowHam
        and p3: Z ∈ components {M'}
by auto

have p4: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {M'} using p1 p2 p3 ⟨Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {X}⟩ apply -
apply (drule distort-LowHam)
apply auto
apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
apply simp
apply (drule-tac H={M'} in subterms.trans) back
apply auto
apply (erule components-subset-subterms)
done

show ?thesis proof cases
assume ?eva ∈ set tr
thus ?thesis using prems apply -
apply (rule Proto.hyps(2)) prefer 5
apply assumption+ defer
apply assumption+
apply auto
done
next
assume ?eva ∉ set tr
with ⟨?eva=?x⟩ ⟨Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva (?x#tr))⟩ have
p5: Nonce A NA ∉ used tr by auto
from p1 p2 p3 p4 and ⟨Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {mb}⟩ have Nonce A NA ∈ used tr
apply - apply (rule Send-imp-parts-used)
apply auto

```

```

done
with p5 show ?thesis by contradiction
qed
qed

— trace equal to: @{term (tc + tab, Recv D mc) # tr
next
case (Con tr trecv M D l tab-l)

let ?x = (trecv, Recv (Rx D l) M) and
    ?eva = (ta, Send (Tx A i) ma La) and ?evb = (tb, Recv (Rx B j) mb)
note caserule = set-two-elem-cases [where eva=?eva and evb=?evb
                                         and tr=tr and x=?x]
have evaneqx: ?eva ≠ ?x by auto
from prems show ?case
proof (cases rule: caserule, simp, simp)
case 6
note (?eva = ?x) and (?evb = ?x)
with prems evaneqx show ?thesis by auto
next
case 5
note (?evb ∈ set tr) and (?eva = ?x) and (?evb ≠ ?x)
with prems evaneqx show ?thesis by auto
next
case 3
note (?eva ∈ set tr) and (?evb ∈ set tr)
with (Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva (?x#tr)))
have Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva tr) by auto
with prems show ?thesis by auto
next
case 4
note (?eva ∈ set tr) and beq=(?evb = ?x) and (?eva ≠ ?x)

obtain X where X ∈ components {mb} and Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {X}
using prems apply -
apply (drule-tac S={mb} in nonce-components-subterm)
apply auto
done

with prems(5-)
obtain C u tcsend Lc M' Z
where p1: (tcsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc) ∈ set tr
and p2: distort X Z ∈ LowHam
and p3: Z ∈ components {M'}
and p4: cdistM (Tx C u) (Rx D l) = Some tab-l
and p5: tcsend + tab-l ≤ trecv
by auto

have p6: Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {M'} using p1 p2 p3 (Nonce A NA ∈

```

```

subterms {X}⟩ apply –
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply auto
  apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
  apply simp
  apply (drule-tac H={M'} in subterms.trans) back
  apply auto
  apply (erule components-subset-subterms)
done

let ?evc=(tcsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc)

show ?thesis
proof cases
  assume C=A
  with prems ‹?eva ≠ ?x› have nafresh: Nonce A NA ∉ used (beforeEvent ?eva
tr)
    by auto
  with p1 prems p6 ‹Nonce A NA ∈ subterms {mb}› ‹C=A› have ?evc ∉ set
(beforEvent ?eva tr)
    apply – apply (rule nonce-orig-not-before)
    apply simp defer
    apply auto
    done
  with prems p1 ‹C=A› have p7: tcsend ≥ ta
    apply – apply (rule not-beforeEvent-later)
    apply simp apply simp
    apply simp apply simp
    done
  from p3 p2 p4 p5 beq ‹C=A› have cdist (Tx A u) (Rx B j) ≤ tb – tcsend
  apply (simp add: cdist-def)
    done
  with p7 beq also have p6: cdist (Tx A u) (Rx B j) ≤ tb – ta by auto
  with p4 p5 beq ‹C=A› have cdistl A B ≤ cdist (Tx A u) (Rx B j)
    apply – apply (unfold cdist-def, rule noflt-some) by simp
  with p6 show ?thesis by auto
next
  assume C ≠ A
  hence p7: cdistl A C ≤ tcsend – ta using prems p6
    apply –
    apply (erule-tac tr=tr in fresh-nonce-earliest-send)
    apply simp prefer 5
    apply assumption
    apply simp
    apply simp
    apply auto
    done
  from beq have eq1: tb=trecv and eq2: B=D and eq3: j=l by auto

```

```

with p4 p5 have p8: cdistl C B ≤ cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B j) apply -
  apply (unfold cdist-def, rule noflt-some) by auto
with p4 p5 eq2 eq3 eq1 have p9: tb - tcsend ≥ cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B j)
apply (auto simp add: cdist-def)
done
with cdistl-triangle have cdistl A B ≤ cdistl A C + cdistl C B
by (auto simp add: cdist-def)
also with p7 p8 p9 have ... ≤ cdistl A C + cdist (Tx C u) (Rx B j) by
auto
also with p7 p8 p9 have ... ≤ tb - ta by arith
finally show ?thesis .
qed
qed
qed

lemma (in PROTOCOL-NONONCE) nonce-usedI-view:
[] Nonce (Honest A) NA ∈ usedI tr; tr ∈ sys []
==> Nonce (Honest A) NA ∈ usedI (view A tr)
apply (auto simp add: usedI-def)
apply (rule nonce-used-view)
apply (auto)
done

lemma (in PROTOCOL-NONONCE) nonce-view-fresh:
tr ∈ sys ==>
(Nonce (Honest A) NA ∉ usedI (view A tr)) =
(Nonce (Honest A) NA ∉ usedI tr)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (erule nonce-usedI-view, simp)
apply (rule usedI-mono-snd) prefer 2
apply force
apply (auto simp add: view-def split: split-if-asm)
apply (rule image-eqI)
apply auto
done

lemma (in PROTOCOL-NONONCE) nonce-view-used:
tr ∈ sys ==>
(Nonce (Honest A) NA ∈ usedI (view A tr)) =
(Nonce (Honest A) NA ∈ usedI tr)
apply auto prefer 2
apply (erule nonce-usedI-view, simp)
apply (rule usedI-mono-snd) prefer 2
apply force
apply (auto simp add: view-def split: split-if-asm)
apply (rule image-eqI)
apply auto
done

```

```

lemma (in MESSAGE-DERIVATION) originate-unique:
  assumes m ∈ used (beforeEvent (ta, Send TA ma La) tr)
  and   m ∈ used (beforeEvent (tb, Send TB mb Lb) tr)
  and   (tb, Send TB mb Lb) ≠ (ta, Send TA ma La)
  and   (tb, Send TB mb Lb) ∈ set tr
  and   (ta, Send TA ma La) ∈ set tr
  and   m ∈ subterms {ma}
  shows m ∈ subterms {mb} using prems
  apply (induct tr)
  apply simp
  apply (case-tac a=(ta, Send TA ma La) ∧ a ∉ set tr)
  apply (elim conjE)
  apply simp
  apply (case-tac m ∈ subterms {mb}) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (subgoal-tac (tb, Send TB mb Lb) ∈ set tr) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (frule-tac Y=m in Send-imp-parts-used)
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (case-tac a=(tb, Send TB mb Lb) ∧ a ∉ set tr)
  apply (elim conjE)
  apply simp
  apply (subgoal-tac (ta, Send TA ma La) ∈ set tr) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (frule-tac Y=m in Send-imp-parts-used)
  apply force
  apply force
  apply auto
done

end

```

## 21 Systems with constant local-clock Offsets

```

theory SystemCoffset imports SystemSimps SystemOrigination begin

consts
  offset :: friendid ⇒ time

specification (clocktime)
  clocktime-coff[simp] : clocktime A t = t + offset A
  apply auto
done

locale PROTOCOL-DELTAONLY = PROTOCOL +
  assumes proto-time-delta:
    step ∈ proto ==>

```

```
(step (timetrans A tr) A (clocktime A t)) =
(step tr A t)
```

**lemma (in PROTOCOL-DELTAONLY) view-timetrans1:**

**assumes a:**

```
( $\bigwedge tr t step m pEv A$ .
  [ $\exists tr \in sys-param; P tr; maxtime tr \leq t$ ;
    $\exists step \in proto; (m,pEv) \in step (timetrans A tr) A (clocktime A t)$ ]
   $\implies P ((t,createEv A pEv m)\#tr))$ 
```

**shows**

```
( $\bigwedge tr t step m pEv A$ .
  [ $\exists tr \in sys-param; P tr; maxtime tr \leq t$ ;
    $\exists step \in proto; (m,pEv) \in step tr A t$ ]
   $\implies P ((t,createEv A pEv m)\#tr))$ 
```

**proof –**

```
fix tr t step m pEv A
assume step ∈ proto and (m,pEv) ∈ step tr A t and
      tr ∈ sys-param and P tr and t ≥ maxtime tr
thus P ((t, createEv A pEv m) # tr) apply –
  apply (rule a [where t=t and A=A, simplified])
  apply force prefer 3
  apply assumption
  apply (auto simp add: proto-time-delta [simplified])
done
```

qed

**lemma (in PROTOCOL-DELTAONLY) view-timetrans2:**

**assumes a:**

```
( $\bigwedge tr t step m pEv A$ .
  [ $\exists tr \in sys-param; P tr; maxtime tr \leq t$ ;
    $\exists step \in proto; (m,pEv) \in step tr A t$ ]
   $\implies P ((t,createEv A pEv m)\#tr))$ 
```

**shows**

```
( $\bigwedge tr t step m pEv A$ .
  [ $\exists tr \in sys-param; P tr; maxtime tr \leq t$ ;
    $\exists step \in proto; (m,pEv) \in step (timetrans A tr) A (clocktime A t)$ ]
   $\implies P ((t,createEv A pEv m)\#tr))$ 
```

**proof –**

```
fix step m t pEv A tr
assume step ∈ proto and (m,pEv) ∈ step (timetrans A tr) A (clocktime A t)
and
      tr ∈ sys-param and P tr and t ≥ maxtime tr
thus P ((t,createEv A pEv m)\#tr) apply –
  apply (rule a [where t=t and A=A, simplified])
  apply (auto simp add: proto-time-delta [simplified])
done
```

qed

```

lemma (in PROTOCOL-DELTAONLY) timetrans-removable:
  ( $\bigwedge tr t step m pEv A.$ 
   [ $tr \in sys\text{-}param; P tr; maxtime tr \leq t;$ 
     $step \in proto; (m, pEv) \in step (timetrans A tr) A (clocktime A t)$ ]
    $\implies P ((t, createEv A pEv m) \# tr))$ )
  ==
  ( $\bigwedge tr t step m pEv A.$ 
   [ $tr \in sys\text{-}param; P tr; maxtime tr \leq t; step \in proto; (m, pEv) \in step tr A t$ ]
    $\implies P ((t, createEv A pEv m) \# tr))$ )
  apply (rule Pure.equal-intr-rule)
  apply (rule view-timetrans1)
  apply auto
  apply (rule view-timetrans2)
  apply auto
  done

```

**locale** PROTOCOL-DELTA-EXEC = PROTOCOL-DELTAONLY + PROTOCOL-EXECUTABLE

These two only hold if PROTOCOL\_EXECUTABLE is instantiated with sys, e.g. the first equality holds

```

lemma (in PROTOCOL-DELTA-EXEC) sys-Proto-exec:
  [ $sys = sys\text{-}param; tr \in sys\text{-}param; maxtime tr \leq t;$ 
    $step \in proto; (m, pEv) \in step (timetrans A tr) A (clocktime A t)$ ]
   $\implies (t, createEv A pEv m) \# tr \in sys$ 
  apply (rule sys_PROTO)
  apply force
  apply force apply force
  apply (subst events-occur-at)
  apply force apply force apply force
  apply (rule messages-derivableI)
  apply force
  apply (subst events-occur-at)
  apply auto
  done

```

```

lemma (in PROTOCOL-DELTA-EXEC) sys-Proto:
  [ $sys = sys\text{-}param; step \in proto; (m, pEv) \in step tr A t;$ 
    $tr \in sys\text{-}param; maxtime tr \leq t$ ]
   $\implies (t, createEv A pEv m) \# tr \in sys$ 
  apply (subgoal-tac (t, createEv A pEv m) # tr  $\in sys$ )
  apply force
  apply (rule sys-Proto-exec)
  apply force
  apply force defer
  apply force
  apply (simp only: proto-time-delta)
  apply force
  done

```

```

lemma in-timetrans:
   $((t, e) \in \text{set}(\text{timetrans } A \text{ } tr)) = ((t - \text{coffset } A, e) \in \text{set } tr)$ 
  apply (auto simp add: timetrans-def intro!: bexI)
done

end

```

**22 Security Analysis of a fixed version of the Brands-Chaum protocol that uses implicit binding to prevent Distance Hijacking attacks.** We prove that the resulting protocol is secure in our model. Note that we abstract away from the individual bits exchanged in the rapid bit exchange phase, by performing the message exchange in 2 steps instead  $2^*k$  steps.

```

theory BrandsChaum-implicit imports SystemCoffset SystemOrigination MessageTheoryXor3 begin

```

```

locale INITSTATE-SIG-NN = INITSTATE-PKSIG + INITSTATE-NONONCE

```

**definition**

```

initStateMd :: agent  $\Rightarrow$  msg set where
initStateMd A == Key‘({priSK A}  $\cup$  (pubSK‘UNIV))

```

**interpretation** INITSTATE-SIG-NN Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components

initStateMd Key

```

apply (unfold-locales, auto simp add: initStateMd-def dest: injective-symKey)
apply (drule subterms.singleton)
apply (auto dest: injective-symKey)
apply (drule subterms.singleton)
apply (auto dest: injective-symKey)
apply (drule subterms.singleton)
apply (auto dest: injective-symKey simp add: MACM-def)
done

```

**definition**

md1 :: msg step

**where**

md1 tr P t =

```

(UN NP. {ev. ev = ( Hash { Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent (Honest P)}}
, SendEv 0 [Number 1, Nonce (Honest P) NP])}  $\wedge$ 

```

*Nonce (Honest P) NP  $\notin$  usedI tr}*

**definition**

*md2 :: msg step*

**where**

*md2 tr V t =*  
 $(UN NV COM trec.$   
 $\{ev. ev = (Nonce (Honest V) NV, SendEv 0 [Number 2, COM, Nonce (Honest V) NV]) \wedge$   
 $Nonce (Honest V) NV \notin \text{usedI tr} \wedge$   
 $(trec, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) COM) \in \text{set tr}\})$

**definition**

*md3 :: msg step*

**where**

*md3 tr P t =*  
 $(UN NP NV trec tsend1 COM.$   
 $\{ev. ev = (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P) NP)$   
 $, SendEv 1 [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV]) \wedge$   
 $(\forall t m nv k. (t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) m [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, nv]) \notin \text{set tr}) \wedge$   
 $(tsend1, Send (Tr (Honest P)) COM [Number 1, Nonce (Honest P) NP]) \in \text{set tr} \wedge$   
 $(trec, Recv (Rec (Honest P)) NV) \in \text{set tr}\})$

**definition**

*md4 :: msg step*

**where**

*md4 tr P t =*  
 $(UN NP NV V tsend trecv.$   
 $\{ev. ev = (Crypt (priSK (Honest P))$   
 $\{\{NV, \{Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent V\}\}$   
 $, SendEv 0 \}) \wedge$   
 $(trecv, Recv (Rec (Honest P)) NV) \in \text{set tr} \wedge (* \text{ not strictly necessary}$   
 $*)$   
 $(tsend, Send (Tu (Honest P))$   
 $(Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P) NP))$   
 $[Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV])$   
 $\in \text{set tr}\})$

**definition**

*md5 :: msg step*

**where**

*md5 tr V t =*

$(UN NP NV P trec1 trec2 tsend CHAL.$   
 $\{ev. ev = (\{\{Agent P, Real ((trec1 - tsend) * vc/2)\}, ClaimEv) \wedge$   
 $P \neq (Honest V) \wedge (* \text{FIXME: would be nice to remove this} *)$   
 $(trec2, Recv (Rec (Honest V)))$

```

( Crypt (priSK P)
  {Nonce (Honest V) NV, {NP, Agent (Honest V)}{}})) ∈ set tr ∧
(trec1, Recv (Ru (Honest V)) (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) NP)) ∈
set tr ∧
(tsend, Send (Tr (Honest V)) CHAL [Number 2, Hash {NP, Agent P} ,
Nonce (Honest V) NV ]) ∈ set tr}

```

**definition**

```

mdproto :: msg proto where
mdproto = {md1,md2,md3,md4,md5}

```

```
lemmas md-defs = mdproto-def md1-def md2-def md3-def md4-def md5-def
```

```
locale PROTOCOL-MD = PROTOCOL-PKSIG-NOKEYS+PROTOCOL-NONONCE+INITSTATE-SIG-N
```

```

interpretation PROTOCOL-MD Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number parts sub-
terms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd Key mdproto
apply (unfold-locales)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs messagesProtoTr-def messagesProtoTrHonest-def
      initStateMd-def
      split: event.split split-if dest: parts.fst-set)
apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule parts-Key-Xor)
apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac t=trec in view-elem-ex)
apply auto

apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac t=trecv in view-elem-ex)
apply auto
done

```

Agents only look at their own views and all messages are derivable.

```

interpretation PROTOCOL-EXECUTABLE Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number
parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd mdproto sys Key
apply (unfold-locales)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs initStateMd-def
      messagesProto-def messagesProtoTrHonest-def MACM-def)

apply (rule DM.Hash)
apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply force
apply force

apply (rule DM.Xor)

```

```

apply (drule view-elem-ex)
apply (erule exE)
apply (drule Recv-imp-knows-A)
apply force
apply force

apply (rule DM.Crypt)
apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply (drule view-elem-ex)
apply (erule exE)
apply (drule Recv-imp-knows-A)
apply force

apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply force
apply force
apply force

apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply force
apply force

apply (auto simp add: nonce-view-fresh [simplified mdproto-def]
         nonce-view-used [simplified mdproto-def]
         recv-a-view-a-r send-a-view-a-r)

```

  

```

apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply auto defer

apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=tsend in exI)
apply (force simp add: view-def in-timetrans)
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend in exI)
apply auto
apply (force simp add: view-def in-timetrans)
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply auto defer
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply auto

```

```

apply (rule-tac x=tsend in exI)
apply (force simp add: view-def in-timetrans)
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend in exI)
apply (force simp add: view-def in-timetrans)
apply (force simp add: view-def in-timetrans)
apply (auto simp add: view-def in-timetrans)
apply (erule-tac x=a + coffset A in allE)
apply (erule-tac x=m in allE)
apply (erule-tac x=nv in allE)
apply (erule-tac x=k in allE)
apply (auto simp add: view-def in-timetrans)
done

```

Agent behaviour does not change with constant clock errors.

```

interpretation PROTOCOL-DELTAONLY Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number
parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd Key mdproto
apply unfold-locales
apply (auto simp add: md-defs in-timetrans)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply auto

apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply auto defer
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 - coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 - coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend - coffset A in exI)
apply auto
apply (simp add: sign-simps)

apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=trec + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=tsend1 + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule-tac x=trec + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI) apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=trecv + coffset A in exI)
apply force

```

```

apply (rule-tac x=tsend + coffset A in exI, force)

apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI) apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 + coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 + coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend + coffset A in exI)
apply auto
apply (simp add: sign-simps)
apply (erule-tac x=t + coffset A in allE)
apply (erule-tac x=m in allE)
apply (erule-tac x=nv in allE)
apply (erule-tac x=k in allE)
apply auto
done

```

**interpretation** PROTOCOL-DELTA-EXEC Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number  
 parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components  
 initStateMd Key mdproto sys  
**by** unfold-locales

## 22.1 Direct Definition for Brands-Chaum Variant

**inductive-set**

*mdb* :: (*msg trace*) set

**where**

Nil [intro] : [] ∈ *mdb*

| *Fake*:

[ $\exists tr \in mdb; t \geq maxtime tr;$

$X \in DM (Intruder I) (knowsI (Intruder I) tr)$  ]

$\implies (t, Send (Tx (Intruder I) j) X []) \# tr \in mdb$

| *Con* :

[ $\exists tr \in mdb; trecv \geq maxtime tr;$

$\forall X \in components \{M\}.$

$\exists tsend A i M' L.$

$\exists Y \in components \{M'\}.$

$(tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) \in set tr \wedge$

$cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) = Some tab \wedge tsend + tab \leq trecv \wedge Xor X$

$Y \in LowHamXor$  ]

$\implies (trecv, Recv (Rx B j) M) \# tr \in mdb$

| *MD1*:

[ $\exists tr \in mdb; t \geq maxtime tr;$

$\neg (used tr (Nonce (Honest P) NP))$  ]

$\implies (t, Send (Tr (Honest P)) (Hash \{Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent (Honest P)\}) [Number 1, Nonce (Honest P) NP]) \# tr \in mdb$

```

| MD2:
  [ tr ∈ mdb; t >= maxtime tr;
    (trec, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) COM) ∈ set tr;
    ⊨ (used tr (Nonce (Honest V) NV)) ]
    ⇒ (t, Send (Tr (Honest V)) (Nonce (Honest V) NV) [Number 2, COM,
      Nonce (Honest V) NV]) # tr ∈ mdb

| MD3:
  [ tr ∈ mdb; tsend >= maxtime tr;
    (trec, Recv (Rec (Honest P)) NV) ∈ set tr;
    (tsend2, Send (Tr (Honest P)) COM [Number 1, Nonce (Honest P) NP]) ∈
      set tr;
    ( ∀ t m nv k. (t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) m [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P)
      NP, nv]) ) ∈ set tr ]
    ⇒ (tsend, Send (Tu (Honest P))
      (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P) NP))
      [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV])
    # tr ∈ mdb

| MD4:
  [ tr ∈ mdb; tsend >= maxtime tr;
    (trecv, Recv (Rec (Honest P)) NV) ∈ set tr;
    (t, Send (Tu (Honest P))
      (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P) NP))
      [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV])
    ∈ set tr ]
    ⇒ (tsend,
      Send (Tr (Honest P))
      (Crypt (priSK (Honest P))
        { NV, { Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent V } } ) )
    # tr ∈ mdb

| MD5:
  [ tr ∈ mdb; tdone ≥ maxtime tr;
    (trec2, Recv (Rec (Honest V)))
    ( Crypt (priSK P)
      { Nonce (Honest V) NV, { NP, Agent (Honest V) } } )
    ∈ set tr;
    (trec1, Recv (Ru (Honest V)) (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) NP))
    ∈ set tr;
    (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest V)) CHAL [Number 2, Hash { NP, Agent P },
      Nonce (Honest V) NV ]) ∈ set tr;
    P ≠ Honest V ]
    ⇒ (tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent P, Real ((trec1 - tsend) * vc/2)} ) # tr
    ∈ mdb

```

obtain a simpler induction rule for protocol since it is executable and deltaonly

**lemmas** proto-induct =

sys.induct [simplified derivable-removable remove-occursAt timetrans-removable]

## 22.2 Equality for direct and parameterized Definition

We now show that both inductive definitions define the same set of traces.

```

lemma abstr-equal: mdb = sys
proof auto
fix tr
assume r: tr ∈ sys
show tr ∈ mdb using r
proof (induct tr rule: proto-induct)
case 1 with prems show ?case by auto
next
case 2 with prems show ?case by (auto intro: mdb.Nil)
next
case 4 with prems show ?case apply -
  apply (rule mdb.Con)
  apply auto
done
next
case 3 with prems show ?case
  by (auto intro: mdb.Fake)
next
case 5
thus ?case
  apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
  apply (auto intro!: mdb.MD1 mdb.MD2 mdb.MD3 [simplified] mdb.MD4
mdb.MD5 simp add: usedI-def)
  apply (auto simp add: mem-def usedI-def)
done
qed
next
fix tr
assume r: tr ∈ mdb
show tr ∈ sys using r
proof(induct tr rule: mdb.induct)
case Nil
with prems show ?case by auto
next
case (Fake tr ts X I j)
with prems show ?case by (auto intro: sys.Fake)
next
case (Con tr)
with prems show ?case apply - apply (rule sys.Con) by auto
next
case (MD1 tr ts A NA)
with prems have (ts,createEv A (SendEv 0 [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A)
NA])) (Hash {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)})) # tr ∈ sys
apply -
apply (rule-tac step=md1 in sys-Proto-exec)
apply force

```

```

apply force
apply force
apply (force simp add: mdproto-def)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
apply (rule-tac x=NA in exI)
apply auto
apply (auto simp add: usedI-def initStateMd-def)
apply (force simp: mem-def)
apply (drule subterms.singleton)
apply auto
done
thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
case (MD2 tr tsend trecv V COM NV)
with prems have
  (tsend,
   createEv V
     (SendEv 0 [Number 2, COM,Nonce (Honest V) NV])
     (Nonce (Honest V) NV))
  # tr ∈ sys
apply – apply (rule-tac step=md2 in sys-Proto)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs usedI-def)
apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
done
thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
case (MD3 tr tsend trecv P NV tsend2 COM NP)
with prems have
  (tsend,
   createEv P (SendEv 1 [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV])
     (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P) (NP)))) # tr ∈ sys
apply – apply (rule-tac step=md3 in sys-Proto)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
done
thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
case (MD5 tr tdone trec2 V P NV NP trec1 tsend CHA)
with prems have
  (tdone, createEv V ClaimEv {Agent P, Real ((trec1 – tsend) * vc/2)}) # tr
  ∈ sys
apply – apply (rule-tac step=md5 in sys-Proto)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
apply (intro exI conjI)
apply auto
done
thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
case (MD4 tr tsend trecv P NV t NP V)
with prems have

```

```

(tsend, createEv P (SendEv 0 []))
  (Crypt (priSK (Honest P))
    {NV, {Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent V}}}) # tr ∈ sys
apply – apply (rule-tac step=md4 in sys-Proto)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
done
thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
qed
qed

```

lemmas [simp,intro] = abstr-equal [THEN sym]

### 22.3 Some invariants capturing the Behavior of honest Agents

```

lemma nonce-fresh-challenge:
assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb and
  send: (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) CHAL [Number 2, COM, Nonce (Honest
A) NA]) ∈ set tr
shows Nonce (Honest A) NA
  ∉ usedI (beforeEvent (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) CHAL [Number 2,
COM, Nonce (Honest A) NA]) tr)
using prems(1–)
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsend) with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr tc C mc D tab) with Con.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD1 tr t P' NP' A')
  thus ?case using MD1.hyps prems by auto
next
  case (MD2 tr t-l trec-l V-l COM-l NV-l A)
  thus ?case using MD2.hyps prems
    apply auto
    apply (auto simp add: usedI-def initStateMd-def)
    apply (force simp add: mem-def)
    apply (drule subterms.singleton)
    apply auto
    done
next
  case (MD4 tr tsend trecv P NV t NP V A)
  with MD4.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD5 tr tdone trec2 V P NV NP trc1 tsend CHAL A)
  with MD5.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (MD3 tr tsend-l trec-l P-l NV-l tsend2-l COM-l NP-l A)
  let ?sendev = (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) CHAL [Number 2, COM, Nonce

```

```

(Honest A) NA]
have ?sendev ∈ set tr using prems by auto
thus ?case apply -
  apply (drule prems(4))
  apply auto
done
qed

lemma nonce-fresh-commit:
assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb and
  send: (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Hash {NP, Agent P})
  [Number 1, NP]) ∈ set tr
shows
  ( $\exists$  NA.
    P = Honest A  $\wedge$ 
    NP = Nonce (Honest A) NA  $\wedge$ 
    Nonce (Honest A) NA
     $\notin$  usedI (beforeEvent
      (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Hash {Nonce (Honest A) NA,
      Agent (Honest A)}))
      [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A) NA])) tr))
  using mdb send
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsend) with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr tc C mc D tab) with Con.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD2 tr t trec V COM NV A')
  thus ?case using MD2.hyps prems by auto
next
  case (MD3 tr tsend trec P' NV tsend1 COM NP A')
  with MD3.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD4 tr tsend trecv P NV t NP V A)
  with MD4.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD5 tr tdone trec2 V P NV NP trc1 tsend CHAL A)
  with MD5.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (MD1 tr t P' NP' A')
  let ?eva = (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A') i) (Hash {NP, Agent P}) [Number 1,
  NP])
  let ?newev = (t, Send (Tr (Honest P')) (Hash {Nonce (Honest P') NP', Agent
  (Honest P')}))
  [Number 1, Nonce (Honest P') NP'])
  show ?case proof cases
  assume eq: ?eva = ?newev

```

```

thus ?case using MD1.hyps prems apply -
  apply (rule-tac x=NP' in exI)
  apply (simp add: usedI-def)
  apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
  done
next
  assume ?eva ≠ ?newev
  hence ?eva ∈ set tr using ⟨?eva ∈ set (?newev#tr)⟩ by auto
  thus ?case apply -
    apply (frule MD1.hyps(2))
    apply (elim conjE exE)
    apply auto
    done
qed
qed

lemma nonce-fresh-commit2:
  assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb and
    send: (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Hash {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)}))
    [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A) NA])
    ∈ set tr
  shows Nonce (Honest A) NA
    ∉ usedI (beforeEvent
      (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Hash {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)})))
    [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A) NA])
    tr)
  using mdb send
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsend) with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr tc C mc D tab) with Con.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD2 tr t trec V COM NV A')
    thus ?case using MD2.hyps prems by auto
next
  case (MD3 tr tsend trec P' NV tsend1 COM NP A')
    with MD3.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD4 tr tsend trecv P NV t NP V A)
    with MD4.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD5 tr tdone trec2 V P NV NP trc1 tsend CHAL A)
    with MD5.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (MD1 tr t P' NP' A')

```

```

let ?eva = (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A') i) (Hash {Nonce (Honest A') NA, Agent (Honest A')}))
[Number 1, Nonce (Honest A') NA]
let ?newev = (t, Send (Tr (Honest P')) (Hash {Nonce (Honest P') NP', Agent (Honest P')}))
[Number 1, Nonce (Honest P') NP']
show ?case proof cases
assume eq: ?eva = ?newev
thus ?case using MD1.hyps prems apply -
apply (simp add: usedI-def)
apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
done
next
assume ?eva ≠ ?newev
hence ?eva ∈ set tr using (?eva ∈ set (?newev#tr)) by auto
thus ?case apply -
apply (frule MD1.hyps(2))
apply auto
done
qed
qed

lemma outside-hash-deducible-implies-received:
assumes sys-proto: tr ∈ mdb
and ded: m ∈ DM B (knowsI B tr)
and neq: B ≠ A
and protected: out-context (Nonce A NA) (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A})
m
shows ∃ trs X i.
(trs, Recv (Rx B i) X) ∈ set tr
∧ out-context (Nonce A NA) (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}) X
using ded sys-proto neq protected
proof (induct rule: DM.induct)
case (Agent ag)
thus ?thesis apply - by (auto dest: out-context-inverse)
next
case (Number n)
thus ?thesis apply - by (auto dest: out-context-inverse)
next
case (Real n)
thus ?thesis apply - by (auto dest: out-context-inverse)
next
case (Nonce n)
thus ?thesis apply - by (auto dest: out-context-inverse)
next
case (Inj Y)
thus ?thesis apply -
apply clar simp
apply (drule knowsI-A-imp-Recv-initState)

```

```

apply (auto simp add: initStateMd-def knowsI-def)
apply (drule out-context-imp-subterms)
apply auto
apply (drule out-context-imp-subterms)
apply auto
done
next
case (MPair Y Z)
thus ?thesis apply -
  apply auto
  apply (drule out-context-inverse)
  apply auto
done
next
case (Crypt Y K)
thus ?thesis apply -
  apply auto
  apply (drule out-context-inverse)
  apply auto
done
next
case (Hash Y)
thus ?thesis apply -
  apply auto
  apply (drule out-context-inverse)
  apply auto
done
next
case (Xor Y Z)
thus ?thesis apply -
  apply auto
  apply (drule out-context-inverse)
  apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac out-context (Nonce A NA) (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
Y
  ∨ out-context (Nonce A NA) (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A})
Z)
  apply force
  apply (drule factors-Xor-Nonce)
  apply auto
  apply (case-tac Y = Nonce A NA)
  apply auto
  apply (case-tac Z = Nonce A NA)
  apply auto defer

apply (drule-tac k=k in out-context.Crypt)
apply force
apply (drule factors-Xor-Crypt)

```

```

apply auto
apply (case-tac Y = (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
apply auto
apply (case-tac Z = (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
apply auto

apply (drule-tac Y=Ya in out-context.PairL)
apply force
apply (drule factors-Xor-MPair)
apply auto
apply (case-tac Y = (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
apply auto
apply (case-tac Z = (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
apply auto

apply (drule-tac Y=Ya in out-context.PairR)
apply force
apply (drule factors-Xor-MPair)
apply auto
apply (case-tac Y = (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
apply auto
apply (case-tac Z = (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
apply auto

apply (drule factors-Xor)
apply auto
apply (case-tac Y = (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
apply auto
apply (case-tac Z = (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
apply auto

apply (drule out-context-inverse)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac out-context.Hash)
apply force
apply (drule factors-Xor-Hash)
apply auto
apply (case-tac Y = (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
apply auto
apply (case-tac Z = (Hash {Nonce A NA, Agent A}))
apply auto
done
next
  case (Fst Y Z)
  thus ?thesis by auto
next
  case (Snd Y Z)
  thus ?thesis by auto
next

```

```

case (Decrypt K Y)
  thus ?thesis by auto
qed

lemma prover-step-1:
   $\llbracket tr \in mdb; (t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) COM [Number 1, Nonce (Honest P) NP]) \in set tr \rrbracket \implies COM = Hash \{Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent (Honest P)\}$ 
  apply (induct rule: mdb.induct)
  by auto

lemma prover-step-3-unique:
  assumes mdb:  $tr \in mdb$ 
  and step:  $(t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) RESP [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV]) \in set tr$ 
  and step':  $(t', Send (Tx (Honest P) k') RESP' [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV']) \in set tr$ 
  shows NV = NV'
  using mdb step step'
  apply (induct rule: mdb.induct)
  apply auto
done

lemma prover-step-3-unique-all:
  assumes mdb:  $tr \in mdb$ 
  and step:  $(t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) RESP [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV]) \in set tr$ 
  and step':  $(t', Send (Tx (Honest P) k') RESP' [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV']) \in set tr$ 
  shows NV = NV'  $\wedge$  t = t'  $\wedge$  RESP = RESP'  $\wedge$  NV = NV'  $\wedge$  k = k'
  using mdb step step'
  apply (induct rule: mdb.induct)
  apply auto
done

lemma verifier-claim-not-himself:
  assumes mdb:  $tr \in mdb$ 
  and step:  $(t, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent P, d\}) \in set tr$ 
  shows P  $\neq$  Honest V
  using mdb step
  apply (induct rule: mdb.induct)
  apply auto
done

lemma prover-step-3:
  assumes mdb:  $tr \in mdb$ 
  and step:  $(t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) RESP [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P)$ 

```

```

 $NP, NV]) \in set tr$ 
shows  $RESP = (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P) NP)) \wedge$ 
 $(\exists trecv. (trecv, Recv (Rec (Honest P)) NV) \in set$ 
 $(beforeEvent (t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P)$ 
 $NP)))$ 
 $[Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP,$ 
 $NV]) tr))$ 
using mdb step
proof (induct arbitrary: t P k RESP NV NP rule: mdb.induct)
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
  next
    case (Fake tr t-fake X-fake I j-fake t P k RESP NV NP)
    thus ?case by (auto dest: prems(4))
  next
    case (Con tr)
    thus ?case by (auto dest: prems(4))
  next
    case (MD1 tr- t- P- NP- t P k RESP NV NP)
    thus ?case by (auto dest: prems(4))
  next
    case MD2
    thus ?case apply -
      apply clarsimp
      apply (elim disjE)
      apply force
      apply (drule prems(4))
      by auto
  next
    case MD4
    thus ?case by (auto dest: prems(4))
  next
    case MD5
    thus ?case by (auto dest: prems(4))
  next
    case (MD3 tr tsend3 trec3 P3 NV3 tsend2-3 COM3 NP3 t P k RESP NV NP)
    let ?newev = (tsend3,
      Send (Tu (Honest P3)) (Xor NV3 (Nonce (Honest P3) NP3)) [Number 3,
      Nonce (Honest P3) NP3, NV3])
    let ?ev = (t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) RESP [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P)
      NP, NV])
    show ?case proof cases
      assume ?newev \in set tr
      hence intr: (t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) RESP [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P)
        NP, NV]) \in set tr
        using prems(8) apply -
        apply auto
        done
      show ?case proof cases
        assume ?newev = ?ev

```

```

have seteq: set ((tsend3, Send (Tu (Honest P3)) (Xor NV3 (Nonce (Honest P3) NP3)))
  [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P3) NP3, NV3]) # tr)
  = set tr using prems(10)
apply force
done
thus ?case using prems(3-) apply -
  apply (simp (no-asm-use) add: seteq)
  apply (drule prems(4))
  apply (rule conjI)
  apply simp
  apply (intro impI conjI)
  apply force
  apply (elim exE)
  apply (drule beforeEvent-subset)
  apply force
  apply auto
  done
next
assume ?newev ≠ ?ev
hence before: RESP = (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P) NP)) ==>
  beforeEvent (t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P) NP))
    [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV])
  ((tsend3, Send (Tu (Honest P3)) (Xor NV3 (Nonce (Honest P3)
    NP3)))
    [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P3) NP3, NV3]) # tr) =
  beforeEvent (t, Send (Tx (Honest P) k) (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P) NP))
    [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV]) tr
  apply auto
  done
thus ?case using prems(3-) intr apply -
  apply (drule-tac t=t in prems(4))
  apply (rule conjI)
  apply force
  apply (elim conjE exE)
  apply (rule-tac x=trecv in exI)
  apply (subst before)
  apply force
  apply assumption
  done
qed
next
assume ?newev ∉ set tr
show ?case proof cases
assume ?newev = ?ev
thus ?case using prems(3-) apply -
  apply (rule conjI)
  apply force
  apply (rule-tac x=trec3 in exI)

```

```

apply (subgoal-tac NV=NV3) prefer 2
apply force
apply simp
done
next
assume ?newev ≠ ?ev
thus ?case using prems(3-) apply -
  apply clar simp
  apply (elim disjE conjE)
  apply simp
  apply (drule prems(4))
  apply auto
done
qed
qed
qed

lemma out-context-componentsE-raw:
  [ normed M; out-context (Nonce B NB) (Hash {Nonce B NB, Agent B}) X;
    X ∈ components {Abs-msg M} ]
  ⇒ out-context (Nonce B NB) (Hash {Nonce B NB, Agent B}) (Abs-msg M)
apply (subgoal-tac M ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (induct rule: normed.induct)
apply (auto simp add: components-def Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (subgoal-tac Abs-msg (MPAIR a b) = MPair (Abs-msg a) (Abs-msg b))
prefer 2
apply (simp add: MPair-def)
apply simp
apply (rule out-context.PairL) prefer 2
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac ∃ ma. Abs-msg m = Abs-msg ma ∧ ma ∈ fcomponents a)
prefer 2
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac a ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply auto

apply (subgoal-tac Abs-msg (MPAIR a b) = MPair (Abs-msg a) (Abs-msg b))
prefer 2
apply (simp add: MPair-def)
apply simp
apply (rule out-context.PairR) prefer 2
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac ∃ ma. Abs-msg m = Abs-msg ma ∧ ma ∈ fcomponents b)
prefer 2
apply (force)
apply (subgoal-tac b ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)

```

```

apply auto
done

lemma out-context-componentsE:

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket \text{out-context } (\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}) (\text{Hash } \{\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}, \text{Agent } B\}) X; \\ & \quad X \in \text{components } \{M\} \rrbracket \\ & \implies \text{out-context } (\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}) (\text{Hash } \{\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}, \text{Agent } B\}) M \end{aligned}$$

apply (subgoal-tac normed (Rep-msg M)  $\wedge$  Abs-msg (Rep-msg M) = M)
apply (elim conjE)
apply (drule out-context-componentsE-raw)
apply auto
apply (simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
done

lemma out-context-componentsI-raw:

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket \text{normed } M; \text{out-context } (\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}) (\text{Hash } \{\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}, \text{Agent } B\}) (\text{Abs-msg } M) \rrbracket \\ & \implies \exists X \in \text{components } \{\text{Abs-msg } M\}. \text{out-context } (\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}) (\text{Hash } \{\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}, \text{Agent } B\}) X \end{aligned}$$

apply (subgoal-tac M ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (induct rule: normed.induct)
apply (auto simp add: components-def Abs-msg-inverse)
apply (subgoal-tac Abs-msg (MPAIR a b) = MPair (Abs-msg a) (Abs-msg b))
prefer 2
apply (simp add: MPair-def)
apply simp
apply (drule out-context-inverse)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac a ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac b ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply auto
done

lemma out-context-componentsI:

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket \text{out-context } (\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}) (\text{Hash } \{\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}, \text{Agent } B\}) M \rrbracket \\ & \implies \exists X \in \text{components } \{M\}. \text{out-context } (\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}) (\text{Hash } \{\text{Nonce } B \text{ NB}, \text{Agent } B\}) X \end{aligned}$$

apply (subgoal-tac normed (Rep-msg M)  $\wedge$  Abs-msg (Rep-msg M) = M)
apply (elim conjE)
apply (drule out-context-componentsI-raw)
apply auto
apply (simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)
done

lemma nonce-use-outside:

```

```

assumes mdb:      tr ∈ mdb
  and nonce:    (tsend, Send (Tx (Honest B) k)
                  (Hash {Nonce (Honest B) NB, Agent (Honest B)}))
  [Number 1, Nonce (Honest B) NB])
  ∈ set tr
  and oev:       oev ∈ set tr
  and msg:       oev = (t, Send (Tx A i) m L) ∨ oev = (t, Recv (Rx A i) m)
  and outside:   out-context (Nonce (Honest B) NB) (Hash {Nonce (Honest
B) NB, Agent (Honest B)}) m
shows ∃ NV Y trep.
  (((trep, Send (Tu (Honest B)) Y [Number 3, Nonce (Honest B) NB,
NV]))
  ∈ set (beforeEvent oev tr))
  ∨ (oev = (trep, Send (Tu (Honest B)) Y [Number 3, Nonce (Honest B)
NB, NV])
  ∧ (trep, Send (Tu (Honest B)) Y [Number 3, Nonce (Honest B) NB,
NV])
  ∈ set tr))
  ∧ (t ≥ trep + cdistl (Honest B) A)
using mdb nonce oev msg outside
proof (induct arbitrary: B k X NB A i m L t tsend oev)
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr trecv-l M-l B-l j-l tab-l)
  let ?lastev = (trecv-l, Recv (Rx B-l j-l) M-l)
  let ?recvev = (t, Recv (Rx A i) m)
  let ?sendev = (t, Send (Tx A i) m L)

  show ?case proof cases
    assume ?sendev ∈ set tr ∧ ?sendev = oev
    thus ?case using prems(5-) apply -
      apply clarsimp
      apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?sendev])
      apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
      done
  next
    assume ¬ (?sendev ∈ set tr ∧ ?sendev = oev)
    hence r-oev: ?recvev = oev using prems by auto
    thus ?case proof cases
      assume ?recvev ∈ set tr
      thus ?case using prems(5-) r-oev apply -
        apply clarsimp
        apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?recvev])
        apply auto
        done
    next
      assume notintr: ?recvev ∉ set tr
      hence ?lastev = ?recvev using prems by auto

```

```

then obtain X where
  comp:  $X \in \text{components } \{M-l\}$  and
  out:  $\text{out-context } (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } B) \text{ NB}) (\text{Hash } \{\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } B) \text{ NB},$ 
  Agent  $(\text{Honest } B)\}) X$ 
  using prems(6–) apply –
  apply clar simp
  apply (drule-tac M=m in out-context-componentsI)
  apply (elim bxE)
  apply auto
  done

thus ?case using prems(6–13) notinr r-oev comp out apply –
  apply clar simp
  apply (erule-tac x=X in ballE) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (elim exE conjE bxE)
  apply (drule-tac oev=(tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) in prems(7))
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply (elim bxE)
  apply simp
  apply (drule out-context-distort)
  apply simp
  apply (rule-tac X=Y in out-context-componentsE)
  apply simp
  apply simp
  apply (subgoal-tac tab-l  $\geq$  cdistl A B-l) prefer 2
  apply (subgoal-tac cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B-l j-l) = None  $\vee$  cdistl A B-l  $\leq$ 
  the (cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B-l j-l))) prefer 2
  apply (rule noflt)
  apply clar simp
  apply (elim exE)
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=Ya in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=trep in exI)
  apply (rule conjI)
  apply (force dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  apply (rule-tac y=trep + cdistl (Honest B) A + cdistl A B-l
         in order-trans)
  apply (auto intro: cdistl-triangle)
  apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=Ya in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=trep in exI)
  apply auto
  done

qed
qed

```

```

next
case (Fake tr t-l X-l I-l j-l B k NB A i m L t tsend oev)
let ?lastev = (t-l, Send (Tx (Intruder I-l) j-l) X-l [])
let ?sendev = (t, Send (Tx A i) m L)
let ?recvev = (t, Recv (Rx A i) m)

show ?case proof cases
assume ?recvev = oev
thus ?case using prems(6–13) apply –
  apply clarsimp
  apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?recvev])
  apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  done

next
assume ?recvev ≠ oev
hence ?sendev = oev using prems by auto
thus ?case proof cases
  assume ?sendev ∈ set tr
  thus ?case using prems(6–) apply –
    apply auto
    apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?sendev])
    by auto
next
assume ?sendev ∉ set tr
hence ?sendev = ?lastev using prems by auto
thus ?case using prems(6–) apply –
  apply auto
  apply (frule-tac A=Honest B in outside-hash-deducible-implies-received)
  apply assumption
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (elim exE conjE)
  apply (drule-tac t=trs and m=X in prems(7)) prefer 2
  apply (rule disjI2) prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply simp
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (elim exE)
  apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=Y in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=trep in exI)
  apply (rule conjI) defer
  apply (subgoal-tac trs ≤ t-l)
  apply force
  apply (erule maxtime-geq-elem)
  apply force
  apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  done

```

```

qed
qed
next
case (MD5 tr tdone-l trec2-l V-l P-l NV-l NP-l trec1-l tsend-l CHAL-l
      B k NB A i m L t tsend oev)
let ?recv = (t, Recv (Rx A i) m)
let ?send = (t, Send (Tx A i) m L)

show ?case proof cases
assume ?send = oev
thus ?case using prems(6-) apply -
  apply clar simp
  apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?send])
  apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  done
next
assume ?send ≠ oev
hence ?recv ∈ set tr ∧ ?recv = oev using prems by auto
thus ?case using prems(6-) apply -
  by (auto dest: prems(7)[where oev=?recv])
qed
next
case (MD1 tr t-l P-l NP-l B k NB A i m L t tsend oev)
let ?last = (t-l, Send (Tr (Honest P-l))
             (Hash {Nonce (Honest P-l) NP-l, Agent (Honest P-l)})
              [Number 1, Nonce (Honest P-l) NP-l])
let ?send = (t, Send (Tx A i) m L)
let ?recv = (t, Recv (Rx A i) m)
let ?nonce = (tsend,
              Send (Tx (Honest B) k)
              (Hash {Nonce (Honest B) NB, Agent (Honest B)})
               [Number 1, Nonce (Honest B) NB])

show ?case proof cases
assume ?nonce ∈ set tr
show ?case proof cases
assume ?send ∈ set tr ∧ ?send = oev
thus ?case using prems(5-) apply -
  apply clar simp
  apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?send])
  apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  done
next
assume ¬ (?send ∈ set tr ∧ ?send = oev)
show ?case proof cases
assume ?send = oev
hence notr: ?send ∈ set tr using prems(3-) by auto
show ?case proof cases
assume seq: ?send = ?last

```

```

thus ?case using prems(5-) apply -
  apply auto

  apply (case-tac Nonce (Honest P-l) NP-l = Nonce (Honest B) NB)
  apply auto
  apply (drule out-context-imp-subterms) back
  apply auto
  done

next
  assume ?sendev ≠ ?lastev
  thus ?case using prems(3-) notr by auto
qed

next
  assume ?sendev ≠ oev
  hence ?recv ev ∈ set tr ∧ ?recv ev = oev using prems by auto
  thus ?case using prems(6-) apply -
    apply clar simp
    apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?recv ev])
    apply auto
    done
  qed
qed

next
  assume ?nonceev ∉ set tr
  hence lev: ?nonceev = ?lastev using prems by auto
  show ?case proof cases
    assume ?sendev ∈ set tr ∧ ?sendev = oev
    thus ?case using prems(5-) apply -
      apply auto
      apply (drule-tac t=t and Y=Nonce (Honest P-l) NP-l
        in Send-imp-parts-used)
      apply (rule out-context-imp-subterms)
      apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
      done
  next
    assume ¬ (?sendev ∈ set tr ∧ ?sendev = oev)
    show ?case proof cases
      assume ?sendev = oev
      hence notr: ?sendev ∉ set tr using prems(3-) by auto
      show ?case proof cases
        assume seq: ?sendev = ?lastev
        thus ?case using prems(5-) apply - by auto
  next
    assume ?sendev ≠ ?lastev
    thus ?case using notr prems(3-) by auto
  qed
next
  assume noev: ?sendev ≠ oev
  hence ?recv ev ∈ set tr and ?recv ev = oev using prems by auto

```

```

thus ?case using prems(6–13) noev lev apply –
  apply (drule out-context-imp-subterms)
  apply (drule-tac nonce-components-subterm)
  apply (elim bxE)
  apply (drule-tac send-before-recv[simplified])
  apply assumption
  apply assumption
  apply (elim exE conjE bxE)
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply auto
  apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
  apply assumption
  apply (drule-tac Y=Y in subterms-component-trans)
  apply simp
  apply (drule-tac t=tsend in Send-imp-parts-used)
  apply assumption
  apply (force simp add: mem-def)
  done
qed
qed
qed
next
case (MD2 tr t-l trec-l V-l COM-l NV-l B k NB A i m L t tsend oev)
let ?lastev = (t-l, Send (Tr (Honest V-l)) (Nonce (Honest V-l) NV-l)
               [Number 2, COM-l, Nonce (Honest V-l) NV-l])
let ?nonceev = (tsend, Send (Tx (Honest B) k) (Hash {Nonce (Honest B) NB,
Agent (Honest B)}) [Number 1, Nonce (Honest B) NB])
let ?recvev = (t, Recv (Rx A i) m)
let ?sendev = (t, Send (Tx A i) m L)

show ?case proof cases
assume ?sendev ∈ set tr ∧ oev = ?sendev
thus ?case using prems(6–) apply –
  apply clar simp
  apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?sendev])
  apply assumption
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  done
next
assume ¬ (?sendev ∈ set tr ∧ oev = ?sendev)
show ?case proof cases
assume oev = ?sendev
hence notr: ?sendev ∉ set tr using prems(3–) by auto
show ?case proof cases
assume seq: ?sendev = ?lastev
have Nonce (Honest V-l) NV-l = Nonce (Honest B) NB

```

```

using prems(6–14) seq notr apply –
apply (case-tac Nonce (Honest V-l) NV-l = Nonce (Honest B) NB)
apply force
apply (drule out-context-imp-subterms)
apply (drule-tac Y=Nonce (Honest B) NB in Send-imp-parts-used)
apply auto
done
hence False using prems(6–14) seq notr apply –
apply clarsimp
apply (drule-tac Y=Nonce (Honest B) NB in Send-imp-parts-used)
apply force
apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
done
thus ?case by auto
next
assume ?sendev ≠ ?lastev
thus ?case using notr prems(3–) by auto
qed
next
assume oev ≠ ?sendev
hence ?recvev ∈ set tr ∧ oev = ?recvev using prems by auto
thus ?case using prems(6–14) apply –
apply auto
apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?recvev])
apply auto
done
qed
qed
next
case (MD4 tr tsend-l trecv-l P-l NV-l t-l NP-l V-l B k NB A i m L t tsend oev)

let ?lastev = (tsend-l, Send (Tr (Honest P-l))
              (Crypt (priSK (Honest P-l))
                     {NV-l,
                      {Nonce (Honest P-l) NP-l, Agent V-l}}))
              [])
let ?nonceev = (tsend,
                 Send (Tx (Honest B) k)
                 (Hash {Nonce (Honest B) NB, Agent (Honest B)})
                  [Number 1, Nonce (Honest B) NB]))
let ?sendev = (t, Send (Tx A i) m L)
let ?recvev = (t, Recv (Rx A i) m)

show ?case proof cases
assume ?sendev ∈ set tr ∧ oev = ?sendev
thus ?case using prems(6–) apply –
apply clarsimp
apply (drule beforeEvent-subset prems(7)[where oev=?sendev])
apply auto

```

```

done
next
assume  $\neg (\text{?sendev} \in \text{set tr} \wedge oev = \text{?sendev})$ 
show ?case proof cases
assume  $oev: oev = \text{?sendev}$ 
hence  $\text{notr}: \text{?sendev} \notin \text{set tr}$  using prems by auto
hence  $\text{seq}: \text{?sendev} = \text{?lastev}$  using prems by auto
show ?case proof cases
assume  $neq: \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest P-l}) \text{ NP-l} = \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest B}) \text{ NB}$ 
thus ?case using prems(6–14) seq notr oev apply –
apply (rule-tac  $x=NV-l$  in exI)
apply (rule-tac  $x=(Xor NV-l (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest B}) \text{ NB}))$  in exI)
apply (rule-tac  $x=t-l$  in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (rule disjI1) defer
apply (subgoal-tac cdistl ( $\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest B})$ ) ( $\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest B})$ ) = 0)
apply (drule-tac  $t'=t-l$  in maxtime-geq-elem)
apply force
apply force
apply (simp add: cdistl-def)
apply (force intro: pdist-equal-zero)
apply force
done
next
assume  $nneq: \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest P-l}) \text{ NP-l} \neq \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest B}) \text{ NB}$ 
thus ?case using prems(6–14) seq notr oev apply –
apply auto
apply (drule-tac  $t=trecv-l$  and  $m=NV-l$  in prems(7))
apply auto defer

apply (rule-tac  $x=NV$  in exI)
apply (rule-tac  $x=Y$  in exI)
apply (rule-tac  $x=trep$  in exI)
apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
apply (subgoal-tac  $trecv-l \leq tsend-l$ )
apply auto
apply (drule maxtime-geq-elem)
apply auto
apply (drule out-context-inverse, auto)+
done
qed
next
assume  $oev \neq \text{?sendev}$ 
hence  $\text{?recvev} \in \text{set tr} \wedge oev = \text{?recvev}$  using prems by auto
thus ?case using prems(6–14) apply –
apply auto
apply (drule prems(7)[where  $oev=\text{?recvev}$ ])
apply auto
done

```

```

qed
qed
next
case (MD3 tr tsend-l trec-l P-l NV-l tsend2-l COM-l NP-l B k NB A i m L t
tsend oev)

let ?lastev = (tsend-l, Send (Tu (Honest P-l)) (Xor NV-l (Nonce (Honest P-l)
NP-l)))
[Number 3, Nonce (Honest P-l) NP-l, NV-l])
let ?nonceev = (tsend, Send (Tx (Honest B) k) (Hash {Nonce (Honest B) NB,
Agent (Honest B)}))
[Number 1, Nonce (Honest B) NB])
let ?sendev = (t, Send (Tx A i) m L)
let ?recv = (t, Recv (Rx A i) m)

show ?case proof cases
assume ?sendev ∈ set tr ∧ oev = ?sendev
thus ?case using prems(6-) apply -
  apply auto
  apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?sendev])
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force
  apply auto
done

next
assume ¬ (?sendev ∈ set tr ∧ oev = ?sendev)
show ?case proof cases
assume oev: oev = ?sendev
hence seq: ?sendev = ?lastev using prems by auto
show ?case proof cases
assume neq: Nonce (Honest P-l) NP-l = Nonce (Honest B) NB
thus ?case using prems(6-16) seq oev apply -
  apply auto
  apply (auto simp add: cdistl-def)
  apply (insert vc-pos)
  apply (simp add: pdist-equal-zero)
done

next
assume nneq: Nonce (Honest P-l) NP-l ≠ Nonce (Honest B) NB
show ?case proof cases
assume Nonce (Honest B) NB ∈ factors NV-l
thus ?case using prems(6-14) seq oev apply -
  apply simp
  apply (drule-tac t=trec-l and m=NV-l in prems(7))
  apply force
  apply force prefer 2
  apply (elim exE conjE)
  apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)

```

```

apply (rule-tac  $x=Y$  in exI)
apply (rule-tac  $x=trep$  in exI)

apply (rule conjI)
apply (rule disjI1)
apply (force dest: beforeEvent-subset)

apply (subgoal-tac  $trec-l \leq tsend-l$ )
apply force
apply (drule maxtime-geq-elem)
apply force
apply force
apply (case-tac  $NV-l = \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) NB$ )
apply auto
done

next
assume  $\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) NB \notin \text{factors } NV-l$ 
thus ?case using prems(6–15) seq nneq oev apply –
  apply auto
  apply (frule factors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm)
  apply auto
  apply (drule out-context-inverse)
  apply auto

  apply (drule-tac  $t=trec-l$  in prems(7)) prefer 2
  apply (rule disjI2) prefer 2
  apply assumption
  apply force defer
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac  $x=NV$  in exI)
  apply (rule-tac  $x=Y$  in exI)
  apply (rule-tac  $x=trep$  in exI)
  apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  apply (subgoal-tac  $trec-l \leq tsend-l$ )
  apply auto
  apply (drule maxtime-geq-elem)
  apply auto
  apply (case-tac  $NV-l = \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) NB$ )
  apply auto

  apply (drule out-context-inverse)
  apply auto

apply (drule factors-Xor-Nonce)
apply auto

apply (drule factors-Xor-Hash)
apply auto
apply (case-tac  $NV-l = \text{Hash } X$ )

```

```

apply auto

apply (drule factors-Xor-Crypt)
apply auto
apply (case-tac NV-l = Crypt k X)
apply auto

apply (drule factors-Xor-MPair)
apply auto
apply (case-tac NV-l = {X, Y})
apply auto

apply (drule factors-Xor-MPair)
apply auto
apply (case-tac NV-l = {X, Y})
apply auto

apply (drule factors-Xor)
apply auto defer

apply (drule out-context-inverse)
apply auto

apply (drule out-context-inverse)
apply auto
apply (case-tac NV-l = X)
apply auto
done
qed
qed
next
assume oev ≠ ?sendev
hence ?recvev ∈ set tr ∧ oev = ?recvev using prems by auto
thus ?case using prems(6–15) apply –
apply auto
apply (drule prems(7)[where oev=?recvev])
apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
done
qed
qed
qed
qed

lemma nonce-use-outside-tr:
assumes mdb:      tr ∈ mdb
and nonce:      (tsend, Send (Tx (Honest B) k)
                  (Hash { Nonce (Honest B) NB, Agent (Honest B) })
[Number 1, Nonce (Honest B) NB])
                  ∈ set tr
and msg:        (t, Send (Tx A i) m L) ∈ set tr ∨ (t, Recv (Rx A i) m) ∈ set

```

```

tr
  and outside: out-context (Nonce (Honest B) NB) (Hash {Nonce (Honest
B) NB, Agent (Honest B)}) m
    shows  $\exists NV Y trep. (trep, Send (Tu (Honest B)) Y [Number 3, Nonce (Honest
B) NB, NV])$ 
       $\in set tr$ 
       $\wedge (t \geq trep + cdistl (Honest B) A)$ 
  using mdb nonce msg outside apply -
  apply (elim disjE)
  apply (drule-tac oev= (t, Send (Tx A i) m L) in nonce-use-outside)
  apply assumption
  apply assumption
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (elim exE)
  apply auto prefer 2
  apply (drule-tac oev= (t, Recv (Rx A i) m) in nonce-use-outside)
  apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
done

lemma sig-msg-originates:
assumes mdb: tr  $\in$  mdb
and fsend: (tf, Send (Tx (Honest P) j) mf Lf)  $\in$  set tr
and mfsubterm: Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) {Nonce (Honest V) NV, {NP', Agent
(Honest V)}}
   $\in$  subterms {mf}
and ffresh: Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) {Nonce (Honest V) NV, {NP', Agent
(Honest V)}}
   $\notin$  used (beforeEvent (tf, Send (Tx (Honest P) j) mf Lf) tr)
shows  $\exists NP. (NP' = \text{Nonce (Honest P)} NP)$ 
   $\wedge Lf = []$ 
   $\wedge mf = \text{Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) } \{\text{Nonce (Honest V) NV, } \{\text{Nonce
(Honest P) NP, Agent (Honest V)}\}\}$  using prems
proof (induct tr arbitrary: tf F j mf LF rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsnd) with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr tc C mc D tab) with Con.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (MD1 tr t-l P-l NP-l)
    show ?case using prems by auto
next
  case (MD2 tr t-l trec-l V-l COM-l NV-l)
    show ?case using prems by auto
next
  case (MD5 tr)
    thus ?case by auto
next

```

```

case ( $MD4 tr tsend-l trecv-l P-l NV-l t-l NP-l V-l tf j mf$ )
thus ?case
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac  $x=NP-l$  in exI)
  apply auto
  apply (frule crypt-components-subterm)
  apply auto
  apply (drule-tac  $X=M$  in send-before-recv[simplified])
  apply assumption
  apply assumption
  apply auto
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply auto
  apply (drule crypt-not-LowHam)
  apply simp
  apply (drule-tac  $Y=Y$  in subterms-component-trans)
  apply assumption
  apply (drule Send-imp-parts-used) back
  apply assumption
  apply (auto split: split-if-asm)
  done
next
case ( $MD3 tr tsend-l trec-l P-l NV-l tsend2-l COM-l NP-l$ )
thus ?case
  apply auto
  apply (drule subterms-Crypt-Xor)
  apply (drule subterms.singleton)
  apply auto
  apply (frule crypt-components-subterm)
  apply auto
  apply (drule-tac  $X=M$  in send-before-recv[simplified])
  apply assumption
  apply assumption
  apply auto
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply auto
  apply (drule crypt-not-LowHam)
  apply simp
  apply (drule-tac  $Y=Y$  in subterms-component-trans)
  apply assumption
  apply (drule Send-imp-parts-used) back
  apply assumption
  apply (auto split: split-if-asm)
  done
qed

lemma originate-unique:
assumes  $m \notin \text{used}(\text{beforeEvent}(ta, \text{Send } TA \text{ ma } La) \text{ tr})$ 
and  $m \notin \text{used}(\text{beforeEvent}(tb, \text{Send } TB \text{ mb } Lb) \text{ tr})$ 

```

```

and      ( $tb, \text{Send } TB mb Lb$ )  $\neq$  ( $ta, \text{Send } TA ma La$ )
and      ( $tb, \text{Send } TB mb Lb$ )  $\in$  set  $tr$ 
and      ( $ta, \text{Send } TA ma La$ )  $\in$  set  $tr$ 
and       $m \in \text{subterms } \{ma\}$ 
shows     $m \notin \text{subterms } \{mb\}$  using prems
apply   (induct  $tr$ )
apply   simp
apply   (case-tac  $a = (ta, \text{Send } TA ma La) \wedge a \notin \text{set } tr$ )
apply   (elim conjE)
apply   simp
apply   (case-tac  $m \in \text{subterms } \{mb\}$ ) prefer 2
apply   force
apply   (subgoal-tac ( $tb, \text{Send } TB mb Lb$ )  $\in$  set  $tr$ ) prefer 2
apply   force
apply   (frule-tac  $Y = m$  in Send-imp-parts-used)
apply   force
apply   force
apply   (case-tac  $a = (tb, \text{Send } TB mb Lb) \wedge a \notin \text{set } tr$ )
apply   (elim conjE)
apply   simp
apply   (subgoal-tac ( $ta, \text{Send } TA ma La$ )  $\in$  set  $tr$ ) prefer 2
apply   force
apply   (frule-tac  $Y = m$  in Send-imp-parts-used)
apply   force
apply   force
apply   auto
done

lemma beforeEvent-not-equal:
  [ $a \notin \text{set } (\text{beforeEvent } b tr); a \neq b; b \in \text{set } tr; a \in \text{set } tr$ ]  $\implies b \in \text{set } (\text{beforeEvent } a tr)$ 
  apply (induct  $tr$ )
  apply (auto split: split-if-asm)
  done

lemma mdb-commit:
  assumes mdb:  $tr \in \text{mdb}$ 
  and believe: ( $tchal, \text{Send } (Tx (\text{Honest } V) j) CHAL [Number 2, COM, Nonce (\text{Honest } V) NV]$ )  $\in$  set  $tr$ 
  shows  $CHAL = \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV \wedge$ 
         $(\exists \text{trecv-com. } (\text{trecv-com}, \text{Recv } (\text{Rec } (\text{Honest } V)) COM)$ 
         $\in \text{set } (\text{beforeEvent } (tchal, \text{Send } (Tx (\text{Honest } V) j) (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV) [Number 2, COM, Nonce (\text{Honest } V) NV])) tr)$ 
         $\wedge (\text{trecv-com} \leq tchal))$  using prems
  apply (induct  $tr$ )
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force defer defer

```

```

apply force
apply force
apply clarsimp
apply (elim disjE) prefer 2
apply force prefer 2
applyclarsimp
apply (elim disjE) prefer 2
apply force
apply auto
apply (drule maxtime-geq-elem)
apply auto
done

lemma resp-implies-commit-send:
assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb
and sign: (tresp, Send (Tx (Honest A) j) X [Number 3, Nonce (Honest A) NA, NV]) ∈ set tr
shows (X = Xor NV (Nonce (Honest A) NA)) ∧
(∃ tcom.
(tcom, Send (Tr (Honest A)) (Hash {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)})) [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A) NA] ∈ set tr)
using prems
apply (induct tr)
apply auto
apply (drule prover-step-1)
apply auto
done

lemma sig-implies-commit-send:
assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb
and sign: (tsig, Send (Tx (Honest A) j) (Crypt (priSK (Honest A)) {NV, {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent V}})) [] ∈ set tr
shows ∃ tcom.
(tcom, Send (Tr (Honest A)) (Hash {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)})) [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A) NA] ∈ set tr
using prems
apply (induct tr)
apply auto
apply (drule resp-implies-commit-send)
apply auto
done

lemma sig-implies-fastrep-send:
assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb
and sign: (tsig, Send (Tx (Honest A) j) (Crypt (priSK (Honest A)) {NV, {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent V}})) [] ∈ set tr
shows ∃ trep.

```

```

(trep, Send (Tu (Honest A)) (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest A) NA)) [Number
3, Nonce (Honest A) NA, NV]) ∈ set tr
  using prems
  apply (induct tr)
  apply auto
done

lemma verifier-NV-notin-factors-NP:
  assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb
  and   believe: (tchal, Send (Tx (Honest V) i) CHAL [Number 2, Hash {NP,
Agent P}], Nonce (Honest V) NV] ) ∈ set tr
  shows Nonce (Honest V) NV ∉ factors NP using prems
  apply (induct tr)
  apply auto
  apply (drule-tac X=Hash {NP, Agent P} in send-before-recv[simplified])
  apply assumption
  apply force
  apply auto
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply (elim bxE)
  apply simp
  apply (subgoal-tac Hash {NP, Agent P} ∈ subterms {Xor Y d}) prefer 2
  apply force
  apply (drule hash-not-LowHam)
  apply assumption
  apply (drule-tac Y=Y in subterms-component-trans)
  apply simp
  apply (drule factors-imp-subterms)
  apply (drule-tac G={NP} and H={Hash {NP, Agent P}} in subterms.trans)
  apply (simp (no-asm-use))
  apply force
  apply (drule-tac H={M'} and G={Hash {NP, Agent P}} in subterms.trans)
  apply simp
  apply (drule-tac Y=Nonce (Honest V) NV in Send-imp-parts-used)
  apply assumption
  apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
done

```

## 22.4 Security proof for Honest Provers

```

lemma mdb-secure:
  assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb
  and   believe: (tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d}) ∈ set tr
  shows d ≥ pdist (Honest V) (Honest P) using prems
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsend)
  hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d})) ∈ set tr by
  auto
  with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)

```

```

next
  case (Con tr tc C mc D tab)
    hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d}) ∈ set tr by
    auto)
      with Con.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
next
  case (MD2 tr)
    hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d}) ∈ set tr
    by auto)
      thus ?case using MD2.hyps prems by auto
next
  case (MD3 tr)
    hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d}) ∈ set tr
    by auto)
      with MD3.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD4 tr)
    hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d}) ∈ set tr by
    auto)
      with MD4.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD1 tr)
    hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d}) ∈ set tr by
    auto)
      with MD1.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  — the only nontrivial case since it adds Claim events
  case (MD5 tr tdone-l trec2-l V-l P-l NV-l NP-l trec1-l tsend-l CHAL-l)
    let ?lastev = (tdone-l, Claim (Honest V-l) {Agent P-l, Real ((trec1-l - tsend-l)*vc / 2)}
    * vc / 2})
    and ?claimev = (tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d})
    show ?case proof cases
    — the added event is the Claim event from the premise, the other case follows
    trivially from the IH
    assume ?lastev = ?claimev
    hence Veq: V-l=V and Peq: P-l=Honest P and deg: d=(trec1-l - tsend-l)*vc/2
    by auto

    let ?NV = Nonce (Honest V) NV-l
    let ?msigned = {?NV, {NP-l, Agent (Honest V)}}
    let ?sigmsg = Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) ?msigned and
      ?commsg = Hash { NP-l, Agent (Honest P)} 

    have NV-fresh:
    ?NV
      notin usedI (beforeEvent (tsend-l, Send (Tr (Honest V))) CHAL-l [Number 2,

```

```

?commmsg, ?NV]) tr)
  using prems (tr ∈ mdb) apply -
  by (rule nonce-fresh-challenge, auto)
— The trivial case where V runs the protocol with himself is excluded
show ?case proof cases
assume PeqV: P = V
thus ?case using prems
  apply -
  apply (drule verifier-claim-not-himself)
  apply auto
  done
next
  assume PnotV: P ≠ V
  have sig-recv: (trec2-l, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) ?sigmsg) ∈ set tr using prems
  Veq Peq
    apply auto
    done

  have ?sigmsg ∈ components {?sigmsg}
  by auto

  have ∃ A i tsend L M'.
    ∃ Y ∈ components {M'}.
    (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) ∈ set tr ∧
    Xor ?sigmsg Y ∈ LowHamXor ∧ cdistM (Tx A i) (Rec (Honest V)) ≠
None
  ∧ tsend ≤ trec2-l - cdist (Tx A i) (Rec (Honest V))
  using prems Veq Peq
  apply -
  apply (rule send-before-recv)
  apply simp
  apply simp
  apply simp
  done

then obtain
E i tesend Le m' Y
where p3: Y ∈ components {m'} and
      p2: Xor ?sigmsg Y ∈ LowHamXor and
      p1: (tesend, Send (Tx E i) m' Le) ∈ set tr and
      p4: tesend ≤ trec2-l - cdist (Tx E i) (Rec (Honest V))
by auto
hence ∃ tp mp j Lp.
  (tp, Send (Tx (Honest P) j) mp Lp) ∈ set tr
  ∧ (Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) ?msigned) ∈ subterms {mp}
  ∧ (Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) ?msigned)
  ∉ used (beforeEvent (tp, Send (Tx (Honest P) j) mp Lp) tr) using
prems apply -

```

```

apply (rule-tac tc=tesend and msig=?msigned in crypt-originates)
apply force prefer 2
apply assumption
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac ?sigmsg ∈ subterms {Y})
apply (drule-tac Y=Y in subterms-component-trans)
apply simp
apply simp
apply (drule distort-LowHam)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac ?sigmsg ∈ subterms {Xor Y d}) defer
apply force
apply (drule crypt-not-LowHam)
apply assumption
apply auto
done
then obtain tp mp j Lp where ftr: (tp, Send (Tx (Honest P) j) mp Lp) ∈
set tr
    and mpsubterm: (Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) ?msigned)
        ∈ subterms {mp}
    and ffresh: (Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) ?msigned)
       notin used (beforeEvent (tp, Send (Tx (Honest P)
j) mp Lp) tr)
        by auto
        hence ex: ∃ NPP. (NP-l = Nonce (Honest P) NPP)
            ∧ Lp = []
            ∧ mp = Crypt (priSK (Honest P))
                {Nonce (Honest V) NV-l, {Nonce (Honest P) NPP, Agent
(Honest V)}}
        apply -
            apply (rule sig-msg-originates)
            apply (auto intro: prems )
            done
        then obtain NPP where ef:
            (tp, Send (Tx (Honest P) j) (Crypt (priSK (Honest P))
                {Nonce (Honest V) NV-l, {Nonce (Honest P) NPP,
Agent (Honest V)}}))
        [])) ∈ set tr
        and NPP: NP-l = Nonce (Honest P) NPP
        apply (insert ftr ex)
        by auto

let ?fastmsg = Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV-l) (Nonce (Honest P) NPP)
let ?commmsg = Hash {Nonce (Honest P) NPP, Agent (Honest P)}

have fast-recv: (trec1-l, Recv (Ru (Honest V)) ?fastmsg) ∈ set tr using prems
NPP
    by auto

have chal-eq-ex : CHAL-l = Nonce (Honest V) NV-l ∧

```

```


$$\begin{aligned}
& (\exists \text{ trecv-com. } (\text{trecv-com}, \text{Recv}(\text{Rec}(\text{Honest } V)) ?\text{commsg}) \\
& \quad \in \text{set}(\text{beforeEvent}(t\text{send-}l, \text{Send}(\text{Tr}(\text{Honest } V))) (\text{Nonce} \\
& (\text{Honest } V) NV-l) \\
& \quad [Number \ 2, ?\text{commsg}, \text{Nonce}(\text{Honest } V) NV-l]) \\
& \quad tr) \\
& \quad \wedge \text{trecv-com} \leq t\text{send-}l) \text{ using prems NPP} \\
& \text{apply -} \\
& \text{apply (rule mdb-commit)} \\
& \text{apply auto} \\
& \text{done}
\end{aligned}$$


then obtain trecv-com where  


$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{recv-com: } (\text{trecv-com}, \text{Recv}(\text{Rec}(\text{Honest } V)) ?\text{commsg}) \\
& \quad \in \text{set}(\text{beforeEvent}(t\text{send-}l, \text{Send}(\text{Tr}(\text{Honest } V))) (\text{Nonce}(\text{Honest } V) NV-l) \\
& \quad [Number \ 2, ?\text{commsg}, \text{Nonce}(\text{Honest } V) NV-l]) tr) \text{ and} \\
& \quad \text{trecv-com-before: } \text{trecv-com} \leq t\text{send-}l \\
& \quad \text{by auto}
\end{aligned}$$


have chal-eq : CHAL-l = Nonce (Honest V) NV-l using chal-eq-ex by auto  

obtain tcom where  


$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{com-ev: } (t\text{com}, \text{Send}(\text{Tr}(\text{Honest } P)) (\text{Hash} \{ \text{Nonce}(\text{Honest } P) NPP, \text{Agent} \\
& (\text{Honest } P) \}) [Number \ 1, \text{Nonce}(\text{Honest } P) NPP]) \\
& \quad \in \text{set } tr \\
& \text{using ef } \langle tr \in \text{mdb} \rangle \text{ apply -} \\
& \text{apply (drule sig-implies-commit-send)} \\
& \text{apply auto} \\
& \text{done}
\end{aligned}$$


hence  $\exists \text{ NV}' Y \text{ trep.}$   


$$\begin{aligned}
& (\text{trep}, \text{Send}(\text{Tu}(\text{Honest } P)) Y [Number \ 3, \text{Nonce}(\text{Honest } P) NPP, \\
& NV']) \in \text{set } tr \wedge \\
& \quad \text{trep} + \text{cdistl}(\text{Honest } P)(\text{Honest } V) \leq t\text{rec1-l} \text{ using prems(3-)} \\
& \text{apply -} \\
& \text{apply (drule-tac } t=t\text{rec1-l} \text{ in nonce-use-outside-tr)} \\
& \text{apply auto} \\
& \text{apply (subgoal-tac } \text{Nonce}(\text{Honest } P) NPP \notin \text{factors}(\text{Nonce}(\text{Honest } V) \\
& NV-l)) \\
& \text{apply (drule factors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm)} \\
& \text{apply auto} \\
& \text{apply (erule contrapos-np) back back} \\
& \text{apply (rule-tac } m=\text{Nonce}(\text{Honest } P) NPP \text{ in out-context.Xor)} \\
& \text{apply force} \\
& \text{apply force} \\
& \text{apply force} \\
& \text{apply (erule contrapos-pp)}
\end{aligned}$$


```

```

apply simp
apply (drule-tac f=factors in HOL.arg-cong)
apply auto
done

then obtain NV' Y trep where
  rep : (trep, Send (Tu (Honest P)) Y [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P)
NPP, NV']) ∈ set tr and
    trep-delay: trep + cdistl (Honest P) (Honest V) ≤ trec1-l
  by auto

then obtain trep2 where
  (trep2, Send (Tu (Honest P)) (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV-l)
(Nonce (Honest P) NPP)) [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NPP, Nonce (Honest V) NV-l]) ∈ set tr
  using ef prems(3-)
  apply auto
  apply (drule sig-implies-fastrep-send)
  apply auto
done

hence NV' = Nonce (Honest V) NV-l using prems(3-) rep
  apply -
  apply (rule prover-step-3-unique[where t=trep and t'=trep2 and P=P and
NP=NPP and RESP=Y and NV=NV' and k=1 and
RESP'=Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV-l) (Nonce (Honest P) NPP)
  and k'=1 and NV'=Nonce (Honest V) NV-l])
  apply assumption
  apply auto
done

hence Y = Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV-l) (Nonce (Honest P) NPP) using
  <tr ∈ mdb> rep
  apply -
  apply simp
  apply (drule resp-implies-commit-send)
  apply auto
done

hence fast-send: trep - tsend-l >= cdistl (Honest V) (Honest P) using <tr ∈
mdb> PnotV
  apply -
  apply (erule-tac NA=NV-l and i=0 and ma=Nonce (Honest V) NV-l
  and mb=Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV-l) (Nonce (Honest P) NPP)
  in fresh-nonce-earliest-send[simplified])
  apply force defer
  apply force defer
  apply (insert prems(3-) chal-eq)

```

```

apply simp
apply simp
apply (drule nonce-fresh-challenge)
apply assumption
apply (force simp add: usedI-def)
apply (rule subterms-Nonce-Nonce)
apply force
done

have 2 * cdistl (Honest V) (Honest P) ≤ cdistl (Honest V) (Honest P) + cdistl
(Honest P) (Honest V)
  by (auto simp add: cdistl-symm)
also have ... ≤ trep - tsend-l + (trec1-l - trep) using fast-send trep-delay by
auto
also have trep - tsend-l + (trec1-l - trep) ≤ trec1-l - tsend-l by auto
finally have cdistl (Honest V) (Honest P) * 2 ≤ trec1-l - tsend-l by auto
thus ?thesis using deq
  apply (simp add: cdistl-def deq)
  apply (subgoal-tac (pdist (Honest V) (Honest P) * 2 / vc) * vc ≤ (trec1-l -
tsend-l) * vc) defer
  apply (rule mult-right-mono)
  apply force
  apply (insert vc-pos, auto split: split-if-asm)
  done
qed
next
assume ?lastev ≠ ?claimev
show ?case using prems by auto
qed
qed

```

## 22.5 Security for dishonest Provers

```

lemma prover-NP-notin-factors-NV:
  assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb
  and   believe: (tresp, Send (Tx (Honest V) i) RESP [Number 3, Nonce (Honest
P) NP, NV]) ∈ set tr
  shows Nonce (Honest P) NP ∉ factors NV using prems
  apply (induct tr)
  apply auto
  apply (frule prover-step-1)
  apply auto
  apply (drule nonce-use-outside-tr)
  apply assumption
  apply (rule disjI2)
  apply auto
  apply (case-tac Nonce (Honest V) NP = NV)
  apply auto
  done

```

```

lemma steps-nonce-different:
  assumes
    mdb:  $tr \in mdb$  and
    ev1:  $(t1, Send(Tx(Honest A) i) (Nonce(Honest A) NA) [Number 2, COM, Nonce(Honest A) NA]) \in set tr$  and
    ev2:  $(t2, Send(Tx(Honest B) j) (Hash\{Nonce(Honest B) NB, Agent(Honest B)\}) [Number 1, Nonce(Honest B) NB]) \in set tr$ 
  shows  $\text{Nonce}(Honest A) NA \neq \text{Nonce}(Honest B) NB$  using prems
  apply (induct tr)
  apply auto
  apply (frule Send-imp-parts-used)
  apply auto
  apply (force simp add: mem-def)
  apply (frule-tac Y=(Nonce(Honest B) NB) in Send-imp-parts-used)
  apply auto
  apply (force simp add: mem-def)
  done

lemma not-before-itself:
   $e \in set(\text{beforeEvent } e tr) \implies False$ 
  apply (induct tr)
  apply (auto split: split-if-asm)
  done

lemma in-before-imp-eq:
   $a \in set(\text{beforeEvent } b tr) \implies \text{beforeEvent } a tr = \text{beforeEvent } a (\text{beforeEvent } b tr)$ 
  apply (induct tr)
  apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  done

lemma cyclic:
   $\llbracket rcom \in set tr; schal \in set tr; sresp \in set tr; \\ rcom \in set(\text{beforeEvent } schal tr); \\ schal \in set(\text{beforeEvent } sresp tr); \\ sresp \in set(\text{beforeEvent } rcom tr) \rrbracket \implies False$ 
  apply (frule in-before-imp-eq)
  apply auto
  apply (frule in-before-imp-eq) back
  apply auto
  apply (drule beforeEvent-subset) back back
  apply (drule beforeEvent-subset) back back
  apply (drule not-before-itself)
  by auto

```

We assume that the verifier cannot receive the signal sent on Tx V 0 on Rx V 1. This is required because there is a attack where a dishonest prover commits to 0 or dmsg otherwise.

**definition**

```
rbe-receiver :: agent ⇒ nat ⇒ bool where
rbe-receiver B j == (cdistM (Tx B 0) (Rx B j) = None)
```

**lemma honest-send:**

```
⟦ tr ∈ mdb; (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) X L) ∈ set tr ⟧
⇒
(∃ NA . i = 0
  ∧ X = Hash {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)}
  ∧ L = [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A) NA])
∨ (exists NA COM . i = 0
  ∧ X = Nonce (Honest A) NA
  ∧ L = [Number 2, COM, Nonce (Honest A) NA])
∨ (exists NV NA . i = 1
  ∧ X = Xor NV (Nonce (Honest A) NA)
  ∧ L = [Number 3, Nonce (Honest A) NA, NV])
∨ (exists NV NA V . i = 0
  ∧ X = Crypt (priSK (Honest A)) {NV, {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent V}}
  ∧ L = [])
apply (induct tr rule: mdb.induct)
apply auto
done
```

**lemma mdb-secure-dishonest:**

```
assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb
and not-recv: rbe-receiver (Honest V) 1
and believe: (tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder P), Real d}) ∈ set tr
shows ∃ P'. d ≥ pdist (Honest V) (Intruder P') using prems
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t rule: mdb.induct)
case (Fake tr mintr I tsend)
hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder P), Real d})) ∈ set tr by
auto
with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
next
case (Con tr tc C mc D tab)
hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder P), Real d})) ∈ set tr by
auto
with Con.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
next
case (MD1 tr t A NA)
hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder P), Real d})) ∈ set tr by
auto
with MD1.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
next
case (MD2 tr tsend trec B NA NB)
hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder P), Real d})) ∈ set tr by
```

```

auto
with MD2.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
next
  case (MD3 tr tsend trec B NA tsend1 NB A)
  hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder P), Real d})) ∈ set tr by
auto
  with MD3.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
next
  case (MD4 tr)
  hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder P), Real d})) ∈ set tr by
auto
  with MD4.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
next
  — the only nontrivial case since it adds Claim events
  case (MD5 tr tdone-l trec2-l V-l P-l NV-l NP-l trec1-l tsend-l CHAL-l)
let ?lastev = (tdone-l, Claim (Honest V-l) {Agent P-l, Real ((trec1-l - tsend-l)
* vc / 2)})
and ?clamev = (tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder P), Real d})

show ?case proof cases
  — the added event is the Claim event from the premise, the other case follows
trivially from the IH
  assume ?lastev = ?clamev
  hence Veq: V=V-l and Beq: P-l=Intruder P and deq: d=(trec1-l - tsend-l)*vc/2
by auto

let ?commsg = Hash {NP-l, Agent P-l}
let ?NV = Nonce (Honest V) NV-l

have NV-fresh:
  ?NV ∉ usedI (beforeEvent (tsend-l, Send (Tr (Honest V)) CHAL-l [Number
2, ?commsg, ?NV]) tr)
  using prems(3-) Veq Beq deq
  apply -
  apply (drule nonce-fresh-challenge)
  apply auto
done

have chal-eq-ex : CHAL-l = Nonce (Honest V) NV-l ∧
  (exists trecv-com. (trecv-com, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) ?commsg )
   ∈ set (beforeEvent (tsend-l, Send (Tr (Honest V)) (Nonce
(Honest V) NV-l)
   [Number 2, ?commsg, Nonce (Honest
V) NV-l])
   tr)
   ∧ trecv-com ≤ tsend-l) using prems
  apply -
  apply (rule mdb-commit)

```

```

apply auto
done

then obtain trecv-com where
  trecv-com: (trecv-com, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) ?commsg )
      ∈ set (beforeEvent (tsend-l, Send (Tr (Honest V)) (Nonce (Honest
V) NV-l)
  [Number 2, ?commsg, Nonce (Honest V)
NV-l]) tr) and
  trecv-com-before: trecv-com ≤ tsend-l
  by auto

have chal-eq : CHAL-l = Nonce (Honest V) NV-l using chal-eq-ex by auto

let ?RESP = Xor (Nonce (Honest V-l) NV-l) NP-l

have NV-not: ?NV ∉ factors NP-l using prems(3-) NV-fresh apply –
  apply (rule verifier-NV-notin-factors-NP)
  apply auto
  done

hence NV-RESP: ?NV ∈ factors ?RESP using Veq
  apply –
  apply (drule factors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm)
  apply (simp add: Xor-comm)
  apply (elim disjE)
  apply auto
  done

have ?RESP ∈ components {?RESP}
  apply (subgoal-tac ∀ X Y. ?RESP ≠ { X , Y })
  apply (drule components-non-pair)
  apply simp
  apply (subgoal-tac ?NV ∈ factors (?RESP))
  apply auto
  apply (rule NV-RESP)
  done

hence ∃ A i tsend L M'.
   $\exists Y \in \text{components } \{M'\}.$ 
   $(\text{tsend}, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } A \ i) \ M' \ L) \in \text{set } \text{tr} \wedge$ 
   $\text{Xor } ?RESP \ Y \in \text{LowHamXor} \wedge \text{cdistM } (\text{Tx } A \ i) \ (\text{Ru } (\text{Honest } V)) \neq$ 
  None
   $\wedge \text{tsend} \leq \text{trecv-l} - \text{cdist } (\text{Tx } A \ i) \ (\text{Ru } (\text{Honest } V))$ 
  using prems
  apply –
  apply (rule send-before-receive)
  apply simp

```

```

apply simp
apply simp
done

then obtain
  E i tesend Le RESP' Y
  where p3:  $Y \in \text{components } \{\text{RESP}'\}$  and
        p2:  $Xor ?RESP Y \in \text{LowHamXor}$  and
        p1:  $(tesend, Send (Tx E i) RESP' Le) \in \text{set tr}$  and
        p4:  $tesend \leq trec1-l - cdist (Tx E i) (Ru (\text{Honest } V))$  and
        p5:  $cdistM (Tx E i) (Ru (\text{Honest } V)) \neq \text{None}$ 
  by auto

have fast-not-send-himself:  $i \neq 0 \vee E \neq \text{Honest } V$ 
  using p5 not-recv apply -
  apply (auto simp add: rbe-receiver-def)
  done

have rfactors:  $?NV \in \text{factors } Y$  using Veq p2 NV-RESP
  apply -
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply auto
  apply (drule factors-Xor)
  apply auto
  apply (frule factors-LowHam)
  apply auto
  done

show ?case proof cases
  assume  $\exists I. E = \text{Intruder } I$ 
  then obtain I where Eeq:  $E = \text{Intruder } I$  by auto

  hence fast-send:  $tesend - tsend-l \geq cdistl (\text{Honest } V) (\text{Intruder } I)$  using
    (tr ∈ mdb)
    apply -
    apply (erule-tac NA=NV-l and i=0 and ma=Nonce (Honest V) NV-l
      and mb=RESP'
      in fresh-nonce-earliest-send[simplified])
    apply force defer
    apply (insert prems(3-) chal-eq) defer defer
    apply simp
    apply simp
    apply (insert NV-fresh)
    apply (force simp add: usedI-def)
    apply force
    apply (insert p3)
    apply (rule-tac Y=Y in subterms-component-trans)
    apply (rule factors-imp-subterms)
    apply (rule rfactors)

```

```

apply simp
done

from p4 p5 Eeq have r: trec1-l - tesend >= cdistl (Intruder I) (Honest V)
apply -
  apply auto
  apply (auto simp add: cdist-def)
  apply (frule noflt-some2)
  apply auto
  done
  have 2* cdistl (Honest V) (Intruder I) ≤ cdistl (Honest V) (Intruder I) +
cdistl (Intruder I) (Honest V)
    by (auto simp add: cdistl-symm)
  also have ... ≤ tesend - tsend-l + (trec1-l - tesend) using fast-send r apply
  -
    apply (rule ordered-ab-semigroup-add-class.add-mono)
    by auto
  also have tesend - tsend-l + (trec1-l - tesend) ≤ trec1-l - tsend-l by auto
  finally have cdistl (Honest V) (Intruder I) * 2 ≤ trec1-l - tsend-l by auto
  thus ?thesis using deg
    apply (simp add: cdistl-def deg)
    apply (subgoal-tac (pdist (Honest V) (Intruder I) * 2 /vc) * vc ≤ (trec1-l -
tsend-l) * vc) defer
      apply (rule mult-right-mono)
      apply force
      apply (insert vc-pos, auto split: split-if-asm)
    done
next
assume ¬ (Ǝ I. E = Intruder I)
then obtain A where Eeq: E = Honest A apply -
  apply (case-tac E, auto)
  done

show ?case proof cases
  assume asm: Ǝ NA. i = 0 ∧
    RESP' = Hash {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)} ∧
    Le = [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A) NA]
  hence Y = RESP' using p3 by auto
  thus ?case using asm rfactors by auto
next
assume n1: ¬ (Ǝ NA. i = 0 ∧
  RESP' = Hash {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)} ∧
  Le = [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A) NA])
show ?case proof cases
  assume ∃ NA COM.
    i = 0 ∧
    RESP' = Nonce (Honest A) NA ∧
    Le = [Number 2, COM, Nonce (Honest A) NA]
  then obtain NA COM where LeEq: Le = [Number 2, COM, Nonce (Honest

```

```

A) NA]
  and Req: RESP' = Nonce (Honest A) NA and izero: i=0
  by auto

hence Yeq: Y = RESP' using p3 by auto

hence Nonce (Honest A) NA = ?NV using rfactors Req by auto

thus ?case using fast-not-send-himself Eeq izero
  by auto
next
assume n2: ¬ (¬ NA COM .
  i = 0 ∧
  RESP' = Nonce (Honest A) NA ∧
  Le = [Number 2, COM, Nonce (Honest A) NA])

show ?case proof cases
assume
(¬ NV NA.
  i = 1 ∧
  RESP' = Xor NV (Nonce (Honest A) NA) ∧
  Le = [Number 3, Nonce (Honest A) NA, NV])

then obtain NV NA where LeEq: Le = [Number 3, Nonce (Honest A) NA,
NV]
  and Req: RESP' = Xor NV (Nonce (Honest A) NA) by auto

let ?NA = Nonce (Honest A) NA

have NAneqNV: ?NV ≠ ?NA using prems(3-) Req apply -
  apply (frule resp-implies-commit-send)
  apply simp
  apply (frule mdb-commit)
  apply simp
  apply (elim conjE exE)
  apply (rule steps-nonce-different)
  apply assumption
  apply auto
done

have facNV: ?NA ∉ factors NV using prems(3-) apply -
  apply (rule prover-NP-notin-factors-NV)
  apply auto
done

hence Yeq: Y = RESP' using Req p3
  apply auto
  apply (subgoal-tac ∀ X Y. (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest A) NA)) ≠ { X , Y })

```

```

apply (drule components-non-pair)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac ?NA ∈ factors (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest A) NA)))
apply auto
apply (drule factors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm)
apply auto
done

have facRESP': ?NA ∈ factors RESP' using Req facNV rfacors apply -
  apply simp
  apply (drule factors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm)
  by auto

hence facRESP: ?NA ∈ factors ?RESP using Req p2 Yeq apply -
  apply auto
  apply (drule distort-LowHam)
  apply auto
  apply (subgoal-tac Nonce (Honest A) NA ∈ factors (Xor (Xor NV d) (Nonce
(Honest A) NA)))
  apply (simp add: Xor-rewrite)
  apply (subgoal-tac Nonce (Honest A) NA ∉ factors (Xor NV d))
  apply (frule factors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm)
  apply auto
  apply (drule factors-Xor) back
  apply auto
  apply (insert facNV, force)
  apply (drule factors-LowHam)
  apply auto
done

hence ?NA ∈ factors NP-l using NAneqNV Veq apply -
  apply (drule factors-Xor)
  apply auto
done

hence out: out-context ?NA (Hash {?NA, Agent (Honest A)}) (Hash {NP-l,
Agent P-l}) using prems
  apply auto
  apply (rule out-context.Hash)
  apply auto
  apply (rule out-context.PairL)
  apply auto
  apply (case-tac NP-l = ?NA)
  apply auto
done

let ?rcom = (trecv-com, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) (Hash {NP-l, Agent P-l}))
let ?schal = (tsend-l, Send (Tr (Honest V-l)) CHAL-l [Number 2, Hash {NP-l,
Agent P-l}, Nonce (Honest V-l) NV-l])

```

```

let ?sresp = (tesend, Send (Tx E i) RESP' Le)

have a: ?rcom ∈ set (beforeEvent ?schal tr) using prems chal-eq
  apply auto
  done

have b: ?schal ∈ set (beforeEvent ?sresp tr) using prems(3-) Yeq apply -
  apply (subgoal-tac ?sresp ∉ set (beforeEvent ?schal tr))
  apply (drule beforeEvent-not-equal)
  apply auto
  apply (drule nonce-fresh-challenge)
  apply assumption
  apply (auto simp add: usedI-def)
  apply (insert rfactors)
  apply (drule factors-imp-subterms)
  apply (subgoal-tac Nonce (Honest V) NV-l ∈
    used
    (beforeEvent
      (tsend-l, Send (Tr (Honest V)) CHAL-l [Number 2, Hash {NP-l, Agent
      (Intruder P)}, Nonce (Honest V) NV-l]) tr))
  apply force
  apply (rule-tac L=[Number 3, Nonce (Honest A) NA, NV] and
    A=(Tx (Honest A) 1) and t=tesend and X=RESP' in
    Send-imp-used-parts)
  apply (insert Req Yeq, auto)
  done

have c: ?sresp ∈ set (beforeEvent ?rcom tr) using prems(3-) out Beq apply
-
  apply (frule-tac tresp=tesend in resp-implies-commit-send)
  apply force
  apply (elim exE conjE)
  apply (frule-tac oev=?rcom and tsend=tcom in nonce-use-outside)
  apply (force dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  apply (force dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  apply (force dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  apply (simp)
  apply auto
  apply (drule-tac t=trep and t'=tesend in prover-step-3-unique-all)
  apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  done

then show ?case using prems(3-) a b c apply -
  apply (subgoal-tac False)
  apply force
  apply (rule-tac rcom=?rcom and schal=?schal and sresp=?sresp and tr=tr
    in cyclic)
  apply (auto dest: beforeEvent-subset)
  done

```

```

next
assume n3:  $\neg (\exists NV NA.$ 
i = 1  $\wedge$ 
 $RESP' = Xor NV (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } A) NA) \wedge$ 
 $Le = [\text{Number } 3, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } A) NA, NV])$ 
hence asm:  $(\exists NV NA V.$ 
i = 0  $\wedge$ 
 $RESP' = \text{Crypt } (\text{priSK } (\text{Honest } A)) \{NV, \{\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } A) NA,$ 
Agent V\} \} \wedge
 $Le = [])$ using  $\langle tr \in mdb \rangle n1 n2 p1 Eeq$  apply –
apply simp
apply (drule honest-send)
apply auto
done
hence Yeq:  $Y = RESP'$  using p3
apply auto
done

thus ?case using asm rfactors by auto
qed qed qed qed
next
assume ?lastev  $\neq$  ?claimev
show ?case using prems by auto
qed
next
case Nil thus ?case by auto
qed

end

```

**23 Security Analysis of a fixed version of the Brands-Chaum protocol that uses explicit binding with a hash function to prevent Distance Hijacking Attacks.** We prove that the resulting protocol is secure in our model. Note that we abstract away from the individual bits exchanged in the rapid bit exchange phase, by performing the message exchange in 2 steps instead 2\*k steps.

```
theory BrandsChaum-explicit imports SystemCoffset SystemOrigination MessageTheoryXor3 begin
```

```
locale INITSTATE-SIG-NN = INITSTATE-PKSIG + INITSTATE-NONONCE
```

**definition**

*initStateMd :: agent  $\Rightarrow$  msg set* **where**  
*initStateMd A == Key‘({priSK A}  $\cup$  (pubSK‘UNIV))*

**interpretation** INITSTATE-SIG-NN Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number parts sub-terms DM LowHamXor Xor components

*initStateMd Key*  
**apply** (unfold-locales, auto simp add: initStateMd-def dest: injective-symKey)  
**apply** (drule subterms.singleton)  
**apply** (auto)  
**apply** (drule subterms.singleton)  
**apply** (auto)  
**apply** (drule subterms.singleton)  
**apply** (auto)  
**done**

**definition**

*md1 :: msg step*  
**where**  
*md1 tr V t =*  

$$(UN NV. \{ev. ev = (Nonce (Honest V) NV, SendEv 0 []) \wedge$$

$$Nonce (Honest V) NV \notin usedI tr\})$$

**definition**

*md2 :: msg step*  
**where**  
*md2 tr P t =*  

$$(UN NP NV trec.$$

$$\{ev. ev = (Xor NV (Hash \{Nonce (Honest P) NP , Agent (Honest P)\})$$

$$, SendEv 0 [NV,Nonce (Honest P) NP]) \wedge$$

$$Nonce (Honest P) NP \notin usedI tr \wedge$$

$$(trec, Recv (Rec (Honest P)) NV) \in set tr\})$$

**definition**

*md3 :: msg step*  
**where**  
*md3 tr P t =*  

$$(UN NP NV V tsend trec.$$

$$\{ev. ev = ( Crypt (priSK (Honest P))$$

$$\{ NV, \{Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent V\}\}$$

$$, SendEv 0 []) \wedge$$

$$(trec, Recv (Rec (Honest P)) NV) \in set tr \wedge$$

$$(tsend,$$

$$Send (Tr (Honest P))$$

$$(Xor NV (Hash \{Nonce (Honest P) NP , Agent (Honest P)\}))$$

$$[NV,Nonce (Honest P) NP])$$

$$\in set tr\})$$

**definition**

*md4 :: msg step*

**where**

*md4 tr V t =*

*(UN NP NV P trec1 trec2 tsend.  
{ev. ev = ({Agent P, Real ((trec1 - tsend) \* vc/2)}, ClaimEv) ∧  
(trec2, Recv (Rec (Honest V))  
(Crypt (priSK P)  
{Nonce (Honest V) NV, {NP, Agent (Honest V)}})} ∈ set tr ∧  
(trec1, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) (Hash {  
NP, Agent P }))} ∈ set tr ∧  
(tsend, Send (Tr (Honest V)) (Nonce (Honest V) NV) [])} ∈ set tr})*

**definition**

*mdproto :: msg proto*

*mdproto = {md1, md2, md3, md4}*

**lemmas** *md-defs = mdproto-def md1-def md2-def md3-def md4-def*

**locale** *PROTOCOL-MD = PROTOCOL-PKSIG-NOKEYS + PROTOCOL-NONONCE + INITSTATE-SIG-NONONCE*

**interpretation** *PROTOCOL-MD Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd Key mdproto*

**apply** (*unfold-locales*)

**apply** (*auto simp add: md-defs messagesProtoTr-def messagesProtoTrHonest-def initStateMd-def*

*split: event.split split-if dest: parts.fst-set*)

**apply** (*drule parts.singleton*)

**apply** *auto*

**apply** (*drule Key-parts-Xor*)

**apply** (*drule parts.singleton*)

**apply** *auto*

**apply** (*drule view-elem-ex*)

**apply** *auto*

**apply** (*drule parts.singleton*)

**apply** *auto*

**apply** (*drule view-elem-ex*)

**apply** *auto*

**done**

Agents only look at their own views and all messages are derivable.

**interpretation** *PROTOCOL-EXECUTABLE Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd mdproto sys Key*

**apply** (*unfold-locales*)

**apply** (*auto simp add: md-defs initStateMd-def*

*messagesProto-def messagesProtoTrHonest-def*)

```

apply (rule DM.Xor)
apply (drule view-elem-ex)
apply auto
apply (drule Recv-imp-knows-A)
apply auto
apply (rule DM.Crypt)
apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply auto
apply (drule view-elem-ex)
apply auto
apply (drule Recv-imp-knows-A)
apply simp

apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (auto simp add: nonce-view-fresh [simplified mdproto-def]
          nonce-view-used [simplified mdproto-def])
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=trec in exI)
apply (auto simp add: recv-a-view-a-r send-a-view-a-r)

apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend in exI)
apply auto
done

```

Agent behaviour does not change with constant clock errors.

**interpretation** PROTOCOL-DELTAONLY Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number  
 parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd Key mdproto

```

apply unfold-locales
apply (auto simp add: md-defs in-timetrans)
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply force
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI) apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply force
apply (intro exI conjI, auto)

```

```

apply (rule-tac f=MPair (Agent P) in HOL.arg-cong)
apply (rule-tac f=Real in HOL.arg-cong)
apply force
apply (intro exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=trec + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (intro exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=trec + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule exI, rule exI, rule exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 + coffset A in exI,
       rule-tac x=trec2 + coffset A in exI,
       rule-tac x=tsend + coffset A in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac f=MPair (Agent P) in HOL.arg-cong)
apply (rule-tac f=Real in HOL.arg-cong)
apply auto
done

interpretation PROTOCOL-DELTA-EXEC Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number
  parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components
  initStateMd Key mdproto sys
by unfold-locales

```

### 23.1 Direct Definition

```

inductive-set
  mdb :: (msg trace) set
  where
    Nil [intro] : [] ∈ mdb
    | Fake:
      [ tr ∈ mdb; t >= maxtime tr;
        X ∈ DM (Intruder I) (knowsI (Intruder I) tr) ]
      ⇒ (t, Send (Tx (Intruder I) j) X []) # tr ∈ mdb

    | Con :
      [ tr ∈ mdb; trecv >= maxtime tr;
        ∀ X ∈ components {M}.
        ∃ tsend A i M' L.
        ∃ Y ∈ components {M'}.
        (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) ∈ set tr ∧
        cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx B j) = Some tab ∧ tsend + tab ≤ trecv ∧ Xor X
        Y ∈ LowHamXor ]
      ⇒ (trecv, Recv (Rx B j) M) # tr ∈ mdb

    | MD1:
      [ tr ∈ mdb; t >= maxtime tr;

```

```

 $\neg (\text{used } tr (\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) NV)) []$ 
 $\implies (t, \text{Send} (\text{Tr} (\text{Honest } V)) (\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) NV) []) \# tr \in mdb$ 

| MD2:
 $\llbracket tr \in mdb; tsend \geq maxtime tr;$ 
 $(trec, \text{Recv} (\text{Rec} (\text{Honest } P)) NV) \in set tr;$ 
 $\neg (\text{used } tr (\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NP)) []$ 
 $\implies (tsend, \text{Send} (\text{Tr} (\text{Honest } P))$ 
 $(\text{Xor} NV (\text{Hash} \{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NP, \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } P) \}))$ 
 $[NV, \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NP])$ 
 $\# tr \in mdb$ 

| MD3:
 $\llbracket tr \in mdb; tsend \geq maxtime tr;$ 
 $(trec, \text{Recv} (\text{Rec} (\text{Honest } P)) NV) \in set tr;$ 
 $(tsend1, \text{Send} (\text{Tr} (\text{Honest } P))$ 
 $(\text{Xor} NV (\text{Hash} \{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NP, \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } P) \}))$ 
 $[NV, \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NP])$ 
 $\in set tr []$ 
 $\implies (tsend,$ 
 $\text{Send} (\text{Tr} (\text{Honest } P))$ 
 $(\text{Crypt} (\text{priSK} (\text{Honest } P))$ 
 $\{ NV, \{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NP, \text{Agent} V \} \}) [])$ 
 $\# tr \in mdb$ 

| MD4:
 $\llbracket tr \in mdb; tdone \geq maxtime tr;$ 
 $(trec2, \text{Recv} (\text{Rec} (\text{Honest } V))$ 
 $(\text{Crypt} (\text{priSK } P))$ 
 $\{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) NV, \{ NP, \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } V) \} \})$ 
 $\in set tr;$ 
 $(trec1, \text{Recv} (\text{Rec} (\text{Honest } V)) (\text{Xor} (\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) NV) (\text{Hash} \{ NP,$ 
 $\text{Agent } P \})))$ 
 $\in set tr;$ 
 $(tsend, \text{Send} (\text{Tr} (\text{Honest } V)) (\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) NV) []) \in set tr []$ 
 $\implies (tdone, \text{Claim} (\text{Honest } V) \{ \text{Agent } P, \text{Real} ((trec1 - tsend) * vc/2) \}) \# tr$ 
 $\in mdb$ 

```

obtain a simpler induction rule for protocol since it is executable and deltaonly

```

lemmas proto-induct =
  sys.induct [simplified derivable-removable remove-occursAt timetrans-removable]

```

## 23.2 Equality for direct and parameterized Definition

We now show that both inductive definitions define the same set of traces.

```

lemma abstr-equal: mdb = sys
proof auto
  fix tr
  assume r: tr ∈ sys

```

```

show tr ∈ mdb using r
proof (induct tr rule: proto-induct)
  case 1 with prems show ?case by auto
next
  case 2 with prems show ?case by (auto intro: mdb.Nil)
next
  case 4 with prems show ?case apply – apply (rule mdb.Con) apply auto
done
next
  case 3 with prems show ?case by (auto intro: mdb.Fake)
next
  case 5
    thus ?case
      apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
      apply (auto intro!: mdb.MD1 mdb.MD2 mdb.MD3 [simplified] mdb.MD4 simp
add: usedI-def)
      apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
      done
qed
next
fix tr
assume r: tr ∈ mdb
show tr ∈ sys using r
proof(induct tr rule: mdb.induct)
  case Nil
  with prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Fake tr ts X I j)
  with prems show ?case by (auto intro: sys.Fake)
next
  case (Con tr)
  with prems show ?case apply – apply (rule sys.Con) apply auto done
next
  case (MD1 tr ts C NA)
  with prems have (ts,createEv C (SendEv 0 []) (Nonce (Honest C) NA)) # tr
  ∈ sys
    apply –
    apply (rule-tac step=md1 in sys-Proto-exec)
    apply force
    apply force
    apply force
    apply (force simp add: mdproto-def)
    apply (simp add: md1-def)
    apply (simp add: usedI-def)
    apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
    done
  thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
  case (MD2 tr tsend trecv P NV NP)

```

```

with prems have
  (tsend,
   createEv P
     (SendEv 0 [NV, Nonce (Honest P) NP])
     (Xor NV (Hash {Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent (Honest P)})))
   # tr ∈ sys
  apply – apply (rule-tac step=md2 in sys-Proto)
  apply (auto simp add: md-defs usedI-def)
  apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
  done
  thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
  case (MD3 tr tsend trecv P NV tsend1 NP V)
  with prems have
    (tsend,
     createEv P (SendEv 0 []))
     (Crypt (priSK (Honest P))
       {NV, {Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent V}})) # tr ∈ sys
  apply – apply (rule-tac step=md3 in sys-Proto)
  apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
  done
  thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
  case (MD4 tr tdone trec2 V P NV NP trec1 tsend)
  with prems have
    (tdone, createEv V ClaimEv {Agent P, Real ((trec1 - tsend) * vc/2)}) # tr
    ∈ sys
  apply – apply (rule-tac step=md4 in sys-Proto)
  apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
  apply (intro exI conjI)
  apply auto
  done
  thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
qed
qed

```

**lemmas** [simp,intro] = abstr-equal [THEN sym]

### 23.3 Some invariants capturing the Behavior of honest Agents

```

lemma nonce-fresh-challenge:
  assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb and
    send: (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Nonce (Honest A) NA) []) ∈ set tr
  shows Nonce (Honest A) NA
    ∉ usedI (beforeEvent (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Nonce (Honest A)
    NA) [])) tr
  using prems(1–)
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsend) with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by auto

```

```

next
  case (Con tr tc C mc D tab) with Con.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD1 tr t V' NV)
  show ?case proof cases
    assume (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Nonce (Honest A) NA) []) =
      (t, Send (Tr (Honest V')) (Nonce (Honest V') NV) [])
    thus ?case using MD1.hyps prems
      apply (auto simp add: usedI-def)
      by (simp add: mem-def)
next
  assume (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Nonce (Honest A) NA) []) ≠
    (t, Send (Tr (Honest V')) (Nonce (Honest V') NV) [])
  thus ?case using MD1.hyps prems by auto
qed
next
  case (MD2 tr tsend trec P' NV NP)
  thus ?case using MD2.hyps prems by auto
next
  case (MD3 tr tsend trec P' NV tsend1 NP V')
  with MD3.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD4 tr t trec2 V' P' NV NP trec1 tsend)
  with MD4.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
qed

lemma nonce-fresh-response:
assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb and
  send: (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Xor NV (Hash {NP, Agent P}))
  [NV, NP]) ∈ set tr
shows
  ( $\exists NA.$ 
    $P = Honest A \wedge$ 
    $NP = Nonce (Honest A) NA \wedge$ 
    $Nonce (Honest A) NA$ 
    $\notin usedI (beforeEvent$ 
     $(ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Xor NV (Hash {Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)}))$ 
     $[NV, Nonce (Honest A) NA]) tr))$ 
  using mdb send
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsend) with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr tc C mc D tab) with Con.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD3 tr tsend trec P' NV tsend1 NP V')
  with MD3.hyps prems show ?case by auto

```

```

next
  case (MD4 tr t trec2 V' P' NV NP trec1 tsend)
    with MD4.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (MD1 tr t V NV) thus ?case by auto
next
  case (MD2 tr tsend trec C ND NC)
    let ?eva = (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Xor NV (Hash {NP, Agent P }))
      [NV, NP])
    let ?newev = (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest C)) (Xor ND (Hash { Nonce (Honest C) NC, Agent (Honest C)}))
      [ND, Nonce (Honest C) NC])
    show ?case proof cases
      assume eq: ?eva = ?newev
      thus ?case using MD2.hyps prems eq apply -
        apply (rule-tac x=NC in exI)
        apply (subgoal-tac NP = Nonce (Honest C) NC prefer 2)
        apply force
        apply (subgoal-tac P = Honest C)
        prefer 2
        apply simp
        apply (drule Xor-same-arg)
        apply force
        apply (auto simp add: usedI-def)
        apply (force simp: mem-def)
        done
next
  assume ?eva ≠ ?newev
  hence ?eva ∈ set tr using (?eva ∈ set (?newev#tr)) by auto
  thus ?case apply -
    apply (frule MD2.hyps(2))
    apply (elim conjE exE)
    apply auto
    done
qed
qed

lemma nonce-fresh-response2:
  assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb and
    send: (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Xor NV (Hash { Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)}))
    [NV, Nonce (Honest A) NA])
    ∈ set tr
  shows Nonce (Honest A) NA
    ∉ usedI (beforeEvent
      (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Xor NV (Hash { Nonce (Honest A) NA, Agent (Honest A)})))

```

```

[NV, Nonce (Honest A) NA]) tr)
using mdb send
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsend) with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr tc C mc D tab) with Con.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD3 tr tsend trec P' NV tsend1 NP V')
    with MD3.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD4 tr t trec2 V' P' NV NP trec1 tsend)
    with MD4.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (MD1 tr t V NV) thus ?case by auto
next
  case (MD2 tr tsend trec C ND NC)
    let ?eva = (ta, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) (Xor NV (Hash { Nonce (Honest A)
      NA, Agent (Honest A)})))
      [NV, Nonce (Honest A) NA])
    let ?newev = (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest C)) (Xor ND (Hash { Nonce (Honest
      C) NC, Agent (Honest C)})))
      [ND, Nonce (Honest C) NC])
    show ?case proof cases
      assume eq: ?eva = ?newev
      thus ?case using MD2.hyps prems apply -
        apply (auto simp add: usedI-def)
        apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
        done
    next
    assume ?eva ≠ ?newev
    hence ?eva ∈ set tr using (?eva ∈ set (?newev#tr)) by auto
    thus ?case apply -
      apply (frule MD2.hyps(2))
      apply auto
      done
    qed
qed

```

If an honest prover sends a signature, then he has sent the corresponding fastreply before. Then we can use nonce fresh response to obtain that the nonce in a fast-reply is fresh.

```

lemma sig-send-prover:
  assumes mdb: tr ∈ mdb
  and mac: (tsend,
    Send (Tx (Honest B) k)
    (Crypt (priSK (Honest B))
      { NA, {Nonce (Honest B) NB, Agent A} } ) [] )

```

```

 $\in \text{set } tr$ 
shows  $(\exists t_{fast}.$ 
 $(t_{fast}, \text{Send} (\text{Tr} (\text{Honest } B))$ 
 $(Xor \text{NA} (\text{Hash } \{\!\! \{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) \text{NB}, \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } B) \}\!\! \})$ 
 $[\text{NA}, \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) \text{NB}] \in \text{set } tr)$ 
using prems
apply (induct tr rule: mdb.induct)
apply (auto)
done

lemma sig-send-prover2:
assumes mdb: tr  $\in$  mdb
and mac: (tsend,
 $\text{Send} (\text{Tx} (\text{Honest } B) k)$ 
 $(\text{Crypt} (\text{priSK} (\text{Honest } B))$ 
 $\{\!\! \{ \text{NA}, \{\!\! \{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) \text{NB}, \text{Agent } A \}\!\! \} \}\!\! \}) \llbracket$ )
 $\in \text{set } tr$ 
shows  $(\exists t_{fast}.$ 
 $(t_{fast}, \text{Send} (\text{Tr} (\text{Honest } B))$ 
 $(Xor \text{NA} (\text{Hash } \{\!\! \{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) \text{NB}, \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } B) \}\}\!\! \})$ 
 $[\text{NA}, \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) \text{NB}] \in \text{set } tr \wedge$ 
 $\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) \text{NB}$ 
 $\notin \text{usedI} (\text{beforeEvent}$ 
 $(t_{fast}, \text{Send} (\text{Tr} (\text{Honest } B))$ 
 $(Xor \text{NA} (\text{Hash } \{\!\! \{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) \text{NB}, \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } B)$ 
 $\}) \llbracket$ 
 $[\text{NA}, \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } B) \text{NB}] \text{ tr}))$ 
using prems apply –
apply (frule sig-send-prover)
apply force
apply (elim exE)
apply (rule-tac x=tfast in exI)
apply (frule nonce-fresh-response2)
by auto

```

The sigs are always unique because they contain the private key of an honest agents and his own nonce contribution

```

lemma sig-msg-originates:
assumes mdb: tr  $\in$  mdb
and fsend (tf, Send (Tx (Honest F) j) mf Lf)  $\in$  set tr
and mfsubterm: Crypt (priSK (Honest P))  $\{\!\! \{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) \text{NV}, \{\!\! \{ \text{NP}', \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } V) \}\!\! \} \}$ 
 $\in \text{subterms } \{mf\}$ 
and ffresh: Crypt (priSK (Honest P))  $\{\!\! \{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) \text{NV}, \{\!\! \{ \text{NP}', \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } V) \}\!\! \} \}$ 
 $\notin \text{used} (\text{beforeEvent} (\text{tf}, \text{Send} (\text{Tx} (\text{Honest } F) j) \text{mf Lf}) \text{tr})$ 
shows  $\exists \text{NP}. \text{F}=\text{P} \wedge (\text{NP}' = \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) \text{NP})$ 
 $\wedge \text{Lf} = \llbracket$ 
 $\wedge \text{mf} = \text{Crypt} (\text{priSK} (\text{Honest } P)) \{\!\! \{ \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) \text{NV}, \{\!\! \{ \text{Nonce}$ 

```

```

(Honest P) NP, Agent (Honest V) } } using prems
proof (induct tr rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsend) with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Con tr tc C mc D tab) with Con.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (MD4 tr t trec2 V' P' NV NP trec1 tsend)
    with MD4.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
  case Nil thus ?case by auto
next
  case (MD1 tr t V NV)
    show ?case using prems by auto
next
  case (MD2 tr tsend trec P' NV' NP)
let ?msg = Xor NV' (Hash { Nonce (Honest P') NP, Agent (Honest P') })
let ?ev = (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest P')) ?msg [NV',Nonce (Honest P') NP])
let ?sig = Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) {Nonce (Honest V) NV, {NP', Agent (Honest V)}}
show ?case proof cases
  assume (tf, Send (Tx (Honest F) j) mf Lf) = ?ev
  hence sub: ?sig ∈ subterms {NV'} using prems
    apply auto
    apply (drule sig-subterms)
    apply (drule subterms.singleton)
    apply auto
    done
  thus ?thesis
proof cases
  assume ?ev ∈ set tr
  thus ?thesis using prems(6-) by auto
next
  assume ?ev ∉ set tr
  thus ?thesis using sub prems(6-) apply -
    apply auto
    apply (frule crypt-components-subterm)
    apply auto
    apply (drule-tac X=M in send-before-recv[simplified])
    apply assumption
    apply assumption
    apply auto
    apply (drule distort-LowHam)
    apply auto
    apply (drule crypt-not-LowHam)
    apply simp
    apply (drule-tac Y=Y in subterms-component-trans)
    apply assumption
    apply (drule Send-imp-parts-used)
    apply assumption

```

```

apply simp
done
qed
next
assume (tf, Send (Tx (Honest F) j) mf Lf) ≠ ?ev
thus ?thesis using prems by auto
qed
next
case (MD3 tr tsend trec P' NV' tsend1 NP V')
let ?msg = Crypt (priSK (Honest P')) {NV', {Nonce (Honest P') NP, Agent V'}}
let ?ev = (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest P')) ?msg [])
let ?sig = Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) {Nonce (Honest V) NV, {NP', Agent (Honest V)}}
show ?case proof cases
assume (tf, Send (Tx (Honest F) j) mf Lf) = ?ev
with (?sig ∈ subterms {mf})
have or: ?sig ∈ subterms {NV'} ∨ (P'=P ∧ V'=Honest V ∧ NV' = Nonce (Honest V) NV
                                         ∧ NP' = Nonce (Honest P') NP)
by auto
thus ?thesis proof cases
assume ?sig ∈ subterms {NV'}
show ?thesis proof cases
assume ?ev ∈ set tr
thus ?thesis using prems(6-) by auto
next
assume ?ev ∉ set tr
thus ?thesis using prems(6-) apply -
apply (frule-tac S={NV'} in crypt-components-subterm)
apply simp
apply (elim bxE)
apply (drule-tac X=M in send-before-recv[simplified])
apply assumption
apply assumption
apply clar simp
apply (drule distort-LowHam)
apply clar simp
apply (drule crypt-not-LowHam)
apply assumption
apply (drule-tac Y=Y in subterms-component-trans)
apply assumption
apply (drule Send-imp-parts-used) back
apply assumption
apply simp
done
qed
next
assume ¬ (?sig ∈ subterms {NV'})

```

```

hence  $P' = P \wedge V' = Honest\ V \wedge NV' = Nonce\ (Honest\ V)\ NV \wedge NP' =$ 
 $Nonce\ (Honest\ P')\ NP$ 
    using or by auto
    thus ?thesis using prems(6-) by auto
qed
next
    assume ( $tf, Send\ (Tx\ (Honest\ F)\ j)\ mf\ Lf \neq ?ev$ )
    thus ?thesis using prems by auto
qed
qed

```

**lemma** *originate-unique*:

```

assumes  $m \notin used\ (beforeEvent\ (ta, Send\ TA\ ma\ La)\ tr)$ 
and  $m \notin used\ (beforeEvent\ (tb, Send\ TB\ mb\ Lb)\ tr)$ 
and  $(tb, Send\ TB\ mb\ Lb) \neq (ta, Send\ TA\ ma\ La)$ 
and  $(tb, Send\ TB\ mb\ Lb) \in set\ tr$ 
and  $(ta, Send\ TA\ ma\ La) \in set\ tr$ 
and  $m \in subterms\ \{ma\}$ 
shows  $m \notin subterms\ \{mb\}$  using prems
apply (induct tr)
apply simp
apply (case-tac  $a=(ta, Send\ TA\ ma\ La) \wedge a \notin set\ tr$ )
apply (elim conjE)
apply simp
apply (case-tac  $m \in subterms\ \{mb\}$ ) prefer 2
apply force
apply (subgoal-tac  $(tb, Send\ TB\ mb\ Lb) \in set\ tr$ ) prefer 2
apply force
apply (frule-tac  $Y=m$  in Send-imp-parts-used)
apply force
apply force
apply (case-tac  $a=(tb, Send\ TB\ mb\ Lb) \wedge a \notin set\ tr$ )
apply (elim conjE)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac  $(ta, Send\ TA\ ma\ La) \in set\ tr$ ) prefer 2
apply force
apply (frule-tac  $Y=m$  in Send-imp-parts-used)
apply force
apply force
apply auto
done

```

**lemma** *components-factors*:

```

factors  $m \neq \{m\} \implies components\ \{m\} = \{m\}$ 
apply (case-tac Rep-msg m)
apply (auto simp add: factors-def components-def)
apply (drule-tac  $f=Abs\text{-}msg$  in HOL.arg-cong, auto simp add: Rep\text{-}msg\text{-}inverse)+
done

```

```

lemma ffactors-fcomponents:
  components {m} ≠ {m} ==> factors m = {m}
  apply (case-tac Rep-msg m)
  apply (auto simp add: factors-def components-def)
  apply (drule-tac f=Abs-msg in HOL.arg-cong, auto simp add: Rep-msg-inverse)+ done

lemma freshNonce-dishonestAgent-send-recv:
  assumes tr ∈ mdb
  and   (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) ∈ set tr ∨ (t, Recv (Rx (Honest A) i)
m) ∈ set tr
  and   X ∈ components {m}
  and   Hash { NC, Agent (Intruder I)} ∈ factors X
  and  Nonce (Honest B) NB ∈ factors X
  and   (tnonce, Send (Tr (Honest B)) (Nonce (Honest B) NB) []) ∈ set tr
  and   Nonce (Honest B) NB
        ∉ usedI (beforeEvent (tnonce, Send (Tr (Honest B)) (Nonce (Honest B)
NB) [])) tr)
  shows   ∃ I'. t - tnonce ≥ cdistl (Honest B) (Intruder I') + cdistl (Intruder
I') (Honest A)
  using prems
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t m L i X rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsend)
  hence (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) ∈ set tr ∨ (t, Recv (Rx (Honest A) i)
m) ∈ set tr by auto
  with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
next
  case (MD1 tr tc V NV)
  have Hash { NC, Agent (Intruder I)} ∉ factors (Nonce (Honest V) NV) by
  auto
  hence (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) ∈ set tr ∨ (t, Recv (Rx (Honest A) i)
m) ∈ set tr
  using MD1.preds by auto
  also have (tnonce, Send (Tr (Honest B)) (Nonce (Honest B) NB) []) ∈ set tr
  using MD1.preds (tr ∈ mdb)
  apply (auto simp add: usedI-def split: split-if-asm)
  apply (drule-tac Y=Nonce (Honest B) NV in Send-imp-parts-used)
  apply auto
  apply (drule factors-imp-subterms) back
  apply (drule-tac Y=X in subterms-component-trans)
  apply simp
  apply simp
  apply (drule factors-imp-subterms) back
  apply (drule-tac Y=X in subterms-component-trans)
  apply simp
  apply (frule-tac S={m} in nonce-components-subterm)
  apply (elim bxE)

```

```

apply (drule-tac X=m in send-before-recv[simplified])
apply assumption
apply assumption
apply auto
apply (drule distort-LowHam)
apply clar simp
apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
apply assumption
apply (drule-tac Y=Y in subterms-component-trans)
apply assumption
apply (drule Send-imp-parts-used)
apply assumption
apply simp
done
ultimately show ?case using MD1.hyps prems apply -
  apply (rule MD1.hyps(2))
  apply (simp)+
done
next
  case (MD4 tr t A NA)
  hence (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) ∈ set tr ∨ (t, Recv (Rx (Honest A) i)
m) ∈ set tr
    using prems by auto
  with MD4.hyps prems show ?case apply -
    apply (rule MD4.hyps(2))
    apply simp+
done
next
  case Nil
  show ?case using prems by auto
next
  case (MD3 tr tsend trec D NE tsend1 NF C)

  let ?sigm = Crypt (priSK (Honest D)) {NE, {Nonce (Honest D) NF, Agent
C}}
  let ?ev = (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest D)) ?sigm [])
  show ?case proof cases
    assume (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) ∈ set (?ev#tr)
    show ?case proof cases
      assume eveq: (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) = ?ev
      thus ?thesis using prems by auto
    next
      assume (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) ≠ ?ev
      hence (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) ∈ set tr using prems by auto
      with MD3.hyps prems show ?thesis apply -
        apply (rule MD3.hyps(2))
        apply force
        apply force
        apply force

```

```

apply force
apply force
apply force
done
qed
next
assume (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) ∈ set (?ev#tr)
hence (t, Recv (Rx (Honest A) i) m) ∈ set tr using prems by auto
with MD3.hyps prems show ?case apply -
  apply (rule MD3.hyps(2))
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force
  apply force
  done
qed
next
case (MD2 tr tsend trec P NV NP)
let ?hash = Hash {Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent (Honest P)}
let ?fr = Xor NV ?hash
let ?ev = (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest P)) ?fr [NV, Nonce (Honest P) NP])
show ?case proof cases
assume (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) ∈ set (?ev#tr)
show ?case proof cases
assume eveq: (t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) = ?ev

have hashFactor: ?hash ∉ factors NV
  using ⊢ MESSAGE-DERIVATION.used subterms tr (Nonce (Honest P)
NP) ⊢
    ((tree, Recv (Rec (Honest P)) NV) ∈ set tr ⊢ tr ∈ mdb)
apply -
apply auto
apply (drule factors-imp-subterms)
apply (subgoal-tac Nonce (Honest P) NP ∈ subterms {NV}) prefer 2
apply (rule-tac G=?hash in subterms.trans)
apply force
apply force
apply (drule nonce-components-subterm)
apply auto
apply (drule send-before-recv[simplified])
apply simp
apply simp
apply auto
apply (drule distort-LowHam)
apply auto
apply (drule nonce-not-LowHam)
apply simp

```

```

apply (drule-tac Y=Y in subterms-component-trans)
apply simp
apply (drule Send-imp-parts-used)
apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
done

have NVzero: NV ≠ Zero using ⟨X ∈ components {m}⟩ ⟨Hash {NC, Agent (Intruder I)}⟩ ∈ factors X eveq
by auto

have ?hash ∈ factors (Xor NV ?hash) using hashFactor
apply -
apply (drule factors-Xor-hash-not-subterm)
by auto

hence XorNotPair: ∀ X Y. Xor NV ?hash ≠ MPair X Y by auto

hence components {Xor NV ?hash} = {Xor NV ?hash} using hashFactor
apply -
apply (drule components-non-pair)
by auto

hence Xeq: X = Xor NV ?hash using prems by auto

hence hashNV: Hash {NC, Agent (Intruder I)} ∈ factors NV
using ⟨Hash {NC, Agent (Intruder I)}⟩ ∈ factors X eveq hashFactor apply-
apply simp
apply (drule factors-Xor-hash-not-subterm)
apply auto
done

hence nonceNV: Nonce (Honest B) NB ∈ factors NV
using ⟨Nonce (Honest B) NB ∈ factors X⟩ hashFactor eveq Xeq apply-
apply -
apply simp
apply (drule factors-Xor-hash-not-subterm)
apply auto
done

have components {NV} = {NV} using nonceNV hashNV apply -
apply (rule components-factors)
apply auto
done

hence NV ∈ components {NV} by auto

thus ?case using prems(8-)
apply auto
apply (subgoal-tac ∃ I'. cdistl (Honest B) (Intruder I') + cdistl (Intruder

```

```

 $I' \ (Honest\ P) \leq trec - tnonce$  prefer 2
  apply (rule prems(9))
  apply (rule disjI2)
  apply simp
  apply assumption
  apply (rule hashNV)
  apply (rule nonceNV)
  apply simp
  apply simp
  apply (elim exE)
  apply (rule-tac  $x=I'$  in exI)
  apply (subgoal-tac  $trec \leq tsend$ )
  apply force
  apply (rule maxtime-geq-elem)
  apply auto
  done

next
  assume ( $t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L \neq ?ev$ )
  thus ?thesis using MD2.prems MD2.hyps apply -
    apply (rule MD2.hyps(2))
    apply force
    apply force
    apply force
    apply force
    apply force
    apply (force simp add: usedI-def)
    done

  qed
next
  assume ( $t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L \notin set (?ev#tr)$ )
  thus ?thesis using MD2.prems MD2.hyps apply -
    apply (rule MD2.hyps(2))
    apply force
    apply force
    apply force
    apply force
    apply force
    apply (force simp add: usedI-def)
    done

  qed
next
  print-cases
  case (Con tr trecv-l M-l B-l j-l tab-l)

  let ?evrecv = (trecv-l, Recv (Rx B-l j-l) M-l)
  show ?case proof cases
    assume ( $t, Recv (Rx (Honest A) i) m \in set (?evrecv#tr)$ )
    show ?case proof cases
      assume ( $t, Recv (Rx (Honest A) i) m = ?evrecv$ )

```

```

hence mceq:  $m = M-l$  and Deq:  $B-l=Honest A$  and trecveq:  $t=trecv-l$  by
auto

```

```

obtain tsend E u M' L' Y where
  p1: (tsend, Send (Tx E u) M' L')  $\in$  set tr and
  p2:  $Y \in components \{M'\}$  and
  p3: Xor X Y  $\in$  LowHamXor and
  p4: cdistM (Tx E u) (Rx B-l j-l) = Some tab-l and
  p5: tsend + tab-l  $\leq$  trecv-l
  using prems
  apply –
  apply (erule ballE)
  apply auto
  done
show ?thesis proof cases
  assume  $\exists I'. E = Intruder I'$ 
  then obtain I' where I:  $E = Intruder I'$  by auto
  have cdist2: cdistl (Honest B) (Intruder I')  $\leq$  tsend – tnonce using prems
  p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 apply –
    apply (rule-tac A=Honest B and NA=NB and i=0 and ma=(Nonce (Honest B) NB) and tr=tr
      and mb=M in fresh-nonce-earliest-send)
    apply force
    apply force
    apply (simp add: usedI-def)
    apply force defer
    apply simp
    apply simp
    apply (rule subterms-component-trans) defer
    apply simp
    apply (drule factors-imp-subterms)
    apply (drule distort-LowHam)
    apply (elim bxE)
    apply simp
      apply (drule-tac d=d and m=Y and A=Honest B and N=NB in nonce-not-LowHam)
        apply (erule factors-imp-subterms)
        apply simp
        done
    have cdist3: cdistl (Intruder I') (Honest A)  $\leq$  t – tsend using p1 p4 p5
    trecveq I Con.hyps Deq
      apply auto
      apply (frule noflt-some2)
      by auto
    hence t – tnonce  $\geq$  cdistl (Honest B) (Intruder I') + cdistl (Intruder I')
    (Honest A) using cdist2
      by auto
    thus ?thesis by auto
  next

```

```

assume  $\neg (\exists I'. E = \text{Intruder } I')$ 
then obtain F where  $F: E = \text{Honest } F$  apply (case-tac E) by auto
hence  $\exists I'. \text{cdistl } (\text{Honest } B) (\text{Intruder } I') + \text{cdistl } (\text{Intruder } I') (\text{Honest } F) \leq t_{\text{send}} - t_{\text{nonce}}$ 
using Con.prem Con.hyps mceq Deq trecveq p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 apply -
apply (rule-tac m=M' in Con.hyps(2))
apply force defer defer defer
apply force
apply (force simp add: usedI-def)
apply assumption

apply (drule distort-LowHam)
apply (elim bxE)
apply simp
apply (drule factors-Xor)
apply clar simp
apply (drule factors-LowHam)
apply simp
apply force

apply (drule distort-LowHam)
apply (elim bxE)
apply simp
apply (drule factors-Xor) back
apply clar simp
apply (drule factors-LowHam)
apply simp
apply force
done

then obtain I where cdist1:
cdistl ( $\text{Honest } B$ ) ( $\text{Intruder } I$ ) + cdistl ( $\text{Intruder } I$ ) ( $\text{Honest } F$ )  $\leq t_{\text{send}}$ 
 $- t_{\text{nonce}}$ 
by auto
have cdist2:  $\text{cdistl } (\text{Honest } F) (\text{Honest } A) \leq t - t_{\text{send}}$  using trecveq
Con.hyps Deq F p1 p4 p5
apply auto
apply (frule noflt-some2)
by auto
have cdist3:  $\text{cdistl } (\text{Intruder } I) (\text{Honest } F) + \text{cdistl } (\text{Honest } F) (\text{Honest } A)$ 
 $\geq$ 
 $\text{cdistl } (\text{Intruder } I) (\text{Honest } A)$ 
by (rule cdistl-triangle)

have  $t - t_{\text{nonce}} \geq (\text{cdistl } (\text{Honest } B) (\text{Intruder } I) + \text{cdistl } (\text{Intruder } I)$ 
( $\text{Honest } F$ ))
 $+ \text{cdistl } (\text{Honest } F) (\text{Honest } A)$  using cdist1 cdist2 apply
 $-$ 
by auto
then also have ...  $\geq \text{cdistl } (\text{Honest } B) (\text{Intruder } I) + \text{cdistl } (\text{Intruder } I)$ 

```

```

(Honest A) using cdist3
  by auto
  ultimately have  $t - tnonce \geq cdistl$  (Honest B) (Intruder I) +  $cdistl$ 
  (Intruder I) (Honest A)
    by auto
    thus ?thesis by auto
qed
next
assume  $(t, Recv (Rx (Honest A) i) m) \neq ?evrecv$ 
hence  $(t, Recv (Rx (Honest A) i) m) \in set tr$  using prems by auto
thus ?thesis using Con.prem apply -
  apply (rule Con.hyps(2))
  by auto
qed
next
assume  $(t, Recv (Rx (Honest A) i) m) \notin set (?evrecv \# tr)$ 
hence  $(t, Send (Tx (Honest A) i) m L) \in set tr$  using prems
  apply -
  apply auto
  done
thus ?thesis using Con.prem apply -
  apply (rule Con.hyps(2))
  by auto
qed
qed

```

### 23.4 Security proof for Honest Provers

```

lemma mdb-secure:
assumes mdb:  $tr \in mdb$ 
and believe:  $((tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent (Honest P), Real d\}) \in set tr)$ 
shows  $d \geq pdist (Honest V) (Honest P)$  using prems
proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t rule: mdb.induct)
  case (Fake tr mintr I tsend)
    hence  $((tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent (Honest P), Real d\}) \in set tr)$  by auto
    with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
  next
    case (Con tr tc C mc D tab)
      hence  $((tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent (Honest P), Real d\}) \in set tr)$  by auto
      with Con.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
  next
    case (MD1 tr t V' NV)
      hence  $((tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent (Honest P), Real d\}) \in set tr)$  by auto
      with MD1.hyps prems show ?case by auto
  next
    case (MD2 tr tsend trec P' NV NP)

```

```

hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d})) ∈ set tr by
auto
with MD2.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
next
case (MD3 tr tsend trec P' NV tsend1 NP V')
hence ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d})) ∈ set tr by
auto
with MD3.hyps prems show ?case by auto
next
— the only nontrivial case since it adds Claim events
case (MD4 tr t trec2 V' P' NV NP trec1 tsend)
let ?x = (t, Claim (Honest V') {Agent P', Real ((trec1 - tsend)*vc/2)})
and ?ev = ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Honest P), Real d}))
show ?case proof cases
— the added event is the Claim event from the premise, the other case follows
trivially from the IH
assume ?x = ?ev
hence Veq: V'=V and Peq: P'=Honest P and deq: d=(trec1 - tsend)*vc/2
by auto
let ?mmac = {Nonce (Honest V) NV, {NP, Agent (Honest P)}}
let ?sigmsg = Crypt (priSK (Honest P))
{Nonce (Honest V) NV, {NP, Agent (Honest V)}} and
?fastmsg = Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) (Hash { NP, Agent (Honest P)})
have NC-fresh:
Nonce (Honest V) NV
notin usedI (beforeEvent (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest V)) (Nonce (Honest V) NV)
[])) tr)
using prems <tr ∈ mdb> apply –
by (rule nonce-fresh-challenge, auto)
— We first handle the trivial case where V runs the protocol with himself
show ?case proof cases
assume PeqV: P=V

let ?XOR = Xor (Nonce (Honest V') NV) (Hash {NP, Agent P'})

have Nonce (Honest V') NV ∈ subterms {?XOR}
apply (auto simp add: subterms-xor-nonce-hash)
done
then obtain X where X ∈ components {?XOR}
and Nonce (Honest V') NV ∈ subterms {X} using prems apply
—
apply (drule nonce-components-subterm)
apply auto
done

with prems(3–) have
exists A i tsend L M'.
exists Z ∈ components {M'}. (tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) ∈ set tr ∧

```

$Xor X Z \in LowHamXor \wedge cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx (Honest V') 0) \neq$   
*None*  
 $\wedge tsend \leq trec1 - cdist (Tx A i) (Rx (Honest V') 0)$   
**apply** –  
**apply** (*rule send-before-recv*)  
**apply** *auto*  
**done**

**then obtain**  $C u tfsend Lc M' Z$   
**where**  $p1: (tfsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc) \in set tr$   
**and**  $p2: Xor X Z \in LowHamXor$   
**and**  $p3: Z \in components \{M'\}$   
**and**  $p4: cdistM (Tx C u) (Rx (Honest V') 0) \neq None$   
**and**  $p5: tfsend \leq trec1 - cdist (Tx C u) (Rx (Honest V') 0)$   
**by** *auto*

**have**  $p6: \text{Nonce} (Honest V') NV \in subterms \{M'\}$   
**using**  $p1 p2 p3 \langle \text{Nonce} (Honest V') NV \in subterms \{X\} \rangle$  **apply** –  
**apply** (*drule distort-LowHam*)  
**apply** *auto*  
**apply** (*drule nonce-not-LowHam*)  
**apply** *simp*  
**apply** (*rule subterms-component-trans*)  
**apply** *auto*  
**done**

**hence**  $tfsend \leq trec1$  **using**  $p4 p5$  **apply** *auto*  
**apply** (*rule-tac*  $y=trec1 - y$  **in** *order-trans*)  
**apply** (*auto simp add: cdist-def*)  
**by** (*rule cdistnoneg-some*)  
**show** ?thesis **proof** (*rule ccontr*)  
**assume**  $\neg pdist (Honest V) (Honest P) \leq d$   
**hence**  $trec1 < tsend$  **using** *PeqV* **apply** –  
**apply** (*auto simp add: minusv-def CauchySchwarz.norm-def*  
 $pdist\text{-def vlen\text{-}def ith\text{-}def deq}$ )  
**apply** (*erule contrapos-np*)  
**apply** (*subgoal-tac*  $trec1 \geq tsend$ )  
**apply** (*rule mult-nonneg-nonneg*)  
**apply** (*auto intro: vc-pos order-less-imp-le*)  
**done**  
**hence**  $tfsend < tsend$  **using**  $\langle tfsend \leq trec1 \rangle$  **by** *auto*  
**hence**  $(tfsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc)$   
 $\in set (\text{beforeEvent} (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest V)) (\text{Nonce} (Honest V) NV) [])) tr$   
**using** *prems* **apply** –  
**apply** (*rule beforeEvent-earlier*)  
**apply** *auto*  
**done**  
**thus** *False* **using** *NC-fresh p6 Veq* **apply** –

```

apply (rotate-tac 2)
apply (erule contrapos-np)
apply (auto simp add: usedI-def)
apply (erule Send-imp-parts-used)
apply auto
done
qed
next
assume PnotV:  $P \neq V$ 
have sig-recv:  $(trec2, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) ?sigmsg) \in set tr$  using prems
by auto
have fast-recv:  $(trec1, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) ?fastmsg) \in set tr$  using prems
by auto

have ?sigmsg  $\in components \{?sigmsg\}$ 
by auto

with prems(3-) have
 $\exists A i tsend L M'.$ 
 $\exists Z \in components \{M'\}.$ 
 $(tsend, Send (Tx A i) M' L) \in set tr \wedge$ 
 $Xor ?sigmsg Z \in LowHamXor \wedge cdistM (Tx A i) (Rx (Honest V'))$ 
 $0) \neq None$ 
 $\wedge tsend \leq trec2 - cdist (Tx A i) (Rx (Honest V') 0)$ 
apply -
apply (rule send-before-recv)
apply auto
done

then obtain C u tfsend Lc M' Z
where p1:  $(tfsend, Send (Tx C u) M' Lc) \in set tr$ 
and p2:  $Xor ?sigmsg Z \in LowHamXor$ 
and p3:  $Z \in components \{M'\}$ 
by auto

have p4:  $?sigmsg \in subterms \{M'\}$ 
using p1 p2 p3 apply -
apply (subgoal-tac ?sigmsg  $\in subterms \{Z\}$ )
apply (rule-tac Y=Z in subterms-component-trans)
apply simp
apply simp
apply (drule distort-LowHam)
apply (elim bxE)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac Xor Z d = ?sigmsg) prefer 2
apply force
apply (thin-tac Crypt ?k ?m = ?u)
apply simp
apply (subgoal-tac ?sigmsg  $\in factors (Xor Z d)$ ) prefer 2

```

```

apply simp
apply (drule factors-Xor)
apply auto
apply (erule factors-imp-subterms)
apply (auto dest: factors-LowHam)
done

hence  $\exists tf mf j Lf.$ 
       $(tf, \text{Send} (Tx (\text{Honest } P) j) mf Lf) \in \text{set } tr$ 
       $\wedge ?sigmsg \in \text{subterms } \{mf\}$ 
       $\wedge ?sigmsg \notin \text{used} (\text{beforeEvent} (tf, \text{Send} (Tx (\text{Honest } P) j) mf Lf) tr)$ 
using prems p4 apply -
  apply (rule-tac tc=tfsend in crypt-originates)
  apply force prefer 2
  apply force
  apply force
done

then obtain  $tf mf j Lf$  where  $ftr: (tf, \text{Send} (Tx (\text{Honest } P) j) mf Lf) \in \text{set } tr$ 
and  $mfsubterm: ?sigmsg \in \text{subterms } \{mf\}$ 
and  $ffresh: ?sigmsg$ 
 $\notin \text{used} (\text{beforeEvent} (tf, \text{Send} (Tx (\text{Honest } P) j) mf Lf) tr)$ 
by auto

hence ex:  $\exists NPP. (P = P) \wedge NP = \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NPP$ 
       $\wedge Lf = []$ 
       $\wedge mf = \text{Crypt} (\text{priSK} (\text{Honest } P))$ 
       $\quad \{\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) NV, \{\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NPP, \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } V)\}\}$  apply -
  apply (rule sig-msg-originates)
  by (auto intro: prems)

then obtain  $NPP$  where ef:
   $(tf, \text{Send} (Tx (\text{Honest } P) j) (\text{Crypt} (\text{priSK} (\text{Honest } P)))$ 
   $\quad \{\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) NV, \{\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NPP, \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } V)\}\})$ 
   $\quad []) \in \text{set } tr$ 
and  $NPP: NP = \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NPP$ 
apply (insert ftr ex)
by auto

then obtain  $tfast$  where
  fastsend:  $(tfast, \text{Send} (\text{Tr} (\text{Honest } P))$ 
   $\quad (\text{Xor} (\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) NV) (\text{Hash} \{\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NPP, \text{Agent} (\text{Honest } P)\}))$ 
   $\quad [\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } V) NV, \text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NPP]) \in \text{set } tr$ 
  and
  fresh:  $\text{Nonce} (\text{Honest } P) NPP$ 
   $\notin \text{usedI}$ 
  (beforeEvent
     $(tfast, \text{Send} (\text{Tr} (\text{Honest } P)))$ 

```

```

(Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) (Hash { Nonce (Honest P) NPP, Agent (Honest P){}))  

[Nonce (Honest V) NV, Nonce (Honest P) NPP]) tr)  

using <tr ∈ mdb> apply –  

apply (drule sig-send-prover2)  

apply assumption  

apply (auto intro: prems)  

done  

hence rec1-fast: trec1 – tfast >= cdistl (Honest P) (Honest V) using <tr ∈  

mdb> PnotV fastsend  

apply –  

apply (erule-tac NA=NPP and  

ma=Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) (Hash { Nonce (Honest P) NPP,  

Agent (Honest P){}) and  

mb=?fastmsg and i=0 and tr=tr and  

A=Honest P and B=Honest V and  

j=0 and tr=tr  

in fresh-nonce-earliest-recv [simplified]) prefer 6  

apply force prefer 4  

apply force prefer 4  

apply (rule fast-recv)  

apply (auto simp add: NPP)  

apply (force simp add: usedI-def)  

apply (auto simp add: subterms-xor-nonce-hash)  

done  

have fast-send: tfast – tsend >= cdistl (Honest V) (Honest P) using <tr ∈  

mdb> PnotV  

apply –  

apply (erule-tac NA=NV and i=0 and ma=Nonce (Honest V) NV  

and mb=Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) (Hash { Nonce (Honest P) NPP, Agent (Honest P){})  

in fresh-nonce-earliest-send[simplified])  

apply force  

apply (insert NC-fresh, force simp add: usedI-def)  

apply force  

apply (auto intro: prems simp add: Veq)  

apply (auto simp add: Veq[THEN sym] intro: prems)  

apply (auto simp add: subterms-xor-nonce-hash)  

done  

have 2* cdistl (Honest V) (Honest P) ≤ cdistl (Honest V) (Honest P) + cdistl  

(Honest P) (Honest V)  

by (auto simp add: cdistl-symm)  

also have ... ≤ tfast – tsend + (trec1 – tfast) using fast-send rec1-fast by  

auto  

also have tfast – tsend + (trec1 – tfast) ≤ trec1 – tsend by auto  

finally have cdistl (Honest V) (Honest P) * 2 ≤ trec1 – tsend by auto  

thus ?thesis using deg  

apply (simp add: cdistl-def deg)  

apply (subgoal-tac (pdist (Honest V) (Honest P) * 2 /vc) * vc ≤ (trec1 –

```

```

 $t\text{send}) * vc)$  defer
  apply (rule mult-right-mono)
  apply force
  apply (insert vc-pos, auto split: split-if-asm)
  done
qed
next
  assume  $?x \neq ?ev$ 
  show  $?case$  using prems by auto
qed
next
  case Nil thus  $?case$  by auto
qed

```

### 23.5 Security for dishonest Provers

```

lemma mdb-secure-dishonest:
  assumes mdb:  $tr \in mdb$ 
  and believe:  $(tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent (Intruder P), Real d\}) \in set tr$ 
  shows  $\exists P'. d \geq pdist (Honest V) (Intruder P')$  using prems
  proof (induct tr arbitrary: A B trec t rule: mdb.induct)
    case (Fake tr mintr I tsend)
    hence  $((tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent (Intruder P), Real d\})) \in set tr$  by
    auto
    with Fake.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
  next
    case (Con tr tc C mc D tab)
    hence  $((tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent (Intruder P), Real d\})) \in set tr$  by
    auto
    with Con.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
  next
    case (MD1 tr t A NA)
    hence  $((tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent (Intruder P), Real d\})) \in set tr$  by
    auto
    with MD1.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
  next
    case (MD2 tr tsend trec B NA NB)
    hence  $((tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent (Intruder P), Real d\})) \in set tr$  by
    auto
    with MD2.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
  next
    case (MD3 tr tsend trec B NA tsend1 NB A)
    hence  $((tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent (Intruder P), Real d\})) \in set tr$  by
    auto
    with MD3.hyps prems show ?case by (auto)
  next
    — the only nontrivial case since it adds Claim events
    case (MD4 tr t trec2 A B NA NB trec1 tsend)
    let  $?x = (t, Claim (Honest A) \{Agent B, Real ((trec1 - tsend)*vc/2)\})$ 

```

```

and ?ev = ((tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder P), Real d}))
show ?case proof cases
  — the added event is the Claim event from the premise, the other case follows
  trivially from the IH
  assume ?x = ?ev
  hence Aeq: A=V and Beq: B=Intruder P and deq: d=(trec1 - tsend)*vc/2
  by auto
  let ?fastmsg = Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NA) (Hash { NB, Agent (Intruder
  P)})
  have NC-fresh:
    Nonce (Honest V) NA
     $\notin$  usedI (beforeEvent (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest V)) (Nonce (Honest V) NA)
    [])) tr)
  using prems {tr ∈ mdb} Aeq Beq deq
  apply –
  by (rule nonce-fresh-challenge, auto)

  have factors ?fastmsg = {Nonce (Honest V) NA, Hash {NB, Agent (Intruder
  P)}}
  apply (subgoal-tac Nonce (Honest V) NA  $\notin$  factors (Hash {NB, Agent
  (Intruder P)}))
  apply (drule factors-Xor-nonce-not-subterm)
  apply (elim disjE)
  apply force
  apply (force simp add: Xor-rewrite)
  apply force
  done
  hence  $\exists I'. trec1 - tsend \geq cdistl (\text{Honest } V) (\text{Intruder } I') + cdistl (\text{Intruder }$ 
   $I') (\text{Honest } V)$ 
  using prems Aeq NC-fresh
  apply –
  apply simp
  apply (rule-tac i=0 and m=?fastmsg and tr=tr in freshNonce-dishonestAgent-send-recv)
  apply simp
  apply force defer defer defer
  apply force
  apply force
  apply (subst components-non-pair) prefer 2
  apply force defer
  apply simp
  apply simp
  apply clar simp
  done
  then obtain I where trec1 - tsend  $\geq cdistl (\text{Honest } V) (\text{Intruder } I) + cdistl$ 
   $(\text{Intruder } I) (\text{Honest } V)$ 
  by auto
  thus ?thesis using deq Aeq vc-pos
  apply (auto simp add: cdistl-def)
  apply (rule-tac x=I in exI)

```

```

apply (auto simp add: pdist-symm)
apply (subgoal-tac (2 * pdist (Honest V) (Intruder I) / vc) * vc ≤ (trec1 -
tsend) * vc) prefer 2
apply (rule mult-right-mono)
apply (auto split: split-if-asm)
done
next
assume ?x ≠ ?ev
show ?case using prems by auto
qed
next
case Nil thus ?case by auto
qed

end

```

## 24 Security analysis of the signature based Brands-Chaum protocol which results in a proof that there is a trace that violates distance-bounding security.

**theory** *BrandsChaum-attack imports SystemCoffset SystemOrigination MessageTheoryXor3 begin*

**locale** *INITSTATE-SIG-NN = INITSTATE-PKSIG + INITSTATE-NONONCE*

**definition**

*initStateMd :: agent ⇒ msg set where*  
*initStateMd A == Key`({priSK A} ∪ (pubSK`UNIV))*

**interpretation** *INITSTATE-SIG-NN Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components*

*initStateMd Key*  
**apply** (*unfold-locales, auto simp add: initStateMd-def dest: injective-symKey*)  
**apply** (*drule subterms.singleton*)  
**apply** (*auto dest: injective-symKey*)  
**apply** (*drule subterms.singleton*)  
**apply** (*auto dest: injective-symKey*)  
**apply** (*drule subterms.singleton*)  
**apply** (*auto dest: injective-symKey simp add: MACM-def*)  
done

**definition**

*md1 :: msg step*  
**where**

**definition**  
 $md1 \ tr \ P \ t =$   
 $(UN \ NP. \{ev. \ ev = (Hash \ (Nonce \ (Honest \ P) \ NP) \ , \ SendEv \ 0 \ [Number \ 1, \ Nonce \ (Honest \ P) \ NP]) \wedge \ Nonce \ (Honest \ P) \ NP \notin usedI \ tr\})$

**definition**  
 $md2 :: msg \ step$   
**where**  
 $md2 \ tr \ V \ t =$   
 $(UN \ NV \ COM \ trec. \{ev. \ ev = (Nonce \ (Honest \ V) \ NV, \ SendEv \ 0 \ [Number \ 2, \ COM, \ Nonce \ (Honest \ V) \ NV]) \wedge \ Nonce \ (Honest \ V) \ NV \notin usedI \ tr \wedge \ (trec, \ Recv \ (Rec \ (Honest \ V)) \ COM) \in set \ tr\})$

**definition**  
 $md3 :: msg \ step$   
**where**  
 $md3 \ tr \ P \ t =$   
 $(UN \ NP \ NV \ trec \ tsend1 \ COM. \{ev. \ ev = (Xor \ NV \ (Nonce \ (Honest \ P) \ NP) \ , \ SendEv \ 0 \ [Number \ 3, \ Nonce \ (Honest \ P) \ NP, \ NV]) \wedge \ (tsend1, \ Send \ (Tr \ (Honest \ P)) \ COM \ [Number \ 1, \ Nonce \ (Honest \ P) \ NP]) \in set \ tr \wedge \ (trec, \ Recv \ (Rec \ (Honest \ P)) \ NV) \in set \ tr\})$

**definition**  
 $md4 :: msg \ step$   
**where**  
 $md4 \ tr \ P \ t =$   
 $(UN \ NP \ NV \ V \ tsend \ trecv. \{ev. \ ev = (Crypt \ (priSK \ (Honest \ P)) \ , \ \{NV, \ \{\Nonce \ (Honest \ P) \ NP, \ Agent \ V\}\} \ , \ SendEv \ 0 \ [])) \wedge \ (trecv, \ Recv \ (Rec \ (Honest \ P)) \ NV) \in set \ tr \wedge \ (* \ not \ strictly \ neccessary \ *) \ (tsend, \ Send \ (Tr \ (Honest \ P)) \ , \ Xor \ NV \ (Nonce \ (Honest \ P) \ NP) \ , \ [Number \ 3, \ Nonce \ (Honest \ P) \ NP, \ NV]) \in set \ tr\})$

**definition**  
 $md5 :: msg \ step$   
**where**  
 $md5 \ tr \ V \ t =$   
 $(UN \ NP \ NV \ P \ trec1 \ trec2 \ tsend \ CHAL. \{ev. \ ev = (\{Agent \ P, \ Real \ ((trec1 - tsend) * vc/2)\}, \ ClaimEv) \wedge \ (trec2, \ Recv \ (Rec \ (Honest \ V)))\})$

```

( Crypt (priSK P)
  {Nonce (Honest V) NV, {NP, Agent (Honest V)}{}})) ∈ set tr ∧
  (trec1, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) NP)) ∈
  set tr ∧
  (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest V)) CHAL [Number 2, Hash NP , Nonce
  (Honest V) NV ]) ∈ set tr}

```

**definition**

```

mdproto :: msg proto where
mdproto = {md1,md2,md3,md4,md5}

```

```
lemmas md-defs = mdproto-def md1-def md2-def md3-def md4-def md5-def
```

```
locale PROTOCOL-MD = PROTOCOL-PKSIG-NOKEYS+PROTOCOL-NONONCE+INITSTATE-SIG-N
```

```

interpretation PROTOCOL-MD Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number parts sub-
terms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd Key mdproto
apply (unfold-locales)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs messagesProtoTr-def messagesProtoTrHonest-def
      initStateMd-def md-defs
      split: event.split split-if dest: parts.fst-set)

apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule parts-Key-Xor)
apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
prefer 2
apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac t=trecv in view-elem-ex)
apply auto

apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac t=trec in view-elem-ex)
apply auto
done

```

Agents only look at their own views and all messages are derivable.

```

interpretation PROTOCOL-EXECUTABLE Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number
parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd mdproto sys Key
apply (unfold-locales)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs initStateMd-def
      messagesProto-def messagesProtoTrHonest-def)

apply (rule DM.Hash)
apply force

```

```

apply (rule DM.Xor)
apply (drule view-elem-ex)
apply (erule exE)
apply (drule Recv-imp-knows-A)
apply force
apply force

apply (rule DM.Crypt)
apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply (drule view-elem-ex)
apply (erule exE)
apply (drule Recv-imp-knows-A)
apply force

apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply force
apply force
apply force

apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply force
apply force

apply (auto simp add: nonce-view-fresh [simplified mdproto-def]
         nonce-view-used [simplified mdproto-def]
         recv-a-view-a-r send-a-view-a-r)

```

**apply** (*rule-tac x=NP in exI*)

**apply** (*rule-tac x=NV in exI*)
**apply** (*rule-tac x=P in exI*)
**apply** (*rule-tac x=trec1 in exI*)
**apply** (*rule-tac x=trec2 in exI*)
**apply** (*rule-tac x=tsend in exI*)
**apply auto**
**apply** (*rule-tac x=NP in exI*)
**apply** (*rule-tac x=NV in exI*)
**apply** (*rule-tac x=P in exI*)
**apply** (*rule-tac x=trec1 in exI*)
**apply** (*rule-tac x=trec2 in exI*)
**apply** (*rule-tac x=tsend in exI*)
**apply auto**

**done**

Agent behaviour does not change with constant clock errors.

**interpretation** PROTOCOL-DELTAONLY Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number

```

parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd Key md-proto
apply unfold-locales
apply (auto simp add: md-defs in-timetrans)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply force
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 - coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 - coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend - coffset A in exI)
apply auto
apply (simp add: sign-simps)

apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=trec + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=tsend1 + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule-tac x=trec + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI) apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=trecv + coffset A in exI)
apply force

apply (rule-tac x=tsend + coffset A in exI, force)

apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI) apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 + coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 + coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend + coffset A in exI)
apply auto
apply (simp add: sign-simps)
done

```

**interpretation PROTOCOL-DELTA-EXEC** Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number  
 parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components  
 initStateMd Key md-proto sys  
 by unfold-locales

## 24.1 Direct Definition for Brands-Chaum protocol

**inductive-set**  
 $mdb :: (msg\ trace)\ set$

**where**

- $\text{Nil} \text{ [intro]} : [] \in \text{mdb}$
- |  $\text{Fake}:$ 
  - $\llbracket tr \in \text{mdb}; t \geq \text{maxtime } tr; X \in DM(\text{Intruder } I) (\text{knowsI } (\text{Intruder } I) tr) \rrbracket$
  - $\implies (t, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } (\text{Intruder } I) j) X []) \# tr \in \text{mdb}$
- |  $\text{Con}:$ 
  - $\llbracket tr \in \text{mdb}; t_{recv} \geq \text{maxtime } tr; \forall X \in \text{components } \{M\}. \exists tsend A i M' L. \exists Y \in \text{components } \{M'\}. (tsend, \text{Send } (\text{Tx } A i) M' L) \in \text{set } tr \wedge cdistM (\text{Tx } A i) (\text{Rx } B j) = \text{Some tab} \wedge tsend + tab \leq t_{recv} \wedge \text{Xor } X \in \text{LowHamXor} \rrbracket$
  - $\implies (t_{recv}, \text{Recv } (\text{Rx } B j) M) \# tr \in \text{mdb}$
- |  $\text{MD1}:$ 
  - $\llbracket tr \in \text{mdb}; t \geq \text{maxtime } tr; \neg (\text{used } tr (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP)) \rrbracket$
  - $\implies (t, \text{Send } (\text{Tr } (\text{Honest } P)) (\text{Hash } (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP)) [\text{Number } 1, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP]) \# tr \in \text{mdb}$
- |  $\text{MD2}:$ 
  - $\llbracket tr \in \text{mdb}; t \geq \text{maxtime } tr; (t_{recv}, \text{Recv } (\text{Rec } (\text{Honest } V)) COM) \in \text{set } tr; \neg (\text{used } tr (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV)) \rrbracket$
  - $\implies (t, \text{Send } (\text{Tr } (\text{Honest } V)) (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV) [\text{Number } 2, COM, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV]) \# tr \in \text{mdb}$
- |  $\text{MD3}:$ 
  - $\llbracket tr \in \text{mdb}; tsend \geq \text{maxtime } tr; (t_{recv}, \text{Recv } (\text{Rec } (\text{Honest } P)) NV) \in \text{set } tr; (tsend2, \text{Send } (\text{Tr } (\text{Honest } P)) COM [\text{Number } 1, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP]) \in \text{set } tr \rrbracket$
  - $\implies (tsend, \text{Send } (\text{Tr } (\text{Honest } P)) (\text{Xor } NV (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP)) [\text{Number } 3, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP, NV]) \# tr \in \text{mdb}$
- |  $\text{MD4}:$ 
  - $\llbracket tr \in \text{mdb}; tsend \geq \text{maxtime } tr; (t_{recv}, \text{Recv } (\text{Rec } (\text{Honest } P)) NV) \in \text{set } tr; (t, \text{Send } (\text{Tr } (\text{Honest } P)) (\text{Xor } NV (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP)) [\text{Number } 3, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP, NV]) \in \text{set } tr \rrbracket$
  - $\implies (tsend,$

```

Send (Tr (Honest P))
(Crypt (priSK (Honest P))
  { NV, {Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent V} } ) [])
# tr ∈ mdb

| MD5:
  [ tr ∈ mdb; tdone ≥ maxtime tr;
    (trec2, Recv (Rec (Honest V))
      ( Crypt (priSK P)
        {Nonce (Honest V) NV, {NP, Agent (Honest V)} } ))
    ∈ set tr;
    (trec1, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) NP))
    ∈ set tr;
    (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest V)) CHAL [Number 2, Hash NP, Nonce (Honest
V) NV ]) ∈ set tr ]
    ==> (tdone, Claim (Honest V) {Agent P, Real ((trec1 - tsend) * vc/2)}) # tr
    ∈ mdb

```

obtain a simpler induction rule for protocol since it is executable and deltaonly

```

lemmas proto-induct =
  sys.induct [simplified derivable-removable remove-occursAt timetrans-removable]

```

## 24.2 Equality for direct and parameterized Definition

We now show that both inductive definitions define the same set of traces.

```

lemma abstr-equal: mdb = sys
proof auto
fix tr
assume r: tr ∈ sys
show tr ∈ mdb using r
proof (induct tr rule: proto-induct)
  case 1 with prems show ?case by auto
next
  case 2 with prems show ?case by (auto intro: mdb.Nil)
next
  case 4 with prems show ?case apply -
    apply (rule mdb.Con)
    by (auto)
next
  case 3 with prems show ?case by (auto intro: mdb.Fake)
next
  case 5
  thus ?case
    apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
    apply (auto intro!: mdb.MD1 mdb.MD2 mdb.MD3 [simplified] mdb.MD4
      mdb.MD5 simp add: usedI-def)
    apply (auto simp add: mem-def usedI-def)
    done
qed

```

```

next
  fix tr
  assume r: tr ∈ mdb
  show tr ∈ sys using r
  proof(induct tr rule: mdb.induct)
    case Nil
      with prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Fake tr ts X I j)
    with prems show ?case by (auto intro: sys.Fake)
next
  case (Con tr)
    with prems show ?case apply –
      apply (rule sys.Con)
      by (auto)
next
  case (MD1 tr ts A NA)
    with prems have (ts,createEv A (SendEv 0 [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A) NA]) (Hash (Nonce (Honest A) NA))) # tr ∈ sys
      apply –
      apply (rule-tac step=md1 in sys-Proto-exec)
      apply force
      apply force
      apply force
      apply (force simp add: mdproto-def)
      apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
      apply (rule-tac x=NA in exI)
      apply auto
      apply (auto simp add: usedI-def initStateMd-def)
      apply (force simp: mem-def)
      apply (drule subterms.singleton)
      apply auto
      done
    thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
  case (MD2 tr tsend trecv V COM NV)
  with prems have
    (tsend,
     createEv V
     (SendEv 0 [Number 2, COM, Nonce (Honest V) NV])
     (Nonce (Honest V) NV))
    # tr ∈ sys
    apply – apply (rule-tac step=md2 in sys-Proto)
    apply (auto simp add: md-defs usedI-def)
    apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
    done
  thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
  case (MD3 tr tsend trecv P NV tsend2 COM NP)

```

```

with prems have
  (tsend,
   createEv P (SendEv 0 [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV])
   (Xor NV (Nonce (Honest P) (NP))) # tr ∈ sys
   apply – apply (rule-tac step=md3 in sys-Proto)
   apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
   done
   thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
  case (MD5 tr tdone trec2 V P NV NP trec1 tsend CHA)
  with prems have
    (tdone, createEv V ClaimEv {Agent P, Real ((trec1 – tsend) * vc/2)}) # tr
  ∈ sys
   apply – apply (rule-tac step=md5 in sys-Proto)
   apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
   apply (intro exI conjI)
   apply auto
   done
   thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
  case (MD4 tr tsend trecv P NV t NP V)
  with prems have
    (tsend, createEv P (SendEv 0 [])
     (Crypt (priSK (Honest P))
      {NV, {Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent V}})) # tr ∈ sys
   apply – apply (rule-tac step=md4 in sys-Proto)
   apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
   done
   thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
qed
qed

```

**lemmas** [simp,intro] = abstr-equal [THEN sym]

```

lemma Xor-idem[simp]: Xor a a = Zero
  apply (auto simp add: Xor-def Zero-def)
  done

lemma components-xor-n-n-a:
  components {Xor (Nonce A NA) (Nonce B NB)}
  = {Xor (Nonce A NA) (Nonce B NB)}
  apply (rule components-non-pair)
  apply (subgoal-tac NONCE A NA ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (subgoal-tac NONCE B NB ∈ msg) prefer 2
  apply (force simp add: msg-def)
  apply (auto simp add: Xor-def MPair-def Nonce-def Agent-def simp del: norm.simps)

```

```

apply (subgoal-tac MPAIR (Rep-msg X) (Rep-msg Y) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (norm
  (Rep-msg (Abs-msg (NONCE A NA)) ⊕
  norm
  (Rep-msg (Abs-msg (NONCE B NB)))))) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)

apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse split: split-if-asm)
done

lemma attack-tr:
  assumes cdPV: cdistM (Tr (Honest P)) (Rec (Honest V)) = Some dPV
  and
    cdVP: cdistM (Tr (Honest V)) (Rec (Honest P)) = Some dVP and
    cdIV: cdistM (Tr (Intruder I)) (Rec (Honest V)) = Some dIV and
    cdVI: cdistM (Tr (Honest V)) (Rec (Intruder I)) = Some dVI and
    cdPI: cdistM (Tr (Honest P)) (Rec (Intruder I)) = Some dPI and
    dist: dPV + dVP < cdistl (Intruder I) (Honest V) * 2
  shows ∃ tr t d. (tr ∈ mdb) ∧
    ((t, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder I), Real d}) ∈ set tr) ∧
    (d < pdist (Intruder I) (Honest V))
proof -
  let ?NP = Nonce (Honest P) 0
  let ?NV = Nonce (Honest V) 1
  let ?COM = (Hash (?NP))

  have dPV-pos: dPV ≥ 0 using prems apply – by (auto dest: cdistnoneg-some)
  have dVP-pos: dVP ≥ 0 using prems apply – by (auto dest: cdistnoneg-some)
  have dIV-pos: dIV ≥ 0 using prems apply – by (auto dest: cdistnoneg-some)
  have dVI-pos: dVI ≥ 0 using prems apply – by (auto dest: cdistnoneg-some)
  have dPI-pos: dPI ≥ 0 using prems apply – by (auto dest: cdistnoneg-some)
  have zero-lh: Zero ∈ LowHamXor by (rule LowHamXor.Zero)

  let ?tr1 = (0, (Send (Tr (Honest P)) ?COM [Number 1, ?NP])) # []
  have v1: ?tr1 ∈ mdb apply –
    apply (rule mdb.MD1)
    by auto

  let ?tr2 = (dPV, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) ?COM) # ?tr1
  have v2: ?tr2 ∈ mdb using v1 prems dPV-pos zero-lh apply –
    apply (rule mdb.Con)
    apply (rule v1)
    by auto

  let ?tr3 = (dPV, Send (Tr (Honest V)) ?NV [Number 2, ?COM, ?NV]) # ?tr2
  have v3: ?tr3 ∈ mdb using v2 prems dPV-pos apply –
    apply (rule mdb.MD2)

```

```

apply (auto simp add: Xor-Zero)
apply (subgoal-tac ?NV ∈ {?NP, ?COM})
prefer 2
apply (simp add: mem-def)
apply force
done

let ?tr4 = (dPV+dVP, Recv (Rec (Honest P)) ?NV) # ?tr3
have v4: ?tr4 ∈ mdb using v3 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos apply -
  apply (rule mdb.Con)
  apply (auto)
  apply (rule-tac x=dPV in exI)
  apply force
done

let ?tr5 = (dPV+dVP, Send (Tr (Honest P))
            (Xor ?NV ?NP)
            [Number 3, ?NP, ?NV]) # ?tr4
have v5: ?tr5 ∈ mdb using v4 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos apply -
  apply (rule mdb.MD3)
  apply (auto simp add: Xor-Zero)
done

let ?tr6 = (dPV+dVP+dPV, Recv (Rec (Honest V))
            (Xor ?NV ?NP)) # ?tr5
have v6: ?tr6 ∈ mdb using v5 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos apply -
  apply (rule mdb.Con)
  apply (rule v5)
  apply (clarsimp)
  apply (auto simp add: components-xor-n-n-a)
  apply (rule-tac x=dPV + dVP in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=Honest P in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=0 in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x= (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) (Suc 0)) (Nonce (Honest P) 0)))
in exI)
  apply auto
  apply (auto simp add: components-xor-n-n-a)
done

let ?tr7 = (dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI, Recv (Rec (Intruder I)) ?NV) # ?tr6
have v7: ?tr7 ∈ mdb using v6 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos dVI-pos dIV-pos
apply -
  apply (rule mdb.Con)
  apply (rule v6)
  apply (auto simp add: components-nonce)
  apply (rule-tac x=dPV in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=Honest V in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=0 in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x= ?NV in exI)

```

```

apply (auto simp add: components-nonce)
done

let ?RESP = Xor ?NV ?NP

let ?tr8 = (dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI, Recv (Rec (Intruder I)) ?RESP) # ?tr7
have v8: ?tr8 ∈ mdb using v7 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos dVI-pos dIV-pos
dPI-pos apply -
  apply (rule-tac mdb.Con)
  apply (rule v7) prefer 2
  apply (auto simp add: components-xor-n-n-a)
  apply (rule-tac x=dPV + dVP in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=Honest P in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=0 in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x= ?RESP in exI)
  apply (auto simp add: components-xor-n-n-a)
done

let ?tr9 = (dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI, Send (Tr (Intruder I))
(Crypt (priSK (Intruder I))
{?NV, {?NP, Agent (Honest V)}}) []) # ?tr8
have v9: ?tr9 ∈ mdb using v8 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos dVI-pos dIV-pos
dPI-pos apply -
  apply (rule mdb.Fake)
  apply (rule v8)
  apply (force)
  apply (rule DM.Crypt) defer
  apply (auto simp add: knowsI-def initStateMd-def)
  apply (rule DM.MPair)
  apply (rule DM.Inj)
  apply (auto simp add: Xor-Zero)

  apply (rule DM.MPair) defer
  apply force
  apply (subgoal-tac Xor ?NV (Xor ?NV ?NP)
    ∈ DM (Intruder I)
    (insert (Key (priSK (Intruder I)))
      (insert (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) (Suc 0)) (Nonce (Honest P) 0))
        (insert (Nonce (Honest V) (Suc 0)) (Key ` range pubSK))))))
  apply (subgoal-tac Xor ?NV (Xor ?NV ?NP) = ?NP)
  apply force defer
  apply (rule-tac DM.Xor)
  apply force
  apply force
  apply auto
done

let ?tr10 = (dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI+dIV, Recv (Rec (Honest V))
(Crypt (priSK (Intruder I)))

```

```

        {?NV, {?NP, Agent (Honest V)}"})#?tr9
have v10: ?tr10 ∈ mdb using v9 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos dIV-pos
dVI-pos dIV-pos dPI-pos apply -
  apply (rule-tac mdb.Con)
  apply (auto simp add: components-crypt)
  apply (rule-tac x=dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI in exI)
  apply auto
  apply (rule-tac x=Intruder I in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=0 in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=(Crypt (priSK (Intruder I))
    {?NV, {?NP, Agent (Honest V)}}) in exI)
  apply (auto simp add: components-crypt)
done

let ?tr11 = (dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI+dIV, Claim (Honest V)
  {Agent (Intruder I), Real ((dPV+dVP+dPV -
dPV)*vc/2)})#?tr10
have v11 : ?tr11 ∈ mdb using v10 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos dIV-pos
dVI-pos dIV-pos dPI-pos apply -
  apply (rule mdb.MD5[where CHAL=?NV and P=Intruder I and NP=?NP
and NV=1 and V=V
])
  apply (rule v10)
  apply force
  apply (simp (no-asm) only: set.simps)
  apply (rule Set.insertCI)
  apply (rule HOL.refl)
  apply (simp (no-asm) only: set.simps)
  apply (rule Set.insertI2)
  apply (rule Set.insertCI) defer

  apply (simp (no-asm) only: set.simps)
  apply (rule Set.insertI2)
  apply (rule Set.insertCI)
  apply (rule HOL.refl)
  apply (simp add: Xor-comm Xor-comm2 Xor-assoc)
done

thus ?thesis using prems
  apply -
  apply (rule-tac x=?tr11 in exI)

```

```

apply (rule-tac  $x=dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI+dIV$  in  $exI$ )
apply (rule-tac  $x=((dPV+dVP+dPV - dPV)*vc/2)$  in  $exI$ )
apply (rule conjI)
apply (rule v11)
apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply (auto simp add: cdistl-def)
apply (insert vc-pos)
apply (case-tac  $vc=0$ )
apply auto
apply (rule-tac  $c=1/vc$  in mult-right-less-imp-less)
apply auto
done
qed
end

```

## 25 Security analysis of the "fixed" version of the signature based Brands-Chaum protocol based on explicit binding with XOR. The analysis results in a proof that there is a trace that violates distance-bounding security.

```

theory BrandsChaum-FixXor-attack imports SystemOffset SystemOrigination
MessageTheoryXor3 begin

locale INITSTATE-SIG-NN = INITSTATE-PKSIG + INITSTATE-NONONCE

definition
  initStateMd :: agent  $\Rightarrow$  msg set where
  initStateMd A == Key‘({priSK A}  $\cup$  (pubSK‘UNIV))

interpretation INITSTATE-SIG-NN Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number parts sub-
terms DM LowHamXor Xor components
  initStateMd Key
  apply (unfold-locales, auto simp add: initStateMd-def dest: injective-symKey)
  apply (drule subterms.singleton)
  apply (auto dest: injective-symKey)
  apply (drule subterms.singleton)
  apply (auto dest: injective-symKey)
  apply (drule subterms.singleton)
  apply (auto dest: injective-symKey simp add: MACM-def)
done

```

definition

*md1 :: msg step*

**where**

*md1 tr P t =*

$(\text{UN } NP. \{ev. ev = (\text{Hash } (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP) \\ , \text{SendEv } 0 [\text{Number } 1, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP]) \wedge \\ \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP \notin \text{usedI } tr\})$

**definition**

*md2 :: msg step*

**where**

*md2 tr V t =*

$(\text{UN } NV \text{ COM } trec. \{ev. ev = (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV, \text{SendEv } 0 [\text{Number } 2, \text{COM}, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV]) \wedge \\ \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV \notin \text{usedI } tr \wedge \\ (trec, \text{Recv } (\text{Rec } (\text{Honest } V)) \text{ COM}) \in \text{set } tr\})$

**definition**

*md3 :: msg step*

**where**

*md3 tr P t =*

$(\text{UN } NP \text{ NV } trec \text{ tsend1 } COM. \{ev. ev = (\text{Xor } NV (\text{Xor } (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP) (\text{Agent } (\text{Honest } P))) \\ , \text{SendEv } 0 [\text{Number } 3, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP, NV]) \wedge \\ (\text{tsend1}, \text{Send } (\text{Tr } (\text{Honest } P)) \text{ COM } [\text{Number } 1, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) \\ NP]) \in \text{set } tr \wedge \\ (trec, \text{Recv } (\text{Rec } (\text{Honest } P)) NV) \in \text{set } tr\})$

**definition**

*md4 :: msg step*

**where**

*md4 tr P t =*

$(\text{UN } NP \text{ NV } V \text{ tsend } trecv. \{ev. ev = (\text{Crypt } (\text{priSK } (\text{Honest } P)) \\ \{\text{NV}, \{\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP, \text{Agent } V\}\} \\ , \text{SendEv } 0 []) \wedge \\ (\text{trecv}, \text{Recv } (\text{Rec } (\text{Honest } P)) NV) \in \text{set } tr \wedge (* \text{ not strictly necessary} \\ *) \\ (\text{tsend}, \text{Send } (\text{Tr } (\text{Honest } P)) \\ (\text{Xor } NV (\text{Xor } (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP) (\text{Agent } (\text{Honest } P)))) \\ [\text{Number } 3, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP, NV]) \\ \in \text{set } tr\})$

**definition**

*md5 :: msg step*

**where**

*md5 tr V t =*

$(\text{UN } NP \text{ NV } P \text{ trec1 } trec2 \text{ tsend } CHAL.$

```

{ev. ev = ({}Agent P, Real ((trec1 - tsend) * vc/2){}, ClaimEv) ∧
(trec2, Recv (Rec (Honest V))
( Crypt (priSK P)
{}Nonce (Honest V) NV, {}NP, Agent (Honest V){}{})) ∈ set tr ∧
(trec1, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) (Xor NP
(Agent P)))) ∈ set tr ∧
(tsend, Send (Tr (Honest V)) CHAL [Number 2, Hash NP , Nonce
(Honest V) NV ]) ∈ set tr}

```

**definition**

```

mdproto :: msg proto where
mdproto = {md1,md2,md3,md4,md5}

```

**lemmas** md-defs = mdproto-def md1-def md2-def md3-def md4-def md5-def

**locale** PROTOCOL-MD = PROTOCOL-PKSIG-NOKEYS+PROTOCOL-NONONCE+INITSTATE-SIG-N

```

interpretation PROTOCOL-MD Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number parts sub-
terms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd Key mdproto
apply (unfold-locales)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs messagesProtoTr-def messagesProtoTrHonest-def
initStateMd-def md-defs
split: event.split split-if dest: parts.fst-set)

apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule parts-Key-Xor)
apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
prefer 2
apply (drule parts-Key-Xor)
apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac t=trec in view-elem-ex)
apply auto

apply (drule parts.singleton)
apply auto
apply (drule-tac t=trecv in view-elem-ex)
apply auto
done

```

Agents only look at their own views and all messages are derivable.

```

interpretation PROTOCOL-EXECUTABLE Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number
parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd mdproto sys Key
apply (unfold-locales)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs initStateMd-def
messagesProto-def messagesProtoTrHonest-def)

```

```

apply (rule DM.Hash)
apply force

apply (rule DM.Xor)
apply (drule view-elem-ex)
apply (erule exE)
apply (drule Recv-imp-knows-A)
apply force
apply (rule DM.Xor)
apply force
apply force

apply (rule DM.Crypt)
apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply (drule view-elem-ex)
apply (erule exE)
apply (drule Recv-imp-knows-A)
apply force

apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply force
apply force
apply force

apply (rule DM.MPair)
apply force
apply force

apply (auto simp add: nonce-view-fresh [simplified mdproto-def]
         nonce-view-used [simplified mdproto-def]
         recv-a-view-a-r send-a-view-a-r)

apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend in exI)

```

```

apply auto
done

```

Agent behaviour does not change with constant clock errors.

**interpretation** PROTOCOL-DELTAONLY Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number  
 parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components initStateMd Key mdproto

```

apply unfold-locales
apply (auto simp add: md-defs in-timetrans)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply force
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 - coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 - coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend - coffset A in exI)
apply auto
apply (simp add: sign-simps)

```

```

apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=trec + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=tsend1 + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule-tac x=trec + coffset A in exI, force)
apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI) apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac x=trecv + coffset A in exI)
apply force

```

```

apply (rule-tac x=tsend + coffset A in exI, force)

```

```

apply (rule-tac x=NP in exI) apply (rule-tac x=NV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=P in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec1 + coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=trec2 + coffset A in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=tsend + coffset A in exI)
apply auto
apply (simp add: sign-simps)
done

```

**interpretation** PROTOCOL-DELTA-EXEC Crypt Nonce MPair Hash Number  
 parts subterms DM LowHamXor Xor components  
 initStateMd Key mdproto sys

by unfold-locales

## 25.1 Direct Definition for Brands-Chaum protocols (Explicit + Xor)

**inductive-set**

*mdb* :: (*msg trace*) set

**where**

*Nil* [*intro*] : [] ∈ *mdb*

| *Fake*:

[ $\llbracket tr \in mdb; t \geq maxtime tr;$

$X \in DM(\text{Intruder } I)(\text{knowsI}(\text{Intruder } I) tr) \rrbracket$

$\implies (t, \text{Send}(Tx(\text{Intruder } I) j) X []) \# tr \in mdb$

| *Con* :

[ $\llbracket tr \in mdb; trecv \geq maxtime tr;$

$\forall X \in components \{M\}.$

$\exists tsend A i M' L.$

$\exists Y \in components \{M'\}.$

$(tsend, \text{Send}(Tx A i) M' L) \in set tr \wedge$

$cdistM(Tx A i) (Rx B j) = Some tab \wedge tsend + tab \leq trecv \wedge Xor X$

$Y \in LowHamXor \rrbracket$

$\implies (trecv, \text{Recv}(Rx B j) M) \# tr \in mdb$

| *MD1*:

[ $\llbracket tr \in mdb; t \geq maxtime tr;$

$\neg (\text{used } tr (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP)) \rrbracket$

$\implies (t, \text{Send}(\text{Tr}(\text{Honest } P)) (\text{Hash}(\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP)) [Number 1, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP]) \# tr \in mdb$

| *MD2*:

[ $\llbracket tr \in mdb; t \geq maxtime tr;$

$(trec, \text{Recv}(\text{Rec } (\text{Honest } V)) COM) \in set tr;$

$\neg (\text{used } tr (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV)) \rrbracket$

$\implies (t, \text{Send}(\text{Tr}(\text{Honest } V)) (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV) [Number 2, COM, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } V) NV]) \# tr \in mdb$

| *MD3*:

[ $\llbracket tr \in mdb; tsend \geq maxtime tr;$

$(trec, \text{Recv}(\text{Rec } (\text{Honest } P)) NV) \in set tr;$

$(tsend2, \text{Send}(\text{Tr}(\text{Honest } P)) COM [Number 1, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP]) \in set tr \rrbracket$

$\implies (tsend, \text{Send}(\text{Tr}(\text{Honest } P))$

$(Xor NV (Xor (\text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP) (\text{Agent } (\text{Honest } P))))$

$[Number 3, \text{Nonce } (\text{Honest } P) NP, NV])$

$\# tr \in mdb$

| *MD4*:

[ $\llbracket tr \in mdb; tsend \geq maxtime tr;$

$(trecv, \text{Recv}(\text{Rec } (\text{Honest } P)) NV) \in set tr;$

$(t, \text{Send}(\text{Tr}(\text{Honest } P))$

$$\begin{aligned}
& (Xor NV (Xor (Nonce (Honest P) NP) (Agent (Honest P)))) \\
& [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV]) \\
\in & \text{set } tr \] \\
\implies & (tsend, \\
& \quad Send (Tr (Honest P)) \\
& \quad (Crypt (priSK (Honest P)) \\
& \quad \quad \{ NV, \{ Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent V \} \} \]) \\
& \quad \# tr \in mdb \\
| & MD5: \\
& \quad \llbracket tr \in mdb; tdone \geq maxtime tr; \\
& \quad (trec2, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) \\
& \quad \quad (Crypt (priSK P) \\
& \quad \quad \{ Nonce (Honest V) NV, \{ NP, Agent (Honest V) \} \})) \\
& \quad \in set tr; \\
& \quad (trec1, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) NV) (Xor NP (Agent \\
& \quad P)))) \\
& \quad \in set tr; \\
& \quad (tsend, Send (Tr (Honest V)) CHAL [Number 2, Hash NP, Nonce (Honest \\
& \quad V) NV]) \in set tr \] \\
\implies & (tdone, Claim (Honest V) \{Agent P, Real ((trec1 - tsend) * vc/2)\}) \# tr \\
& \in mdb
\end{aligned}$$

obtain a simpler induction rule for protocol since it is executable and deltaonly

```
lemmas proto-induct =
  sys.induct [simplified derivable-removable remove-occursAt timetrans-removable]
```

## 25.2 Equality for direct and parameterized Definition

We now show that both inductive definitions define the same set of traces.

```
lemma abstr-equal: mdb = sys
proof auto
fix tr
assume r: tr ∈ sys
show tr ∈ mdb using r
proof (induct tr rule: proto-induct)
  case 1 with prems show ?case by auto
next
  case 2 with prems show ?case by (auto intro: mdb.Nil)
next
  case 4 with prems show ?case apply -
    apply (rule mdb.Con)
    by (auto)
next
  case 3 with prems show ?case by (auto intro: mdb.Fake)
next
  case 5
  thus ?case
    apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
```

```

apply (auto intro!: mdb.MD1 mdb.MD2 mdb.MD3 [simplified] mdb.MD4
mdb.MD5 simp add: usedI-def)
  apply (auto simp add: mem-def usedI-def)
  done
qed
next
fix tr
assume r: tr ∈ mdb
show tr ∈ sys using r
proof(induct tr rule: mdb.induct)
  case Nil
  with prems show ?case by auto
next
  case (Fake tr ts X I j)
  with prems show ?case by (auto intro: sys.Fake)
next
  case (Con tr)
  with prems show ?case apply -
    apply (rule sys.Con)
    by (auto)
next
  case (MD1 tr ts A NA)
  with prems have (ts,createEv A (SendEv 0 [Number 1, Nonce (Honest A) NA]) (Hash (Nonce (Honest A) NA))) # tr ∈ sys
    apply -
    apply (rule-tac step=md1 in sys-Proto-exec)
    apply force
    apply force
    apply force
    apply (force simp add: mdproto-def)
    apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
    apply (rule-tac x=NA in exI)
    apply auto
    apply (auto simp add: usedI-def initStateMd-def)
    apply (force simp: mem-def)
    apply (drule subterms.singleton)
    apply auto
    done
  thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
  case (MD2 tr tsend trecv V COM NV)
  with prems have
    (tsend,
     createEv V
     (SendEv 0 [Number 2, COM, Nonce (Honest V) NV])
     (Nonce (Honest V) NV))
    # tr ∈ sys
    apply - apply (rule-tac step=md2 in sys-Proto)
    apply (auto simp add: md-defs usedI-def)

```

```

apply (auto simp add: mem-def)
done
thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
case (MD3 tr tsend trecv P NV tsend2 COM NP)
with prems have
  (tsend,
   createEv P (SendEv 0 [Number 3, Nonce (Honest P) NP, NV])
   (Xor NV (Xor (Nonce (Honest P) (NP)) (Agent (Honest P)))))

# tr ∈ sys
apply – apply (rule-tac step=md3 in sys-Proto)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
done
thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
case (MD5 tr tdone trec2 V P NV NP trec1 tsend CHA)
with prems have
  (tdone, createEv V ClaimEv {Agent P, Real ((trec1 – tsend) * vc/2)}) # tr
∈ sys
apply – apply (rule-tac step=md5 in sys-Proto)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
apply (intro exI conjI)
apply auto
done
thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
next
case (MD4 tr tsend trecv P NV t NP V)
with prems have
  (tsend, createEv P (SendEv 0 []))
  (Crypt (priSK (Honest P))
   {NV, {Nonce (Honest P) NP, Agent V}}) # tr ∈ sys
apply – apply (rule-tac step=md4 in sys-Proto)
apply (auto simp add: md-defs)
done
thus ?case by (auto simp add: createEv.psimps)
qed
qed

```

**lemmas** [simp,intro] = abstr-equal [THEN sym]

```

lemma Xor-idem[simp]: Xor a a = Zero
apply (auto simp add: Xor-def Zero-def)
done

lemma components-xor-n-n-a:
components {Xor (Nonce A NA) (Xor (Nonce B NB) (Agent C))}
= {Xor (Nonce A NA) (Xor (Nonce B NB) (Agent C))}

apply (rule components-non-pair)

```

```

apply (subgoal-tac NONCE A NA ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac NONCE B NB ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac AGENT C ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (auto simp add: Xor-def MPair-def Nonce-def Agent-def simp del: norm.simps)
apply (subgoal-tac MPair (Rep-msg X) (Rep-msg Y) ∈ msg) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)
apply (subgoal-tac normed (norm
  (Rep-msg (Abs-msg (NONCE A NA)) ⊕
  norm
  (Rep-msg (Abs-msg (NONCE B NB)) ⊕ Rep-msg (Abs-msg (AGENT
C)))))) prefer 2
apply (force simp add: msg-def)

apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inverse split: split-if-asm)
apply (auto simp add: Abs-msg-inject XORnz-def)
done

lemma attack-tr:
  assumes cdPV: cdistM (Tr (Honest P)) (Rec (Honest V)) = Some dPV
  and
    cdVP: cdistM (Tr (Honest V)) (Rec (Honest P)) = Some dVP and
    cdIV: cdistM (Tr (Intruder I)) (Rec (Honest V)) = Some dIV and
    cdVI: cdistM (Tr (Honest V)) (Rec (Intruder I)) = Some dVI and
    cdPI: cdistM (Tr (Honest P)) (Rec (Intruder I)) = Some dPI and
    dist: dPV + dVP < cdistl (Intruder I) (Honest V) * 2
  shows ∃ tr t d. (tr ∈ mdb) ∧
    ((t, Claim (Honest V) {Agent (Intruder I), Real d}) ∈ set tr) ∧
    (d < pdist (Intruder I) (Honest V))
proof -
  let ?NP = Nonce (Honest P) 0
  let ?NV = Nonce (Honest V) 1
  let ?COM = (Hash (?NP))

```

```

have dPV-pos: dPV ≥ 0 using prems apply – by (auto dest: cdistnoneg-some)
have dVP-pos: dVP ≥ 0 using prems apply – by (auto dest: cdistnoneg-some)
have dIV-pos: dIV ≥ 0 using prems apply – by (auto dest: cdistnoneg-some)
have dVI-pos: dVI ≥ 0 using prems apply – by (auto dest: cdistnoneg-some)
have dPI-pos: dPI ≥ 0 using prems apply – by (auto dest: cdistnoneg-some)
have zero-lh: Zero ∈ LowHamXor by (rule LowHamXor.Zero)

```

```

let ?tr1 = (0, (Send (Tr (Honest P)) ?COM [Number 1, ?NP])) # []
have v1: ?tr1 ∈ mdb apply –
  apply (rule mdb.MD1)
  by auto

```

```

let ?tr2 = (dPV, Recv (Rec (Honest V)) ?COM) #?tr1
have v2: ?tr2 ∈ mdb using v1 prems dPV-pos zero-lh apply -
  apply (rule mdb.Con)
  apply (rule v1)
  by auto

let ?tr3 = (dPV, Send (Tr (Honest V)) ?NV [Number 2, ?COM, ?NV]) #?tr2
have v3: ?tr3 ∈ mdb using v2 prems dPV-pos apply -
  apply (rule mdb.MD2)
  apply (auto simp add: Xor-Zero)
  apply (subgoal-tac ?NV ∈ {?NP, ?COM})
  prefer 2
  apply (simp add: mem-def)
  apply force
  done

let ?tr4 = (dPV+dVP, Recv (Rec (Honest P)) ?NV) #?tr3
have v4: ?tr4 ∈ mdb using v3 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos apply -
  apply (rule mdb.Con)
  apply (auto)
  apply (rule-tac x=dPV in exI)
  apply force
  done

let ?tr5 = (dPV+dVP, Send (Tr (Honest P))
            (Xor ?NV (Xor ?NP (Agent (Honest P)))) [Number 3, ?NP, ?NV]) #?tr4
have v5: ?tr5 ∈ mdb using v4 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos apply -
  apply (rule mdb.MD3)
  apply (auto simp add: Xor-Zero)
  done

let ?tr6 = (dPV+dVP+dPV, Recv (Rec (Honest V))
            (Xor ?NV (Xor ?NP (Agent (Intruder I))))) #?tr5
have v6: ?tr6 ∈ mdb using v5 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos apply -
  apply (rule mdb.Con)
  apply (rule v5)
  apply (clarsimp)
  apply (auto simp add: components-xor-n-n-a)
  apply (rule-tac x=dPV + dVP in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=Honest P in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=0 in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=(Xor (Nonce (Honest V) (Suc 0)) (Nonce (Honest P) 0) (Agent (Honest P)))) in exI)
  apply auto
  apply (auto simp add: components-xor-n-n-a)
  apply (simp add: Xor-rewrite)
  apply (rule LowHamXor.Xor)
  apply (rule LowHamXor.Agent)

```

```

apply (rule LowHamXor.Agent)
done

let ?tr7 = (dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI, Recv (Rec (Intruder I))
               ?NV) #?tr6)
have v7: ?tr7 ∈ mdb using v6 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos dVI-pos dIV-pos
apply –
  apply (rule mdb.Con)
  apply (rule v6)
  apply (auto simp add: components-nonce)
  apply (rule-tac x=dPV in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=Honest V in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=0 in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x= ?NV in exI)
  apply (auto simp add: components-nonce)
  done

let ?RESP = Xor ?NV (Xor ?NP (Agent (Honest P)))

let ?tr8 = (dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI, Recv (Rec (Intruder I)) ?RESP) #?tr7)
have v8: ?tr8 ∈ mdb using v7 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos dVI-pos dIV-pos
dPI-pos apply –
  apply (rule-tac mdb.Con)
  apply (rule v7) prefer 2
  apply (auto simp add: components-xor-n-n-a)
  apply (rule-tac x=dPV + dVP in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=Honest P in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x=0 in exI)
  apply (rule-tac x= ?RESP in exI)
  apply (auto simp add: components-xor-n-n-a)
  done

let ?tr9 = (dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI, Send (Tr (Intruder I))
               (Crypt (priSK (Intruder I))
                {?NV, {?NP, Agent (Honest V)}}}]) #?tr8
have v9: ?tr9 ∈ mdb using v8 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos dVI-pos dIV-pos
dPI-pos apply –
  apply (rule mdb.Fake)
  apply (rule v8)
  apply (force)
  apply (rule DM.Crypt) defer
  apply (auto simp add: knowsI-def initStateMd-def)
  apply (rule DM.MPair)
  apply (rule DM.Inj)
  apply (auto simp add: Xor-Zero)

  apply (rule DM.MPair) defer
  apply force
  apply (subgoal-tac Xor (Agent (Honest P)) (Xor ?NV (Xor ?NV (Xor ?NP
```

```

(Agent (Honest P))))))
    ∈ DM (Intruder I)
    (insert (Key (priSK (Intruder I))))
        (insert (Xor (Nonce (Honest V) (Suc 0)) (Xor (Nonce (Honest P) 0)
(Agent (Honest P))))))
            (insert (Nonce (Honest V) (Suc 0)) (Key `range pubSK))))))
    apply (subgoal-tac Xor (Agent (Honest P)) (Xor ?NV (Xor ?NV (Xor ?NP
(Agent (Honest P))))) = ?NP)
        apply force defer
        apply (rule-tac DM.Xor)
        apply force
        apply (rule-tac DM.Xor)
        apply force
        apply force
        apply force
        apply auto
    done

let ?tr10 = (dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI+dIV, Recv (Rec (Honest V))
    (Crypt (priSK (Intruder I))
        {?NV, {?NP, Agent (Honest V)}}))#?tr9
have v10: ?tr10 ∈ mdb using v9 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos dIV-pos
dVI-pos dIV-pos dPI-pos apply -
    apply (rule-tac mdb.Con)
    apply (auto simp add: components-crypt)
    apply (rule-tac x=dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI in exI)
    apply auto
    apply (rule-tac x=Intruder I in exI)
    apply (rule-tac x=0 in exI)
    apply (rule-tac x=(Crypt (priSK (Intruder I))
        {?NV, {?NP, Agent (Honest V)}})) in exI)
    apply (auto simp add: components-crypt)
done

let ?tr11 = (dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI+dIV, Claim (Honest V)
    {Agent (Intruder I), Real ((dPV+dVP+dPV -
dPV)*vc/2)})#?tr10
have v11 : ?tr11 ∈ mdb using v10 prems dPV-pos zero-lh dVP-pos dIV-pos
dVI-pos dIV-pos dPI-pos apply -
    apply (rule mdb.MD5[where CHAL=?NV and P=Intruder I and NP=?NP
and NV=1 and V=V
])
    apply (rule v10)
    apply force
    apply (simp (no-asm) only: set.simps)
    apply (rule Set.insertCI)
    apply (rule HOL.refl)
    apply (simp (no-asm) only: set.simps)
    apply (rule Set.insertI2)
    apply (rule Set.insertI2)

```

```

apply (rule Set.insertI2)
apply (rule Set.insertI2)
apply (rule Set.insertCI) defer

apply (simp (no-asm) only: set.simps)
apply (rule Set.insertI2)
apply (rule Set.insertCI)
apply (rule HOL.refl)
apply (simp add: Xor-comm Xor-comm2 Xor-assoc)
done
thus ?thesis using prems
apply -
apply (rule-tac x=?tr11 in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=(dPV+dVP+dPV+dVI+dPI+dIV in exI)
apply (rule-tac x=((dPV+dVP+dPV - dPV)*vc/2) in exI)
apply (rule conjI)
apply (rule v11)
apply (rule conjI)
apply force
apply (auto simp add: cdistl-def)
apply (insert vc-pos)
apply (case-tac vc=0)
apply auto
apply (rule-tac c=1/vc in mult-right-less-imp-less)
apply auto
done
qed

end

```